"Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect": Correction to Krueger and Zeiger.

Reports an error in "Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect" by Joachim Krueger and Joanna S. Zeiger (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993[Oct], Vol 65[4], 670-680). In this article, the second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed. The corrected table is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1994-33435-001.) The false consensus effect involves adequate inductive reasoning and egocentric biases. To detect truly false consensus effects (TFCEs), item endorsements were correlated with the differences between estimated and actual consensus within Ss. In Exp 1, Ss overgeneralized from themselves to gender in-groups and to the overall population, but not to gender out-groups. Exps 2 and 3 demonstrated intuitive understanding of consensus bias. Another person's choices were inferred from that person's population estimates or estimates about the gender in-group. In Exp 4, Ss inferred that consensus estimates for a behavior were higher among people who were willing to engage in that behavior than among those who were not. Implications of these findings for general induction, social categorization, and the psychological processes underlying TFCEs are discussed. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993, Vol 65(6), 1090. The second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed and the corrected table is included.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 19(5) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10486-001). The captions for Figures 1 and 2 on pp. 979 and 980, respectively, were transposed. The figures and the correct captions are included in the erratum.] Four experiments compared learning of scientific concepts as expressed in either traditional literal form or through an analogy. Comprehension of basic-level details and inferential implications was measured through muliple-choice testing. In Exp 1, literal or analogical renditions were presented in textual form only. In Exp 2, text was accompanied by a dynamic video. In Exp 3, the video and text literal rendition was compared with a text-only analogical rendition. In Exp 4, Ss read only about a familiar domain. Ss consistently answered basic-level questions most accurately when concepts were expressed literally, but answered inferential questions most accurately when concepts were expressed analogically. Analysis of individual differences (Exp 2) indicated that this interaction strongly characterized the conceptual learning of science novices. The results are discussed within the framework of schema induction. [A correction to this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993, Vol 19(5), 1093. The captions for Figures 1 and 2 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of the concept of truth-functional negation.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 22(1) of Developmental Psychology (see record 2008-10957-001). In the article, several key words were omitted from the last sentence of the Method section on page 464, column 2, third paragraph. The corrected sentence is included in the erratum.] Studied the development of the concept of truth-functional negation in 2 experiments, using 36 English-speaking children (aged 3–6 yrs) and 10 Korean-speaking children (aged 4–5 yrs) as Ss. In Exp I, English-speaking Ss were given a sentence-variation task in which the following 4 sentence types were used to describe 36 pictures of common items: true affirmative, false affirmative, true negative (TN), and false negative. The results show that a majority of Ss under 5 yrs had difficulty with negative sentences, particularly TN sentences, indicating a lack of explicit understanding of truth-functional negation as defined in logic. In Exp II, a cross-linguistic replication of Exp I was attempted with Korean-speaking Ss. Despite some cross-linguistic differences in the negation system, the Korean-speaking Ss showed essentially the same pattern of results, suggesting that the development in question proceeds within the general limit set by the general cognitive development. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 78(4) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2007-17406-001). In this article, Table 3 (p. 987) contained an error. The row "Number of subgroups" was inadvertently omitted. The corrected table appears in this erratum.] Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts": Correction to Donnelly and McDaniel.

