The value of information in electricity investment games

In this paper we look at the assumptions behind a Cournot model of investment in electricity markets. We analyze how information influences investment, looking at the way common knowledge of marginal costs, expectations on the competitors’ marginal costs, expectations on the level and duration of demand, and conjectures on the others’ behavior, influence the value of a project. We expose how the results are highly dependent on the assumptions used, and how the investment Nash–Cournot game with perfect and complete information implies such a degree of coordination between players that the outcome of the game would be classified by any regulation law as collusive behavior. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of Nash Value of Complete Information. As an example we use a stylized model of investment in liberalized electricity markets.     

Electricity regulation and electricity market reforms in China

The electricity industry of China has been in a process of reforms since the 1980s. This paper gives a review on the three main stages of reforms in China so as to trace out key features of various reform measures including those for power investment financing, the separation between government and power enterprises, and the division between power generation firms and power grids. The findings suggest that further regulatory change in China's electricity market reform is necessary when integration of the electricity markets and increased competition are paving the way ahead for a market-oriented structure. Prospective electricity regulation in the form of a strong legal system and effective institutions that protect market competition and promote appropriate incentives for efficiency are suggested in the paper.     

An overview of the Portuguese electricity market

The electricity market in Portugal was recently opened up to all consumers. However, it remains highly concentrated in terms of control of production and supply and long-term power purchase arrangements still coexist with free market operation. This paper discusses the electricity market restructuring process in Portugal, presenting the market main characteristics in past years and the present situation. The evolution of the electricity prices in Portugal is analysed, and a comparison with EU-15 is presented. Special attention is given to Spain due to the possibility of cross-border competition in the future, arising from the formation of the Iberian electricity market.     

Price formation and market power in the German wholesale electricity market in 2006

From 2002 to 2006, German wholesale electricity prices more than doubled. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the price components in 2006 in order to identify the factors responsible for the increase. We develop a competitive benchmark model, taking into account power plant characteristics, fuel and CO₂-allowance prices, wind generation, cross-border flows, unit commitment, and startup conditions, to estimate the difference between generation costs and observed market prices for every hour in 2006. We find that prices at the German wholesale market (European Energy Exchange—EEX) are above competitive levels for a large fraction of the observations. We verify the robustness of the results by carrying out sensitivity analyses. We also address the issue of revenue adequacy.     

The politics of regulation in the Turkish electricity market

Turkey began reforming the electricity market in 2001. The regulatory reform aimed to liberalize the market. However, the institutional and political structure was not ready for creating an efficiently working competition. The independent regulator did not have both experience and will to direct the industry to a more competitive environment. Currently, the reform has slowed down and political preferences drive the industry. This paper studies the reasons for the slowdown in the reform efforts by focusing on the relationships between the government, judiciary and the independent regulator. We conclude that strategic behaviors of players in the market, including the judiciary, the government, and the regulator, have made the introduction of competition to the market more costly.     

Analysis of competition and market power in the wholesale electricity market in India

The electricity reforms were initiated in India with the objective of promoting competition in the electricity market. In order to promote competition, the Electricity Act 2003 was enacted and various policy initiatives were taken by the Government of India. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) also facilitated competition through the regulatory framework of availability based tariff, Indian Electricity Grid Code, open access in inter-state transmission, inter-state trading and power exchanges. Despite these initiatives, electricity prices increased in the Wholesale Electricity Market in India (WEMI). This paper analyses the market structure and competitiveness in the WEMI. There are, of course, various potential reasons for the rise in the electricity price. This paper seeks to investigate, if market power was one of the reasons for increase in market prices. Concentration ratio, Herfindahl–Hirschman index, Supply Margin Assessment, and Residual Supply Index have been used to measure market power. This paper also uses the price–cost mark-up to examine, if exercise of market power led to higher margins. The analysis suggests that market power of firms may be part of the reason for the increase in electricity prices in WEMI. The study suggests various measures to increase competition in the WEMI.     

Trends in prices to commercial energy consumers in the competitive Texas electricity market

To date, the price of electricity to commercial or business energy consumers has generally increased at greater rates in the areas of Texas where retail competition has been introduced than in areas that do not enjoy competition. Trends in commercial competitive prices have largely mirrored trends in residential prices. Market restructuring has tended to increase the sensitivity of retail electricity prices to changes in the price of natural gas, the marginal fuel used for generation in Texas. Consequently, the rapid increases in the commodity price of natural gas following restructuring led to increases in competitive electric rates which exceeded the increases in areas not exposed to restructuring, where the fuel component of electric rates tend to reflect a weighted average of the utilities’ fuel costs. There is some evidence that pricing behavior by competitive retailers changed when the retailers affiliated with the incumbent utilities were permitted some pricing flexibility, resulting in a reduction in prices.     

