供应链促销-定价决策与内生时机

在两个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链中,为了得到供应链内生时机,构建了促销-定价博弈模型,分析产品替代度和促销效率对促销-定价策略和内生时机的影响,并通过数值仿真探讨成本差异对成员决策和内生时机的影响。研究表明：强势品牌促销效率的增加将提高供应链的协调水平;成本差异不改变整体内生时机,只对区域范围产生一定影响,如果研究者随意假设博弈参与人的行动时机,那么所得结论可能是错误的。     

Joint optimization of pricing and planning decisions in divergent supply chain

In divergent supply chains, such as in the oil industry, processing raw materials results in an outflow of multiple products. Final products are stored at international depots, from where they are ready to be shipped to the markets. Even if one company controls the entire chain, when production and sales organizations are decoupled, a relevant problem is to determine the internal prices of products at depots for achieving coordination. We propose an optimization model involving pricing and production decisions, and several constraints commonly used in divergent chains. In our approach, the producer incorporates the sellers’ behavior by expressing demand as a function of the internal price. As a result, our model serves as a coordination mechanism in trying to get an overall coordinated integrated solution in a decoupled reality. Numerical examples in single and multiple periods problems show the advantages of our approach over cost‐based methods.     

主制造商供应商协同合作最优定价决策博弈与混沌分析

基于主制造商供应商的协同合作模式和利益追求,建立了主制造商供应商的价格博弈模型,考虑主制造商供应商的合作共生关系,引入共生系数,研究利益分配下的供应链定价问题.应用复杂系统理论分析了系统的稳定性与混沌状态,通过数值模拟,发现了供应商的价格调整速度影响供应链系统的稳定,共生系数影响主制造商和供应商的利益.由此,供应链企业通过选择合适的控制系数,可使系统维持在稳定状态下,这一研究结果对复杂产品主制造商供应商的价格决策有很好的借鉴作用.     

零售商定价/订货决策下竞争/互补制造商采用RFID的策略研究

以一个零售商主导的两级供应链为研究对象,构建两个生产竞争性或互补性产品的制造商是否采用无线射频识别技术(radio frequency identification,RFID)时链上成员的收益模型,分析求解出各种情景下零售商定价/订货决策时制造商的最优批发价和RFID标签成本分摊系数,以及零售商的最优零售价/订货量,进...     

Dynamic ordering and pricing for a perishable goods supply chain

The paper studies the combined problem of pricing and ordering for a perishable product supply chain with one supplier and one retailer in a finite horizon. The lifetime of the product is two periods and demand in each period is random and price-sensitive. In each period, the supplier determines first a wholesale price and then the retailer decides an order quantity and retail prices. We show that the optimal pricing strategy for the non-fresh product depends only on its inventory, and the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal order quantity for the fresh product depend only on the wholesale price and they have a constant relation. Moreover, the game between the retailer and the supplier for finite horizon is equivalent to a one period game with only one order. Thus, the optimal policies are identical at each period. For the additive and multiplicative demands, we further obtain equations to compute the optimal strategies. All of above results are extended into the infinite horizon case and longer lifetime products. Finally, a numerical analysis is given.     

双渠道供应链中服务对定价和需求的影响研究

研究了集中式决策和基于Stackelberg博弈这两种情况下的双渠道供应链的定价、服务及需求的关系。制造商和零售商提供的服务对价格、需求会产生影响,渠道商改善服务有利于本渠道价格的提高,同时会影响到另一渠道的定价,影响程度与双渠道决策模式相关。与服务对定价的影响不同,渠道商提供的服务对本渠道需求产生的影响是双向的,当服务水平在一定的范围内,改善服务可以增加本渠道市场需求,降低另一渠道需求;当服务水平过高,继续改善服务不仅不能增加需求反而减少需求,同时对另一渠道的需求产生影响,这种影响与消费者市场类型存在密切关系。当消费者市场属于价格敏感型时,服务水平存在一个帕累托区间,任一渠道商改善服务都会促进双渠道需求的增加。     

基于链链竞争的闭环供应链渠道结构选择策略

研究当零售商之间存在价格竞争时,两条竞争闭环供应链的渠道结构选择问题。结果表明：从供应链系统总利润角度出发,当两条链之间竞争强度较小时,中心化渠道结构占优;反之,分散化渠道结构占优。从消费者与环境的角度出发,无论两链之间竞争强度为何值,两条链同时选择中心化渠道结构时最有利。     

