Preorder-based triangle: a modified version of bilattice-based triangle for belief revision in nonmonotonic reasoning

Bilattice-based triangle provides an elegant algebraic structure for reasoning with vague and uncertain information. But the truth and knowledge ordering of intervals in bilattice-based triangle cannot handle repetitive belief revisions which is an essential characteristic of nonmonotonic reasoning. Moreover, the ordering induced over the intervals by the bilattice-based triangle is not sometimes intuitive. In this work, we construct an alternative algebraic structure, namely preorder-based triangle and we formulate proper logical connectives for this. It is also demonstrated that Preorder-based triangle serves to be a better alternative to the bilattice-based triangle for reasoning in application areas, that involve nonmonotonic fuzzy reasoning with uncertain information.     

A logic programming system for nonmonotonic reasoning

The evolution of logic programming semantics has included the introduction of a new explicit form of negation, beside the older implicit (or default) negation typical of logic programming. The richer language has been shown adequate for a spate of knowledge representation and reasoning forms.The widespread use of such extended programs requires the definition of a correct top-down querying mechanism, much as for Prolog wrt. normal programs. One purpose of this paper is to present and exploit a SLDNF-like derivation procedure, SLX, for programs with explicit negation under well-founded semantics (WFSX) and prove its soundness and completeness. (Its soundness wrt. the answer-sets semantics is also shown.) Our choice ofWFSX as the base semantics is justi-fied by the structural properties it enjoys, which are paramount for top-down query evaluation.Of course, introducing explicit negation requires dealing with contradiction. Consequently, we allow for contradiction to appear, and show moreover how it can be removed by freely changing the truth-values of some subset of a set of predefined revisable literals. To achieve this, we introduce a paraconsistent version ofWFSX, WFSX _p , that allows contradictions and for which our SLX top-down procedure is proven correct as well.This procedure can be used to detect the existence of pairs of complementary literals inWESX _p simply by detecting the violation of integrity rulesf L, -L introduced for eachL in the language of the program. Furthermore, integrity constraints of a more general form are allowed, whose violation can likewise be detected by SLX.Removal of contradiction or integrity violation is accomplished by a variant of the SLX procedure that collects, in a formula, the alternative combinations of revisable literals' truth-values that ensure the said removal. The formulas, after simplification, can then be satisfied by a number of truth-values changes in the revisable, among true, false, and undefined. A notion of minimal change is defined as well that establishes a closeness relation between a program and its revisions. Forthwith, the changes can be enforced by introducing or deleting program rules for the revisable literals.To illustrate the usefulness and originality of our framework, we applied it to obtain a novel logic programming approach, and results, in declarative debugging and model-based diagnosis problems.     

On nonmonotonic reasoning with the method of sweeping presumptions

Reasoning almost always occurs in the face of incomplete information. Such reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions drawn may later be withdrawn when additional information is obtained. There is an active literature on the problem of modeling such nonmonotonic reasoning, yet no category of method-let alone a single method-has been broadly accepted as the right approach. This paper introduces a new method, called sweeping presumptions, for modeling nonmonotonic reasoning. The main goal of the paper is to provide an example-driven, nontechnical introduction to the method of sweeping presumptions, and thereby to make it plausible that sweeping presumptions can usefully be applied to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper discusses a representative sample of examples that have appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, and discusses them from the point of view of sweeping presumptions.     

Reasoning with Sets of Defaults in Default Logic

We present a general approach for representing and reasoning with sets of defaults in default logic, focusing on reasoning about preferences among sets of defaults. First, we consider how to control the application of a set of defaults so that either all apply (if possible) or none do (if not). From this, an approach to dealing with preferences among sets of default rules is developed. We begin with an ordered default theory , consisting of a standard default theory, but with possible preferences on sets of rules. This theory is transformed into a second, standard default theory wherein the preferences are respected. The approach differs from other work, in that we obtain standard default theories and do not rely on prioritized versions of default logic. In practical terms this means we can immediately use existing default logic theorem provers for an implementation. Also, we directly generate just those extensions containing the most preferred applied rules; in contrast, most previous approaches generate all extensions, then select the most preferred. In a major application of the approach, we show how semimonotonic default theories can be encoded so that reasoning can be carried out at the object level. With this, we can reason about default extensions from within the framework of a standard default logic. Hence one can encode notions such as skeptical and credulous conclusions, and can reason about such conclusions within a single extension.     

