大宗商品的供应链期权契约影响因素研究

供应链中大宗商品的期权定价通常采用Black-Scholes期权定价模型,但该模型没有考虑资金时间成本、现货价格波动风险和期权期限三方面因素对期权定价的影响.所以在传统的供应链期权契约模型基础上引进市场利率、现货价格波动率和期权期限三个主要市场因素,对供应链期权契约模型进行扩展,更符合现代经济情况对期权定价的要求.经过模型推导进一步分析供应商主导型供应链期权契约的决策机制,计算出使供应链整体利润优化的供应商和零售商最优定价策略和最优采购决策,最后采用灵敏度分析的方法找到主要影响因素,计算出影响程度.     

以扶贫为导向的企业与农户部分保证价契约研究

在订单农业背景下,以企业与小农户为研究对象,对农产品引入产出不确定性因子,双方签订部分保证价收购契约。期末收获时将部分农产品以契约价销售,剩下部分则按当地公开市场收获季价格销售,建立斯坦伯格博弈模型,对比分析了农户和企业选用部分保证价收购契约前后的利润差值和成本大小,进一步推广到当企业同时为农户提供农业信息与技术支持时,双方都能获取更多的利益空间。结果表明:基于部分保证价收购契约的机制,能有效协调供应链,增加农户利润,降低其价格风险;同时企业减小采购成本,也能更好地应对现货供需市场的高度波动性,实现供应链上农户和企业的共赢。最后以数值分析说明契约的正确性。     

考虑双边可靠性的物流服务供应链协调契约研究

研究由单个物流集成商和单个功能型物流提供商构成的二级物流服务供应链,考虑双方的可靠性均影响客户物流需求的情况下,针对物流服务供应链的协调问题进行研究。讨论物流服务供应链在分散式决策与集中式决策下的决策情况,指出传统批发价格契约的局限,提出利用考虑双边可靠性的收益共享契约对物流服务供应链进行协调,并讨论协调契约的效果与局限。研究表明:收益共享契约能激励企业双方提升自身的可靠性,使物流服务供应链协调;双方具有的基本可靠性在实施契约前后对各自的利润与协调均有正向积极影响,并且收益共享契约扩大了该积极影响;最后,通过仿真验证了该协调契约的有效性,并对相关参数进行灵敏度分析。     

弹性需求条件下供应链协作的批发价格机制研究

研究了一类由供应商与分销商组成的两级供应链在弹性需求下的协作机制设计问题.分析了供应商与分销商未进行任何协作时整个供应链的收益情况.在此基础上,对供应商与分销商进行协作时最优订货量与整个供应链的收益进行了分析.研究结果表明双方协作可以提高整个供应链系统的收益,但并不能保证合作各方的收益均会增加.为此,提出了一种基于不对称Nash协商模型的批发价格契约机制来协调合作双方的收益,并进行了数据模拟与综合分析.     

具有风险偏好的供应链期权契约协调模型

在需求随机的条件下,研究了由一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险偏好的销售商组成的供应链的协调问题。首先建立了基于M-CVaR(均值条件风险价值)和期权契约的决策模型,分别推出了销售商和供应链整体的最优订购策略,然后分析了销售商的风险规避度及悲观系数对其风险偏好和最优订购量的影响,最后给出了销售商在不同风险偏好(风险规避、风险中性和风险喜好)下供应链的协调条件,并通过算例分析了主要参数对销售商订购策略及供应链双方收益的影响。研究表明:①M-CVaR风险测度下,采用期权契约时销售商的最优现货订购量和最优期权订购量存在并且唯一;②随着销售商的悲观系数由1向0逐渐递减或风险规避度由0向1逐渐增加,其风险偏好由风险规避转为风险中性再转为风险喜好且最优总订购量逐渐增加;③当销售商表现出风险中性或销售商的悲观系数等于1时,供应链的协调条件只有一种情况,当销售商表现出风险规避或风险喜好时,供应链的协调条件根据销售商的悲观系数的大小分为三种情况。     

