碳限额交易政策下考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链定价与协调

在碳限额交易政策及消费者低碳偏好条件下,针对两个制造商(一个碳减排、一个不进行碳减排)和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,分析了碳限额及消费者碳排放敏感系数对产品零售价和最优碳减排量的影响,并利用Shapley值法协调供应链。研究发现:最优碳减排量、产品零售价不仅依赖于碳限额和消费者碳排放敏感系数,还与初始碳排放量相关;清洁型制造商最优碳排放量为零;政府应该实行差异化碳限额交易政策,对于中间型及轻污染型制造商应该适当降低碳限额,对于重污染型制造商应该适当提高碳限额并给予企业碳减排补贴;对于清洁型及中间型制造商,政府应该提供低碳消费补贴;另外政府还应该加强节能环保宣传。     

需求波动下政府补贴对低碳产品选择的影响

研究了需求波动下政府补贴对制造商生产低碳产品选择的影响。建立垄断和双寡头两种情形下的古诺博弈模型,分析不同生产策略对制造商产量和利润的影响,得出满足各均衡策略的条件。研究发现：制造商生产策略受政府补贴、市场流失率和市场偏好的影响;政府补贴可引导制造商生产低碳产品,但竞争会削弱补贴对生产低碳产品的激励作用;较大的政府补贴反而会增加碳排放;市场波动程度越大,政府补贴对制造商生产低碳产品的激励作用越弱。     

低碳背景下政府财税行为对制造商决策影响

补贴与碳税是我国政府在践行碳减排过程中常见的策略之一。基于消费者和生产者剩余理论下,建立了以社会总福利为目标函数的模型,比较了政府不同财税政策下的补贴与碳税政策。分析了政府补贴与碳税对高碳产品和低碳产品制造商决策的影响,同时对比分析了不同情况下两种产品的均衡价格、均衡需求、均衡收益以及社会总福利。研究表明,无论政府采用哪种策略,社会总福利均会增加,但政府采用只向生产低碳产品的制造商进行补贴的策略,比只向生产高碳产品的制造商碳税的策略达到的社会总福利的效果要好,而综合考虑碳税和补贴的策略比前两种策略要好。     

考虑风险态度的绿色供应链定价策略及政府补贴政策分析

针对同为风险规避者的零售商与制造商组成的二级绿色供应链系统,基于政府对制造商进行生产成本补贴的政策环境,在零售商与制造商共同进行生态努力的假设下,分别就零售商领导下的博弈以及集中控制型决策下的2种不同的渠道结构,讨论了绿色产品的零售价格、批发价格以及绿色度的均衡结果。同时,进一步分析比较了在零售商占据主导地位的Stackelberg模型中,制造商成本补贴、消费价格补贴以及无政府补贴3种不同的政府策略下各因素均衡结果的变化。最后,通过数值仿真深入分析了政府补贴比例和零售商与制造商的风险规避程度的变动对各均衡结果的影响。结果表明,在零售商主导模式下,制造商的风险规避程度对于各因素均衡影响相对更大。相较于其他策略,政府对绿色消费者实施价格补贴策略能够更好地提高产品绿色质量、降低产品价格、刺激绿色需求、提升社会效用。     

考虑政府补贴和不同回收渠道的再制造闭环供应链最优决策研究

为研究政府分别实施再制造补贴和回收补贴下不同回收渠道对再制造闭环供应链的决策影响,建立以制造商为领导者,零售商和回收商为跟随者的闭环供应链的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,对比分析两种补贴方式下不同回收渠道的最优定价和回收策略。结果表明,补贴金额的多少会降低产品价格和批发价,刺激消费,提高回收率,增加闭环供应链上所有参与方的利润,而与补贴类别无关;当存在双回收渠道时,回收商与零售商之间回收的竞争强度影响产品售价、回收率和制造商的利润,而回收转移价格仅与补贴类型有关。最后,通过实例分析探讨不同补贴与不同回收渠道对闭环供应链的影响。     

