A game theoretical perspective on the quantum probabilities associated with a GHZ state

In the standard approach to quantum games, players’ strategic moves are local unitary transformations on an entangled state that is subsequently measured. Players’ payoffs are then obtained as expected values of the entries in the payoff matrix of the classical game on a set of quantum probabilities obtained from the quantum measurement. In this paper, we approach quantum games from a diametrically opposite perspective. We consider a classical three-player symmetric game along with a known expression for a set of quantum probabilities relevant to a tripartite Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) experiment that depends on three players’ directional choices in the experiment. We define the players’ strategic moves as their directional choices in an EPR setting and then express their payoff relations in the resulting quantum game in terms of their directional choices, the entries of the payoff matrix, and the quantum probability distribution relevant to the tripartite EPR experiment.     

Quantum games and quaternionic strategies

It is well-known that the phenomenon of entanglement plays a fundamental role in quantum game theory. Occasionally, games constructed via maximally entangled initial states (MEIS) will have new Nash equilibria yielding to the players higher payoffs than the ones they receive in the classical version of the game. When examining these new games for Nash equilibrium payoffs, a fundamental question arises; does a suitable choice of an MEIS improve the lot of the players? In this paper, we show that the answer to this question is yes for at least the case of a variant of the well-known two player, two strategy game of Chicken. To that end, we generalize Landsburg’s quaternionic representation of the payoff function of two player, two strategy maximally entangled states to games where the initial state is chosen arbitrarily from a circle of maximally entangled initial states and for the corresponding quantized games show the existence of superior Nash equilibrium payoffs when an MEIS is appropriately chosen.     

Evolutionarily stable sets in quantum penny flip games

In game theory, an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES set) is a set of Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies that give the same payoffs. Similar to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ES strategy), an ES set is also a strict NE. This work investigates the evolutionary stability of classical and quantum strategies in the quantum penny flip games. In particular, we developed an evolutionary game theory model to conduct a series of simulations where a population of mixed classical strategies from the ES set of the game were invaded by quantum strategies. We found that when only one of the two players’ mixed classical strategies were invaded, the results were different. In one case, due to the interference phenomenon of superposition, quantum strategies provided more payoff, hence successfully replaced the mixed classical strategies in the ES set. In the other case, the mixed classical strategies were able to sustain the invasion of quantum strategies and remained in the ES set. Moreover, when both players’ mixed classical strategies were invaded by quantum strategies, a new quantum ES set was emerged. The strategies in the quantum ES set give both players payoff 0, which is the same as the payoff of the strategies in the mixed classical ES set of this game.     

A Quantum Treatment of Public Goods Economics

Quantum generalizations of conventional games broaden the range of available strategies, which can help improve outcomes for the participants. With many players, such quantum games can involve entanglement among many states which is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. This paper describes a quantum approach to the economically significant n-player public goods game that requires only two-particle entanglement and is thus much easier to implement than more general quantum mechanisms. In spite of the large temptation to free ride on the efforts of others in the original game, two-particle entanglement is sufficient to give near optimal expected payoff when players use a simple mixed strategy for which no player can benefit by making different choices. This mechanism can also address some heterogeneous preferences among the players. PACS: 03.67-a; 02.50Le; 89.65.Gh     

Three-player conflicting interest games and nonlocality

We outline the general construction of three-player games with incomplete information which fulfil the following conditions: (i) symmetry with respect to the permutations of players; (ii) the existence of an upper bound for total payoff resulting from Bell inequalities; (iii) the existence of both fair and unfair Nash equilibria saturating this bound. Conditions (i)–(iii) imply that we are dealing with conflicting interest games. An explicit example of such a game is given. A quantum counterpart of this game is considered. It is obtained by keeping the same utilities but replacing classical advisor by a quantum one. It is shown that the quantum game possesses only fair equilibria with strictly higher payoffs than in the classical case. This implies that quantum nonlocality can be used to resolve the conflict between the players.     

Quantum game simulator, using the circuit model of quantum computation

We present a general two-player quantum game simulator that can simulate any two-player quantum game described by a 2×2 payoff matrix (two strategy games).The user can determine the payoff matrices for both players, their strategies and the amount of entanglement between their initial strategies. The outputs of the simulator are the expected payoffs of each player as a function of the other player's strategy parameters and the amount of entanglement. The simulator also produces contour plots that divide the strategy spaces of the game in regions in which players can get larger payoffs if they choose to use a quantum strategy against any classical one. We also apply the simulator to two well-known quantum games, the Battle of Sexes and the Chicken game.

