混合回收模式下权力结构对逆向物流外包策略的影响

为分析混合回收、权力结构和物流策略三者共同作用下对企业和供应链决策的影响,在制造商和销售商混合回收废弃电子产品的条件下,构建了制造商主导和第三方物流服务商主导的两类供应链模式,运用博弈理论,分析了两种供应链权力结构下逆向供应链决策。研究发现:无论何种供应链权力结构,混合回收模式下,物流自营时制造商给予销售商的回收补贴始终高于物流外包,TPLSP主导时,物流外包时制造商或销售商的回收价格和回收量始终大于物流自营;制造商主导时,不同物流模式下的回收价格和回收量大小关系受再制造节约成本的制约;TPLSP主导时,物流外包时制造商或销售商的利润始终大于物流自营,供应链企业选择物流外包策略是最优的;制造商主导时,只有当制造商再制造节约成本满足一定条件时,物流外包时制造商或销售商的利润才会大于物流自营;制造商和销售商的物流策略偏好是否一致与再制造节约成本密切相关。     

基于多代理系统的协同物流模式研究

协同物流模式涉及选择第三方物流企业招标、竞标以及第三方物流企业的利润分配等问题.以多代理系统为框架,定量研究了协同物流模式中的物流企业选择、招标、竞标以及利润分配等环节.在满足客户要求的前提下,确定了选择第三方物流企业的方法,改进了合同网协议以优化投标和竞标过程,并给出了第三方物流企业的利润分配方式.     

第三方资金流提供商的采购协同问题研究

在传统的供应链采购运作过程中,由于核心制造商一直对其供应商供货采取下线结算的方式,从而导致供应商一直承担着巨大的库存持有成本.在基于Supply Hub的供应链运作模式下,提出了一种新的资金结算方式:令传统的3PL充当第三方资金流提供商来对供应商提前支付货款.从而解决供应商库存成本压力过大的问题,并且实现对资金流、信息流、物流的整合.在新的结算模式下,通过对供应链的成本分析研究得出一种有效的供应链运作机制,从而提高供应商的响应速度及协同性,降低供应链的总成本.通过数据模拟进一步证明.在该模式下核心制造商能够获得更快的产品交货期;供应商能够有效地降低库存持有成本;第三方资金流提供商可以通过对供应商采取适当的惩罚来约束供应商,促使供应商对交货期做出最合适的选择,并且使自身获利.     

基于第三方物流服务提供商的供应链系统集成

分析了目前供应链集成面临的现状,提出基于第三方物流服务提供商的供应链系统集成策略.借助于网络与信息技术,研究了第三方物流服务提供商进入供应链系统的切入方案,以及基于网络协作实现制造商、供应商及分销商集成的方法.     

第四方物流长期合作下的激励机制

考虑了第四方物流在协调及对第三方物流的培训、质量指导等方面的努力对第三方物流完成物流任务的影响,建立了第四方物流与第三方物流长期合作下的静态模型及动态模型,比较了相同期不同模型下各策略变量的影响因素,得出了第四方物流在动态模型下且努力水平调整系数大于零时能起到更好的激励效果的结论.     

基于微分对策的闭环供应链中制造商合作策略选择

以动态环境为背景，研究了存在第三方的闭环供应链中制造商合作策略选择。分别建立了制造商与回收商和零售商三方共同合作，制造商仅与回收商或零售商其中一方合作，以及三方均不合作等4种合作模型，利用微分对策理论对模型进行求解得到不同合作策略下的最优控制策略。研究发现：制造商总是存在与零售商或回收商合作的动机，制造商与零售商和回收商均合作时供应链利润以及消费者福利最高，制造商与其均不合作时供应链利润和消费者福利最低。但制造商仅与零售商合作时供应链利润是否高于其与回收商合作时的供应链利润依赖于旧产品回收效率和再制造所节约成本等。     

碳减排成本信息不对称下的供应合同设计

在碳限额与交易政策下,针对一个供应商和一个制造商的供应链博弈模型,研究了双向碳减排成本信息不对称下供应商的减排成本信息披露与供应合同设计策略,并通过算例分析讨论了不同条件下的企业决策行为和利润变化。研究结果表明,供应商在减排成本披露上的说谎行为对制造商来说并非完全不利,有时可以提高低减排成本制造商的实际利润。其次,供应商可以通过合同设计保证风险中性的制造商接受合同,但不对称信息使制造商的期望利润与实际利润存在偏差,导致制造商的实际利润可能小于保留利润。另外,供应商只能制定针对高减排成本制造商的合同,因此在某些情况下只能保证高减排成本制造商获得保留利润,导致低减排成本制造商的实际利润可能小于高减排成本制造商,这说明制造商的减排成本并不是越低越好。     