碳限额及交易下低碳补贴和低碳宣传成本分摊的双渠道供应链联合减排策略

为了研究碳限额及交易下考虑低碳补贴和零售商低碳宣传的双渠道供应链联合减排策略问题,构建由一个制造商和一个零售商组成双渠道供应链,分别建立碳减排补贴与低碳宣传的双渠道供应链集中式决策模型以及无碳减排补贴且无低碳宣传成本分摊、有碳减排补贴但无低碳宣传成本分摊、碳减排补贴且低碳宣传成本分摊的双渠道供应链分散式决策模型,分析其最优决策,并指出政府碳减排补贴、碳减排成本和低碳宣传成本分摊能够实现双渠道供应链协调。研究结果表明,在碳限额及交易下,最优碳减排率、最优低碳宣传水平和双渠道供应链利润与政府补贴比例、低碳偏好对需求的影响系数、低碳宣传对线上消费者需求的影响系数、低碳宣传对线下消费者需求的影响系数都成正向变化关系;最优碳减排率、最优低碳宣传水平和双渠道供应链利润与低碳宣传成本系数、最优碳减排成本系数成反向变化关系;最优碳减排率与碳排放交易价格成正向变化关系,而最优低碳宣传水平、双渠道供应链利润与碳排放交易价格成反向变化关系。     

Financing Strategy of Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cap-and-trade regulation provides incentives for manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions, but manufacturers’ insufficient capital can disrupt the implementation of low-carbon emission reduction technologies. To alleviate capital constraints, manufacturers can adopt external financing for low-carbon emission reduction investments. This paper studies the independent financing and financing cooperation behavior in a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and then organize production and sales in accordance with wholesale price contracts. Through comparing the optimal profits and low-carbon emission reduction levels under the independent financing and financing cooperation mode, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Although financing interest increases the cost of the supply chain, manufacturers prefer to invest in reducing carbon emissions rather than buying carbon quotas. (2) When financing independently, a decentralized decision-making mode (MD) is the best choice for manufacturers. (3) In cooperative financing, when the supply chain adopts a decentralized decision-making mode (SD) in which the retailer determines the financing cost-sharing ratio according to their optimal profit, the profits of the supply chain and its members are significantly improved. (4) When manufacturers and retailers adopt a centralized decision-making model (SC) in cooperative financing, they jointly determine the financing cost-sharing ratio and the level of low-carbon emission reduction. If the financing cost-sharing ratio meets a certain threshold range, the profits of manufacturers and retailers achieve Pareto improvement, indicating that this cooperative financing model is effective.     

考虑碳税征收的供应链纵向减排博弈研究

在低碳经济背景下引入碳排放税及消费者低碳偏好,对供应商主导的二级供应链减排博弈展开研究;进而通过逆向归纳法求得序贯行动的精炼子博弈纳什均衡,并采用数值实验展开分析。研究表明,在外生碳税下供应商和制造商都将采取减排策略,可求得最优产量与单位产品减排量,但征收碳税并不一定能够保证碳排放总量的降低;供应链中一方的减排行为将激励另一方增加单位产品减排量;企业减排成本系数越低,征收碳税对控制碳排放总量的效果越明显。     

考虑绿色偏好和政府补贴的供应链营销策略研究

为研究消费者绿色偏好和政府补贴的不同水平对供应链成员营销策略的影响问题,本文建立了仅包含一个制造商和一个零售商的营销策略选择模型,分别运用演化博弈理论和Matlab软件进行了理论分析和数值仿真。结果表明：只有当消费者绿色偏好以及政府补贴达到一定水平时才能有效促进制造商和零售商双方均采取绿色营销策略;当消费者绿色偏好或政府补贴处于较低水平时,零售商往往会通过搭便车的方式分享制造商绿色营销所带来的收益;随着制造商和零售商采取绿色营销策略所需投入成本的上升,双方采取绿色营销策略所需消费者绿色偏好水平也会上升,随着市场上消费者绿色偏好水平的上升,双方采取绿色营销策略所需政府补贴将会下降。     

The Supply Chain Contract Design under Cap-and-Trade Mechanism with Free Riding

This paper studies the influence of free riding on enterprise product pricing and carbon emissions reduction investment, as well as the contract design to achieve supply chain coordination under the carbon trading mechanism. First, we discuss the situation where carbon emissions reduction investment affects the product price and income. It demonstrates that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturer increases with the degree of the free riding of the downstream manufacturer. The upstream manufacturer can improve their carbon reduction investment and the whole supply chain achieves Pareto improvement when the investment cost sharing contract is introduced. Nevertheless, under the cost-sharing contract the optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain is still lower than that of the centralized supply chain, and only in some particular cases can the two types of supply chain achieve equal total profits. Then, we preliminarily explore the situation where the product price and income is influenced by carbon emissions reduction investment. The consequences indicate that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturers in this situation is less than the former one's, and the transfer payment mechanism is able to improve the level of the supply chain overall carbon emissions-reduction. Moreover, compared to the former situation, the effects of free riding of the downstream manufacturer are even more serious. The conclusions can provide some intellectual support for manufacturing enterprises to make reasonable emissions reduction strategies and coordinate the supply chain existing in free riding.     

