需求信息不对称下的双渠道供应链合作广告投资决策分析

研究制造商主导的Stackelberg 博弈下双渠道供应链的合作广告策略, 分析信息不对称及双渠道对供应链合作广告投资决策的影响. 研究表明, 零售商在具有需求信息优势时会谎报需求信息, 并且在一定条件下其谎报决策会降低制造商的利润, 但能提高供应链的利润, 这种情况下制造商无法通过激励合同促使零售商共享信息. 另外, 在最优合作广告策略下, 当直销渠道与分销渠道所占市场份额的分配比例小于一定值时, 制造商采取双渠道会使供应链参与者均受益.

     

基于微分对策的供应链合作广告决策研究

针对供应链系统中制造商和零售商的合作广告计划问题,利用微分对策构建动态模型．分别研究制造商和零售商在合作和非合作条件下的广告策略．运用动态规划原理。分别得出静态反馈Nash均衡和反馈Stackelberg均衡,将两种均衡策略加以比较,结果显示合作广告计划是供应链系统中的一种协调和激励机制,可以提高两个渠道成员以及整个供应链系统的利润。     

供应链动态合作广告策略

研究产品信誉受广告投入水平影响的供应链合作广告问题,建立具有广告投入水平抑制作用的产品信誉动态模型.通过哈密顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别得到制造商和零售商在分散决策和集中决策下的最优广告策略以及在分散决策下制造商的最优合作广告参与率,比较发现,集中决策下制造商和零售商的最优广告投入水平高于分散决策下的相应值.设计了双边补贴策略来协调供应链.数值仿真实验验证了所得结论的正确性.     

Cooperative advertising in a capacitated manufacturer–retailer supply chain: a game‐theoretic approach

To achieve a more realistic understanding of how the supply chain's components interact, it is helpful to consider the operational limitations of the underlying supply chain while analyzing cooperative advertising. This paper studies cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain under the practical operational assumption that the manufacturer's production capacity is limited. The retailer advertises locally, and the manufacturer advertises in national media and supports part of the retailer's promotional costs. Equilibria are determined under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, both retailer and manufacturer move simultaneously, while in the second scenario, they move sequentially, with the manufacturer being the leader. The sales function is a bivariate version of the diminishing returns response function. When the production capacity is unlimited, several important properties can be proven, which cannot be shown analytically for the existing sales functions. Considering the production‐capacity constraint leads to new managerial insights into cooperative advertising. For example, only if the production capacity is large enough, both manufacturer and retailer are better off under the second scenario than the first scenario. In other words, the sequential move is not necessarily Pareto‐improving when the production capacity is limited. It is also observed that, under the first scenario, there are multiple equilibria whenever the production capacity is not too high. Under the second scenario, the manufacturer supports the retailer only when the retailer's margin is relatively small compared to the manufacturer's margin and production capacity.     

Coordinating two-period ordering and advertising policies in a dynamic market with stochastic demand

In this paper, we study the optimal two-stage advertising and ordering policies and the channel coordination issues in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer sells a short-life-cycle product through the retailer facing stochastic demand in dynamic markets characterised by price declines and product obsolescence. Following a two-period newsvendor framework, we develop two members’ optimal ordering and advertising models under both the centralised and decentralised settings, and present the closed-form solutions to the developed models as well. Moreover, we design a two-period revenue-sharing contract, and develop sufficient conditions such that the channel coordination can be achieved and a win–win outcome can be guaranteed. Our analysis suggests that the centralised decision creates an incentive for the retailer to increase the advertising investments in two periods and put the purchase forward, but the decentralised decision mechanism forces the retailer to decrease the advertising investments in two periods and postpone/reduce its purchase in the first period. This phenomenon becomes more evident when demand variability is high.     