Reports an error in "Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts" by Carol M. Donnelly and Mark A. McDaniel (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993[Jul], Vol 19[4], 975-987). The captions for Figures 1 and 2 on pp. 979 and 980, respectively, were transposed. The figures and the correct captions are included in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1993-44140-001.) Four experiments compared learning of scientific concepts as expressed in either traditional literal form or through an analogy. Comprehension of basic-level details and inferential implications was measured through multiple-choice testing. In Exp 1, literal or analogical renditions were presented in textual form only. In Exp 2, text was accompanied by a dynamic video. In Exp 3, the video and text literal rendition was compared with a text-only analogical rendition. In Exp 4, Ss read only about a familiar domain. Ss consistently answered basic-level questions most accurately when concepts were expressed literally, but answered inferential questions most accurately when concepts were expressed analogically. Analysis of individual differences (Exp 2) indicated that this interaction strongly characterized the conceptual learning of science novices. The results are discussed within the framework of schema induction. [A correction to this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993, Vol 19(5), 1093. The captions for Figures 1 and 2 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotional disclosure about traumas and its relation to health: Effects of previous disclosure and trauma severity.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 63(2) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10509-001). In the article, a sentence was incorrect. The corrected sentence is included in the erratum.] Sought to replicate previous findings that disclosing traumas improves physical health and to compare the effects of revealing previously disclosed vs undisclosed traumas. According to inhibition theory, reporting about undisclosed traumas should produce greater health benefits. 60 healthy undergraduates wrote about undisclosed traumas, previously disclosed traumas, or trivial events. Contrary to expectations, there were no significant between-groups differences on longer term health utilization and physical symptom measures. However, Ss who disclosed more severe traumas reported fewer physical symptoms in the months following the study, compared with low-severity trauma Ss, and tended to report fewer symptoms than control Ss. Results suggest that health benefits occur when severe traumas are disclosed, regardless of whether previous disclosure has occurred. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The truly false consensus effect: An ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by J. Krueger and R. W. Clement (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1994[Oct], Vol 67[4], 596–610). A correction to the equation on page 605 is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in PA, Vol 82:5338.) Consensus bias is the overuse of self-related knowledge in estimating the prevalence of attributes in a population. The bias seems statistically appropriate (R. M. Dawes; see record 1989-25841-001), but according to the egocentrism hypothesis, it merely mimics normative inductive reasoning. In Exp 1, Ss made population estimates for agreement with each of 40 personality inventory statements. Even Ss who had been educated about the consensus bias, or had received feedback about actual consensus, or both showed the bias. In Exp 2, Ss attributed bias to another person, but their own consensus estimates were more affected by their own response to the item than by the other person's response. In Exp 3, there was bias even in the presence of unanimous information from 20 randomly chosen others. In all 3 experiments, Ss continued to show consensus bias despite the availability of other statistical information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Temporal measures of vocalization: Some methodological considerations.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 48(2) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10973-001). The copyright notice was inadvertently omitted. The notice that should have appeared on the first page of this article is provided in the erratum.] Five studies—with 164 university students, 56 military personnel, and 4 elderly persons—examined methodological issues associated with temporal measures of vocalization. The simple measures of phonation, silence, and interrupt and measures of silence relative to phonation were found to be sensitive to task and emotional factors and were stable across experience. A procedure for analyzing interviews is presented, and potential applications of the temporal measures are discussed. (46 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 50(2) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10962-001). There are errors in the labeling of Figure 1 on p. 244. The ordinate percentages should be three times greater than indicated. In addition, the algebraic formula in the note for Table 2 on p. 245 is incorrect. The correct ordinate percentages and the correct algebraic formula are provided in the erratum.] Adapted E. Tulving and D. M. Thomson's (see record 2005-09647-002) encoding specificity paradigm for 2 recall experiments with 153 undergraduates to investigate whether Ss would make trait inferences without intentions or instructions at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information. Under memory instructions only, Ss read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, Ss recalled each sentence under 1 of 3 cuing conditions: a dispositional cue (e.g., generous); a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or no cue. Results show that recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Ss were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, findings indicate that Ss unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. It is suggested that attributions are made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Snatching Defeat From the Jaws of Victory: Self-Esteem Differences in the Experience and Anticipation of Success.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 90(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2007-16792-001). There are typographical errors in Table 2 (certain values should not have been in bold face). The corrected table is provided in the erratum.] Successes--defined broadly as meeting important standards or receiving positive evaluations--are widely assumed to be enjoyed equally by people with high self-esteem (HSEs) and low self-esteem (LSEs). Three studies examined the contradictory hypothesis that HSEs react more favorably to success than do LSEs and that success brings about certain unfavorable consequences for LSEs. Undergraduate participants reacted to a laboratory-manipulated success (Studies 1 and 2) or imagined highly positive events in the future (Study 3). Self-esteem differences emerged in anxiety, thoughts about the self, and (in Study 3) thoughts about non-self-related aspects of the event. LSEs were more anxious than HSEs after succeeding, success improved HSEs' self-relevant thoughts but not LSEs', and LSEs focused more on success's negative aspects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does reward increase or decrease creativity?

