Clarifications with respect to psychology and phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). The comment author discusses the original article from three perspectives: the issue of subjectivity in phenomenology that he raised, the relevance of American phenomenological psychology to the topic to which Kendler oddly made no reference, and the promotion of and reservations about the "naturalization" of phenomenology in relation to psychology. Kendler advocated the "moral pluralism" of democracy. A similar position of advocacy for "methodological pluralism" is required (cf. Farber, 1967, p. 6). Recognition and respectful consideration of other methodologies in psychology advance the discipline and safeguard against intellectual parochialism and prejudice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Placebo Psychotherapies and Nonconscious Learning in the Placebo Effect: Reply to Kirsch (2004).

In this reply, the authors explore several issues raised by I. Kirsch (2004; see record 2004-11156-008) concerning their original article (S. Stewart-Williams & J. Podd, 2004; see record 2004-11156-007), which dealt with the roles of expectancy and classical conditioning in the placebo effect. The only notable disagreement concerns a definitional issue, namely, Stewart-Williams and Podd's claim that the placebo concept can be extended to inert psychotherapies. The authors defend this claim against the criticisms Kirsch raised. In addition, they comment on the suggestion that nonconscious learning processes play only a small role in human placebo effects, arguing that there are theoretical reasons to expect these processes to be more important than has previously been recognized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Science, public policy, and legal recognition of same-sex relationships.

In their comments on my article discussing the social science data relevant to societal recognition of same-sex committed relationships (see record 2006-11202-004), Rosik and Byrd (see record 2007-14606-024) and Schiller (see record 2007-14606-025) criticized aspects of my analysis and raised questions about the role of psychology in policy debates concerning sexual orientation. In the limited space available here, I first respond to their specific criticisms and then briefly consider the broader policy question. Both comments raised questions about whether and how psychologists should address policy issues related to sexual orientation. Rosik and Byrd advocated what they called a "measured approach" that "would distinguish the social scientist from the social activist" (p. 712). In practice, however, their measured approach apparently allows for vague constructs (e.g., men's "uncivilized" sexual nature), accepts conservative social activists' assumptions (e.g., about the necessity of marital "gender complementarity"), and ignores data that contradict their predictions (e.g., Badgett, 2004). Thus, it clearly is inadequate as a source for guidance. As for Tyler's fourth criterion (see record 200714606-026), it is difficult to know if and how psychologists' efforts in this arena will be effective. Regardless of the ultimate policy outcome, however, to the extent that we successfully communicate accurate information about the current state of scientific knowledge on sexual orientation and same-sex relationships, we will have remained true to our commitment to take a leading role in removing the stigma associated with homosexuality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparing the Heroism of Women and Men.

Comment on "Definitions and Omissions of Heroism" by Jeffery W. Martens (see record 2005-05480-013) which is a comment on the original article "The Heroism of Women and Men" by Selwyn W. Becker and Alice H. Eagly (see record 2004-14611-002). Becker and Eagly welcome the opportunity to discuss the questions about defining heroism that Martens raised in his comment on their article. One of his questions is whether our operational definition of heroism is consistent with our conceptual definition. Conceptually, we defined heroism as voluntarily risking physical injury or death in the service of one or more other people. Operationally, we examined archival data from real-life situations in which people voluntarily assumed such risks in the service of others. To reach our goal of comparing heroic behavior in women and men, we obtained archival data only from settings populated by both sexes. The second reason that we eliminated heroism in paid occupational roles is that our specific purpose of studying whether women as well as men behave heroically made it illogical to include these roles. The authors also state they did not study heroes who pursued ideas and causes because it was difficult to study both sexes equally within prominent leadership roles. They also discuss stereotypes, social constructs of heroism as well as future research that would further our knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Kosits (2004).

Reports two errors in the original article by Russell D. Kosits (History of Psychology, 2004, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 340-366). On p. 358, the first paragraph should read "Given this theological background, it is now possible to consider the New Psychology's Fallacy argument as deeply ironic and even tragic, particularly for William James, the argument's most influential articulator." Also, on p. 342, footnote 5, 6th line of the quotation, the word to should not be crossed out. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2004-21409-002.) In The Principles of Psychology, William James (1890) articulated an influential, boundary-setting argument against faculty psychology, subsequently dubbed the Fallacy of the Faculty Psychology. This argument was reiterated in American psychology textbooks for the next several decades, arguably solidifying and simplifying American perceptions of the "old" faculty psychology and establishing belief in the superiority of the "New Psychology." When placed in the context of American theological and philosophical history, however, the New Psychology argument appears unoriginal, somewhat unfair, and deeply (and even tragically) ironic. Despite their best intentions, a fallacy did emerge in the old psychology as they sought psychological foundations for libertarian free will. For those members of the New Psychology still committed to free will, then, the Fallacy argument cut both ways--refuting the fallacy also meant tearing down a long-standing foundation for free will in American psychology. Offering no viable alternative to fill the moral void, the New Psychology appeared at times conflicted with its new deterministic identity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

There are no "specific correct" usages of concepts, only correct usages: Linguistic rules and the bounds of sense.

