Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 65(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10490-001). In this article, the second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed. The corrected table is provided in the erratum.] The false consensus effect involves adequate inductive reasoning and egocentric biases. To detect truly false consensus effects (TFCEs), item endorsements were correlated with the differences between estimated and actual consensus within Ss. In Exp 1, Ss overgeneralized from themselves to gender in-groups and to the overall population, but not to gender out-groups. Exps 2 and 3 demonstrated intuitive understanding of consensus bias. Another person's choices were inferred from that person's population estimates or estimates about the gender in-group. In Exp 4, Ss inferred that consensus estimates for a behavior were higher among people who were willing to engage in that behavior than among those who were not. Implications of these findings for general induction, social categorization, and the psychological processes underlying TFCEs are discussed. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993, Vol 65(6), 1090. The second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed and the corrected table is included.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts": Correction to Donnelly and McDaniel.

Reports an error in "Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts" by Carol M. Donnelly and Mark A. McDaniel (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993[Jul], Vol 19[4], 975-987). The captions for Figures 1 and 2 on pp. 979 and 980, respectively, were transposed. The figures and the correct captions are included in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1993-44140-001.) Four experiments compared learning of scientific concepts as expressed in either traditional literal form or through an analogy. Comprehension of basic-level details and inferential implications was measured through multiple-choice testing. In Exp 1, literal or analogical renditions were presented in textual form only. In Exp 2, text was accompanied by a dynamic video. In Exp 3, the video and text literal rendition was compared with a text-only analogical rendition. In Exp 4, Ss read only about a familiar domain. Ss consistently answered basic-level questions most accurately when concepts were expressed literally, but answered inferential questions most accurately when concepts were expressed analogically. Analysis of individual differences (Exp 2) indicated that this interaction strongly characterized the conceptual learning of science novices. The results are discussed within the framework of schema induction. [A correction to this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993, Vol 19(5), 1093. The captions for Figures 1 and 2 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The truly false consensus effect: An ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by J. Krueger and R. W. Clement (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1994[Oct], Vol 67[4], 596–610). A correction to the equation on page 605 is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in PA, Vol 82:5338.) Consensus bias is the overuse of self-related knowledge in estimating the prevalence of attributes in a population. The bias seems statistically appropriate (R. M. Dawes; see record 1989-25841-001), but according to the egocentrism hypothesis, it merely mimics normative inductive reasoning. In Exp 1, Ss made population estimates for agreement with each of 40 personality inventory statements. Even Ss who had been educated about the consensus bias, or had received feedback about actual consensus, or both showed the bias. In Exp 2, Ss attributed bias to another person, but their own consensus estimates were more affected by their own response to the item than by the other person's response. In Exp 3, there was bias even in the presence of unanimous information from 20 randomly chosen others. In all 3 experiments, Ss continued to show consensus bias despite the availability of other statistical information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Gender-related traits and gender ideology: Evidence for a multifactorial theory": Correction.

Reports errors in the original article by J. T. Spence (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993[Apr], Vol 64[4], 624–635). Several columns in Table 1 (page 630) were incorrectly labeled. The corrected table is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1993-25426-001). 95 male and 221 female college students were given 2 measures of gender-related personality traits, the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI) and the Personal Attributes Questionnaire, and 3 measures of sex role attitudes. Correlations between the personality and the attitude measures were traced to responses to the pair of negatively correlated BSRI items, masculine and feminine, thus confirming a multifactorial approach to gender, as opposed to a unifactorial gender schema theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Retrospective reports on the causes of decisions: Correction to Wright and Rip.