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 67(1) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10477-001). In the aforementioned article, Figures 1 and 2 were interchanged. The figures appear with their correct captions in the erratum.] Two studies involving 504 school children investigated why behaviorists and cognitively oriented investigators have come to opposite conclusions about reward's effects on creativity. A monetary reward for a high degree of divergent thought in 1 task (word construction) increased children's subsequent originality in a different task (picture drawing). The same reward, made contingent on a low degree of divergent thought, reduced this generalized originality. These effects were eliminated by using a large reward and were restored by keeping the large reward out of the children's sight. The results suggest that reward training increases generalized creativity when (1) a high degree of divergent thought is required and (2) the reward is presented in not too salient a fashion. The findings are consistent with a 2-factor interpretation of rewarded creativity effects that incorporates learned industriousness and selective attention. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1994(Jul), Vol 67(1), 125. Figures 1 and 2 were interchanged.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Situational and transituational determinants of adolescent self-feelings.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 50(2) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10959-001). In regards to the article, in a reanalysis of Savin-Williams and Demo's data, Schilling found that within-subject and between-subject effects in analysis of variance were not differentiated and that consequently several findings were in error. Details of the reanalysis and the corrected findings are included in the erratum.] Employing a new self-report technique (paging devices), this study assessed the self-feelings of 35 adolescents (mean age 13.3 yrs) in various naturalistic contexts. Regression analysis was used to assess the stability of self-feelings. Ss fell into 3 groups: stable, oscillating, and unpredictable (the largest). For the sample as a whole, self-feelings were not influenced by the immediate context, although specific settings, activities, and others present within the contexts elicited various levels of self-feelings. More crucial for predicting the self-feelings were such enduring characteristics as sex, social class, pubertal maturation, stability group, birth order, and number of siblings. The authors argue for a baseline conceptualization of adolescent self-conception from which fluctuations occur. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Retrospective reports on the causes of decisions: Correction to Wright and Rip.

Reports an error in the original article by Peter Wright and Peter D. Rip (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 601-614). The first sentence on page 607 refers to the cells of Table 1 incorrectly. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1982-05780-001.) Two experiments examined a person's ability to retrieve valid memories of the causes of prior judgments of preference. In Exp I, 140 high school students and their parents judged profiled colleges in a within-S design, reported his or her reactions to the colleges' features, and guessed the reactions of the other family members. The self-reports were more accurate than the guesses by the observers, implying that the self-reports did not stem from a public theory of the actor. In Exp II, 48 high school sophomores either judged colleges after exposure to information that influenced which features drew strong reactions or received no information. Ss then received either instructions motivating careful retrieval and candid reporting of memories or ones motivating the reporting of certain reactions to impress others. The Ss motivated to try retrieval achieved higher accuracy than 24 graduate student observers who tried to infer the S's reactions from knowledge of the overt judgments. Results suggest that accurate retrieval-based reporting of earlier misjudgment reactions to attributes of a stimulus may be possible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Development of the concept of truth-functional negation": Correction to Kim.