考虑广告投入影响的再制造闭环供应链优化决策博弈模型研究

针对制造/再制造产品的市场竞争与合作问题, 考虑广告投入对产品消费者效用的增长效应及消费者环境偏好的影响, 在构建制造产品和再制造产品的市场需求函数基础上, 应用博弈方法比较分析合作博弈、纳什均衡博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈三种决策模式下制造/再制造产品的最优定价和广告投入策略, 并针对非合作博弈下的效率损失设计了闭环供应链中制造和再制造过程的利益协调机制。数值算例分析表明, 合作博弈决策下供应链总利润最优、制造和再制造产品市场销售价格最高, 而合作博弈和Stackelberg主从博弈都会以牺牲再制造产品利润为代价获得最优利润, 因此再制造部门会偏好纳什均衡博弈, 采取以自身利益最优为目标的竞争策略, 没有动机成为制造部门的跟随者。     

零售商价格竞争下的最优决策与收益共享契约

研究由一个制造商与两个竞争零售商组成的两级供应链系统的最优决策及契约协调问题,其中每个零售商面临的需求是价格敏感和随机的.当随机需求分布具有递增失败率(IFR)时,竞争的零售商存在唯一最优的定价和订购决策,并给出了最优决策的解析表达式,证明了收益共享契约能使两个竞争零售商加盟的供应链达到协调及契约成立的条件.最后通过理论推导和数值分析给出了需求价格弹性系数对最优决策及协调的影响.     

考虑平台营销努力的直播电商服务供应链质量努力策略

直播电商作为电商市场的新趋势日益受到人们的关注,鉴于此,研究一个品牌服务提供商、一个主播和一个直播服务平台所组成的直播电商服务供应链质量努力策略问题.考虑主播不签约和主播签约两种情形,分别构建直播电商服务供应链成员的利润函数,以利润最大化为目标,运用博弈理论优化得到两种情形下直播电商服务供应链成员最优质量努力策略和利润.通过算例分析,探讨主播佣金比例和直播服务平台抽成比例对服务供应链最优策略和最优利润的影响.研究结果表明:两种情形下主播服务质量努力随主播佣金比例的增加而增大,随直播服务平台抽成比例的增加而减少,而直播服务平台质量努力均随主播佣金比例和直播服务平台抽成比例的增加而增大.     

基于不同交货期决策权下的供应链交货期和定价决策研究

基于对价格和交货期敏感的需求,针对一个制造商与一个零售商构成的两阶段供应链,以最大化期望利润为目标,分别建立供应链交货期由制造商和零售商控制的决策模型,以得到相应的最优解和最大期望利润.通过比较,探讨了不同交货期决策权对供应链最优交货期和最大期望利润的影响,得到了为实现期望利润最大化,针对顾客需求特性,供应链系统应在保证一定交货期服务水平的基础上选择由制造商控制供应链交货期的结论.     

A decision support system for strategic planning in large-scale marketing channels: An example in the tile industry

This paper presents a decision support system for strategic planning in marketing channels. A dynamic model of the marketing channel is employed which comprises manufacturer and retailer levels. Decision making is achieved through a game theoretical inference mechanism in which each player (manufacturer/retailer) optimises for a long-term profit maximisation objective. Both historical data and managerial expertise are used for the parameterisation of the system's knowledge base. The decision support system provides a forecast of profit and sales and computes pricing and shelf space allocation strategies that maximise long-term profit. It offers facilities such as the study of coalitions, long-term decision-making in all phases of a product's life cycle, the impact of pricing, allocation strategies, production expansion, cost regulation, and others. The operationality of the system is illustrated in decision-making situations in the tile industry.     

Pricing,manufacturing and inventory policies for raw material in a three-level supply chain

We studied a decentralised three-layer supply chain including a supplier, a producer and some retailers. All the retailers order their demands to the producer and the producer order his demands to the supplier. We assumed that the demand is price sensitive and shortage is not permitted. The goal of the paper is to optimise the total cost of the supply chain network by coordinating decision-making policy using Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium. The decision variables of our model are the supplier's price, the producer's price and the number of shipments received by the supplier and producer, respectively. To illustrate the applicability of the proposed model numerical examples are presented.     

考虑需求响应的纳网双向定价斯坦伯格博弈模型 (英文）

新能源发电和负荷需求的波动性使得纳网内能源盈馀不同,从而影响本地新能源消纳水平和运行成本。本文针对纳网内暖通空调潜在的热弹性调节能力,阐述了一种基于用户舒适度偏好和环境因素的需求响应和双向定价策略,来优化纳网与公共管理中心间的能源双向交易及时均收益。所构建的双层交易随机优化模型中由于存在不确定参数和时间耦合温度队列使得长期优化问题求解复杂。为此设计了一种基于李雅普诺夫优化方法的松弛形式对原问题进行时间解耦,重构主从博弈框架来刻画参与者能量交易决策间的相互影响关系,并进一步对博弈均衡点的存在与唯一性给出严格的证明。在此基础上提出了一种优化响应算法使得决策者间能以较少的信息交换达到博弈均衡。最后通过仿真实验验证了该能量管理算法的有效性。     