Reports an error in the original article by Peter Wright and Peter D. Rip (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 601-614). The first sentence on page 607 refers to the cells of Table 1 incorrectly. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1982-05780-001.) Two experiments examined a person's ability to retrieve valid memories of the causes of prior judgments of preference. In Exp I, 140 high school students and their parents judged profiled colleges in a within-S design, reported his or her reactions to the colleges' features, and guessed the reactions of the other family members. The self-reports were more accurate than the guesses by the observers, implying that the self-reports did not stem from a public theory of the actor. In Exp II, 48 high school sophomores either judged colleges after exposure to information that influenced which features drew strong reactions or received no information. Ss then received either instructions motivating careful retrieval and candid reporting of memories or ones motivating the reporting of certain reactions to impress others. The Ss motivated to try retrieval achieved higher accuracy than 24 graduate student observers who tried to infer the S's reactions from knowledge of the overt judgments. Results suggest that accurate retrieval-based reporting of earlier misjudgment reactions to attributes of a stimulus may be possible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 19(5) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10486-001). The captions for Figures 1 and 2 on pp. 979 and 980, respectively, were transposed. The figures and the correct captions are included in the erratum.] Four experiments compared learning of scientific concepts as expressed in either traditional literal form or through an analogy. Comprehension of basic-level details and inferential implications was measured through muliple-choice testing. In Exp 1, literal or analogical renditions were presented in textual form only. In Exp 2, text was accompanied by a dynamic video. In Exp 3, the video and text literal rendition was compared with a text-only analogical rendition. In Exp 4, Ss read only about a familiar domain. Ss consistently answered basic-level questions most accurately when concepts were expressed literally, but answered inferential questions most accurately when concepts were expressed analogically. Analysis of individual differences (Exp 2) indicated that this interaction strongly characterized the conceptual learning of science novices. The results are discussed within the framework of schema induction. [A correction to this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993, Vol 19(5), 1093. The captions for Figures 1 and 2 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Development of the concept of truth-functional negation": Correction to Kim.

Reports an error in "Development of the concept of truth-functional negation" by Kyung Kim (Developmental Psychology, 1985[May], Vol 21[3], 462-472). In the article, several key words were omitted from the last sentence of the Method section on page 464, column 2, third paragraph. The corrected sentence is included in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1985-25108-001.) Studied the development of the concept of truth-functional negation in 2 experiments, using 36 English-speaking children (aged 3-6 yrs) and 10 Korean-speaking children (aged 4-5 yrs) as Ss. In Exp I, English-speaking Ss were given a sentence-variation task in which the following 4 sentence types were used to describe 36 pictures of common items: true affirmative, false affirmative, true negative (TN), and false negative. The results show that a majority of Ss under 5 yrs had difficulty with negative sentences, particularly TN sentences, indicating a lack of explicit understanding of truth-functional negation as defined in logic. In Exp II, a cross-linguistic replication of Exp I was attempted with Korean-speaking Ss. Despite some cross-linguistic differences in the negation system, the Korean-speaking Ss showed essentially the same pattern of results, suggesting that the development in question proceeds within the general limit set by the general cognitive development. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Gender characteristics and adjustment: A longitudinal study": Addendum.

