浅谈工程分包管理监理控制措施

随着工程项目管理体制改革的深入,我国初步形成了以项目总承包为龙头,以专业、劳务分包为依托的工程项目结构模式。当前,专业、劳务分包单位鱼目混珠,专业化程度低,素质参差不齐,给工程项目管理带来较大风险。根据监理合同约定和建设管理单位要求,分包管理是监理工作内容的重要组成部分,如何履行好监理管控职责、规避分包管理风险对监理企业来说十分重要。结合近几年对工程分包管理的控制经验,从分包计划及分包单位资质审查、分包过程动态控制等方面进行阐述说明。     

城市地铁项目施工分包管理及业主方对策

正一、基于业主方施工分包管理的概念和管理依据依据《中华人民共和国合同法》和《房屋建筑和市政基础设施工程施工分包管理办法》,总承包单位与分包单位就分包工程向建设单位承担连带责任。也就是说,从法律角度层面,业主为分包工程的决策主体和监督责任主体,总承包企业和分包企业为分包工程的共同实施主体,业主有权对分包工程进行管理。因此,本文引入     

项目分包管理经验浅谈

分析了工程分包管理中最容易发生矛盾的地方,从分包单位的选择、分包单位的现场管理、工程款支付等方面对项目分包管理的经验进行了探讨,论述了实际管理过程中的一些经验,以保证工程的顺利进行。     

建筑分包工程的质量责任分析和质量控制

对分包工程的质量责任进行了分析,从总包单位的角度就如何对分包工程实施有效管理以确保其工程质量的问题进行了探讨,并就如何加强分包工程质量管理的责任意识、把好分包工程合同签约关、加强对分包工程的技术管理、严格监督落实分包单位主要施工资源配备、加强对分包工程施工现场质量的监督检查及做好分包工程各阶段的验收工作等问题提出意见。     

基于土木工程施工中分包管理技术风险研究

分包管理技术既要合法合规,满足工程施工安全、质量和进度要求,又要控制施工成本,拓宽项目盈利空间,这成了单位管理中的一道重要课题.文章通过长期的分包管理技术实践,分析多元业务下工程总承包单位施工分包管理技术存在的主要分包管理技术风险及可能导致的后果,如法律分包管理技术风险、分包策划分包管理技术风险等,并探讨其防控措施,以...     

以提升履约能力为目标的分包管理

建筑市场走向总承包与分包经营模式后,建筑工程总承包下分包难履约现象普遍存在,总承包企业对分包履约管理日趋重要。文章从总承包企业角度,探讨了如何加强分包管理,提高分包单位的履约能力以及促进分包单位诚信履约的机制、方法和措施。以期为总承包企业强化分包企业按合同履约管理提供借鉴思路。     

浅谈工程项目管理中总包分包施工界面划分

工程发包中,总承包工程、分包工程是非常普遍现象。总承包单位和分包单位就分包工程对建设单位承担连带责任,明确总、分包工程之间工作要求和承担的责任,具体划分施工界面,有利工程项目管理。     

谈如何做好分包资料的管理

分包资料管理是工程资料管理中比较难以控制的一项内容,由于分包单位的资料管理要求各有差异,总包为了统一资料管理,一般要和分包单位签订资料交底,在签订分包资料交底中,一般应包括明确责任、人员要求、资料审查、资料编制、内容填写等方面的内容。     

浅谈工程项目的分包管理

工程项目管理是一个很复杂的过程,分包管理更是项目管理中的重点。如何做好对分包单位的管理,赢得更好的效益,提升自己的社会竞争力,这是施工企业的长期发展的关键。本文从工程项目分包单位的选择开始,提出了分包管理的合同及现场管理,进度、质量、成本、安全四控制和竣工验收等全过程的管理要点。     

浅谈监理对工程分包单位的管理

房屋建筑工程在进入装修阶段后，众多的专业分包单位进入现场施工，这给施工现场管理带来不少问题。作为监理方，在此阶段对总包、分包如何进行管理是个值得研究探讨的问题。本文对分包单位进场后总包单位的责任，现场项目监理部对分包商的管理及相关的监理工作内容，总包单位与分包单位之间的工程交接进行了论述。     

多级工程供应链多边激励机制研究

基于业主、总承包商、分包商之间的多级委托代理关系,分别构建“业主—总承包商” 一级激励机制模型和“业主—总承包商—两个分包商” 二级激励机制模型,分析信息结构对多级工程供应链中多边决策行为的影响。研究发现: 无论是一级激励还是二级激励, 多边不对称信息的存在使得总承包商获得信息租金,从而扭曲总承包商工作努力和业主的收益; 业主在选择合作伙伴时, 委托代理链越长, 越要谨慎考察总承包商的能力水平;随着委托代理链的增长,业主和总承包商宁愿降低自身收益,以激励总承包商和分包商努力工作。     

工程施工分包商和总承包商配合与索赔的探讨

结合自身工作实践,介绍了国内工程施工管理现状,阐述了国内工程分包中存在的问题,并对总承包商与分包商之间的权利、义务及配合等进行了探讨,提出了分包商索赔时应考虑事项,以期规范分包商与总承包商之间的合作。     

