A Theory of Shape by Space Carving

In this paper we consider the problem of computing the 3D shape of an unknown, arbitrarily-shaped scene from multiple photographs taken at known but arbitrarily-distributed viewpoints. By studying the equivalence class of all 3D shapes that reproduce the input photographs, we prove the existence of a special member of this class, the photo hull, that (1) can be computed directly from photographs of the scene, and (2) subsumes all other members of this class. We then give a provably-correct algorithm, called Space Carving, for computing this shape and present experimental results on complex real-world scenes. The approach is designed to (1) capture photorealistic shapes that accurately model scene appearance from a wide range of viewpoints, and (2) account for the complex interactions between occlusion, parallax, shading, and their view-dependent effects on scene-appearance.     

Symbols and Computation A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind

Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.¹ The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from philosophers has been the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). CTM was first articulated by Hilary Putnam (1960, 1961), but finds perhaps its most consistent and enduring advocate in Jerry Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994). It is this theory, and not any broader interpretations of what it would be for the mind to be a computer, that I wish to address in this paper. What I shall argue here is that the notion of symbolic representation employed by CTM is fundamentally unsuited to providing an explanation of the intentionality of mental states (a major goal of CTM), and that this result undercuts a second major goal of CTM, sometimes refered to as the vindication of intentional psychology. This line of argument is related to the discussions of derived intentionality by Searle (1980, 1983, 1984) and Sayre (1986, 1987). But whereas those discussions seem to be concerned with the causal dependence of familiar sorts of symbolic representation upon meaning-bestowing acts, my claim is rather that there is not one but several notions of meaning to be had, and that the notions that are applicable to symbols are conceptually dependent upon the notion that is applicable to mental states in the fashion that Aristotle refered to as paronymy. That is, an analysis of the notions of meaning applicable to symbols reveals that they contain presuppositions about meaningful mental states, much as Aristotle's analysis of the sense of healthy that is applied to foods reveals that it means conducive to having a healthy body, and hence any attempt to explain mental semantics in terms of the semantics of symbols is doomed to circularity and regress. I shall argue, however, that this does not have the consequence that computationalism is bankrupt as a paradigm for cognitive science, as it is possible to reconstruct CTM in a fashion that avoids these difficulties and makes it a viable research framework for psychology, albeit at the cost of losing its claims to explain intentionality and to vindicate intentional psychology. I have argued elsewhere (Horst, 1996) that local special sciences such as psychology do not require vindication in the form of demonstrating their reducibility to more fundamental theories, and hence failure to make good on these philosophical promises need not compromise the broad range of work in empirical cognitive science motivated by the computer paradigm in ways that do not depend on these problematic treatments of symbols.     

The Ancient Theory of Mind

Happiness and suffering are both the result of two factors combined: the situation in which one is placed and our consciousness of it. Happiness is not only of personal importance, it is also a necessary factor for ensuring peace in society. Therefore it is important to know the two possible ways for the pursuit of happiness: applied science, which focuses on how situations can be controlled, and spirituality, which focuses on developing the various types of consciousness one can have. The notion of purified consciousness is formulated in terms of psychology, neurophysiology, logic and meditative practice. Received February 2002 / Accepted in revised form March 2002     

Learning to Apply Theory of Mind

In everyday life it is often important to have a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people. Sometimes it is even useful to to have a correct model of their model of our own mental states: a second-order Theory of Mind. In order to investigate to what extent adults use and acquire complex skills and strategies in the domains of Theory of Mind and the related skill of natural language use, we conducted an experiment. It was based on a strategic game of imperfect information, in which it was beneficial for participants to have a good mental model of their opponent, and more specifically, to use second-order Theory of Mind. It was also beneficial for them to be aware of pragmatic inferences and of the possibility to choose between logical and pragmatic language use. We found that most participants did not seem to acquire these complex skills during the experiment when being exposed to the game for a number of different trials. Nevertheless, some participants did make use of advanced cognitive skills such as second-order Theory of Mind and appropriate choices between logical and pragmatic language use from the beginning. Thus, the results differ markedly from previous research.     

How the Gateway Arch Got its Shape

Robert Osserman examines Eero Saarinen’s Gateway Arch in St. Louis in order to shed light on what its exact shape is, why it is that shape, and whether the various decisions made during its design were based on aesthetic or structural considerations. Research included discussions with engineers and architects who worked with Saarinen on the project. The paper concludes by noting some questions that are still unanswered.     

Conscious Representations: An Intractable Problem for the Computational Theory of Mind

Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness plays a minor role in mental activity. However, contemporary neuroscience provides experimental evidence suggesting that mental representations necessarily involve consciousness. Consciousness does not only enable individuals to become aware of their own thoughts, it also constantly changes the causal properties of these thoughts. In light of these empirical studies, mental representations appear to be intrinsically dependent on consciousness. This discovery represents an obstacle to any attempt to construct an artificial mind.     

