Probability-based design criteria for shear walls in nuclear power plants

The development of probability-based criteria for the design of reinforced concrete shear walls subjected to dead load, live load and in-plane earthquake forces in nuclear plants is described. These criteria are determined for flexure and shear limit states in a load and resistance factor design (LRFD) format. The flexure limit state is defined according to traditional principles of ultimate strength analysis, while the shear limit state is established from experimental results. Resistance factors for shear and flexure, load factors for dead and live load, and a load factor for effect of Safe-Shutdown Earthquake are determined for target limit state probabilities of 1.0 × 10⁻⁶ and 1.0 × 10⁻⁵ over a a period of 40 years. Comparisons among the proposed design criteria, ACI 349 and US NRC Standard Review Plan 3.8.4 are included.     

Fission product release and its environment impact for normal reactor operations and for relevant accidents

The radioactive concentration in the primary loop and the radioactive release for both normal operations and accidents for the HTR-10 are calculated and presented in the paper. The coated-particle fuel is used in the HTR-10, which has good performance of retaining fission products. Therefore the radioactive concentration in the primary loop of the HTR-10 is very low, and the amount of radioactive release to the environment is also very small for both normal operation and accident conditions. The radiation doses to the public caused by radioactive release for both normal operations and accidents are given in the paper. The results show that the maximum individual effective dose to the public due to the release of airborne radioactivity during normal operations is only 1.4×10⁻⁴ mSv a⁻¹, which is much lower than the dose limit (1 mSv a⁻¹) stipulated by Chinese National Standard GB8703-86. For depressurization accident and water ingress accident, the maximum individual whole-body doses to man are only 7.7×10⁻² and 2.0×10⁻¹ mSv, thyroid doses only 1.7×10⁻¹ and 1.1 mSv, respectively. They are much lower than the prescribed minimum of emergency intervention level (whole-body dose: 5 mSv, thyroid dose: 50 mSv) for sheltering measures stipulated by the Chinese Nuclear Safety Criterion HAD002/03. The conclusion is that the environmental impact is very small for normal operations and accidents for the HTR-10, and the requirements stipulated in the Chinese Nuclear Safety Criterions are satisfied perfectly.     

JR curves of the low alloy steel 20 MnMoNi 5 5 with two different sulphur contents in oxygen-containing high temperature water at 240°C

J_R curves of the low alloy steel 20 MnMoNi 5 5 with two different sulphur contents (0.003 and 0.011 wt.%) were determined at 240°C in oxygen-containing high temperature water as well as in air. The tests were performed by the single-specimen unloading compliance technique at load line displacement rates from 1 × 10⁻⁴ down to 1 × 10⁻⁶ mm s⁻¹ on 20% side-grooved 2T CT specimens in an autoclave testing facility at an oxygen content of 8 ppm and a pressure of 7 MPa under quasi-stagnant flow conditions.In the case of testing in high temperature water, remarkably lower J_R curves than in air at the same load line displacement rate (1 × 10⁻⁴ mm s⁻¹) were obtained. A decrease in the load line displacement rate as well as an increase in the sulphur content of the steel caused a reduction of the J_R curves. At the fastest load line displacement rate a stretch zone could be detected fractographically on the specimens tested in air and in high temperature water and consequently J_i could be determined. When testing in high temperature water, the J_i value of the higher sulphur material type decreases from 45 N mm⁻¹ in air to 3 N mm⁻¹, much more than that of the optimized material type from 51 N mm⁻¹ in air to 20 N mm⁻¹ at 1 × 10⁻⁴ mm s⁻¹.     