Reports an error in "Development of the concept of truth-functional negation" by Kyung Kim (Developmental Psychology, 1985[May], Vol 21[3], 462-472). In the article, several key words were omitted from the last sentence of the Method section on page 464, column 2, third paragraph. The corrected sentence is included in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1985-25108-001.) Studied the development of the concept of truth-functional negation in 2 experiments, using 36 English-speaking children (aged 3-6 yrs) and 10 Korean-speaking children (aged 4-5 yrs) as Ss. In Exp I, English-speaking Ss were given a sentence-variation task in which the following 4 sentence types were used to describe 36 pictures of common items: true affirmative, false affirmative, true negative (TN), and false negative. The results show that a majority of Ss under 5 yrs had difficulty with negative sentences, particularly TN sentences, indicating a lack of explicit understanding of truth-functional negation as defined in logic. In Exp II, a cross-linguistic replication of Exp I was attempted with Korean-speaking Ss. Despite some cross-linguistic differences in the negation system, the Korean-speaking Ss showed essentially the same pattern of results, suggesting that the development in question proceeds within the general limit set by the general cognitive development. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clinical significance of psychotherapy for unipolar depression: A meta-analytic approach to social comparison.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 55(3) of Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (see record 2008-10745-001). The data presented in Table 2 were incorrect because a row and a column were inadvertently omitted. The corrected Table 2 appears in the erratum.] This study used meta-analysis to study the clinical significance of psychotherapy for symptoms of unipolar depression. The following questions were addressed: How similar is the posttherapy adjustment of depressed adults to that of nondepressed adults? Is this adjustment maintained at follow-up? What dimensions of treatment, therapists, or design are associated with clinical significance? Using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), we calculated composite BDI norms from 28 published studies. Sixty effect sizes (from 31 outcome studies utilizing the BDI) were calculated. The results indicated that psychotherapy produces outcomes that have moderate clinical significance and that are well-maintained at follow-up, that individual therapy is associated with greater clinical significance than group treatment, and that type of therapy is not related to improvement. Alternative approaches for operationalizing clinical significance as the return of individuals to normal levels of functioning are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Illusory correlation in the perception of group attitudes.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 49(5) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10980-001). In the article, several important corrections and additions were not made in the course of the production process. The corrected entries are included in the erratum.] 126 undergraduates with pro- or anti-attitudes toward nuclear power and 15 local members of a campaign for nuclear disarmament viewed opinion statements supposedly made by residents of 2 towns. One town was larger and statements from it occurred frequently, the other was small and statements from it were infrequent. Statements expressed either pro- or anti-attitudes to the building of a nuclear power station, in which one position was in a majority over the other. Despite the fact that the proportion of pro- and anti-statements was the same for both towns, it was predicted that the most statistically infrequent category, minority position/small town, would appear most distinctive and receive greatest encoding, leading Ss to overrepresent this category. It was also hypothesized that attitude-congruent positions would appear more salient than others because of their self-relevance, resulting in enhanced illusory correlation for minority-congruent attitude holders (distinctiveness plus salience). Futhermore, it was predicted that salience and therefore illusory correlation would increase as a function of attitude extremity for these Ss. All 3 predictions were supported, replicating the findings of D. L. Hamilton and R. K. Gifford (1976) that distinctiveness, operationalized as statistical infrequency, mediated an illusory correlation effect. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What is learned during automatization? The role of attention in constructing an instance.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 20(6) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10475-001). In the aforementioned article, the Appendix on page 1050 was incomplete. The complete Appendix is presented in the erratum.] Seven experiments with 372 Ss were conducted to examine the role of attention in automatization. Ss searched 2-word displays for members of a target category in divided-attention, focused-attention, and dual-task conditions. The main issue was whether attention conditions would affect what Ss learned about co-occurrences of the words in the displays. The attention hypothesis, derived from the instance theory of automaticity, predicts learning of co-occurrences in divided-attention and dual-task conditions in which Ss attend to both words but not in focused-attention conditions in which Ss only attend to 1 word. The data supported the attention hypothesis and therefore the instance theory. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 1994(Nov), Vol 20(6), 1390. The Appendix was incomplete and the complete Appendix is presented.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clinical comparability of the standard MMPI and the MMPI-168.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 17(5) of Professional Psychology: Research and Practice (see record 2008-10955-002). In this article, the copyright information was incorrect. The corrected copyright information is included in the erratum.] Examined the clinical correspondence of the full-scale Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and the MMPI-168 on a psychiatric screening sample of 210 men (mean age 43.27 yrs). The present results fail to replicate previous optimistic findings regarding the worth of the MMPI-168 and accent the need for caution in any further use of this abbreviated instrument. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: The role of emotion specificity.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 78(4) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2007-17405-001). The graph in the upper panel, "Low NC Participants," was incorrect. The corrected figure in its entirety appears in this erratum.] Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson and A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (1) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (2) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (3) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz and G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)