Reports an error in "Gender characteristics and adjustment: A longitudinal study" by Jennifer Aubé and Richard Koestner (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1992[Sep], Vol 63[3], 485-493). The authors would like to acknowledge that the age 41 longitudinal data used in their study were collected by David McClelland, Carol Franz, Joel Weinberger, Richard Koestner, and Joseph Healy. This data collection was supported by a grant from the Seaver Institute. The data are currently being archived at the Henry Murray Research Center of Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Massachusetts. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1993-01033-001.) Used a prospective longitudinal design to investigate the long-term developmental implications of gender-related interests and traits. Archival data were available for Ss in the R. R. Sears et al (1957) study. Men, who at age 12 yrs endorsed interests and undesirable traits more typically associated with women, had poorer social–personal adjustment at ages 31 and 41 yrs. No effects were found for women. Feminine expressive traits at age 31 yrs did not impact on 41-yr-old adjustment for either men or women, whereas masculine instrumental traits were positively related for both. These findings support a multidimensional view of gender and indicate that harsher consequences follow when adolescent boys endorse nontraditional gender-related interests and undesirable traits than when girls do so. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Effects of aerobic exercise on cognitive and psychosocial functioning in patients with mild hypertension": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by T. W. Pierce et al (Health Psychology, 1993[Jul], Vol 12[4], 286–291). Table 4, which was inadvertently excluded, is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1993-46609-001.) The effects of 16 wks of physical exercise training on the psychological functioning of 90 patients with mild hypertension were examined. At baseline and after 16 wks of training, patients completed a psychometric test battery that included objective measures of neuropsychological performance and standardized self-report measures of psychosocial functioning. Patients were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups: aerobic exercise, strength training and flexibility exercise, or a waiting list control group. After training, there were no group differences on any of the psychological measures, even though patients who engaged in exercise perceived themselves as functioning better in a number of psychological domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of the concept of truth-functional negation.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 22(1) of Developmental Psychology (see record 2008-10957-001). In the article, several key words were omitted from the last sentence of the Method section on page 464, column 2, third paragraph. The corrected sentence is included in the erratum.] Studied the development of the concept of truth-functional negation in 2 experiments, using 36 English-speaking children (aged 3–6 yrs) and 10 Korean-speaking children (aged 4–5 yrs) as Ss. In Exp I, English-speaking Ss were given a sentence-variation task in which the following 4 sentence types were used to describe 36 pictures of common items: true affirmative, false affirmative, true negative (TN), and false negative. The results show that a majority of Ss under 5 yrs had difficulty with negative sentences, particularly TN sentences, indicating a lack of explicit understanding of truth-functional negation as defined in logic. In Exp II, a cross-linguistic replication of Exp I was attempted with Korean-speaking Ss. Despite some cross-linguistic differences in the negation system, the Korean-speaking Ss showed essentially the same pattern of results, suggesting that the development in question proceeds within the general limit set by the general cognitive development. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Gender differences in interaction style and influence": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by L. L. Carli (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, [Apr] Vol 56[4], 565–576). On page 567, the 3rd sentence in the Procedure section should read, "Half of the subjects were paired with same-sex partners and half with opposite-sex partners, resulting in 16 female pairs, 16 male pairs, and 32 mixed-sex pairs.' On page 568, the equation at the bottom of the left-hand column should read as follows: (Mfs?–?Mms?–?Mfm?+?Mmm)/((2MSe?+ &2MS′e)(1/n))?. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1989-25837-001.) Observed 128 Ss in mixed- and same-sex dyads to examine effects of interaction on sex differences in influence. Ss discussed 2 topics on which they disagreed. During the 2nd discussion, 1 S in each pair was told to influence the other. Ss showed more agreement and positive social behavior when paired with a woman and more disagreement and task behavior when paired with a man. Although… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Type A behavior pattern and emotion expression in younger and older adults": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by C. Malatesta-Magai et al (Psychology & Aging, 1992[Dec], Vol 7[4], 551–561). A citation that was inadvertently omitted from the original article is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1993-17168-001.) 80 younger (M?=?28 yrs) and 80 older (>50 yrs, M?=?69 yrs) Type A and Type B Ss were evaluated for Type A behavior pattern using the Structured Interview (SI) and given personality tests for anxiety, depression, anger, aggression, hostility, and anger-in–anger-out. Ss also underwent an emotion induction procedure. Videotapes of the emotion induction procedure (N?=?160) and the SI (N?=?80) were coded for facial expression of emotion. Type As did not differ from Bs on anxiety or depression but did on anger and aggression. Type As showed anger inhibition and anger bound to shame, as predicted by emotion socialization theory. The greatest number of differential effects were observed between age groups. Older individuals, in general, were more emotionally expressive than younger Ss across a range of emotions. Women appeared more conflicted about anger expression than men, and Type A women more so than Type A men. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences": Correction to Winter and Uleman.