HTGR core auxiliary cooling system availability and reliability

Using fault tree techniques, a quantitative estimate is made to predict both the start-up availability and operational reliability of the core auxiliary cooling system (CACS) of an HTGR following the postulated, simultaneous occurrence of a design basis depressurization accident (DBDA) and the complete loss of main loop cooling (LOMLC). The effects of a postulated, concurrent loss of offsite power are considered as well. Several potential common mode failures are identified. The limited availability of data presents a problem to numerical evaluation and estimates of uncertainty are at best crude. To provide a basis for measure of this uncertainty, the fault trees were solved using, on a consistent basis, either ‘optimistic’ failure rates, ‘pessimistic’ failure rates, or mean values (the geometric mean).Generally, about 80% of the failure rate data was larger than the ‘optimistic’ value, while only 20% was larger than the ‘pessimistic’ value. Predicated on a variety of assumptions, many of which may be unduly pessimistic, the CACS unavailability following a postulated DBDA and LOMLC has been estimated to be between 4 × 10⁻⁷ and 3 × 10⁻⁵ for the 2000 MW (th) HTGR and between 5 × 15⁻⁷ and 5 × 10⁻⁵ for the 3000 MW (th) HTGR. At the end of 300 hr, the estimated probability that the CACS will not leave sufficient core cooling capacity varies between 9 × 10⁻⁵ and 4 × 10⁻² for the smaller plant and 3 × 10⁻⁴ and 6 × 10⁻² for the larger plant. If it is further postulated that offsite power is concurrently lost, then the estimated mean unavailability at start-up is 3 × 10⁻³ for the 2000 MW (th) plant. The estimated mean probability that the CACS of the smaller plant will not be available at start-up and not be operational after 300 hr is 8 × 10⁻².     

Consequence evaluation for pressurized thermal shock

In order to estimate the risk associated with Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS), a sample calculation of the core melt frequency and offsite consequences has been performed for Oconee Unit 1, a Babcock and Wilcox pressurized water reactor located in the United States. Core melt frequency was derived from through-wall-crack frequency estimates based on thermal-hydraulic and fracture mechanics analyses performed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The mode and timing of containment response was estimated from previous risk studies for Oconee Unit 3 and other plants with large dry containments.The core melt frequency was calculated to be 6 × 10⁻⁶ per reactor year for operation at the PTS screening criterion. Operation of redundant and independent containment heat removal systems results in low probability of containment failure. The risk dominant scenario involves overpressure failure of containment due to failure of containment heat removal. Prompt containment failure was assigned a very low probability (10⁻⁴), and hydrogen burn failure was not considered.The central estimate of annual risk was 5 × 10⁻⁷ early fatalities, 2 × 10⁻⁴ latent cancer fatalities and 0.7 person-rem. These values are minimal compared with other severe accident scenarios.Uncertainties and sensitivies to important parameters are discussed. The response of other types of plants is briefly described.     

Power up-grading study for the first Egyptian research reactor

In the present work, power up-grading study is performed, for the first Egyptian Research Reactor (ET-RR-1), using the present fuel basket with 4×4 fuel rods, (17.5 mm pitch), and a proposed fuel basket with 5×5 fuel rods, (14.0 mm pitch), without violating the thermal hydraulic safety criteria. These safety criteria are; fuel centerline temperature (fuel melting), clad surface temperature (surface boiling), outlet coolant temperature, and maximum heat flux (critical heat flux ratio). Different thermal reactor powers (2–10 MW) and different core coolant flow rates (450, 900, 1350 m³ h⁻¹) are considered. The thermal hydraulic analysis was performed using the subchannel code COBRA-IIIC for the estimation of temperatures, coolant velocities and critical heat flux. The neutronic calculations were performed using WIMS-D4 code with 5 — group neutron cross section library. These cross sections were adapted to use in the two-dimensional (2-D) diffusion code DIXY for core calculations. The study concluded that ET-RR-1 power can be upgraded safely up to 4 MW with the present 4×4-fuel basket and with the proposed 5×5-fuel basket up to 5 MW with the present coolant flow rate (900 m³ h⁻¹). With the two fuel arrays, the reactor power can be upgraded to 6 MW with coolant flow rate of 1350 m³ h⁻¹ without violating the safety criterion. It is also concluded that, loading the ET-RR-1 core with the proposed fuel basket (5×5) increases the excess reactivity of the reactor core than the present 4×4 fuel matrix with equal U-235 mass load and gave better fuel economy of fuel utilization.     

Vapour void fraction in subcooled flow boiling

Experimental data on steam void fraction and axial temperature distribution in an annular boiling channel for low mass-flux forced and natural circulation flow of water with inlet subcooling have been obtained. The ranges of variables covered are: mass flux = 1.4 × 10⁴−1.0 × 10⁵ kg/hr m²; heat flux = 4.5 × 10³−7.5 × 10⁴ kcal/hr m²; and inlet subcooling = 10–70°C. The present and literature data match well with the theoretical void predictions using a four-step method similar to that suggested by Zuber and co-workers.     