Program summary

Program title: Quantum Game Simulator (QGS)Catalogue identifier: AEED_v1_0Program summary URL:http://cpc.cs.qub.ac.uk/summaries/AEED_v1_0.htmlProgram obtainable from: CPC Program Library, Queen's University, Belfast, N. IrelandLicensing provisions: Standard CPC licence, http://cpc.cs.qub.ac.uk/licence/licence.htmlNo. of lines in distributed program, including test data, etc.: 3416No. of bytes in distributed program, including test data, etc.: 583 553Distribution format: tar.gzProgramming language: Matlab R2008a (C)Computer: Any computer that can sufficiently run Matlab R2008aOperating system: Any system that can sufficiently run Matlab R2008aClassification: 4.15Nature of problem: Simulation of two player quantum games described by a payoff matrix.Solution method: The program calculates the matrices that comprise the Eisert setup for quantum games based on the quantum circuit model. There are 5 parameters that can be altered. We define 3 of them as constant. We play the quantum game for all possible values for the other 2 parameters and store the results in a matrix.Unusual features: The software provides an easy way of simulating any two-player quantum games.Running time: Approximately 0.4 sec (Region Feature) and 0.3 sec (Payoff Feature) on a Intel Core 2 Duo GHz with 2 GB of memory under Windows XP.     

Differential games with open-loop saddle point conditions

Zero-sum differential games are considered in which one or both of the players are restricted to use open-loop control. It is shown that the first-order necessary conditions for such problems are identical to the first-order necessary conditions for the usual form of a differential game, where both players use closed-loop control laws. An investigation of the conjugate point condition for a special class of games shows that this condition is not the same but depends on the type of solution sought. For games where one or both of the players use open-loop control, there are two conjugate point conditions that must be satisfied. This differs from games in which both players use closed-loop control, where there is only one conjugate point necessary condition.     

Studying interval valued matrix games with fuzzy logic

Matrix games have been widely used in decision making systems. In practice, for the same strategies players take, the corresponding payoffs may be within certain ranges rather than exact values. To model such uncertainty in matrix games, we consider interval-valued game matrices in this paper; and extend the results of classical strictly determined matrix games to fuzzily determined interval matrix games. Finally, we give an initial investigation into mixed strategies for such games. This work is partially supported by the NSF grant CCF-0202042.     

Matrix games with missing,interval, and ambiguous lottery payoffs of pure strategy profiles and compound strategy profiles

In a matrix game, the interactions among players are based on the assumption that each player has accurate information about the payoffs of their interactions and the other players are rationally self‐interested. As a result, the players should definitely take Nash equilibrium strategies. However, in real‐life, when choosing their optimal strategies, sometimes the players have to face missing, imprecise (i.e., interval), ambiguous lottery payoffs of pure strategy profiles and even compound strategy profile, which means that it is hard to determine a Nash equilibrium. To address this issue, in this paper we introduce a new solution concept, called ambiguous Nash equilibrium, which extends the concept of Nash equilibrium to the one that can handle these types of ambiguous payoff. Moreover, we will reveal some properties of matrix games of this kind. In particular, we show that a Nash equilibrium is a special case of ambiguous Nash equilibrium if the players have accurate information of each player's payoff sets. Finally, we give an example to illustrate how our approach deals with real‐life game theory problems.     

On One Feature of Multicriteria Differential Games

Differential two-person zero-sum games with a vector payoff function are considered. A counterexample states that a payoff function component convolution into a linear convolution and further finding saddle point results in the interior instability of a set of such solutions. It is found that such saddle points are Geoffrion saddle points for an initial multicriteria game.     

Interactive strategy sets in multiple payoff games

In game theory, it is usually assumed that each player has only one payoff function and the strategy set of the game is composed of the topological product of individual players’ strategy sets. In real business and system design or control problems, however, players’ strategy sets may be interactive and each player may have more than one payoff function. This paper, investigates the more general situation of multiple payoff and multiple person games in a normal form. In this paper, each player has several payoff functions which are dominated by certain convex cones, and the feasible strategy set of each player may be interactive with those of the other players. This new model is applied to a classical example without requiring variational and quasi-variational inequalities, or point-to-set mappings.     

Equilibrium Trajectories in Dynamical Bimatrix Games with Average Integral Payoff Functionals

This paper considers models of evolutionary non-zero-sum games on the infinite time interval. Methods of differential game theory are used for the analysis of game interactions between two groups of participants. We assume that participants in these groups are controlled by signals for the behavior change. The payoffs of coalitions are defined as average integral functionals on the infinite horizon. We pose the design problem of a dynamical Nash equilibrium for the evolutionary game under consideration. The ideas and approaches of non-zero-sum differential games are employed for the determination of the Nash equilibrium solutions. The results derived in this paper involve the dynamic constructions and methods of evolutionary games. Much attention is focused on the formation of the dynamical Nash equilibrium with players strategies that maximize the corresponding payoff functions and have the guaranteed properties according to the minimax approach. An application of the minimax approach for constructing optimal control strategies generates dynamical Nash equilibrium trajectories yielding better results in comparison to static solutions and evolutionary models with the replicator dynamics. Finally, we make a comparison of the dynamical Nash equilibrium trajectories for evolutionary games with the average integral payoff functionals and the trajectories for evolutionary games with the global terminal payoff functionals on the infinite horizon.     