绿色供应链协同创新合作策略研究

考虑供应链绿色声誉对整体收益的影响,运用微分博弈方法,研究由单一核心企业和单一配套企业组成的绿色供应链协同创新合作问题,分别考察了在不合作契约、成本分担契约和合作契约3种情形下,核心企业和配套企业的最优绿色创新投入、各自的最优收益以及绿色供应链整体的最优收益情况。通过比较分析发现：1) 成本分担契约作为激励机制,可提高配套企业绿色创新投入、双方最优收益和整体收益;2) 合作契约下的绿色供应链整体收益和参与双方的绿色创新投入达到最优。研究结论从理论层面论证绿色供应链核心企业与配套企业协同创新合作行为的有效性。     

期权定价市场化情况下的供应链协调机制

通过对期权定价市场化情况下的供应链协调过程的研究,构建出期权定价市场化情况下的供应链决策机制模型.并对供应链期权契约双方的决策机制和决策过程进行深入分析,计算出使供应链整体利润优化化的供应商和零售商最优定价策略和最优采购决策,最后通过数例分析对结果进行验证.     

基于顾客现状偏好的供应链无理由退货策略

首次将顾客现状偏好因素引入到供应链无理由退货策略中,主要研究了当制造商和零售商之间存在回扣契约或销售折扣契约时,供应链及其成员的最优无理由退货策略问题。文中通过对供应链无理由退货策略进行建模分析,分别得出了在不同契约中供应链整体和零售商的最优退货价格以及二者的双边际效益情况,并且发现了部分契约可以通过调整契约参数来消除这种矛盾边际效益现象,以此来实现供应链的协调。     

价格随机条件下看涨期权折扣契约的应急供应链协调研究

在突发事件造成市场需求与市场价格均随机波动的条件下,将期权与数量折扣契约融合,形成一种新的期权折扣契约,并用看涨期权折扣契约模型来协调供应链。通过海塞矩阵判断得知供应链存在最优决策,并进行算例分析。结果表明：当突发事件引起市场需求增加时,看涨期权折扣契约和数量折扣契约均能有效地提升供应链收益,且看涨期权折扣契约提升的幅度更大;当突发事件引起市场需求缩小时,2种契约均不能扭转整个供应链收益大幅下降的局面,且看涨期权折扣契约下降的幅度更大。为获取超额利润,决策者必须充分获取市场信息并对市场需求进行准确的预测才能使新的契约机制更有效。在新的前提条件下,看涨期权折扣契约模型能有效地协调供应链并提高整个供应链系统的绩效。该契约实现了风险共担和收益双赢,在一定程度上提升了供应链的柔性。     

财务困境下基于努力与激励的外包供应链契约协调

在一个用户公司和一个面临财务困境的客服中心构成的外包供应链中,考虑用户公司与客服中心各自的努力对客户数量影响,构建了用户公司提供激励且用户公司与客服中心双方努力及客户中心一方努力的情况下外包供应链双方的利润函数,分析了外包供应链集中决策与分散决策的协调机制。在此基础上,将激励契约与成本共担契约相结合,最终实现财务困境下集中决策外包供应链的协调,并确定出实现协调的契约参数与条件。最后通过数值算例对研究结论进行说明、验证和相应的敏感性分析。     

Positive implications of market valuation under asymmetric quality information

We investigate a buyer’s contract design problem in which the buyer’s supplier has private quality cost information and is concerned with market valuation. We characterise the parameters of the contract menu (including quantity, quality level and transfer payment) and determine the market price. Our results show that the supplier’s market value concern (MVC) has positive implications and mitigates the distortion of quality level. Although both the buyer and the entire chain system benefit from this MVC, it may give advantage or disadvantage to the supplier of the low-cost type, depending on this supplier’s efficiency and the extent of the MVC. Numerical study reveals that the buyer is insensitive to the pricing decision, which suggests that contracts subject to the optimal market price without MVC serve as a good heuristic.     

