Social comparison and depression: Company's effect on misery.

Two studies examined the social comparison processes of 50 depressed and 48 nondepressed college students selected on the basis of their scores on the Beck Depression Inventory. In the 1st study, Ss' preferences for information from others were assessed after they had received a manipulation intended to improve or worsen their mood states. The responses of the depressed Ss provide evidence of downward comparison: They indicate a preference for information from people who were experiencing negative affect, but only when they themselves were also experiencing relatively negative affect, not when their moods had been temporarily improved. In the 2nd study, Ss' moods were assessed before and after they had received information indicating another person was currently experiencing highly negative affect. This information had little effect on the nondepressed Ss; however, the mood states of the depressed Ss improved after they read the information. Results suggest that realizing that others are doing worse may help depressed persons to feel somewhat better. (38 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self–other judgments and perceived vulnerability to victimization.

Previous studies have shown that people who have not been victimized by negative life events tend to perceive themselves as less vulnerable than others to victimization. The present 2 studies examined the conditions under which Ss' judgments of others' vulnerability would differ from judgments of their own vulnerability. In Study 1, 101 undergraduates saw vague comparison targets (either the average person or the average college student) as more vulnerable than themselves to 10 negative events. In contrast, Ss perceived a specific target (their closest friend, sibling, or same-sex parent) as equally invulnerable as themselves. In Study 2, 190 Ss who were instructed to consider a vague, abstract target (either the average college student or one of their friends) made downward comparisons, choosing a real or hypothetical other who was especially vulnerable to a particular event. Ss who were instructed to consider a specific, concrete target (their closest friend) perceived no self–other differences in risk status. It is concluded that when given the opportunity, Ss actively engage in downward comparisons, thereby seeing themselves as relatively invulnerable. Whereas vague targets facilitate downward comparisons, specific targets make such comparisons more difficult. Both cognitive and motivational mechanisms underlying such downward comparisons are discussed. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

For better and for worse: Everyday social comparisons between romantic partners.

The authors examined the frequency, direction, and impact of social comparisons between romantic partners. Comparisons were expected to occur on a daily basis, owing to regular interactions between partners. To the extent that one empathizes and shares outcomes with one's partner, one might respond more positively to upward than to downward comparisons. Study 1a was an experience-sampling study in which participants reported comparisons made to their spouse over 2 weeks. Study 1b examined reactions to the most significant comparisons made during the experience-sampling study. Participants reported making comparisons to their romantic partner more than once a day on average and experienced more positive responses to upward than to downward comparisons. Study 2 demonstrated that participants empathized and shared outcomes with their partner to a greater extent than with a friend. Study 3 confirmed that participants responded more positively to upward than to downward comparisons even for domains high in self-relevance and even when the comparison had negative self-evaluative implications. These results suggest that, owing to higher levels of empathy and shared fate with partners, comparisons function differently in romantic than in other relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Internal comparisons in everyday life.

According to the internal/external frame of reference (I/E) model (H. W. Marsh, 1986), students not only compare their own abilities in a domain with those of other students (social comparison), they also compare their own achievements in different domains (internal comparison). The main purpose of this study was to investigate internal comparison processes in everyday life using an introspective methodology. Over 2 weeks, 67 university students (Study 1) and 65 high school students (Study 2) using a diary instrument recorded more upward than downward internal comparisons, most of them triggered by academic achievement situations. In both studies, multilevel analyses showed links between the direction of comparison and affective state: (a) upward internal comparisons were associated with negative mood states; (b) downward internal comparisons were associated with positive mood states; (c) upward internal comparisons increased positive and decreased negative mood states; (d) downward internal comparisons decreased positive and increased negative mood states. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mood as a moderator of acceptance of interpersonal feedback.