A design-phase PSA of a nuclear-powered hydrogen plant

A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is being developed for a steam-methane reforming hydrogen production plant linked to a high-temperature gas-cooled nuclear reactor (HTGR). This work is based on the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute's (JAERI) High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR) prototype in Japan. The objective of this paper is to show how the PSA can be used for improving the design of the coupled plants. A simplified HAZOP study was performed to identify initiating events, based on existing studies. The results of the PSA show that the average frequency of an accident at this complex that could affect the population is 7 × 10⁻⁸ year⁻¹ which is divided into the various end states. The dominant sequences are those that result in a methane explosion and occur with a frequency of 6.5 × 10⁻⁸ year⁻¹, while the other sequences are much less frequent. The health risk presents itself if there are people in the vicinity who could be affected by the explosion. This analysis also demonstrates that an accident in one of the plants has little effect on the other. This is true given the design base distance between the plants, the fact that the reactor is underground, as well as other safety characteristics of the HTGR.     

An evaluation of containment inerting and air dilution systems as methods for post-accident hydrogen control in BWRS

Hydrogen control is important in post-accident situations because of possibilities for containment rupture due to hydrogen deflagration or detonation. Post-accident hydrogen generation in BWR containments is analyzed as a function of engineered hydrogen control system, assumed either nitrogen inerting or air dilution. Fault tree analysis was applied to assess the failure probability per demand of each system. These failure rates were then combined with the probability of accidents producing various hydrogen generation rates to calculate the overall system hydrogen control probability. Results indicate that both systems render approximately the same overall hydrogen control failure rate (air dilution: 8.3 × 10⁻²−1.1 × 10⁻²; nitrogen inerting: 1.3 × 10⁻²−2 × 10⁻³). Drywell entries and unscheduled shutdowns were also analyzed to determine the impact on the total BWR accident risk as it relates to the decay heat removal system. Results indicate that inerting may increase the overall risk due to a possible increase in the number of unscheduled shutdowns due to a lessened operator ability to correct and identify ‘unidentified’ leakage from the primary coolant system. Further, possible benefits of inerting due to reduced torus corrosion and fire risk in containment appear to be dominated by the possible operations-related disadvantages.     

Fluence dependence of the surface roughness of InP after bombardment

InP(1 0 0) surfaces were sputtered under ultrahigh vacuum conditions by 5 keV ions at an angle of incidence of 41° to the sample normal. The fluence, , used in this study, varied from 1 × 10¹⁴ to 5 × 10¹⁸ cm⁻². The surface topography was investigated using field emission scanning electron microscopy (FE-SEM) and atomic force microscopy (AFM). At the lower fluences ( 5 × 10¹⁶ cm⁻²) only conelike features appeared, similar in shape as was found for noble gas ion bombardment of InP. At the higher fluences, ripples also appeared on the surface. The bombardment-induced topography was quantified using the rms roughness. This parameter showed a linear relationship with the logarithm of the fluence. A model is presented to explain this relationship. The ripple wavelength was also determined using a Fourier transform method. These measurements as a function of fluence do not agree with the predictions of the Bradley–Harper theory.     

Friction and wear of Inconel 690 and Inconel 600 for steam generator tube in room temperature water

In the steam generators of nuclear power plants, the flow of cooling water can cause the tubes to vibrate, resulting in fretting wear damage due to contacts between these tubes and their supports. The tubes are made of Inconel 690 and Inconel 600 and the supports are made of STS 304. In this paper, fretting wear tests in water were performed using the materials Inconel 690 and Inconel 600 in contact with STS 304. Fretting tests using a cross-cylinder type set up were conducted under various vibrating amplitudes and applied normal loads in order to measure friction forces and wear volumes. Also, conventional sliding tests using a pin-on-disk type set up were carried out to compare these test results.In the fretting tests, friction force was found to be strongly dependent on normal load and vibrating amplitude. Coefficients of friction decreased with an increase in the normal load and a decrease in the vibrating amplitude applied. Also, the wear of Inconel 600 and Inconel 690 was predicted using a work rate model. Depending on the normal load and vibrating amplitude applied, distinctively different wear mechanisms and often drastically different wear rates occurred. It was found that the fretting wear coefficients for Inconel 600 and Inconel 690 were 9.3×10⁻¹⁵ and 16.2×10⁻¹⁵ Pa⁻¹, respectively. This study shows that Inconel 690 can result in lesser friction forces and exhibits less wear resistance than Inconel 600 in room temperature water.     