Proactive and reactive purchasing planning under dependent demand,price, and yield risks

The trend of globalization and outsourcing makes supply unreliable and companies begin to have supplier diversity embedded into their procurement departments. Traditionally, contract suppliers are a major supply channel for many companies, while the effectiveness of reactive supply sources, such as spot markets, is often ignored. Spot markets have negligible lead times and higher average prices comparing with contract suppliers. In our research, procurement utilizes the combinatorial benefits of proactive supply (a contract supplier) and reactive supply (a spot market). The uncertainties of yields, spot prices, and demand, and the correlations among them are also taken into consideration when designing procurement plans. The objectives of this paper were to evaluate the effectiveness of dealing with uncertain supply using the spot market along with the contract supplier and to model the dependences among all the potential uncertainties. This research also seeks high expected profits without overlooking the associated variances. The analytical expression to determine the optimal order quantity is obtained under the most general situations where commodities can be both bought and sold via the spot market. Some properties are derived to provide useful managerial insights. In addition, reference scenarios, such as pure contract sourcing and the spot market restricted for buying or selling only, are included for comparison purposes.     

Random yield and coordination mechanisms of a supply chain with emergency backup sourcing

This paper considers a supply chain in which a buyer purchases finished items from a contracting supplier to satisfy a stochastic market demand, where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield. We assume that the buyer can make up the shortage by sourcing from an emergency backup supplier. We develop two Stackelberg game models, i.e. buyer-Stackelberg (BS) model and supplier-Stackelberg (SS) model, and find that the decentralised BS model results in a higher stocking factor of supplier’s input than the decentralised SS model. Compared with BS model, the buyer in SS model performs more explicit order plan, and we find that only when the actual yield of the supplier is insufficient, the buyer would use emergency backup sourcing to make up the shortage. When the manufacturing operation of the supplier is in the good state, the buyer only orders a certain amount and has some leftover. When the actual yield of the supplier is moderate, the buyer uses up every item produced from the supplier regardless of the yield rate. Comparing both channel structures, SS operation is a more effective way of controlling both inventory cost and backup sourcing cost, and it can be beneficial for each player as well as for the whole channel. Finally, we develop the coordination mechanism for each channel to investigate the issues of risk handling and risk sharing for uncertain demand and uncertain yield.     

航空货运市场运力分配及定价的协调问题研究

为解决航空运输企业在货运代理市场和现货市场上运力分配优化问题,约束代理人的定价行为,提出了一种能有效协调供应链的补偿合约。数值算例表明,现货市场需求波动程度的越强,补偿合约在实现供应链协同、优化航空运力配置方面发挥的作用越大。     

Supply contract design under price volatility and competition

This study analyses index-based contract designs and contract equilibria in a competitive setting. We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a retailer. Each manufacturer procures a commodity in a spot market and uses such a commodity to produce a product. The manufacturers initially choose either an index-based or fixed-price contract. Thereafter, the manufacturer that adopts an index-based contract designs the contract price on the basis of the spot and forward prices of its input commodity. Finally, the two products are sold through the common retailer. Our analysis indicates that an index-based contract provides a manufacturer with a contingent pricing mechanism, thereby enabling the contract price to respond to the spot price of its input commodity. If only one manufacturer adopts an index-based contract, then the contract price is designed to respond positively to the corresponding spot price, while the contract design constantly benefits the designer but may either benefit or hurt the rival and retailer. If both manufacturers adopt an index-based contract, then the contract price may be designed to respond negatively to the corresponding spot price. The reason is that the manufacturer intends to dampen competition by adopting an opposite contract price design. Further study shows that in equilibrium, both manufacturers consistently adopt an index-based contact if the spot prices are positively correlated. However, differentiated contract strategies may be optimal for manufacturers if the correlation is negative.     