Two studies demonstrated that feedback is likely to be accepted when its affective tone matches an individual's mood state. In Study 1, Ss in an induced positive mood were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of positive feedback, whereas Ss in an induced negative mood were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of negative feedback. In Study 2, after a neutral mood induction, nondepressed Ss were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of positive feedback, whereas depressed Ss were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of negative feedback. After a positive mood induction, both nondepressed and depressed Ss were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of positive feedback. These results suggest that motivations for self-enhancement or self-consistency do not generally underlie acceptance of feedback. Instead, a model of accessibility of information in memory is proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social comparison in adjustment to breast cancer.

Investigated 4 theoretical perspectives concerning the role of social comparison in coping with a threatening event, using 78 29–78 yr old females with breast cancer as Ss. It is noted that, according to the supercoper perspective, personal contact with comparison others is often unavailable to patients; in addition, contact with media supercopers (fellow victims presented as adjusting smoothly) may make patients feel inadequate by comparison. According to the similarity perspective, patients select comparison targets who are similar to themselves because those comparisons should be the most informative. The upward comparison perspective is predictive of comparisons to relatively advantaged or superior individuals. The downward comparison perspective leads to the prediction that, under conditions of threat, individuals make comparisons to people who are inferior or less fortunate in order to enhance their self-esteem. Ss were interviewed to determine which perspective had the most validity in terms of their experience with closed-ended questions. Ss offered spontaneous comparisons throughout the interview. Both closed-ended questions and spontaneously offered comparisons yielded a preponderance of downward comparisons. Findings support the value of using naturalistic methods for studying comparisons and suggest a more active and cognitive role for social comparison than is usually portrayed. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-esteem, mood, and self-evaluation: Changes in mood and the way you see you.

Three studies found that self-esteem moderates the relation between mood and self-evaluation. In Study 1, a standard mood-induction procedure was used to induce positive, negative, or neutral moods in low self-esteem (LSE) Ss and high self-esteem Ss. Afterward, Ss evaluated their specific qualities and characteristics (e.g., How smart are you? How kind are you?). Both self-esteem groups evaluated themselves favorably in a positive mood, but LSE Ss were more apt to lower their self-evaluations in a negative mood. Study 2 found a similar, though weaker, pattern using a noncognitive, musical mood induction; Study 3 found that these effects occur with variations in naturally occurring mood over a 6-wk period. The authors suggest that the tendency for LSE people to respond to negative mood with self-depreciation contributes to psychological distress. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From Seeing to Being: Subliminal Social Comparisons Affect Implicit and Explicit Self-Evaluations.

The authors hypothesize that social comparisons can have automatic influences on self-perceptions. This was tested by determining whether subliminal exposure to comparison information influences implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Study 1 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information increased the accessibility of the self. Study 2 revealed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information resulted in a contrast effect on explicit self-evaluation. Study 3 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information affects self-evaluations more easily than it affects mood or evaluations of other people. Studies 4 and 5 replicated these self-evaluation effects and extended them to implicit measures. Study 6 showed that automatic comparisons are responsive to a person's perceptual needs, such that they only occur when people are uncertain about themselves. Implications for theories of social cognition, judgment, and comparison are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The affective consequences of social comparison: Either direction has its ups and downs.

Research on social comparison processes has assumed that a comparison in a given direction (upward or downward) will lead to a particular affective reaction. In contrast, the present 2 studies proposed and found that a comparison can produce either positive or negative feelings about oneself, independent of its direction. Several factors moderated the tendency to derive positive or negative affect from upward and downward comparisons. In Study 1, cancer patients low in self-esteem and with low perceived control over their symptoms and illness were more likely to see downward comparisons as having negative implications for themselves. Those low in self-esteem were also more likely to perceive upward comparisons as negative. In Study 2, individuals with high marital dissatisfaction and those who felt uncertain about their marital relationship were more likely to experience negative affect from upward and downward comparisons. The implications of these findings for social comparison theory and for the coping and adaptation literature are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mood and the formation of attitudes.