“一带一路”背景下我国西部第三方物流企业信息技术应用研究

"一带一路"国家战略的提出及实施,为我国西部第三方物流企业的发展带来了难得的契机。但现代物流的发展与信息技术密切相关。本文以"一带一路"国家战略的实施为背景,在对我国西部第三方物流企业信息技术应用现状及问题系统分析的基础之上,结合西部第三方物流企业实际,最终针对性的提出了包括与信息技术供应商加强合作,量身定制信息技术等在内的提升策略及建议,最终达到促进我国西部第三方物流发展的目的。     

基于第三方物流循环取货模式的供应商管理库存系统研究

做好库存控制,降低库存成本和运输费用进而降低物流成本是企业竞争制胜的重要因素,具有相当大的现实意义。通过对已实现的基于第三方物流循环取货的供应商管理库存模式的研究,通过现代信息技术实现该现代物流管理模式在企业中的应用,有效实现供应链的优化管理。     

第三方负责回收再制造闭环供应链契约设计

以博弈论为基本研究方法,考查了制造商、销售商和第三方物流服务商构成的Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链中,节点企业为了取得最优利润,如何确定产品的批发价、销售价,废旧产品的回收价和回收转移价等,发现在分散决策(非合作博弈)下系统的利润要低于集中决策(合作博弈)下系统的利润。通过设计收入费用共享契约,增加了产品的销售量和废旧产品的回收量,提高了制造商、销售商、第三方物流服务商的利润和消费者的效用,实现了Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链系统的协调。     

突发公共卫生事件下医疗防护用品供应链协调

针对一个生产商-第三方物流提供商-零售商组成的医疗防护用品三级供应链,在考虑随机性需求的基础上,利用收益共享契约来探讨突发事件对三级供应链的影响。研究表明：突发事件下,供应链成员企业通过调整收益共享契约中转移支付的产品批发价格及物流服务价格参数,可使收益共享契约具有抗突发事件性,同时也使得供应链收益在生产商、物流商和零售商之间重新分配,实现了供应链企业共赢。     

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.     

第三方物流联盟中物流任务的优化调度

为了提高物流服务水平、降低物流运作成本,针对由多个第三方物流服务商组建而成的第三方物流联盟中物流任务与物流服务资源的优化调度问题展开研究,综合考虑各第三方物流服务商资源节点提供物流活动服务成本和物流服务总时间,以时间最短和成本最低为优化目标,提出了基于时间和成本的多目标优化调度模型,针对目前物流任务调度优化模型中只考虑各物流服务资源节点本身的服务成本和时间,而未考虑执行各个物流活动之间的物流资源节点之间的衔接时间与衔接成本的问题,提出一种计算不同物流服务资源节点之间的物流服务衔接时间和衔接成本的方法,在模型中,考虑了物流资源服务时间窗限制问题.最后提出了一个改进的遗传算法进行模型求解,并通过算例验证了研究的有效性.     

Horizontal cooperation and information sharing between suppliers in the manufacturer–supplier triad

In this paper, we analyse a collusion and information-sharing problem between two suppliers in a manufacturer–supplier triad. The manufacturer treats one supplier as a strategic supplier and the other as a backup. While the strategic supplier offers modules of good quality but longer lead times, the backup supplier offers modules with inferior quality but shorter lead times. If there are urgent orders, the manufacturer must turn to the backup supplier. However, it is difficult for the manufacturer to estimate whether the urgent supplier has put extra effort into their production. We formulate this problem by assuming that the urgent supplier has either low or high production costs. To take advantage of the competition between two suppliers, the manufacturer can design a contract menu that defines total payment and lead times, under which both suppliers may be worse off. Meanwhile, it is possible for the suppliers to tacitly form a coalition, and to even share the private cost information. We study this problem by formulating it as a three-stage game. Furthermore, we investigate the variation of profits for each part of the supply chain. We find that the manufacturer is worse off when suppliers cooperate or share private information. Both suppliers, however, can benefit from cooperation and information sharing.     

