考虑社会责任和政府补贴的双渠道供应链决策与协调

考虑由单个主导制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链,以及政府以社会福利最大化为目的对制造商履行的社会责任进行补贴决策,研究集中式和分散式决策下政府补贴比率和制造商谎报因子对供应链和社会福利的影响。研究发现,分散式决策中的企业社会责任努力水平和最大社会福利总是低于集中式决策;分散式决策中的最优政府补贴比率高于集中式决策;利用成本分担-收益共享的组合契约可以实现双渠道供应链的完美协调与帕累托改进。     

供应链中供应商-零售商之间的渠道协调机制的研究

研究了由一个供应商、N个零售商组成的供应链的渠道协调机制,建立了协调机制的基本模型,得到协调价格和联合最优订货数量,以此来提高供应链的整体效益;分析了影响供应链协调的主要因素和因供应商或整个供应链采取协调机制而新增收益的来源,对进一步分析供应链协调机制提供了依据。     

双重补贴下双渠道供应链创新及协调策略研究

构建由创新投入的制造商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链决策模型,研究政府同时采用研发补贴和生产量补贴对供应链创新、定价以及利润的影响,并以集中式决策为基准,采用收益共享—费用分担机制对分散式决策进行协调.得出结论:政府双重补贴下有助于提高企业自身的研发能力;两种补贴方式在绝大多数情况下都能同时提高传统渠道和直销渠道的销售价格...     

考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究

考虑双渠道零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商直接回收、委托第三方回收模式下的动态博弈模型,以公平中性时的均衡策略为参照,对比分析了线下零售商的横向公平偏好对双渠道闭环供应链中各决策主体定价策略及利润的影响。研究表明,无论零售商是否存在横向公平关切行为,制造商直接回收模式都优于委托第三方回收。在直接回收模式下,线下零售商的横向公平偏好使得在正向供应链中的两零售商为提高市场占有率会竞相降低零售价格,制造商为鼓励竞争会降低批发价,并且价格均与横向公平关切系数负相关。在逆向供应链中,制造商会提高废旧产品的回收率;相比公平中性的情况,此定价策略使制造商和整个供应链系统效用增加,而两零售商收益递减。制造商作为渠道管理者为鼓励零售商之间竞相降价,可通过一个三方收益共享的契约实现协调,达到帕累托最优。     

经销商如何管理营销渠道

主持人:得渠道者得天下,生存于供应商和终端商夹缝中的经销商更是如此.无论是供货渠道还是销售渠道,都关系着经销商的存亡.良好的供货渠道可以让经销商以最低价及时地拿到产品,保证其利润;还可以帮助提升其信誉.良好的销售渠道可以实现经销商的营销目标,使其获得利润,实现发展目标.而良好的营销渠道管理可以给经销商带来良好的供货渠道和销售渠道.     

基于顾客渠道偏好改进的Hotelling模型的双渠道供应链零售商博弈

为了对双渠道供应链中互相独立的不同渠道零售商的决策进行分析,从考虑顾客对不同购买渠道的心理偏好角度出发,构建出在Hotelling线性城市模型基础上加以改进的博弈模型。在前往不同渠道购买的产品存在成本差异,产品对网络渠道适用性不同这两个条件的约束下,分析了互相独立的不同渠道零售商之间博弈均衡价格、市场份额和利润的变化趋势。研究说明,随着产品网络渠道适用性的增大,不同渠道零售商的博弈均衡价格差异、均衡市场份额差异均会随之减小,同时,传统零售商利润也会随之减小,而电子渠道零售商利润会随之增大。网络渠道的适用性确定时,对网络适用性好的产品会受到不同渠道购买成本的影响,导致不同渠道零售商的定价和市场份额占比不同。     

价格相依的闭环供应链渠道选择和协调策略

从社会环保意识、回收价格以及产品销量的角度构建了EOL(End-of-life)产品的供给函数,对分散决策时零售商销售渠道下的不同回收模式之闭环供应链进行了博弈分析,得到了闭环供应链成员的最优定价策略和最终利润,以及制造商渠道选择与回收成本的临界关系.设计了一个收入费用分享合同用以协调分散决策下的闭环供应链.     

考虑研发努力与营销投入的绿色供应链协调

研究了由单一供应商和单一制造商构成的二级供应链在不同领导者情景下的绿色研发努力和绿色营销投入决策,以及通过成本分担契约激励供应链伙伴建立绿色创新的协调决策模型,并通过数值模拟进行验证分析.研究结果表明:某一企业的绿色创新单位成本系数过大会降低供应链所有成员的绿色投入,进一步引起产品总绿色度的下降;当消费者的绿色偏好较低...     