Abductive logics in a belief revision framework

Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a good explanation of E. The paper surveys four known schemes for abduction that can be used in both fields. Its first contribution is a taxonomy of these schemes according to a common semantic framework based on belief revision. Its second contribution is to produce, for each non-trivial scheme, a representation theorem linking its semantic framework to a set of postulates. Its third contribution is to present semantic and axiomatic arguments in favor of one of these schemes, ordered abduction, which has never been vindicated in the literature.     

Default reasoning by deductive planning

This paper deals with the automation of reasoning from incomplete information by means of default logics. We provide proof procedures for default logics' major reasoning modes, namely, credulous and skeptical reasoning. We start by reformulating the task of credulous reasoning in default logics as deductive planning problems. This interpretation supplies us with several interesting and valuable insights into the proof theory of default logics. Foremost, it allows us to take advantage of the large number of available methods, algorithms, and implementations for solving deductive planning problems. As an example, we demonstrate how credulous reasoning in certain variants of default logic is implementable by means of a planning method based on equational logic programming. In addition, our interpretation allows us to transfer theoretical results, such as complexity results, from the field of planning to that of default logics. In this way, we have isolated two yet unknown classes of default theories for which deciding credulous entailment is polynomial.Our approach to skeptical reasoning relies on an arbitrary method for credulous reasoning. It does not strictly require rather the inspection of all extensions, nor does it strictly require the computation of entire extensions to decide whether a formula is skeptically entailed. Notably, our approach abstracts from an underlying credulous reasoner. In this way, it can be used to extend existing formalisms for credulous reasoning to skeptical reasoning.This author was a visiting professor at the University of Darmstadt while parts of this work were being carried out. This author also acknowledges support from the Commission of the European Communities under grant no. ERB4001GT922433.     

基于四值语义的缺省逻辑

基于公式变换,给出一组缺省理论的变换方法,将命题语言L中的缺省理论变换到对应的命题语言L^-＋中,保证了所得到的缺省理论的所有扩张均不平凡,并通过一种弱变换可同时保证缺省扩张的存在性．为缺省理论定义了各种四值模型,使得缺省逻辑具有非单调超协调推理能力,并证明了L^-＋中的缺省扩张与L中缺省理论的四值模型之间具有一一对应关系．四值模型描述了公式变换的语义,基于四值语义的缺省推理通过缺省理论的变换技术能在标准的缺省逻辑中实现．     

Splitting Finite Default Theories: A Comparison of Two Approaches

Default logic is computationally expensive. One of the most promising ways of easing this problem and developing powerful implementations is to split a default theory into smaller parts and compute extensions in a modular, local way. This paper compares two recent approaches, Turner's splitting and Cholewinski's stratification. It shows that the approaches are closely related – in fact the former can be viewed as a special case of the latter.     

What Should Default Reasoning be,by Default?

This is a position paper concerning the role of empirical studies of human default reasoning in the formalization of AI theories of default reasoning. We note that AI motivates its theoretical enterprise by reference to human skill at default reasoning, but that the actual research does not make any use of this sort of information and instead relies on intuitions of individual investigators. We discuss two reasons theorists might not consider human performance relevant to formalizing default reasoning: (a) that intuitions are sufficient to describe a model, and (b) that human performance in this arena is irrelevant to a competence model of the phenomenon. We provide arguments against both these reasons. We then bring forward three further considerations against the use of intuitions in this arena: (a) it leads to an unawareness of predicate ambiguity, (b) it presumes an understanding of ordinary language statements of typicality, and (c) it is similar to discredited views in other fields. We advocate empirical investigation of the range of human phenomena that intuitively embody default reasoning. Gathering such information would provide data with which to generate formal default theories and against which to test the claims of proposed theories. Our position is that such data are the very phenomena that default theories are supposed to explain.     

Modal logic for default reasoning

In the paper we introduce a variant of autoepistemic logic that is especially suitable for expressing default reasonings. It is based on the notion of iterative expansion. We show a new way of translating default theories into the language of modal logic under which default extensions correspond exactly to iterative expansions. Iterative expansions have some attractive properties. They are more restrictive than autoepistemic expansions, and, for some classes of theories, than moderately grounded expansions. At the same time iterative expansions avoid several undesirable properties of strongly grounded expansions, for example, they are grounded in the whole set of the agent's initial assumptions and do not depend on their syntactic representation.Iterative expansions are defined syntactically. We define a semantics which leads to yet another notion of expansion — weak iterative expansion — and we show that there is an important class of theories, that we call -programs, for which iterative and weak iterative expansions coincide. Thus, for -programs, iterative expansions can be equivalently defined by semantic means.This work was partially supported by Army Research Office under grant DAAL03-89-K-0124, and by National Science Foundation and the Commonwealth of Kentucky EPSCoR program under grant RII 8610671.     

