Direct-comparison judgments: When and why above- and below-average effects reverse.

Above-average and below-average effects appear to be common and consistent across a variety of judgment domains. For example, several studies show that individual items from a high- (low-) quality set tend to be rated as better (worse) than the other items in the set (e.g., E. E. Giladi & Y. Klar, 2002). Experiments in this article demonstrate reversals of these effects. A novel account is supported, which describes how the timing of the denotation of the to-be-judged item influences attention and ultimately affects the size or direction of comparative biases. The authors discuss how this timing account is relevant for many types of referent-dependent judgments (e.g., probability judgments, resource allocations) and how it intersects with various accounts of comparative bias (focalism, generalized-group, compromise between local and general standards [LOGE]). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing architectures of the decision–confidence relation.

Two experiments examined the effect of rendering confidence judgments on the properties of the comparative decision process. In Exp 1, participants worked for 12 sessions that required 2-alternative perceptual, line-length comparisons. For sessions 1–4 and sessions 9–12, confidence judgments were not required. For sessions 5–8, participants provided confidence reports following each comparative judgment. The requirement of confidence judgments significantly increased decisional response time, suggesting that some confidence processing occurs in parallel with the primary decision process. Concomitantly, an examination of the properties of the time to determine confidence during sessions 5–8 revealed clear evidence of postdecisional confidence processing. These results were replicated in a 2nd experiment requiring 2 alternative comparative judgments of Canadian city populations. The authors conclude that confidence processing occurs both during the decision process and postdecisionally, and discuss the implications of the present findings for current theories of confidence in human judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biases in Social Comparative Judgments: The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and Comparative-Optimism Effects.

Biases in social comparative judgments, such as those illustrated by above-average and comparative-optimism effects, are often regarded as products of motivated reasoning (e.g., self-enhancement). These effects, however, can also be produced by information-processing limitations or aspects of judgment processes that are not necessarily biased by motivational factors. In this article, the authors briefly review motivational accounts of biased comparative judgments, introduce a 3-stage model for understanding how people make comparative judgments, and then describe how various nonmotivational factors can influence the 3 stages of the comparative judgment process. Finally, the authors discuss several unresolved issues highlighted by their analysis, such as the interrelation between motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias and the influence of nonmotivated sources of bias on behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Instruction wording and the transitivity of comparative judgments.

In the construction of devices for assessing attitudes and opinions, questions pertaining to item form, instruction wording, and scoring were investigated. 30 student Ss were asked to make judgments about national group names with respect to desirability as classmates, social and fraternal group members, and as dormitory roommates. "The judgment data were analyzed… to determine the number of violations of transitivity observed under the three instruction conditions. The results indicated that there were no significant differences noted among the three groups." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fast similarities: Efficiency advantages of similarity-focused comparisons.

People constantly have to make efficient use of their limited cognitive resources. Recently, T. Mussweiler and K. Epstude (2009) demonstrated that comparative thinking simplifies information processing and increases the efficiency of judgment. However, there are different types of comparative thinking. While comparing 2 entities, people may focus on either similarities or dissimilarities between target and standard. The authors propose that these 2 comparative thinking styles differ in their efficiency. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that comparisons with a focus on similarities lead to more focused information processing and faster judgments than comparisons with a dissimilarity focus. In line with these hypotheses, the authors demonstrate that participants are indeed faster at judging the similarity of 2 stimuli (Study 1) and that they search for less target information in a comparative judgment task (Study 2) if they focus on similarities rather than dissimilarities. Focusing on similarities thus appears to be the more efficient comparative thinking style. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The influence of chronically and temporarily accessible information on life satisfaction judgments.

The authors examined the influence of temporarily and chronically accessible information on life satisfaction judgments. Meta-analyses revealed high retest-reliability of life satisfaction judgments and weak effects of the item order of domain and global satisfaction judgments. Study 1 (N=225) failed to replicate a widely cited finding of strong item-order effects. In Studies 2 (N=100), 3 (N=200), and 4 (N=222), chronically accessible information was a strong predictor of life satisfaction judgments, whereas item order had a relatively small effect. Study 5 (N=651) demonstrated that the results generalize to single item measures and judgments of shorter time periods. The results suggest that life satisfaction judgments are more heavily based on chronically accessible than temporarily accessible information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Olympic medals as fruits of comparison? Assimilation and contrast in sequential performance judgments.