Information sharing and the impact of shutdown policy in a supply chain with market disruption risk in the social media era

This paper investigates the information sharing issue in a simple supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The market demand might be subject to disruption, but the retailer can get access to some signals from social media platforms to better forecast the market state (regular or disrupted) even though the signals might be not fully reliable. Different from the traditional information sharing literature, we incorporate the shutdown policy into our model. We first characterize the equilibrium outcomes under both with- and without-information sharing cases and then examine the players’ preferences over information sharing or not. It is shown that when the level of information reliability is relatively low, the manufacturer prefers the information sharing cases, whereas the retailer prefers the no-sharing case, and information sharing does harm to the whole channel. In addition, our results show that as the level of information reliability increases, the manufacturer benefits more but the retailer and the whole channel lose more from information sharing. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, when the level of information reliability falls into an intermediary interval, the retailer will have an incentive to share information, and information sharing will benefit the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. However, the benefits from information sharing decrease as the level of information reliability increases. When the level of information reliability is sufficiently high, both firms are indifferent between the information sharing and no-sharing cases. Additionally, the incorporation of the shutdown policy has important implications for the information sharing issue, and thus, the policy should not be overlooked.     

Optimal dual-channel supply chain configuration for product categories with different customer preference of online channel

This study addresses the supply chain configuration problem of manufacturer faced with multiple channel choices. We investigate the optimal combination of traditional and online sales channels for different product categories with differing customer preference of the online channel. We have considered three distinct dual-channel supply chain configurations comprising of a manufacturer, a traditional channel and an online channel viz. retailer–e-tailer; company store–e-tailer; and retailer–e-marketplace. As the manufacturer will face a quantity allocation decision between traditional and online channels, the competition is modeled using Cournot model with the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader. Values of optimal order quantity and price for the different entities have been established. Influence of variation in customer preference of online channel on the optimal policies is also examined. We find that the manufacturer prefers retailer–e-marketplace configuration for products with high customer preference of online channel and company store–e-tailer configuration for products with low customer preference of online channel. In addition, we find that the retailer–e-tailer configuration is dominated by company store–e-tailer and retailer–e-marketplace configuration irrespective of the product’s customer preference of online channel.     

Vertical cooperative advertising in a retailer duopoly

This paper focuses on optimal pricing and advertising decisions within a two-echelon distribution channel, which consists of one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Assuming an inter-echelon Stackelberg equilibrium, where the manufacturer obtains channel leadership, we compare two different forms of retailer behavior: non-cooperative (Horizontal Nash) and cooperative (Cooperation). While the consumer demand depends both on retail price and advertising, the manufacturer can offer a vertical cooperative advertising program to increase the advertising efforts of his retailers. In order to derive a logically consistent price demand function, we deduce our demand function from the consumers’ utility function. Numerical examples lead to the following main findings: (i) consumers can benefit from retailer-competition, as it reduces retail price; (ii) the manufacturer’s participation in retailers’ advertising will be the highest when there is strong competition and no Cooperation; (iii) a Cooperation does not always yield higher profits for the retailers, but can also produce better results for the manufacturer.     

Effects of the pricing and cooperative advertising policies in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain

The rapid development of e-commerce has reduced the intermediary channels between manufacturers and consumers and changed consumption patterns. However, channel conflicts occur when manufacturers engage in direct sales. Using traditional and direct online channels as its setting, this paper evaluates the impact of price schemes and cooperative advertising mechanisms on dual-channel supply chain competition. Our analysis offers structural and quantitative insights into the interplay between upstream and downstream entities in the supply chain, helping managers to understand the interplay between the upstream and downstream entities of a dual channel structure.     

Note on “Coordinating the ordering and advertising policies for a single-period commodity in a two-level supply chain”

In a recent paper, Chen (2011) studied a two-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. In this supply chain, demand is random and depends on the advertisements of both the manufacturer and the retailer. There are some serious flaws in the assumptions of the model, and consequently some of the results derived are incorrect. In this note, we point out the flaws and correct them. The corrected model is illustrated with the help of numerical examples.     