A Critical Reexamination of Default Logic, Autoepistemic Logic, and Only Knowing

Fifteen years of work on nonmonotonic logic has certainly increased our understanding of the area. However, given a problem in which nonmonotonic reasoning is called for, it is far from clear how one should go about modeling the problem using the various approaches. We explore this issue in the context on two of the best–known approaches, Reiter's default logic and Moore's autoepistemic logic, as well as two related notions of "only knowing," due to Halpern and Moses and to Levesque. In particular, we return to the original technical definitions given in these papers and examine the extent to which they capture the intuitions they were designed to capture.     

Dynamic belief revision operators

The AGM approach to belief change is not geared to provide a decent account of iterated belief change. Darwiche and Pearl have sought to extend the AGM proposal in an interesting way to deal with this problem. We show that the original Darwiche-Pearl approach is, on the one hand excessively strong and, on the other rather limited in scope. The later Darwiche-Pearl approach, we argue, although it addresses the first problem, still remains rather permissive. We address both these issues by (1) assuming a dynamic revision operator that changes to a new revision operator after each instance of belief change, and (2) strengthening the Darwiche-Pearl proposal. Moreover, we provide constructions of this dynamic revision operator via entrenchment kinematics as well as a simple form of lexicographic revision, and prove representation results connecting these accounts.     

Operational and complete approaches to belief revision

Two operational approaches to belief revision are presented in this paper.The rules of R-calculus are modified in order to deduce all the maximal consistent subsets.Another set of given in order to deduce all the minimal inconsistent subsets.Then a procedure,which can generate all the maximal consistent subsets,is presented.They are complete approaches,since all the maximal consistent subsets can be deduced or generated.In this paper,only the case of propositional logic is considered.     

Agent信念的遗忘修正方法

为了使信念修正能够满足最小改变原则,首先基于遗忘理论定义遗忘收缩算子,并且证明该算子满足必要AGM收缩假定;然后通过Levi Identity构建遗忘修正算子;最后给出遗忘修正方法和多次遗忘修正算法。实例分析表明,算法具有可行性和有效性,能够得到较满意的修正结果。     

Iterated belief revision, revised

The AGM postulates for belief revision, augmented by the DP postulates for iterated belief revision, provide widely accepted criteria for the design of operators by which intelligent agents adapt their beliefs incrementally to new information. These postulates alone, however, are too permissive: They support operators by which all newly acquired information is canceled as soon as an agent learns a fact that contradicts some of its current beliefs. In this paper, we present a formal analysis of the deficiency of the standard postulates alone, and we show how to solve the problem by an additional postulate of independence. We give a representation theorem for this postulate and prove that it is compatible with AGM and DP.     

The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning

This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions about the system of beliefs. The procedures mentioned in (i) depend on the explication in (ii), which is largely described in terms of a Prolog program, EVID, which implements a system for interactive, defeasible reasoning when combined with an application knowledge base. It is shown that defeasible reasoning depends on a meta-level Closed World Assumption applied to the relationship between supporting evidence and a defeasible conclusion based on this evidence. Thesis (i) is then further defended by showing that the EVID explication of defeasible reasoning has sufficient representational power to cover a wide variety of practical applications of defeasible reasoning, especially in the context of decision making.     

Deductive efficiency,belief revision and acting

Abstract

The SNePS inference engine is optimized for deductive efficiency, i.e. all beliefs acquired via inference are added to the agent's beliefs so that future queries may be answered by a retrieval rather than rederivation. An assumption-based truth maintenance system keeps track of the derivation histories of derived beliefs. We show how such an architecture simplifies the ontology of prepositional representations of plans; acts; preconditions, and effects of actions. In addition, the deductive efficiency of the basic system automatically extends itself to efficient search of plans, and hierarchical plan decompositions.     

Iterated Belief Change

Most existing formalizations treat belief change as a single-step process, and ignore several problems that become important when a theory, or belief state, is revised over several steps. This paper identifies these problems, and argues for the need to retain all of the multiple possible outcomes of a belief change step, and for a framework in which the effects of a belief change step persist as long as is consistently possible. To demonstrate that such a formalization is indeed possible, we develop a framework, which uses the language of PJ-default logic (Delgrande and Jackson 1991) to represent a belief state, and which enables the effects of a belief change step to persist by propagating belief constraints . Belief change in this framework maps one belief state to another, where each belief state is a collection of theories given by the set of extensions of the PJ-default theory representing that belief state. Belief constraints do not need to be separately recorded; they are encoded as clearly identifiable components of a PJ-default theory. The framework meets the requirements for iterated belief change that we identify and satisfies most of the AGM postulates (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985) as well.