Investment prospects for geothermal power in El Salvador''s electricity market

A mixed-integer optimizing programming model was created to simulate capacity expansion for the electricity market in El Salvador. Various demand scenarios were constructed, under which capacity expansion alternatives were tested. Results showed that possible geothermal projects were able to meet the growing energy needs of El Salvador, while yielding relatively low prices for the end-user. A best case projection for 2020 showed an increased proportion of geothermal generation in the energy mix by 6% compared to the present mix.

Much of the current generating plants and planned capacity are distanced from the load center, San Salvador. In order to meet the country's increasing demand, it was found that generating capacity investment should be accompanied by transmission upgrades. Even when current conditions were simulated, transmission congestion appeared to be present. Results from some expansion scenarios showed that transmission congestion increased nodal prices despite the addition of further generating capacity.     

The futures and forward price differential in the Nordic electricity market

This note investigates price differentials between electricity forwards and portfolios of short-term futures with identical delivery periods at the Nordic Power Exchange (Nord Pool). Since both contracts are traded at the same exchange, there is no influence of, for example, different market microstructure and default risk when examining the effect of the marking-to-market of futures on the price differential. Although the prices of the futures portfolios are, on average, below the corresponding forward prices, these price differentials are, on average, not statistically significant and not economically significant when taking transaction costs into account. Given the characteristics of the electricity contracts under observation, this is consistent with the predictions of the Cox et al. (1981) model and indicates efficient pricing in the Nord Pool forward market in contrast to previous results.     

Transmission expansion in Argentina 5: The regional electricity forum of Buenos Aires province

This paper supplements analyses of Argentine transmission expansions at the federal level by looking at experience in Buenos Aires province. A Regional Electricity Forum of distribution companies has drawn up and begun to implement a 10-year transmission expansion plan. Contrary to previous fears, getting agreement between the members on investment and cost sharing has not been unduly problematic. More challenging was getting approval of the provincial government on funding. Deferring tariff reductions and using the revenues for investment facilitated the process, and now some innovative financing arrangements are underway. Again contrary to some previous suggestions, the controversial Area of Influence method was extended rather than replaced. This overcame concerns about free-riding. Progress and investment have been severely curtailed by the economic crisis in 2001 and subsequent federal government policy. The arrangements nonetheless appear to be working well, and to be conducive to more efficient transmission expansion. This confirms that it is practicable and advantageous to allow users rather than the transmission company or the regulator to propose and determine transmission investment, even in a meshed rather than radial system. An appropriate regulatory framework is needed to approve that part of the total budget to paid by distribution business consumers, but this does not require the regulator to lead or monitor the detail of the process.     

Vertical integration and market power: A model-based analysis of restructuring in the Korean electricity market

An agent-based simulation model is developed using computational learning to investigate the impact of vertical integration between electricity generators and retailers on market power in a competitive wholesale market setting. It is observed that if partial vertical integration creates some market foreclosure, whether this leads to an increase or decrease in market power is situation specific. A detailed application to the Korean market structure reveals this to be the case. We find that in various cases, whilst vertical integration generally reduces spot prices, it can increase or decrease the market power of other market generators, depending upon the market share and the technology segment of the market, which is integrated, as well as the market concentrations before and after the integration.     

Government procurement of peak capacity in the New Zealand electricity market

This paper analyzes the impact of government procurement of reserve electricity generation capacity on the long-run equilibrium in the electricity market. The approach here is to model the electricity market in a context where the supply companies have market power. The model is then used to analyze the impact of government direct supply of peak capacity on the market. We find that the firms build less peak-generation capacity when the government procures peak generating capacity. The long-run equilibrium with N firms and government capacity of K_G results in an increase of total peak generation capacity of K_G/(N+1) compared to the long-run equilibrium with no government capacity. Supply disruptions of baseline capacity during the peak time period are also considered. It is found that peak prices do not go up any further with (anticipated) supply disruptions. Instead the entire cost of the extra peakers is borne by customers on traditional meters and off-peak customers who face real-time pricing.     

On the evaluation of market power and market dominance—The Nordic electricity market

This paper studies different concentration and dominance measures using structural indexes used to initially screen the competitive situation in a market. The Nordic and Swedish electricity markets are used as the empirical cases. Market concentration issues in the Nordic electricity market in general and in Sweden in particular have been, at least in initial screenings, approached by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). This article uses an alternative measure to HHI, which is based on market shares of the two largest firms in the market. The results shows that only the Swedish wholesale market has a firm that can be regarded as dominant, but only during very short periods. The results from a hypothetical merger between the second and third largest company in the Swedish wholesale market shows that when the dominant position of the largest firm is reduced, by increasing the size of the second largest firm, the threshold value indicates that competition actually will increase (contradicting to the HHI).     

Simulation of current pricing-tendencies in the German electricity market for private consumption

The German electricity market for private consumption is characterized by increasing prices and low participation of the consumers. This prompts us to investigate the interdependencies between the customers’ engagement in the market and the suppliers’ pricing strategies. Based on an analysis of the German retail market, an agent-based simulation model is developed. Whereas the behaviour of private customers is calibrated on field data, the suppliers learn to maximize profits with a feedback-learning heuristic. The simulation results show a tendency of rising prices, which are created without the assumption of tacit collusion among suppliers. We conclude that in Germany the current market pressure of private customers may not be a sufficient incentive for suppliers to lower electricity prices.     