Channel characteristics and coordination in three-echelon dual-channel supply chain

We explore the impact of channel structure on the manufacturer, the distributer, the retailer and the entire supply chain by considering three different channel structures in radiance of with and without coordination. These structures include a traditional retail channel and two manufacturer direct channels with and without consistent pricing. By comparing the performance of the manufacturer, the distributer and the retailer, and the entire supply chain in three different supply chain structures, it is established analytically that, under some conditions, a dual channel can outperform a single retail channel; as a consequence, a coordination mechanism is developed that not only coordinates the dual channel but also outperforms the non-cooperative single retail channel. All the analytical results are further analysed through numerical examples.     

低碳环境下双渠道供应链线上线下广告策略的微分博弈分析

以一个由绿色制造商与零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,基于微分博弈分别比较分析集中式决策、采用竞争型广告策略的分散式决策与采用支持型广告策略的分散式决策模型下,双渠道供应链的最优均衡决策与最优利润.研究发现:集中式决策下的最优低碳水平、最优线上与线下广告水平均高于分散式决策,而产品最优销售价格可能高于、等于或低于分散式决策;分散式决策下,采用支持型广告策略的双渠道供应链的产品最优低碳水平、最优销售价格和最优线上广告投入水平与采用竞争型广告策略的双渠道供应链均衡策略一致;一定条件下,支持型广告策略使得分散式双渠道供应链得到Pareto改进,此时的最优线下广告投入水平优于竞争型广告策略下的最优线下广告投入水平.     

Supply chain model with price- and trade credit-sensitive demand under two-level permissible delay in payments

This article develops a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain model under two-level permissible delay in payments when the manufacturer follows a lot-for-lot policy in response to the retailer's demand. The manufacturer offers a trade credit period to the retailer with the contract that the retailer must share a fraction of the profit earned during the trade credit period. On the other hand, the retailer provides his customer a partial trade credit which is less than that of the manufacturer. The demand at the retailer is assumed to be dependent on the selling price and the trade credit period offered to the customers. The average net profit of the supply chain is derived and an algorithm for finding the optimal solution is developed. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the coordination policy of the supply chain and examine the sensitivity of key model-parameters.     

Co-op advertising and pricing models in manufacturer–retailer supply chains

Cooperative (co-op) advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs in conventional supply chains and makes up the majority of promotional budgets in many product lines for both manufacturers and retailers. Nevertheless, most studies to date on co-op advertising have only assumed that the market demand is only influenced by the advertising level but not in any way by the retail price. That is why our work is concerned with co-op advertising and pricing strategies in distribution channels consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Four different models are discussed which are based on three non-cooperative games (i.e., Nash, Stackelberg retailer and Stackelberg manufacturer) and one cooperative game. We identify optimal co-op advertising and pricing strategies for both firms mostly analytically but we have to resort to numerical simulations in one case. Comparisons are then made about various outcomes, especially the profits, for all cases. This leads to consider more specifically the cooperation case in which profits are the highest for both the retailer and the manufacturer, and how they should share the extra joint profit achieved by moving to cooperation. We solve this bargain problem using the Nash bargaining model.     

公平关切下具有广告效应的闭环供应链定价决策模型

研究制造商公平关切下具有广告效应的闭环供应链定价决策问题.分别在制造商与零售商广告下,分析广告效应及制造商的公平关切行为对闭环供应链定价策略的影响.研究表明,广告效应对闭环供应链成员及系统整体都是有利的,制造商的公平关切行为有利于自身利润及效用最大化,不利于零售商及系统整体利润最大化.在制造商广告下,当制造商的公平关切程度相对较弱时,零售商的利润不小于制造商的利润;反之,制造商的利润更大.     

基于微分博弈的双渠道广告合作协调策略研究

研究在制造商开通网上和零售渠道的情形下, 供应链成员的广告合作和成本分担对双渠道协调的影响. 研究结果表明, 无论零售商的广告对品牌形象产生何种影响, 制造商分担零售商的部分广告费用均能使得双方的利润优于分散决策的情形, 但不能完全实现双渠道协调. 此外, 当零售商也分担制造商的部分广告费用时, 双方均可以实现完全的协调. 相比于零售商频繁促销产生负面影响的情形, 在不产生负面影响的情况下, 双方能够实现更多的价值.