Pressure vessel integrity and weld inspection procedure

The primary objective of this study is to develop a simple methodology which, when coupled with existing observations on pressure vessel behavior, provides an interrelation between nuclear pressure vessel weld integrity and the parameters of the in-service inspection program, including inspection sample size, frequency and efficiency. The basic input information on rate of generation and development of weld flaws of different sizes and types is drawn primarily from published British and German studies taken almost exclusively from welds of non-nuclear pressure vessels. The input information is varied to reflect differences in weld quality and uncertainty of input data. A modified Markov process is employed and a computer code written to obtain numerical results. If it is assumed that the quality of nuclear reactor welds are the same as the quality of non-nuclear welds (i.e. the data base), then, based on the limitations of the model, the predicted critically sized defect concentration is about 50 × 10⁻⁷ per weld at the end of weld life for welds under both high and low stress if ASME, Section XI, In-Service Inspection Requirements are applied. Based on the British data and the less stringent inspection standards (compared to Section XI) the estimated number of critically sized defects per weld at the end of weld life is 250 × 10⁻⁷ and 170 × 10⁻⁷ per weld for high and low stressed welds, respectively. If it is assumed that the nuclear reactor pressure vessel welds have superior quality to the non-nuclear welds, then the model predicts an appropriately lower probability of critical defects at the end of weld life. A variety of other sensitivity studies are included in the report. Also, a simple methodology to provide an optimal weld inspection program which is consistent with a minimum cost criteria is outlined. It should be noted that the results of this study are based on the limitations of the simple model that was used and on a variety of corresponding assumptions.     

Wear behavior of graphite studies in an air-conditioned environment

The wear performance of graphite used in the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR-10) was researched. The wear mechanism, worn surface and wear debris were analyzed under SEM. Under test conditions, the wear rate was 2.27×10⁻⁷ g/m for surface contact, and 1×10⁻⁶ g/m level for line contact. The main wear mechanisms of graphite were groove and fatigue. The projected area of wear debris followed the logarithm normal school, giving most wear debris as a small sphere and large flake debris as only a small part.     

Dissolution of uranium metal without hydride formation or hydrogen gas generation

This study shows that metallic uranium will cleanly dissolve in carbonate-peroxide solution without generation of hydrogen gas or uranium hydride. Metallic uranium shot, 0.5–1 mm diameter, was reacted with ammonium carbonate–hydrogen peroxide solutions ranging in concentration from 0.13 M to 1.0 M carbonate and 0.50 M to 2.0 M peroxide. The dissolution rate was calculated from the reduction in bead mass, and independently by uranium analysis of the solution. The calculated dissolution rate ranged from about 4 × 10⁻³ to 8 × 10⁻³ mm/h, dependent primarily on the peroxide concentration. Hydrogen analysis of the etched beads showed that no detectable hydrogen was introduced into the uranium metal by the etching process.     

Influence of the depth position on the neutron embrittlement of the VVER reactor pressure vessel steel 15Cr2MoV(A) consequences for the assessment of reactor safety

The dependence of the mechanical properties on the depth position in the unirradiated state and after irradiation up to neutron fluences of approximately 5 × 10¹⁸ and 70 × 10¹⁸ cm⁻² (E > 0.5 MeV) is tested on a forging made out of VVER 440 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steel 15CrMoV. The near-surface position shows a higher strength and a lower transition temperature than the positions greater than 1/4 wall thickness. Irradiation does not change these differences in a significant manner. The testing of specimens from the 1/4 depth position within the surveillance programme, as normally laid down in the legal rules relating to nuclear power plants, results in a conservative safety assessment against brittle failure up to the EOL fluence. On taking into account fluence attenuation, the flux effect, etc., the toughness gradually increases from the inside to the outside of the wall after longer RPV operating times.     

A simple coincidence method of deuterium profiling using the DHe, α)H reaction

A simple standard coincidence arrangement is described for D(³He, α)H depth profiling experiments of deuterium in solids. Both reaction products are detected in coincidence, the high-energy protons being observed in transmission through a foil target. The energy of the α-particles is converted into the corresponding depth scale, whereas the local deuterium concentration is calculated from the yield of the α-particle spectrum. The measurement of α-particles in coincidence with protons allows a reduction of background arising from Rutherford scattering of ³He and other reaction products. For samples of deuterium implanted into Ta₂O₅ and Er, the method allows a reduction of the backscattering yield by a factor of more than 10³. The residual background is due to accidental coincidences. It can be even more reduced using an accurate experimental geometry. The background reduction is largest for samples with a low content of deuterium, allowing measurements of deuterium profiles of 9 × 10¹³ D⁺/cm² implanted into Ta₂O₅ at an energy of 8 keV. This corresponds to a maximum deuterium concentration of about 5 × 10⁻⁴ D per Ta₂O₅. This method is not restricted to thin films, but it allows measurements of deuterium profiles in a thick sample, e.g. of an implantation profile in a 0.4 mm silicon wafer.     