Conducted 2 studies to examine how mood influences the attitudes formed by 72 undergraduates (Study 1) and 45 undergraduates (Study 2). After reading the Velten mood induction cards, Ss were presented with positive and negative belief statements about an unfamiliar attitude object. Measures of attitudes, statements recalled, and evaluations of statements were taken. In both studies, mood was shown to influence attitudes. Moreover, in Study 1, Ss evaluated both positive and negative statements in line with their mood. These results are consistent with the research of D. M. Mackie and L. T. Worth (see record 1989-31851-001) on the effects of positive mood on persuasion and suggest that negative mood may also operate to encourage the use of heuristic processing of information. No evidence was found for a mood-congruity effect in either study. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affect and stereotyping: The effect of induced mood on distinctiveness-based illusory correlations.

In 2 studies, the effects of mood on the formation of distinctiveness-based illusory correlations were examined. After exposure to stimuli inducing positive, neutral, or negative mood, Ss read information about behaviors performed by members of 2 groups in an illusory correlation paradigm. In both experiments, only Ss in a neutral mood formed illusory correlations. In addition, Exp 2 assessed Ss' processing latencies as a means of investigating differential attention to distinctive behaviors. Only Ss in a neutral mood differentially attended to the minority group's infrequent behaviors. Induced mood apparently interfered with the processing necessary to differentially encode distinctive stimuli, undermining the illusory correlation effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Prospective and cross-sectional mood reports offer no evidence of a "blue Monday" phenomenon.

Conducted 3 studies, 2 using prospective and 1 using cross-sectional methods, to examine mood variation in married men over the days of the week. In Study 1, 46 Ss (mean age 42 yrs) kept a record of daily events, illnesses, and moods for 90 consecutive days. In Study 2, 58 Ss (mean age 43 yrs) also kept records, but for 112 days; severe dysphoric mood was also measured. 57 Ss in Study 2 also were asked on the telephone about which days of the week were worst and best for their mood. 21 Ss from this study also participated in a study in which they reported on their mood 5 times/day for 2 wks. In Study 3, 616 Ss (aged 18–60 yrs) completed 1 depressed mood scale. Although Ss thought that their mood was lowest on Monday, mood measures collected on a daily basis did not support the belief. Monday's mood was not different than mood on Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, but positive mood was higher and negative mood was lower on the weekend; measures of depressed mood did not vary by day of the week. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inoculation by emotion: Effects of positive emotional states on children's reactions to social comparison.

90 five- and 6-yr-old children, equally divided by sex, were assigned randomly to 1 of 3 emotion-inducing conditions: self-focused happy, other-focused happy, or neutral. After the emotion induction, the Ss experienced social comparisons in which the peer received more, fewer, or an equal number of rewards. It is suggested that ratings of facial expressions after the emotion inductions confirmed that Ss in the self- or other-focused conditions were equally happy and significantly happier than Ss in the neutral condition. Furthermore, all Ss accurately recalled the reward outcome of the social comparison experience. As predicted, when Ss received relatively fewer rewards, they displayed reduced generosity toward others except when this negative inequality had followed the induction of a self-focused happy mood. Results are discussed in terms of the cognitive processes initiated by emotional states that may influence tolerance for aversive experiences. Particular attention is given to the role of cognitive loops, selective attention, and tacit comparison processes initiated by emotional states and social comparisons. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerability: How magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy influence affect.

Two studies with 129 undergraduates examined whether the type of emotional change experienced by individuals is influenced by the magnitude and accessibility of the different types of self-discrepancies they possess. In both studies, Ss filled out a measure of self-discrepancy a few weeks prior to the experimental session. Ss were asked to list up to 10 attributes each for their actual self, their ideal self (their own or others' hopes and goals for them), and their ought self (their own or others' beliefs about their duty and obligations). In Study 1, Ss asked to imagine a positive or negative event who had a predominant actual–ideal discrepancy felt more dejected on a mood measure and wrote more slowly on a writing-speed task in the negative event condition than in the positive event condition. Ss with a predominant actual–ought discrepancy felt more agitated and wrote more quickly in the negative event condition. In Study 2, Ss high or low in both kinds of discrepancies were either asked to discuss their own and their parents' hopes and goals for them (ideal priming) or asked to discuss their own and their parents' beliefs concerning their duty and obligations (ought priming). For high-discrepancy Ss, ideal priming increased their dejection, whereas ought priming increased their agitation. (59 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Observers and participants in an intergroup setting.