     

基于零售商资金约束供应链采用RFID技术的决策及融资分析

为研究零售商存在资金约束和库存错放时,供应链成员采用无线射频识别(radio frequency identification,RFID)技术及融资决策的均衡问题,以单制造商和单资金约束零售商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,基于报童模型构建供应链成员采用RFID技术前后零售商是否融资4种情景下的收益模型,求解出相应的最优解并探讨供应链成员RFID采用决策与零售商的融资策略.研究发现:当零售商的自有资金适中时,供应链成员采用RFID技术一定程度上能够缓解零售商的资金约束;零售商选择融资时,供应链及其成员能够承担更高的RFID成本;零售商分摊RFID固定成本的比例对制造商、零售商和供应链能够承担的RFID标签成本阈值有决定性的影响.     

Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints

Carbon tax policy is widely adopted by many countries to curb carbon emissions. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms have more incentive to improve carbon reduction levels by reducing their carbon tax costs. However, firms need to bear carbon reduction costs that may cause shortage of capital. Thus, firms may face problems of financial constraints, which may demotivate firms to produce greener products. To address the decision‐making challenges of firms in the contexts of carbon tax policy and financial constraints, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer who produces green products and a retailer who sells these products. Our study develops five models to investigate the two firms’ optimal wholesale price, carbon reduction level and ordering quantity, according to the manufacturer and retailer with or without financial constraints. Our goal in this study is to explore how carbon tax policy and banks’ interest rates affect the profits of the two firms, supply chain and consumer surplus. Certain managerial insights are obtained as follows. We demonstrate that carbon tax policy and banks’ interest rates demotivate the manufacturer to produce greener products and demotivate the retailer to order more products. If the interest rate to the manufacturer (retailer) is relatively low, then the manufacturer with financial constraint benefits (harms) the consumers compared with the retailer with financial constraint. Importantly, our analysis suggests that carbon tax policy harms the firms but benefits consumers, and the government in some conditions should reduce unit carbon tax.     

Coordinating a two-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with forecast updating

We consider the component-purchasing problem for a supply chain consisting of one retailer and two complementary suppliers with different lead-times. The retailer purchases a specific component from each supplier for assembling into a fashionable product. After ordering from the long-lead-time supplier (Supplier 1) and before ordering from the short-lead-time supplier (Supplier 2), the retailer can update its demand forecast for the product. The retailer can partially cancel its order from Supplier 1 after forecast updating. By formulating the problem as a dynamic optimization problem, we explore the measures that can be deployed to coordinate the retailer’s ordering decisions with forecast updating. We analytically show that the supply chain can be coordinated if both suppliers offer a returns policy and Supplier 1 charges an order-cancelation penalty to the retailer. We find that the coordination mechanism is independent of demand distribution and the forecast updating process. We further show that it is easier for the suppliers to coordinate the supply chain if market observation indicates the future market demand is sufficiently large. We also study the case where demand is price-dependent and propose a generalized revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. We discuss the academic and managerial implications of the theoretical findings.     

考虑交叉销售的O2O供应链合作广告策略研究

基于网络零售平台与制造商的合作广告实践，运用Stackelberg博弈理论研究了平台交叉销售效应及合作广告引导作用对O2O供应链合作广告决策的影响，并通过数值算例对参与合作广告计划前后渠道成员的决策变量均衡结果和利润进行对比分析，研究发现平台交叉销售效应是影响网络零售平台合作广告计划制定和实施的关键因素，只有当其达到一定水平时，制造商才拥有参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的资格；在一定条件时，合作广告计划能够实现制造商和网络零售平台利润的提升；当平台交叉销售效应较大时，网络零售平台获得的利润大于制造商。