Seismic loads for crack stability assessment, in a review of leak-before-break (LBB) applicability

This study was performed to define the seismic loading conditions for use in the crack stability assessment of a BWR for the applicability of the leak-before-break (LBB) criterion. The LBB has been applied to the design of Class 1 piping in Japanese light-water reactors. Crack penetrated condition with detectable leak in the LBB applicability review is classified into the Level C service condition. Here an S₁-earthquake (maximum design earthquake) is currently assumed, rather than an S₂-earthquake (extreme design earthquake). In order to justify this assumption, the frequency of an S₁-earthquake occurring during coolant leakage due to crack propagation was determined. The frequency of coolant leakage from Class 1 piping must be less than that of the Level C service condition (2.5 × 10⁻² to 1 × 10⁻⁴ per year) in order to assume that an S₁-earthquake is appropriate. Accordingly, the frequency of coolant leakage from Class 1 piping was calculated using a probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM). The results of this analysis indicate that the frequency of coolant leakage from Class 1 piping is less than the expected occurrence of an S₁-earthquake. As the results, it is concluded that the assumption of the seismic loading employed in an LBB applicability review should be appropriate.     

Shaking table tests on failure characteristics of base isolation system for a DFBR plant

The building of a demonstration fast breeder reactor (DFBR) plant in Japan is planed to be base isolated in the horizontal direction. To verify the seismic safety of the isolation system, a series of shaking table tests was conducted using a reduced scale model with three types of base isolation system, natural rubber bearing with steel damper (NRB+SD), lead rubber bearing (LRB), and high damping rubber bearing (HRB). The results of these tests showed NRB+SD, LRB and HRB were within the stable domain (not hardening) at 1×S2 (maximum acceleration 3.80 m s⁻²) input, and were nearly hardening at 2×S2 input. None of the rubber bearings broke at 3×S2 input, which was the design limit. All these bearings broke at over 4×S2 input.     

SCALE calculation for evaluation of spent fuel condition during long-term storage

Experiences with an advanced spent nuclear fuel management in Slovakia are presented in this paper. The evaluation and monitoring procedures are based on practices at the Slovak wet interim spent fuel storage facility in NPP Jaslovské Bohunice. Since 1999, leak testing of WWER-440 fuel assemblies were completed using a special leak tightness detection system developed by Framatome-anp, “Sipping in Pool”. This system utilized external heating for the precise defects determination.Optimal methods for spent fuel disposal and monitoring were designed. A new conservative factor for specifying of spent fuel leak tightness is introduced in the paper. Limit values of leak tightness were established from the combination of SCALE4.4a (ORIGEN-ARP) calculations and measurements from the “Sipping in Pool” system. These limit values are: limiting fuel cladding leak tightness coefficient for tight fuel assembly – k_FCT(T) = 3 × 10⁻¹⁰, limiting fuel cladding leak tightness coefficient for fuel assembly with leakage – k_FCT(L) = 8 × 10⁻⁷.     

Thermal- and radiation-stability of hydrogen-implanted silicon standards for ion-beam analysis

The effect of thermal annealing and particle radiation on the depth profile of 25 keV H⁺ implanted into crystalline and ion-beam amorphised silicon has been studied via the ¹H(¹⁵N, αγ)¹²C reaction. Out-diffusion of hydrogen from crystalline silicon was observed after annealing at 100 °C for 45 min. The corresponding temperature for ion-beam (300 keV, ⁸⁴Kr²⁺) amorphised silicon was between 300 and 500 °C. Radiation damage produced by 3 × 10¹⁵ 6.4 MeV ¹⁵N²⁺ ion cm⁻² lead to effective trapping of the hydrogen in crystalline silicon whilst 1.1 × 10¹⁵ 300 keV Kr²⁺ ions cm⁻² gave rise to significant spreading.