Dynamic pricing for remanufacturing within socially environmental incentives

We study a dual-product dynamic pricing problem for a remanufacturing system in which a manufacturer makes new and remanufactured products competing for a certain market share. The socially environmental incentives, consisting of consumers' environmentally conscious demand and governments' subsidy on remanufactured products, are considered in this study, which encourage the manufacturer to exert production effort toward environmentally friendly remanufacturing. Three models, namely, two-period, multi-period, and infinite-period scenarios, are formulated to investigate the dynamic pricing problem. Analytical results show that the government's subsidy policies, which provide subsidies to consumers or firms, have equivalent effects for the manufacturer in terms of production and profit. Consumers' environmental consciousness and government subsidy are effective incentives to induce the manufacturer to make more remanufactured products. Some threshold policies are proposed to provide decision supports for manufacturers to formulate pricing and production strategies. By comparing the pricing and production strategies of the three models, we find it interesting that the pricing and production strategies of the multi-period model can be ideally characterised by those of the two-period and infinite-period models. This managerial concept is valuable for manufacturers in formulating pricing and production strategies when the precise production planning horizon is unknown.     

考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究

考虑双渠道零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商直接回收、委托第三方回收模式下的动态博弈模型,以公平中性时的均衡策略为参照,对比分析了线下零售商的横向公平偏好对双渠道闭环供应链中各决策主体定价策略及利润的影响。研究表明,无论零售商是否存在横向公平关切行为,制造商直接回收模式都优于委托第三方回收。在直接回收模式下,线下零售商的横向公平偏好使得在正向供应链中的两零售商为提高市场占有率会竞相降低零售价格,制造商为鼓励竞争会降低批发价,并且价格均与横向公平关切系数负相关。在逆向供应链中,制造商会提高废旧产品的回收率;相比公平中性的情况,此定价策略使制造商和整个供应链系统效用增加,而两零售商收益递减。制造商作为渠道管理者为鼓励零售商之间竞相降价,可通过一个三方收益共享的契约实现协调,达到帕累托最优。     

考虑互惠利他偏好和政府补贴的绿色供应链最优决策研究

为了研究政府补贴、绿色供应链制造商及零售商的互惠利他偏好对双方定价策略、利润、产品绿色度及绿色供应链整体利润的影响,运用博弈理论结合数值仿真方法对4种决策情形下的绿色供应链成员最优策略进行了研究。结果表明,制造商或零售商单方面的互惠利他偏好均会降低自身利润,提高产品绿色度、对方利润及供应链整体利润,且当双方互惠利他程度相同时,零售商的互惠利他偏好更能有效提高产品绿色度;无论是制造商或零售商具有互惠利他偏好,政府增加补贴均会在一定程度上增强其互惠利他偏好对产品绿色度、对方利润及供应链整体利润的提升作用,但不同的是,当制造商具有互惠利他偏好时,政府增加补贴会在一定程度上加重其互惠利他偏好对其自身利润的损害作用,当零售商互惠利他时则不会出现这种情况。     

碳税与减排补贴下混合双寡头企业竞合博弈研究

针对低碳减排背景下，混合双寡头市场中企业与政府的最优决策问题，构建私有企业与部分私有化的公有企业古诺竞争博弈模型、伯特兰德竞争博弈模型以及合作模型。比较3种模型下两企业的最优减排量与产量决策，政府的最优碳税率与减排补贴率决策，两企业目标利润，社会福利与环境污染，并探讨公有企业的私有化水平对最优减排、碳税率、减排补贴率的影响。研究表明：在合作时，两企业有更大的减排力度；在竞争时，公有企业加深私有化水平会促使行业整体提高减排水平；无论是在企业竞争还是合作情形，随着公有企业私有化水平的提高，政府减排措施应该由以碳税为主转变为以碳减排补贴为主。     

Effect of carbon content on plastic flow behaviour of plain carbon steels at elevated temperature

Abstract

In the present study the effect of carbon composition on the hot flow behaviour of two different plain carbon steels is analysed. For this purpose the constitutive equations describing the stress–strain (σ–?) relationships at a given strain rate ? and temperature T were determined for each steel. Uniaxial hot compression tests were performed to characterise the mechanical behaviour of the alloys. It was observed that irrespective of the test conditions, the low carbon steel displayed similar flow stresses to the high carbon steel. Comparison of the characteristic parameters of the constitutive equations describing the high temperature flow behaviour of these steels, together with values reported in the literature enabled determination of the effect of carbon content on flow behaviour. It has been found that flow stresses can be rationalised as a balance between work hardening and softening processes (basically dynamic recovery). At high temperatures and small strain rates, the high carbon steel showed lower hardening rates and slower dynamic recovery kinetics than the low carbon steel. In contrast, at low temperatures and large strain rates, the high carbon steel displayed higher hardening rates and recovery rates than the low carbon steel.     