In this article we respond to Justin Sytsma's (see record 2008-01492-007) critique of our 2005 article "Analogy and Metaphor Running Amok: An Examination of the Use of Explanatory Devices in Neuroscience" (see record 2006-12348-004). We address each of Sytsma's major criticisms in turn. We conclude that, not only does Sytsma fail to convincingly demonstrate how our argument fails, he falls headlong into the very conceptual confusions we examine in our original article. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and the naturalistic ethics of social policy.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. This argument is challenged with reference to the behaviorist position of ethical naturalism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). This article calls for clarifications regarding its characterization of Heideggerian phenomenology. Kendler drew on his admittedly "limited understanding" (p. 322) of Heidegger and rested his critique upon a critical confusion that pervaded his presentation--a confusion of the ontological and ontic dimensions of Heidegger's work. In his depiction of authenticity as an objective set of values that form "a universal ethical system that is right for all humanity" (Kendler, 2005, p. 321), Kendler made the mistake of taking an ontological structure to instead prescribe an ontically particular way of living these structures out. Beyond the confusion of ontological structure with ontic particulars, Kendler's (2005) characterization of phenomenological inquiry as "naive" calls for a response. Indeed, whether one agrees with the epistemology of the co-constitution of phenomena or not, the epistemological rigor with which phenomenological psychologists consider approach--a term which "denote[s] the ways a science's basic presuppositions are intimately interrelated with the content it takes up and the methods it evolves" (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 4)--belies this charge (see also Giorgi, 1970, 1985; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental Illness and Employment.

Comments on an article by Sturm and Lipton, and the article they are commenting on, by Rothaus, Cleveland and Johnson (see record 1964-02889-001). Sturm and Lipton criticize the study by Rothaus, Hanson, Cleveland and Johnson (the current authors) on the grounds that employment of psychiatrically discharged patients is controlled by personnel directors and not by employment interviewers. In our study we had found it advantageous for the psychiatric patient seeking employment to describe his recent hospitalization as a learning experience designed to aid him in coping with the problems of living rather than alluding to his hospitalization as treatment or a cure for illness. Using the former approach, ex-psychiatric-patients were judged by employment interviewers of the Texas Employment Commission as being more readily employable than patients using the mental-illness approach. But Sturm and Lipton complain that we were working with the wrong people since only personnel directors and employers do the direct hiring. In Texas at least, this is not necessarily so. The authors also comment on other criticisms of Sturm and Lipton. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Separating ideology from currently available data: A reply to Cotton and Cook and McGlynn.

Responds to criticisms by J. L. Cotton and M. S. Cook (see record 1982-26971-001) and R. P. McGlynn (see record 1982-26992-001) of conclusions reached by the present authors in an earlier article (Johnson et al; see record 1981-05387-001). The data are reexamined, and it is concluded that Cotton and Cook's emphasis on the importance of interactions between goal structures and situational variables was not supported. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emphasis on Interpersonal Factors in a Dynamic Model of Relapse.

Comment on "Relapse Prevention Needs More Emphasis on Interpersonal Factors" by Stanton (see record 2005-05480-011) which is a comment on the original article "Relapse Prevention for Alcohol and Drug Problems: That Was Zen, This Is Tao" by Katie Witkiewitz and G. Alan Marlatt (see record 2004-14303-002). In the current comment the authors of the original article respond to Stanton. Witkiewitz and Marlatt acknowledge that Stanton's comment is an important and thoughtful extension of the dynamic model of relapse they originally proposed. Stanton reviewed empirical research on the proximal role of social support in lapse events and provided a careful consideration of why interpersonal dynamics may serve as phasic processes within high-risk situations for relapse. Clearly the data provide support for an emphasis on interpersonal precipitants in the model. It is important to note that the relationship between interpersonal factors and treatment outcomes is not straightforward. The authors agree with Stanton that the dynamic relationship between interpersonal factors and relapse is an important area of future research. In general, the dynamic model of relapse that they proposed should be treated as an empirical question, and they encourage more critical thinking about, and revision of, the model. The field may benefit greatly by returning to the study of individual differences, systemic relapse processes, and the individual dynamics of treatment failure, as well as the protective factors that are predictive of treatment success. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The place of facts in a world of values: Subject and object in a postmodern world": Errata.

Reports an error in the original article by R. J. Smith (Journal of Philosophical and Theoretical Psychology, 2001[Fall], 21[2], 153-172). On pages 160, 161, 166, and 167 the subject to object relationship was reported at "S/O". The corrected representation is "S?O". (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2002-10964-004.) The value-fact or subject-object split (S-O) recently defended by H. H. Kendler (1999) as necessary for a scientific psychology to establish facts, was rejected by Gestalt psychology as reducing the person to object status. The Gestalt solution correlating principles of perceptual organization with corresponding features of the object world (S/O) has however answered poorly to the vast cultural differences found in values. Communal/dialectical psychology in agreement with a postmodern worldview, treats facts as intrinsically value-laden social constructions mediated by a society's particular social relations (S?O) Examples of fact ambiguity are illustrated, and S?O is recommended as ontologically preferable for psychology as social science and for turn-of-the-millenium psycho-ecology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

E pluribus unum.