Reports an error in "When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences" by Laraine Winter and James S. Uleman (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1984[Aug], Vol 47[2], 237-252). There are errors in the labeling of Figure 1 on p. 244. The ordinate percentages should be three times greater than indicated. In addition, the algebraic formula in the note for Table 2 on p. 245 is incorrect. The correct ordinate percentages and the correct algebraic formula are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1985-01259-001.) Adapted E. Tulving and D. M. Thomson's (see record 2005-09647-002) encoding specificity paradigm for 2 recall experiments with 153 undergraduates to investigate whether Ss would make trait inferences without intentions or instructions at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information. Under memory instructions only, Ss read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, Ss recalled each sentence under 1 of 3 cuing conditions: a dispositional cue (e.g., generous); a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or no cue. Results show that recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Ss were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, findings indicate that Ss unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. It is suggested that attributions are made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 78(4) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2007-17406-001). In this article, Table 3 (p. 987) contained an error. The row "Number of subgroups" was inadvertently omitted. The corrected table appears in this erratum.] Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 50(2) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10962-001). There are errors in the labeling of Figure 1 on p. 244. The ordinate percentages should be three times greater than indicated. In addition, the algebraic formula in the note for Table 2 on p. 245 is incorrect. The correct ordinate percentages and the correct algebraic formula are provided in the erratum.] Adapted E. Tulving and D. M. Thomson's (see record 2005-09647-002) encoding specificity paradigm for 2 recall experiments with 153 undergraduates to investigate whether Ss would make trait inferences without intentions or instructions at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information. Under memory instructions only, Ss read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, Ss recalled each sentence under 1 of 3 cuing conditions: a dispositional cue (e.g., generous); a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or no cue. Results show that recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Ss were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, findings indicate that Ss unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. It is suggested that attributions are made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology: Erratum.

Reports an error in the Table of Contents of the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1973[Apr], Vol 40[2]. In the Table of Contents for this issue, the authors of the first article "Some Sources of Variance in 'Accurate Empathy' Ratings' should read Larry E. Beutler, Dale T. Johnson, Charles W. Neville, Jr., and Samuel N. Workman. Dr. Johnson's name was omitted inadvertently. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Effects of optimism, pessimism, and trait anxiety on ambulatory blood pressure and mood during everyday life": Correction to R?ikk?nen et al. (1999).

Reports an error in the original article by K. R?ikk?nen et al (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 76(1), 104–113). Table 4 on page 111 contained an error. The 4 sets of column heads ("Adjusted" and "Unadjusted") were inadvertently transposed. The corrected table is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1999-00166-008): This study tested whether dispositional measures of optimism, pessimism, and anxiety affected ambulatory blood pressure (BP) and mood and whether any cardiovascular effects of dispositions were moderated by mood. Pessimistic and anxious adults had higher BP levels and felt more negative and less positive than did optimists or low anxious adults throughout the monitoring. The few times that optimists did feel negative were associated with levels of BP as high as those observed among pessimists or anxious individuals, regardless of their mood. To the extent that trait anxiety measures neuroticism, these findings suggest that neuroticism is directly related to health indicators rather than simply to illness behavior. Furthermore, the results suggest that pessimism has broad physiological and psychological consequences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributions and disability acceptance following traumatic injury: A replication and extension.

(This reprinted article originally appeared in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1977, Vol 35 [5], 351–363. The following abstract of the original article appeared in PA, Vol 62:3939.) Examined the relation between victims' attributions of causality for their accidents and their ability to cope with severe misfortune. A total of 29 individuals who had been paralyzed in serious accidents between the ages of 16 and 35 yrs were intensively interviewed. Individuals were selected who had been injured either 1–4 or 8–22 mo prior to the interview. Both quantitative and open-ended questions were used to elicit attributions of blame and causality by Ss; coping scores were obtained from a social worker and a nurse familiar with each case. Findings suggest that blaming another and feeling that one could have avoided the accident were successful predictors of poor coping; self-blame was a successful predictor of good coping. The question "Why me?" was posed by all Ss, and 28 of the 29 Ss offered to explain why the accident had happened to them. Their responses seemed to illustrate their need for meaning in explaining the selective incidence of the accident. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The distressed psychologist: Prevalence and treatment considerations": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by R. W. Thoreson et al (Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 1989[June], Vol 20[3], 153–258). On page 156, a variable was left out of Table 2. A corrected table is given. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1989-34534-001.) Investigated the level and types of distress in a sample of 379 psychologists, using survey methodology. Overall, Ss were healthy and satisfied with work and interpersonal relationships. 10% of Ss experienced distress in the areas of depression, marital/relationship, physical illness, alcohol use, and loneliness. A distress band was calculated and ranged from 9% for multiple categories to 19% for single categories of distress. A subsample of Ss in distress from alcohol use was characterized by use of controlled drinking strategies… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)