The authors investigated the evaluative consequences of sequential performance judgments. Recent social comparison research has suggested that performance judgments may be influenced by judgments about a preceding performance. Specifically, performance judgments may be assimilated to judgments of the preceding performance if judges focus on similarities between the two. If judges focus on differences, however, contrast may ensue. The authors examined sequential performance judgments, using data gathered from the 2004 Olympic Games as well as data gathered in the laboratory with students or experienced gymnastics judges as participants. Sequential performance judgments were influenced by previously judged performances, and the direction of this influence depended on the degree of perceived similarity between the successive performances. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of a communication on attitude change and scale judgments.

"The purposes of this study were to assess the effects of a persuasive communication on attitude change and on judgments of the scale values of opinion items and to examine the relationship between attitude change and evaluations of the communication. An experimental group of subjects was exposed to a communication advocating abolution of capital punishment, after which they evaluated the communication, judged the scale values of 36 opinion statements, and revealed their own attitudes by responding to 20 opinion items… . The major results are: The communication changed attitudes in the direction advocated. But the groups were alike in their judgments of the scale values of the related opinion statements. Hence, a change in scale judgments is not a necessary condition for attitude change." From Psyc Abstracts 36:01:3GD33W. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

“Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles”: Correction to Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011).

Reports an error in "Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles" by Arie W. Kruglanski and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2011[Jan], Vol 118[1], 97-109). An incorrect reference was given in the reference list. The incorrect reference and the correct reference are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-00732-006.) A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 118(3) of Psychological Review (see record 2011-07436-001). An incorrect reference was given in the reference list. The incorrect reference and the correct reference are provided in the erratum.] [Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported online in Psychological Review on April 11 2011 (see record 2011-07436-001). An incorrect reference was given in the reference list. The incorrect reference is: Osman, B. (2004). Quality assessment, verification, and validation of modeling and simulation applications. Proceedings of the 2004 Winter Simulation Conference, 122–129. The correct reference is: Osman, M. (2004). An evaluation of dual process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 998–1010.] A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Dog's Got Personality: A Cross-Species Comparative Approach to Personality Judgments in Dogs and Humans.

This research offers a blueprint for how a cross-species comparative approach can be realized empirically. In a single design, parallel procedures and instruments were used in 2 species, dogs (Canis familiaris) and humans (Homo sapiens), to test whether personality differences exist and can be judged in dogs as accurately as in humans. Personality judgments of humans and dogs were compared on 3 accuracy criteria: internal consistency, consensus, and correspondence. Results showed that, on all 3 criteria, judgments of dogs were as accurate as judgments of humans. These findings are consistent with the evolutionary continuity hypothesis and suggest an important conclusion not widely considered by either personality or animal researchers: Personality differences do exist and can be measured in animals other than humans. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Encoding fluency is a cue used for judgments about learning.

The authors used paired-associate learning to investigate the hypothesis that the speed of generating an interactive image (encoding fluency) influenced 2 metacognitive judgments: judgments of learning (JOLs) and quality of encoding ratings (QUEs). Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that latency of a keypress indicating successful image formation was negatively related to both JOLs and QUEs even though latency was unrelated to recall. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when concrete and abstract items were mixed in a single list, latency was related to concreteness, judgments, and recall. However, item concreteness and fluency influenced judgments independently of one another. These outcomes suggest an important role of encoding fluency in the formation of metacognitive judgments about learning and future recall. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of information on the assessment of attitudes by authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.

"This study was concerned with the effects of differentially relevant information on social judgments of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. After listening to standard recorded interviews, the content of which was derived from the theoretical clusters of the F scale, Ss made judgments about the respondent's F scale attitudes and his values. It was hypothesized that Ss low in F are better able to use information for making accurate judgments. On the whole, results confirmed the hypothesis, although there was some evidence that Ss low in F, as well as those high in F, tended toward stereotyped thinking." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The interplay between value and relatedness as bases for metacognitive monitoring and control: Evidence for agenda-based monitoring.

Two experiments are reported examining how value and relatedness interact to influence metacognitive monitoring and control processes. Participants studied unrelated and related word pairs, each accompanied by point values denoting how important the items were to remember. These values were presented either before or after each pair in a between-subjects design, and participants made item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs) predicting the likelihood that each item would be remembered later. Results from Experiment 1 showed that participants used value and relatedness as cues to inform their JOLs. Interestingly, JOLs increased as a function of value even in the after condition in which value had no impact on cued recall. Participants in Experiment 2 were permitted to control study time for each item. Results showed that value and relatedness were simultaneously considered when allocating study time. These results support a cue-weighting process in which JOLs and study time allocation are based on multiple cues, which may or may not be predictive of future memory performance, and complements the agenda-based regulation model of study time (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009) by providing evidence for agenda-based monitoring. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgments of learning reflect encoding fluency: Conclusive evidence for the ease-of-processing hypothesis.