Beyond Mind: How Brains Make up Artificial Cognitive Systems

What I call semiotic brains are brains that make up a series of signs and that are engaged in making or manifesting or reacting to a series of signs: through this semiotic activity they are at the same time engaged in “being minds” and so in thinking intelligently. An important effect of this semiotic activity of brains is a continuous process of disembodiment of mind that exhibits a new cognitive perspective on the mechanisms underling the semiotic emergence of meaning processes. Indeed at the roots of sophisticated thinking abilities there is a process of disembodiment of mind that presents a new cognitive perspective on the role of external models, representations, and various semiotic materials. Taking advantage of Turing’s comparison between “unorganized” brains and “logical” and “practical” machines” this paper illustrates the centrality to cognition of the disembodiment of mind from the point of view of the interplay between internal and external representations, both mimetic and creative. The last part of the paper describes the concept of mimetic mind I have introduced to shed new cognitive and philosophical light on the role of computational modeling and on the decline of the so-called Cartesian computationalism.     

一种动画形象素材的形状检索方法

在动画形象的形状检索基础上,通过轮廓分解及Hausdorff距离的改进,提出一种动画形象素材的形状检索方法。该方法对形象进行前期预处理,得到形象二值闭合边界点集;根据边界围成区域的主惯量轴,将形象图片归一化;利用角点检测到的角点对图像的边界分割,每段弧线等距取相同的采样点数,从而将得到的采样点作为动画形象描述特征点集,利用加权Hausdorff距离测量库中图像与示例图像的距离。实验结果表明,与目前已有方法相比,该方法具有较高的检索精度。     

Theory of Mind for a Humanoid Robot

If we are to build human-like robots that can interact naturally with people, our robots must know not only about the properties of objects but also the properties of animate agents in the world. One of the fundamental social skills for humans is the attribution of beliefs, goals, and desires to other people. This set of skills has often been called a theory of mind. This paper presents the theories of Leslie (1994) and Baron-Cohen (1995) on the development of theory of mind in human children and discusses the potential application of both of these theories to building robots with similar capabilities. Initial implementation details and basic skills (such as finding faces and eyes and distinguishing animate from inanimate stimuli) are introduced. I further speculate on the usefulness of a robotic implementation in evaluating and comparing these two models.     

Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology

Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in our interpersonal relationships. I contend that these eliminativist arguments typically run together two distinct capacities: the folk psychological mechanisms which we use to understand one another, and scientific and philosophical guesses about the structure of those understandings. Both capacities are ontologically committed and therefore empirical. However, the commitments whose prospects look so dismal to the eliminativist, in particular the causal and logical image of propositional attitudes, belong to the guesses, and not necessarily to the underlying mechanisms. It is the commitments of traditional philosophical perspectives about the operation of our folk psychology which are contradicted by␣new evidence and modeling methods in connectionist psychology. Our actual folk psychology was not clearly committed to causal, sentential propositional attitudes, and thus is not directly threatened by connectionist psychology.     

Mind the gap: A study of Tube tour

The problem considered in this paper can be expressed as a question: Is it possible to visit all Tube lines in a day? This is a new type of combinatorial optimization problem which generalizes classic problems like TSP, set cover. It has similarities with classic combinatorial optimization problems and ties with operations research applications. We call the graphs corresponding to the city railway systems subway graphs. Examples and properties of such graphs are described in the paper. We show that our problem is NP-hard. Algorithms solving the problem are proposed and their performance is studied both analytically and experimentally on transportation networks of several big cities of the world.     

物联网离我们有多远?

2009年8月7日,国务院总理温家宝在中科院无锡微纳传感网工程技术研发中心视察时指出."在传感网发展中,要早一点谋划未来,早一点攻破核心技术","在国家重大科技专项中,加快推进传感网发展".     

The Internet of Things: A survey

This paper addresses the Internet of Things. Main enabling factor of this promising paradigm is the integration of several technologies and communications solutions. Identification and tracking technologies, wired and wireless sensor and actuator networks, enhanced communication protocols (shared with the Next Generation Internet), and distributed intelligence for smart objects are just the most relevant. As one can easily imagine, any serious contribution to the advance of the Internet of Things must necessarily be the result of synergetic activities conducted in different fields of knowledge, such as telecommunications, informatics, electronics and social science. In such a complex scenario, this survey is directed to those who want to approach this complex discipline and contribute to its development. Different visions of this Internet of Things paradigm are reported and enabling technologies reviewed. What emerges is that still major issues shall be faced by the research community. The most relevant among them are addressed in details.     

Steven W. Horst,Symbols, Computation,and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind

Minds and Machines -