Replies to comments on the original article by R. J. Sternberg and E. L. Grigorenko (see record 2001-10045-001), which described an approach to psychology ("unified psychology") which is a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrated study of psychological phenomena through converging operations. Sternberg and Grigorenko reply to comments by H. H. Kendler (see record 2003-03406-005), M. Y. Lau (see record 2003-03406-006), J. I. Kassinove (see record 2003-03406-007), W. Chovan (see record 2003-03406-008) and R. Chao (see record 2003-03406-009). Sternberg and Grigorenko note that the aforementioned authors disagree at least as much among themselves as they do with Sternberg and Grigorenko's proposals. Sternberg and Grigorenko provide brief replies to each published comment here. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rehabilitation Psychology, Medical Psychology, Health Psychology, and Behavioral Medicine.

In their recent article, "The Distinctiveness of Rehabilitation Psychology," Shontz and Wright (see record 1981-26520-001) attempt to differentiate rehabilitation psychology from other areas of applied and professional psychology in health settings. Although the authors' historical recounting of early research and theory in rehabilitation psychology is informative, too little emphasis is placed on the relationship between rehabilitation psychology and "mainstream" professional psychology, particularly with regard to its health-setting applications. There appear to be more similarities than differences. The authors' argument runs full circle, namely, that rehabilitation psychology is distinct because of its philosophy, but its philosophy and "principles are valuable to psychologists in many specialties" (p. 919). The notion of involving a patient in his/her care and treatment planning also is not unique to rehabilitation psychology. Shontz and Wright state that rehabilitation psychology is not medical psychology; however, instead of defining medical psychology, they go on to talk about medical care. Medical care is not medical psychology. Further confusion is added by the statement that medical psychology should be a component of rehabilitation psychology. The authors are using medical psychology, health psychology, and behavioral medicine as if they are synonymous, when they are not. Each discipline is made distinct here. Shontz and Wright do not address what the majority of psychologists in rehabilitation do, that is, provide services. In short, although the authors complain about the unfamiliarity of rehabilitation psychology relative to the profession as a whole, their article does little to promote rehabilitation psychology as an area of interest important to professional psychologists in health care and/or rehabilitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

No easy solution to subgroup differences.

Replies to comments by A. G. Bedeian (see record 2002-12457-016), G. Bocknek (see record 2002-12457-017), G. E. Zuriff (see record 2002-12457-018), and J. E. Helms (see record 2002-12457-019) on the article by P. R. Sackett, N. Schmitt, J. E. Ellingson, and M. B. Kabin (see record 2001-00625-002) which posed the dilemma of how to use tests to select for performance without excluding minority group members. The authors argue that it is difficult to envision a university that would ignore cognitive ability when making admissions decisions, as Zuriff advocated. In response to Bocknek, the authors question the validity of individual assessments to index traits such as motivation, perseverance, and problem solving. In response to Bedeian, the authors argue that society and the legal system (as it exists now) force the consideration of ascribed characteristics, and few, if any, good measures of racial identity (or intellectual diversity) exist. Finally, the authors argue that Helm's position that individuals' racial identity must be destroyed in the interest of raising their status in high-stakes testing situation is misguided. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and obfuscation in Kendler's (2005) "clarification."

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology depends on human nature.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). Kendler contrasted objective phenomena going on in the mind with phenomenological convictions. He concluded, on the basis of a thoughtful analysis, that scientific psychology cannot validate moral principles, which have to be agreed upon by discussion among educated members of a democratic community. He recommended psychological research on the consequences of social policies that may facilitate humans' decisions. I argue that research on the nature of phenomenological convictions is useful as well, enabling human beings to amend their strategies when reasoning about moral values. Scientific psychology can contribute to moral reasoning not only by examining social consequences of certain policies but also by highlighting the very process, starting from phenomenological convictions and ending in moral values within a community. Thus, psychological research contributes to the reflection of how members of a community exert their freedom and may give them the opportunity to enhance their reasoning and negotiation procedures. Scholars have to be humble and admit that the limit to this enhancement lies in the limitations of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Research on human judgment and its application to clinical practice": Response to Garb.

In response to the comment by H. N. Garb (see record 1988-18224-001) on the article by the present author (see record 1987-05373-001) concerning research on human judgment and its application, the present author refutes Garb's criticisms and maintains that many core aspects of the original argument remain untouched. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ideology of logic in contemporary psychology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler sought to resolve the methodological issue that divides much of contemporary psychology--namely, the difference between natural science and human science in their respective views of psychological life. Whereas Kendler provided an evocative historical account of conflicts over how psychology has interpreted consciousness, the force of his analysis depends on the extent to which the proverbial "is/ought" distinction, invoked any time the question of "science" is at stake, can have any meaningful purchase in the face of a radical phenomenology like that of Martin Heidegger. Regrettably, Kendler's position in the end eclipses any intention to clarify our understanding of the relationship between "natural" and "human" science. The consequence of his article will not likely resolve the controversy he put before us, but if it does nothing more than provoke further discussion, Kendler will have provided our profession with an opportunity to understand more fully this business we call psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)