Game theoretic analysis of horizontal carrier coordination with revenue sharing in E-commerce logistics

This paper proposes comparisons among two different competitive power structures with and without horizontal coordination. We conduct a game theoretic analysis on the situation where two logistics service providers compete in an e-commerce logistics market with respect to the order quantity and service level decision on a particular logistics service product. Under a consumer utility-based demand, we acquire the equilibrium order quantity decisions and optimal profits under the centralised setting and decentralised setting. An analytical model is established to examine the existence of the Nash equilibrium in the service game. We then prove that the logistics service demand depends on different competitive power structures with the establishment of Cournot game and Stackelberg game model. The analytical results and the equilibrium analysis of the e-commerce logistics system are investigated. After that, we compare the equilibrium results among the centralised system, Cournot game, and Stackelberg game. To empower the horizontal carrier coordination, we design a revenue sharing contract for the decentralised model. A numerical study illustrates the impact of parameters on the optimal decision variables. In this paper, we prove the effectiveness of horizontal carrier collaboration and explicate the reason for the lower marginal profit in logistics theoretically.     

零售商主导下考虑增值物流服务的供应链期权契约协调

在零售商为主导者,生产商为跟随者且承担物流服务的模式下,考虑物流服务价值增值,建立了物流服务水平影响市场需求情形下的两级Stackelberg博弈模型。研究表明,分散决策下生产商的生产量和物流服务水平均低于集中决策下的结果,引入期权契约和物流服务成本共担契约可同时协调生产量和物流服务水平。最后,通过算例验证了上述契约组合的可行性,改变物流服务成本分担比例的取值,分析了零售商期权价格、期望利润以及第一次订购产品量的变化情况。     

Pricing and lot-sizing decisions in a two-echelon system with transportation costs

We consider a single-buyer single-supplier system. The market demand is sensitive to the selling price set by the buyer. Both the buyer and the supplier operate with unit product costs, inventory holding costs, and order placement costs. In addition, the buyer is responsible for the freight cost. We formulate a model for determining the optimal lot-sizing and pricing decisions. Existing models for the problem do not consider the transportation costs with price sensitive market demand, and determine the optimal decisions through an exhaustive search. We propose an approximate solution procedure, and report the computational results on the effectiveness of the proposed procedure.     

市场细分下考虑需求扰动的双渠道定价决策及协调研究

针对一个拥有独立细分市场的制造商与一个传统零售商组成的双渠道供应链在面临需求扰动时的定价决策及协调问题，应用动态博弈，在市场需求无扰动的前提下，建立了市场细分下双渠道供应链的模型。当市场需求发生扰动时，对于集中式供应链，通过求解供应链系统最优利润的Karush-Kuhn-Tucker（KKT）条件，分4种情形讨论，得出了市场细分下双渠道供应链的最优价格及数量决策，并将其与无扰动情形的最优决策进行比较。对于分散式供应链，推导出供应链协调时，收益共享契约应满足的条件，证明了收益共享契约能够实现市场细分下双渠道供应链的协调。算例分析结果表明：当收益共享契约参数的取值在指定区间内，供应链总利润可提高约4.5%，同时实现帕累托改进。     

Free shipping and purchasing decisions in B2B transactions: A game-theoretic analysis

Free shipping offers by eBusiness companies have become an effective means of attracting and keeping customers. Many business-to-consumer and business-to-business (B2B) companies now offer free shipping to buyers who spend more than a specific amount. In this paper we consider a B2B environment and assume that the buyer may be enticed to increase her purchase amount in order to qualify for free shipping. The seller's and the buyer's decisions (i.e., free shipping cutoff level and purchase amounts, respectively) affect each other's objective functions. Thus, we model the problem as a leader-follower game under complete information where the leader is the seller and the follower is the buyer. We assume that if the cutoff level announced by the seller is lower than the buyer's purchase amount, the seller absorbs the shipping cost. Otherwise, the buyer compares the values of two functions to determine whether she should increase her purchase amount to qualify for free shipping. We first determine the best response function for the buyer for any given value of the seller's cutoff level and present some structural results related to the response function. We then compute the Stackelberg solution for the leader-follower game and discuss the managerial implications of our findings. The results obtained are demonstrated with the help of two examples. We also present a complete sensitivity analysis for the Stackelberg solution and the objective function values for variations in the unit shipping cost.