量子竞争决策算法及其在旅行商问题中的应用*

提出一种新型优化算法——量子竞争决策算法,在竞争决策的基础上,将进化博弈论中博弈者不断学习和调整来提高竞争力的思想引入到优化中,使竞争者具有自进化能力,同时充分利用量子进化计算中量子比特、叠加态等理论,增加竞争群体的多样性,缩小群体规模。通过对典型的TSP实验计算和与其他算法比较,均取得了较好的效果,算法具有较强的全局优化能力。     

The impact of consumer behavior on preannounced pricing for a dual‐channel supply chain

This study discusses a dual‐channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a regular‐priced product through dual channels in the normal sales period and only sells overstocked products through the direct channel in the discounted sales period in the presence of strategic consumers. The manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader to adopt a preannounced pricing policy. This study first proposes demand functions for a two‐period dual‐channel model by incorporating consumer utility functions. Based on the demand functions, optimal pricing strategies for both manufacturer and retailer are established. The results show that the manufacturer prefers to raise prices in both periods for consumers with a short delivery lead time. However, counterintuitively, the selling prices set by the manufacturer do not decrease as the degree of consumer patience increases. Finally, there is a Pareto zone under a certain condition where both the manufacturer and the retailer in the two‐period dual‐channel model outperform their counterparts in terms of profit in the single‐period dual‐channel model.     

存在强势零售商与直销渠道的供应链内生时机

在由强弱零售商和直销渠道组成的非对称供应链中,探讨定价权转移、消费者忠诚度以及保留价格差异对三种博弈时机下均衡结果的影响,然后研究供应链内生时机,对消费者剩余和社会福利进行分析,最后通过数值仿真验证所得结论。研究表明:在三种博弈时机下,定价权转移使得强势零售商比竞争对手获得更多利润;供应链博弈内生时机为制造商领导和零售商领导;随着产品保留价格差异的增加,消费者剩余降低,但社会福利先降低后升高。     

Coordination between strategic forest management and tactical logistic and production planning in the forestry supply chain

In this paper, we study the coordination mechanism in the forestry supply chain between strategic forest management and tactical production planning. We first formulate an integrated model to establish a theoretical benchmark for performance of the entire supply chain. It is a mixed integer programming model that involves harvesting, bucking, transportation, production, and sales decisions for both tactical and strategic planning levels. We then present two sequential approaches S‐A and S‐B where the coordination is done through internal pricing. S‐A is the approach currently used in practice where harvesting in the forest is the main driver of the supply chain activities and internal pricing is introduced to control bucking decision in a separate stage. In contrast, S‐B takes downstream demand information into consideration and internal pricing directly influences harvesting decision in the first stage. In order to find the appropriate setting of internal pricing that leads to the system optimum, we suggest two heuristics H‐I and H‐II. The internal pricing in H‐I is based on dual values and in H‐II, it is derived from a Lagrangian decomposition. A real‐life case study in the Chilean forestry industry is used to compare the results of different approaches. It is shown that the new sequential approach S‐B generates as good feasible solution as that obtained from the integrated approach but in much less time. Both heuristics H‐I and H‐II bring about near‐optimal feasible solutions. H‐II also provides optimistic bound of the optimal objective function value, which can be used as a measure of the solution quality.     

Optimal pricing decisions for an omni‐channel supply chain with retail service

Motivated by the emergence of dominant physical stores utilizing a buy‐online‐and‐pickup‐in‐store (BOPS) channel, we examine the interaction of such a stronger retailer and a manufacturer's strategies on the pricing and service value. The dominant retailer provides an added service value to end consumers by the traditional channel and BOPS option, which has a positive influence on the market demand. The manufacturer makes the channel selection decision between a dual channel and an omni‐channel. We formulate a retailer Stackelberg game and characterize the equilibrium pricing and service solutions under centralized and decentralized cases. Our results indicate that the service value of a physical store strongly influences the players' pricing strategies. The sensitivity analysis reveals that the total revenue of the supply chain increases with the market scale expansion coefficient of the BOPS option. Furthermore, the result suggests that offering the BOPS channel is always an effective initiative to boost supply chain performance, especially in the centralized structure.     

基于群决策的供应链伙伴选择与评价过程

分析了供应商选择与评价过程的两个基本阶段静态评价和动态评价,提出了基于群决策的供应链伙伴选择与评价方法,构造了选择矩阵,证明了选择过程的可控性,举例说明了问题的求解过程,结果证明了方法的有效性.