According to the ease-of-processing hypothesis, judgments of learning (JOLs) rely on the ease with which items are committed to memory during encoding—that is, encoding fluency. Conclusive evidence for this hypothesis does not yet exist because encoding fluency and item difficulty have been confounded in all previous studies. To disentangle the effects of encoding fluency and item difficulty on JOLs, we used a variant of the learner–observer–judge method in which participants observed the study phase of another participant and indicated his or her JOLs. At the same time, the to-be-studied word pairs were concealed by strings of symbols. Our experiment revealed that participants use self-paced study time as a cue for JOLs when they themselves have studied and recalled word pairs before. This metacognitive monitoring of study time provides strong support for the ease-of-processing hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirical analysis of the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction of judgments of learning (JOLs): Effects of relatedness and serial position on JOLs.

A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework provided a significant advance in understanding how people make judgments of learning (JOLs). A major distinction is made between intrinsic and extrinsic cues. JOLs are predicted to be sensitive to intrinsic cues (e.g., item relatedness) and less sensitive to extrinsic cues (e.g., serial position) because JOLs are comparative across items in a list. The authors evaluated predictions by having people make JOLs after studying either related (poker flush) or unrelated (dog-spoon) items. Although some outcomes confirmed these predictions, others could not be readily explained by the framework. Namely, relatedness influenced JOLs even when manipulated between participants, primacy effects were evident on JOLs, and the order in which blocks of items were presented (either all related items first or all unrelated items first) influenced JOLs. The authors discuss the framework in relation to these and other outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A model for inferential accuracy.

Inferential accuracy is distinguished from other forms of accuracy in social perception, including differential and stereotype accuracy, and defined in terms of a person's ability, given limited information about a target person, correctly to judge other pertinent characteristics about that person. A model and accompanying paradigm are proposed for studying this process. Given the observation that judgments about the joint probability of traits tend to be highly stable across groups of judges, it is possible to obtain scale values for a set of personality characteristics for each target. Each judge's ratings of this target may be plotted with respect to these ranked scale values in such a way that the degree to which his own judgments parallel the consensual patterning of trait inferences may be determined. Two parameters, slope and intercept, determine a straight line summarizing this relationship. These parameters are hypothesized to correspond to the judge's sensitivity to trait inferential information, and his threshold for employing more or less remote inferential data. It is hypothesized that these two parameters will account for a major portion of the individual difference variance in tasks involving inferential accuracy. The evidence to date, although limited, suggests that while sensitivity is general across dimensions, threshold is more specific. Whereas sensitivity is potentially linked to accurate knowledge of lay personality theory, threshold may be related to a process similar to assimilative projection. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The assignment of job-attitude items to subscales.

An attitude questionnaire, for use with the personnel of a Great Lakes shipping concern, was constructed using rational judgments to assign items to areas of the questionnaire. The areas were nominally those suggested as invariant by Wherry. The degree of agreement between the rational sort and the areas named from the invariant factor characteristics was determined. Attitude characteristics of the surveyed group as well as mechanical and response artifacts are suggested as providing partial explanations of the differences found. Items identified as critical through use of several item indices are compared to evaluate index utility. (16 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgments about judgments: The dissociation of consideration price and transaction commitment judgments.

There are many contexts in which people make judgments about prior judgments. For example, Internet shopping bots (e.g., NexTag.com) allow consumers to search for products and, if the price is too high, list a price at which they would consider making the purchase (i.e., base judgment). If the price drops to this level, the vendor generates an e-mail inviting the consumer to execute the transaction at the reduced price (i.e., contingent judgment). The authors show that the consideration price depends on the content of retrieved information, whereas the willingness to execute the transaction at the consideration price depends on the ease-of-retrieving the information. The authors use different offer prices to encourage the consumer to retrieve information consistent with different product quality levels. The authors also select offer prices so that information retrieval is more difficult at moderate offer prices than at high or low offer prices. Accordingly, the authors show that the consideration price increases as the offer price increases, but the willingness to execute the transaction at the consideration price is greater when there are high and low, as opposed to moderate, offer prices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)