High- and low-self-esteem participant and observer (control) Ss received feedback about the performance of in-groups and out-groups. Self-evaluations and evaluations of the groups were assessed. Results suggest that participant group members (vs observers) enhance evaluations of both groups under conditions of failure feedback. Intergroup bias was obtained over and above these effects for participant high-self-esteem Ss. However, participant low-self-esteem Ss favored failing out-groups. Results suggest that individuals with different levels of self-esteem may differ in terms of their inferred status within groups. Intragroup comparisons may then influence one's choice of group for social identification. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of mood states, costs, and benefits on helping.

263 college students participated in a factorial experiment designed to test the hypotheses that mood states interact with costs and with benefits in determining helping. Positive and negative mood states were induced by varying the difficulty of a bogus aptitude test; neutral-mood (control) Ss did not take the test. Benefits for helping were manipulated by asking Ss to collect donations for a worthwhile charity (the American Cancer Society) or to a less worthwhile charity (Little League baseball). In the high-costs-for-helping condition, Ss were asked to collect donations by going door to door, whereas in the low-cost condition, Ss were asked to sit at donations desks. Pretests indicated that the manipulations effectively induced the intended mood states, costs, and benefits. The results generally support the hypotheses. Positive-mood Ss volunteered more than neutral-mood Ss, and whether negative-mood Ss volunteered more or less than neutral-mood Ss depended on the costs and benefits. It is suggested that the seemingly conflicting results of previous investigations of negative mood and helping can be explained by interactions of mood states with costs and with benefits. (21 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of induced mood on self-reported life events and perceived and received social support.

Tested the relation between mood (depressed [D], elated [E], or neutral [N]), induced by the Velten (1968) procedure, and college students' responses on a subjectively scored life events questionnaire and measures of perceived and received social support. A manipulation check showed that the mood manipulation was successful. There was a significant mood effect on the number of self-reported negative life events, with E Ss reporting the fewest. However, mood had no significant effect on the number of self-reported positive life events or the rated intensity of negative and positive events. Mood had a significant effect on perceived social support, with D Ss scoring the lowest. Self-report of received social support, however, was not affected by the mood manipulation. The findings challenge the widespread use of life event and perceived social support questionnaires whose independence from a mood-related response bias has not been adequately demonstrated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-esteem and clarity of the self-concept.

This article examines the association between evaluative and knowledge components of the self. Four studies tested the hypothesis that the self-concepts of low-self-esteem (LSE) people are characterized by less clarity or certainty than those of high-self-esteem (HSE) people. LSE Ss exhibited less extremity and self-reported confidence when rating themselves on bipolar trait adjectives (Study 1), less temporal stability in their trait ratings over a 2-month interval (Study 2), less congruence between their self-concepts and their subsequent perceptions of situation-specific behavior and memory for prior behavior (Study 3), and less internal consistency, lower self-rated confidence, and longer reaction times when making me/not me responses to pairs of opposite traits (Study 4). Alternative accounts of the results and the implications of self-concept clarity for understanding the pervasive impact of self-esteem on behavior are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Influence of mood on health-relevant cognitions.

Three experiments assessed the effects of mood on symptom appraisal, health behavior self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and perceptions of vulnerability. Ss in Experiments 1 and 2 were acutely ill, whereas Ss in Experiment 3 were healthy. In each experiment, happy, sad, and neutral moods were induced. In Experiment 1, Ss who experienced sadness reported more aches and pains and greater discomfort than happy Ss. Sad Ss were less confident that they could carry out illness-alleviating behaviors. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that mood's influence of vulnerability perceptions is moderated by health status. Although mood had little impact on perceptions of vulnerability among ill Ss, probability estimates of future negative health-relevant events among healthy Ss were mood sensitive. Seeing oneself as invulnerable to future negative events was accentuated among happy Ss and attenuated among sad Ss. Mood may be an important determinant of care seeking, adherence, and recovery from illness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)