不同契约下考虑公平偏好的供应商创新投入研究

针对一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链,研究供应商公平偏好对其创新投入的影响。引入公平偏好理论,运用Stackelberg博弈,建立批发价格契约、研发成本分担契约和收益共享契约3种契约下的供应链决策模型,对比分析不同契约下公平偏好系数对供应链均衡信息的影响。研究表明,研发成本分担契约下的供应商创新水平、供应链中成员效用及供应链整体效用总高于其他2种契约;收益共享契约下的供应商创新水平和供应链整体效用高于批发价格契约;批发价格契约和收益共享契约下的制造商效用和供应商效用的大小与供应商公平偏好系数以及收益共享契约下的供应商保留效用的大小有关。     

Moral hazard problem and collaborative coordination in supply chain with capacity reservation contract

This paper has considered collaborative coordination in supply chains with capacity reservation contracts using the game theory. In some traditional papers, the capacity reservation contracts have contained a capacity quantity, a reservation quantity and a reservation fee as a decision variable. Each decision variable is determined separately based on individual profit functions of a supplier and a manufacturer under the noncooperative game theory. Those papers have assumed that the supplier is always forced to build sufficient capacity to cover the reservation amount of the manufacturer. However, the supplier might not always comply with the reservation amount of the manufacturer since the capacity quantity is a private decision in the supplier and not released to external companies in practice. For instance, the supplier may choose to under-build knowingly to ensure high utilisation of his capacity. This is a kind of moral hazard problems. This paper has investigated such a strategy that the supplier and manufacturer voluntarily comply with the contract for the purpose of solving the moral hazard problem in the capacity reservation contract. Consequently, we have proposed a method of determining the decision variables collaboratively in the contract such that a consensus of the supplier and manufacturer is built.     

Sequencing mixed-model assembly lines to minimize part inventory cost

A mixed-model assembly line enables the joint production of different models of a common base product in intermixed model sequence (lot size one). Previous approaches for the short-term planning task of model sequencing either aim at minimizing work overload (mixed-model sequencing and car sequencing) or leveling part usages (level scheduling). However, at many manufacturers parts are consolidated by a third party logistics provider, who stocks Just-in-Time delivered parts in a consignment warehouse adjacent to the line. The manufacturer issues a complete cargo carrier (e.g. a euro-pallet) whenever his own intermediate storage of parts is depleted. Thus, the manufacturer aims at a model sequence which minimizes his own inventory costs. This paper formalizes this novel model sequencing problem and describes different heuristic and exact procedures. Furthermore, the solutions yielded by these approaches are compared to the traditional level scheduling.     

Contract duration: Barrier or bridge to successful public-private partnerships?

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are predominantly executed through the use of formal contracts which define the relationship between a public agency and private supplier. As such, a PPP is not a generic contract between buyer and supplier but rather a specific contractual arrangement between a public buyer and private supplier. The contract captures the responsibilities of each party in achieving a specific set of performance objectives. Given budgetary pressures faced by public agencies, there is an increasing need for suppliers to make investments which could reduce future-year costs of meeting contract performance objectives. This research addresses two overarching questions specific to the issue of private, supplier-side investment. First, “how does public agency and private supplier perception of risk influence contract duration?” and second, “how does contract duration influence private investment?” To answer these questions, structured interviews were conducted with those in public agencies and private, supplier firms actively engaged in PPPs. Factors suspected to contribute to the risk position of public and private actors were evaluated. Additionally, linkages between public buyer-private supplier risk position, contract duration and private, supplier-side investment were addressed. Outcomes suggest properly structured long-term contracts may: 1) provide the risk mitigation mechanisms needed for both public and private actors, and 2) facilitate private, supplier-side investment.     

随机弹性需求下的再制造闭环供应链的协调机制研究

在价格敏感型随机需求的闭环供应链中,分析了以制造商为Stackelberg领导的集中式决策与3种分散式回收模式（制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收）下的定价策略和系统利润。首先从集中式决策出发得到闭环供应链协调的一阶必要条件,在分散决策中证明了完全退货与回馈惩罚混合契约能使分散式闭环供应链达到完美协调,实现供应链成员的共赢,通过协调时利润的比较表明制造商不会选择第三方回收模式,最后证明了协调的充分性和有效性,并给出了一个算例验证了上述结论。     

A basic model for co-ordinating a four-level supply chain of a product with a vendor,multiple buyers and tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers

This paper investigates the co-ordination of order quantities amongst the players in a four-level supply chain with a centralised decision process. The first level of the supply chain consists of multiple buyers, the second level of a vendor (manufacturer), the third level consists of multiple tier-1 suppliers, and the fourth level consists of multiple tier-2 suppliers. Each supplier supplies one or more items that are components of the product produced by the manufacturer. The model developed in this paper guarantees that the local costs for the players either remain the same as before co-ordination, or decrease as a result of co-ordination. A mathematical model is developed, with numerical examples presented and results discussed.