Evaluating the efficiency of divestiture policy in promoting competitiveness using an analytical method and agent-based computational economics

Choosing a desired policy for divestiture of dominant firms’ generation assets has been a challenging task and open question for regulatory authority. To deal with this problem, in this paper, an analytical method and agent-based computational economics (ACE) approach are used for ex-ante analysis of divestiture policy in reducing market power. The analytical method is applied to solve a designed concentration boundary problem, even for situations where the cost data of generators are unknown. The concentration boundary problem is the problem of minimizing or maximizing market concentration subject to operation constraints of the electricity market. It is proved here that the market concentration corresponding to operation condition is certainly viable in an interval calculated by the analytical method. For situations where the cost function of generators is available, the ACE is used to model the electricity market. In ACE, each power producer’s profit-maximization problem is solved by the computational approach of Q-learning. The power producer using the Q-learning method learns from past experiences to implicitly identify the market power, and find desired response in competing with the rivals. Both methods are applied in a multi-area power system and effects of different divestiture policies on market behavior are analyzed.     

Generators' bidding behavior in the NYISO day-ahead wholesale electricity market

This paper proposes a statistical and econometric model to analyze the generators' bidding behavior in the NYISO day-ahead wholesale electricity market. The generator level bidding data show very strong persistence in generators' grouping choices over time. Using dynamic random effect ordered probit model, we find that persistence is characterized by positive state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence is more important than unobserved heterogeneity. The finding of true state dependence suggests a scope for economic policy intervention. If NYISO can implement an effective policy to switch generators from higher price groups to lower price groups, the effect is likely to be lasting. As a result, the market price can be lowered in the long-run. Generators' offered capacity is estimated by a two-stage sample selection model. The estimated results show that generators in higher-priced groups tend to withhold their capacity strategically to push up market prices. It further confirms the importance of an effective policy to turn generators into lower price groups in order to mitigate unexpected price spikes. The simulated market prices based on our estimated aggregate supply curve can replicate most volatility of actual DA market prices. Applying our models to different demand assumptions, we find that demand conditions can affect market prices significantly. It validates the importance of introducing demand side management during the restructure of electricity industry.     

The potential for segmentation of the retail market for electricity in Ireland

We estimate the gross margin that is earned from the supply of electricity to households in Ireland. Using half hourly electricity demand data, the system marginal price (also called the wholesale price) and the retail price of electricity, we analyse how the gross margin varies across customers with different characteristics. The wholesale price varies throughout the day, thus, the time at which electricity is used affects the gross margin. The main factor in determining gross margin, however, is the level of demand.The highest gross margins are earned from supplying customers that have the following characteristics: being aged between 46 and 55, having a household income of at least €75,000 per annum, being self-employed, having a third-level education, having a professional or managerial occupation, living in a household with seven or more people, living in a detached house, having at least five bedrooms or being a mortgage holder.An OLS regression shows that gross margin is partly explained by the energy conservation measures which are present in a household; the number of household members; the number of bedrooms; age; occupation; and accommodation-type.     

Productivity growth and deregulation of Japanese electricity distribution

Deregulation of Japanese electric power industry began in 1995. After the amendment of Electricity Utility Industry Law in 1995, competition was partially introduced in a generation sector and retail competition started from 2000. Eligibility to choose suppliers was gradually extended from larger to smaller customers. As of 2008, almost all customers except households can choose their electricity suppliers. Based upon both previous implementation result of competition policy and review on their achievement, Japanese government will begin new policy debate in 2013 to assess further retail competition which includes household customers. To prepare for policy suggestion on the future electric power industry, this study examines the cost structure of Japanese electricity distribution. For the purpose, we estimate a multi-product translog cost function of Japanese electricity distribution from 1983 to 2003. Using the estimated cost function, we calculate several economic measures such as productivity growth, technical change and economies of scale and scope. The empirical results of this study indicate the improvement in productivity growth after deregulation.     

Capacity commitment and price volatility in a competitive electricity market

The long lead time required to add new capacity in the electricity generation industry means that daily demands are necessarily served by capacity already installed. However, in a competitive market, even if the installed capacity was designed to serve the projected demands, frequent surpluses and occasional full utilization inevitably lead to price volatility. This paper develops a two-stage model of the generation market in which capacity construction occurs in stage 1, before demand realization, and price determination occurs in stage 2, when the equilibrium price ensures that the realized demand does not exceed the installed capacity. We show that price volatility and price spikes are inevitable, and that while price capping can mitigate high and volatile prices, it causes unmet demands and reduction in system reliability. This paper accentuates the interdependence among generating capacity, price volatility and service reliability, a primary cause of concern in the debate on electricity market reform.