On the effect of quantum noise in a quantum prisoner’s dilemma cellular automaton

The disrupting effect of quantum noise on the dynamics of a spatial quantum formulation of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with variable entangling is studied in this work. The game is played in the cellular automata manner, i.e., with local and synchronous interaction. It is concluded in this article that quantum noise induces in fair games the need for higher entanglement in order to make possible the emergence of the strategy pair (Q, Q), which produces the same payoff of mutual cooperation. In unfair quantum versus classic player games, quantum noise delays the prevalence of the quantum player.     

Game and Information Theory Analysis of Electronic Countermeasures in Pursuit-Evasion Games

Two-player pursuit-evasion games in the literature typically either assume both players have perfect knowledge of the opponent's positions or use primitive sensing models. This unrealistically skews the problem in favor of the pursuer who needs only maintain a faster velocity at all turning radii. In real life, an evader usually escapes when the pursuer no longer knows the evader's position. In our previous work, we modeled pursuit evasion without perfect information as a two-player bimatrix game by using a realistic sensor model and information theory to compute game-theoretic payoff matrices. That game has a saddle point when the evader uses strategies that exploit sensor limitations, whereas the pursuer relies on strategies that ignore the sensing limitations. In this paper, we consider, for the first time, the effect of many types of electronic countermeasures (ECM) on pursuit-evasion games. The evader's decision to initiate its ECM is modeled as a function of the distance between the players. Simulations show how to find optimal strategies for ECM use when initial conditions are known. We also discuss the effectiveness of different ECM technologies in pursuit-evasion games.      

Games Played under Fuzzy Constraints

Psychological experiment studies reveal that human interaction behaviors are often not the same as what game theory predicts. One of important reasons is that they did not put relevant constraints into consideration when the players choose their best strategies. However, in real life, games are often played in certain contexts where players are constrained by their capabilities, law, culture, custom, and so on. For example, if someone wants to drive a car, he/she has to have a driving license. Therefore, when a human player of a game chooses a strategy, he/she should consider not only the material payoff or monetary reward from taking his/her best strategy and others' best responses but also how feasible to take the strategy in that context where the game is played. To solve such a game, this paper establishes a model of fuzzily constrained games and introduces a solution concept of constrained equilibrium for the games of this kind. Our model is consistent with psychological experiment results of ultimatum games. We also discuss what will happen if Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt are played under fuzzy constraints. In general, after putting constraints into account, our model can reflect well the human behaviors of fairness, altruism, self‐interest, and so on, and thus can predict the outcomes of some games more accurate than conventional game theory.     

Linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic potential games

Discrete-time game-theoretic models of resource exploitation are treated as dynamic potential games. The players (countries or firms) exploit a common stock on the infinite time horizon. The main aim of the paper is to obtain a potential for the linear-quadratic games of this type. The class of games where a potential can be constructed as a quadratic form is identified. As an example, the dynamic game of bioresource management is considered and the potentials are constructed in the case of symmetric and asymmetric players.     

A quantum approach to play asymmetric coordination games

We present a quantum approach to play asymmetric coordination games, which are more general than symmetric coordination games such as the Battle of the Sexes game, the Chicken game and the Hawk–Dove game. Our results show that quantum entanglement can help the players to coordinate their strategies.     

Noise and the magic square game

A pseudo-telepathy game is a game for two or more players for which there is no classical winning strategy, but there is a winning strategy based on sharing quantum entanglement by the players. Since it is generally very hard to perfectly implement a quantum winning strategy for a pseudo-telepathy game, quantum players are almost certain to make errors even though they use a winning strategy. After introducing a model for pseudo-telepathy games, we investigate the impact of erroneously performed unitary transformations and also of noisy measurement devices on the quantum winning strategy for the magic square game. The question of how strong both types of noise can be so that quantum players would still be better than classical ones is also dealt with.     

Nonlocal sets of orthogonal multipartite product states with less members

Repeated quantum game theory addresses long-term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, single-round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been widely studied; however, less is known for infinitely repeated quantum games. Investigating infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games do not much differ from single-round games. In this work, we establish the concept of general repeated quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterating a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single-round quantum game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma and repeated classical prisoner’s dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is sufficiently strong. When entanglement is sufficiently strong and reward is small, mutual cooperation cannot be an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game. In addition, we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of the repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma.

     

Coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs and credibilistic core

As an important branch of game theory, coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperation among the players. This paper deals with this topic further by incorporating the fuzzy payoff information. Based on the credibility theory, we introduce two decision criteria to define the preferences of players, which leads to two definitions of credibilistic cores—the solution of coalitional game with fuzzy transferable payoffs. Meanwhile, we give a sufficient and necessary condition to ensure non-emptiness of the credibilistic cores. Finally, an example is provided for illustrating the usefulness of the theory developed in this paper.