浅论建筑施工企业劳务分包管理

现今建筑施工企业生产一线实际作业人员有80%-90％为农民工,如何合理有效地选择劳务分包队伍,形成一种合理有效的施工总承包和劳务分包的总分包关系,实施对劳务分包队伍有效的监管,直接决定建筑施工企业对建设工程项目实施的综合效果。本文针对现今建筑施工企业的特点．对劳务分包管理的现状和弊端进行了分析和剖析．提出了相应的对策和措施。     

建设项目总承包商与分包商合作关系的单期博弈分析

文章利用博弈论的静态博弈理论,对总承包商与分包商在总分包合作生产模式下基于项目的单期博弈时,各种战略选择中各方的收益进行了详细分析,得出了总承包商不合作而分包商不合作、总承包商不合作而分包商合作两种均衡解。深入地研究了博弈结果得出结论,追逐单个项目利益最大化的短期总承包商与分包商的合作生产模式,不利于建设项目的总体目标实现;为此必须建立总承包商与分包商的长效合作机制,以及建立与健全对建设项目建设过程的外部监控机制。研究结论可为建筑业总分包合作模式的健康发展,以及建筑业企业总承包商与分包商合作关系决策提供重要依据。     

Pre-tender and post-tender negotiations in Australia

One of the main features of the Australian building industry is the high level of subcontracting of building works. This paper reports on a survey of 43 subcontractors regarding various aspects of the relationship between subcontractors and general contractors. In particular it reports on the practice of ‘bid shopping’ in which the general contractor in various ways attempts to reduce the subcontractor's price below that of the tender. Generally the subcontractors were strongly against bid shopping attempts to tie with general contractors and negotiations in general. However, the strength of the responses was determined by the size of the firms. The larger firms were more open to negotiations and deals than the smaller firms. The overall benefits to the general contractors who ‘shop’ are doubtful, most subcontractors adjust their mark up by up to 20% to allow for such negotiations.     

An economic game theory model of subcontractor resource allocation behaviour

Periodic review and adjustment of resource allocations to construction projects is critical for subcontractors to maintain profitability under traditional unit price or lump sum contracts. Project managers strive to control subcontractors in an effort to meet budgets and schedules; subcontractors often work on multiple projects simultaneously and strive independently to allocate resources to those projects where they perceive that they will bring maximum utility. An economic game theory model is proposed as a foundation for understanding the behaviour of subcontractors in allocating resources to projects. The model describes the influence of the degree of reliability of the planned schedule on subcontractors' and project managers' behaviours under traditional unit price contracting. Unreliable plans undermine efforts to promote cooperative behaviour.     

Potential benefits for collaborating formwork subcontractors based on co-operative game theory

Formwork subcontractors that hire open shop workers, rather than union workers can win more contracts and earn more profits from general contractors because of greater agility and lower costs. A subcontractor may earn even more profit if it collaborates with others in a coalition. Payoff functions for individual subcontractors and a group of subcontractors in a coalition are formulated. Profit can also be reasonably allocated to each subcontractor in a coalition using the Shapley value and nucleolus.     

Subcontractor-general contractor relationship in Australian building industry

This paper is based on a major survey of tendering practices in the Australian building industry. The material was obtained from interviews comprising a stratified sample of 43 subcontractors representing five trades and four different size groups. The results show that the most important factors affecting subcontractors' bids to general contractors are a good past relationship with general contractors, a reputation for prompt payment, discussions of how the job will be done, planning and supervision of the work and a reputation for finishing projects on time. The majority of subcontractors seek and receive feedback from general contractors regarding the prices that other subcontractors are quoting on or before tender day. However, only the larger subcontractors respond to this feedback by lowering their bids.     

Resolution of disputes arising from set-off clauses between main contractors and subcontractors

Set-off relates to the situation where a main contractor raises a counterclaim against a subcontractor's claim or where an employer raises a counterclaim against the main contractor. The alternative terms cross claim, counterclaim, contra charge, compensation and retention are explained in the context of Scots law. Set-off in the construction industry in Scotland is then discussed within the contractual frameworks upon which main contractors are entitled to exercise such rights and how these conditions of contract have been formed over recent years. A study reported shows the extent of the use of amended and unamended forms of subcontract and main contractors' own forms of subcontract which imposed more onerous set-off conditions than the standard forms, the reasons given by main contractors for exercising their rights of set-off, the level of satisfaction amongst subcontractors with the sums set-off against them, the means by which main contractors and subcontractors settled disputed set-offs, and subcontractors' reasons for accepting unsatisfactory instances of set-off. The research was undertaken using a questionnaire to a stratified sample of subcontractors throughout central Scotland in 1995. Forty-seven subcontractors responded to the questionnaire and 427 instances of set-off were recorded. The study indicated that, despite the considerable protection given to subcontractors in the standard forms of subcontract and in common law, they were prepared to settle set-offs with which they were dissatisfied without initiating contractual proceedings which would have improved their situation. It would appear from this study that subcontractors are reluctant to use their contractual entitlements either because of fears over the costs of disputing set-offs or because they fear that they will be denied opportunities to tender for work in the future. Until there is a culture shift in the industry, reliance on contractual conditions alone may be inadequate to meet the needs of subcontractors.