非对称信息下考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链博弈模型

考查由1个生产商和1个零售商构成的两级绿色供应链系统,绿色产品的市场需求由产品价格和产品绿色度共同决定。假设消费者对绿色产品的偏好程度是非对称信息,生产商无法准确预测消费者的绿色偏好。构建3种不同情形下的博弈模型,得到3种情形下的批发价、产品绿色度、零售价、生产商利润和零售商利润的最优解。比较分析3种情形下最优解的不同变化,并分析消费者的绿色偏好程度对最优决策和利润产生的不同影响。     

政府研发补贴与企业创新投入:数量激励抑或质量导向?

如何有效发挥政府“有形之手”对企业创新的激励作用,优化公共资源配置效率,是实施创新驱动战略和推动经济高质量发展的关键一环。基于2001-2017年中国非金融类A股上市公司面板数据,用研发投资衡量创新投入数量,用专利产出衡量创新投入转化质量,从理论上分析政府研发补贴对企业创新投入数量和投入转化质量的作用机制,并采用固定效应模型、联立方程模型等进行实证检验。结果发现:第一,政府研发补贴能够显著提高企业研发投资额,表明政府补贴对企业创新投入存在数量激励,同时,企业研发投资对专利产出具有显著正向影响,增加创新投入资金数量是确保投入转化质量的必要非充分条件;第二,在控制内生性后,政府研发补贴对企业专利产出具有不显著负向影响,表明政府研发补贴未能形成创新投入质量导向;第三,在政府干预程度较低、法治水平较好的情况下,政府研发补贴能够同时提升企业研发投资与专利产出,证实寻租行为、逆向选择行为和缺乏政府监管等是政府补贴无法有效发挥投入质量导向作用的潜在原因。     

双方不完全信息下政府引导的逆向供应链协调研究

讨论双方不完全信息下政府引导一个制造商和两个零售商组成的逆向供应链的协调问题。运用信号甄别和委托代理理论,分别从政府不参与、政府奖励零售商和政府奖励制造商三个方面得到零售商和制造商的协调策略。研究表明:定价合同可有效避免逆向选择,实现逆向供应链协调;高市场需求状态下低成本零售商获得收益较高;政府对企业的合理奖励,尤其是对零售商的奖励,可以促进逆向供应链协调,提高收益。     

Impacts of government subsidies and environmental regulations on green process innovation: A nonlinear approach

With China's tremendous economic development following its reform and opening-up, the problem of environmental deterioration has become increasingly serious. To achieve a win-win situation between economic growth and environmental protection, enterprises are being encouraged to carry out green technology innovation, but due to the risks and uncertainties inherent in it, the government is providing research and development (R&D) subsidies while at the same time implementing environmental regulations. As the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [5] divides green technology innovation into green product innovation and green process innovation, this study focuses on the latter in order to better study its relationship with environmental regulations and government subsidies. We select panel data of 30 provinces and cities in China from 2009 to 2017 (excluding Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, because of a lack of data) and use the system GMM and threshold-effect model for empirical analysis. The results show that environmental regulations have a U-shape non-linear effect on green process innovation, while government subsidies have a positive role in promoting green process innovation, or the so-called leverage effect. Based on government subsidies, the impact of environmental regulations on green process innovation has a threshold effect, and therefore regulations and subsidies should be increased. In addition, the level of economic development has a U-shape effect of inhibition and then promotion on green process innovation. Overall, the China government should continue to develop its economy, but must not neglect the impact of environmental regulations on technological innovation at the expense of environmental damage.     

碳交易下供应链中的技术创新激励合约设计

来自市场和政府的压力迫使企业进行低碳技术创新,完成减排目标。因此,在碳交易且信息不对称情况下,对制造商低碳技术创新投资决策和政府的激励合约展开研究。研究表明,信息不对称时,通过激励合约的设计,政府可以观察消费者低碳偏好程度实现最优激励;激励合约有效提高了制造商技术创新的动力,得出了制造商最优决策及影响因素;提出制造商和政府要通过广告、政策等方式努力提高消费者低碳偏好程度,达到降低碳排放的目的。