CVaR准则下双渠道供应链订货与信息搭便车行为

研究双渠道供应链中生产商负责的网上直销渠道对零售商负责的传统零售渠道的信息服务搭便车行为。假定产品需求随机且依赖于零售商信息服务水平,利用条件风险值准则和均衡分析方法建立了生产商与零售商均为风险厌恶者时双渠道供应链的集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,利用合同理论给出了协调供应链的回购加信息服务补贴契约,利用数值仿真方法验证了模型的合理性和协调契约的有效性。研究表明,增加直销渠道对供应链而言是把“双刃剑”,既可吸引潜在需求,也应避免需求由零售渠道向直销渠道的大规模转移;直销渠道的信息服务搭便车行为有利于供应链各方;决策者越厌恶风险,其订货量越低,此时生产商、零售商和供应链的利润都将下降;当风险厌恶因子等于1时,决策者风险厌恶时双渠道供应链的决策与决策者风险中性时一致。     

基于零售商代发货模式的双渠道供应链协调

提出了零售商代发货模式,构建了一个由制造商和网络零售商组成的代发货双渠道供应链模型,其中制造商拥有网络直销渠道,并将订单全部交给网络零售商,由网络零售商代发到顾客手中。分析、比较了集中式和分散式决策下制造商和网络零售商的最优均衡解,论证了逆向收益共享契约对这种代发货双渠道供应链协调的有效性。最后通过算例分析,发现存在一个共享因子变化范围能够实现这种代发货双渠道供应链的完美协调。     

Multi-period hedging and coordination in a prefabricated construction supply chain

In this paper, a multi-period buffer space hedging coordination between a building contractor (BC) and a logistics provider (LP) is investigated. In order to facilitate the application of the construction lead-time hedging (CLTH) strategy, adopted by the BC, extra buffer space needs to be reserved at LP’s intermediate warehouse for contingency usage. This strategy is defined as ‘buffer space hedging (BSH)’ and it increases the pressure of LP on involving extra storage and maintenance cost. Two coordination mechanisms are adopted for solving this BSH problem. One scheme is by introducing a cost-sharing term. A Nash game model is studied to find the individual optimal decisions. Another scheme is a cooperative game model with proper side-payments. We show that adjusting the BSH amount for each review period benefits the supply chain. Both coordination mechanisms enable a win–win outcome. Especially, if system resources are sufficient, the cooperative game outperforms the Nash game. Numerical experiments further demonstrate that the benefit of the proposed model is more significant under the case with lower unit enlarging/rearrangement cost, higher tardiness penalty and unpredictable and uncontrollable construction process-determined assembled and installed prefabs.     

Production lead-time hedging and coordination in prefabricated construction supply chain management

This paper studies a coordination scheme to solve a production lead-time hedging (PLTH) issue in the prefabricated construction supply chain management. To mitigate tardiness delivery owing to prefab production uncertainty, the project contractor (PC) prefers to inform the prefab factory (PF) an earlier due date which is termed as PLTH strategy. However, this strategy forces the PF to compress its production process. A balance must be optimised through the proposed PLTH coordination scheme. It includes a PLTH-related cost term, i.e. crashing money (charged by the PF to the PC) and a constant transfer term. Three models with different power structures are considered. Firstly, two Stackelberg games with alternative decision-making sequences and an equal power model are discussed to obtain the optimal PLTH amount and crashing money. Later on, a cost-sharing term is used to fairly allocate the system surplus. It is observed that this coordination scheme reduces the PLTH amount and ensures win–win coordination for both parties. Some interesting managerial implications are also obtained from comparison analysis and numerical studies.     

Random yield and coordination mechanisms of a supply chain with emergency backup sourcing

This paper considers a supply chain in which a buyer purchases finished items from a contracting supplier to satisfy a stochastic market demand, where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield. We assume that the buyer can make up the shortage by sourcing from an emergency backup supplier. We develop two Stackelberg game models, i.e. buyer-Stackelberg (BS) model and supplier-Stackelberg (SS) model, and find that the decentralised BS model results in a higher stocking factor of supplier’s input than the decentralised SS model. Compared with BS model, the buyer in SS model performs more explicit order plan, and we find that only when the actual yield of the supplier is insufficient, the buyer would use emergency backup sourcing to make up the shortage. When the manufacturing operation of the supplier is in the good state, the buyer only orders a certain amount and has some leftover. When the actual yield of the supplier is moderate, the buyer uses up every item produced from the supplier regardless of the yield rate. Comparing both channel structures, SS operation is a more effective way of controlling both inventory cost and backup sourcing cost, and it can be beneficial for each player as well as for the whole channel. Finally, we develop the coordination mechanism for each channel to investigate the issues of risk handling and risk sharing for uncertain demand and uncertain yield.     

Trust-embedded coordination in supply chain information sharing

This paper studies supply chain coordination with trust-embedded cost-sharing contract. In a two-tier supply chain, a retailer (she) and a supplier (he) make their private demand forecasting individually. The retailer places soft-orders, which are costless, non-verifiable and cancellable before shipping, to the supplier. After that, the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information to update his demand evaluation and prepare his capacity. How much the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information is specified by trust, which is a kind of psychological feeling and affected by multiple factors. When the supplier does not fully trust the retailer, he tends to prepare a conservative capacity to avoid over-production. To coordinate the supply chain, a two-stage coordination process is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and retailer negotiate a cost-sharing rule to bind soft-orders. At the second stage, the retailer places a soft-order and decides whether or not to bind it referring to the cost-sharing rule. After that, the supplier determines his optimal production capacity. We show that the retailer and supplier value trust differently in the experimental studies. We also find that there is a threshold of negotiation power for the supply chain partners which means the supplier’s/retailer’s expected profit drops down if his/her negotiation power exceeds certain thresholds. The experimental studies also show that the proposed the two-stage coordination is effective.     

Equilibrium markup pricing strategies for the dominant retailers under supply chain to chain competition

Markup pricing policies have been widely employed in the retailing industry. Under such policies, a retailer requires a retail margin over the wholesale price charged by the supplier to guarantee her profitability. This paper investigates and compares the performance of two commonly used markup pricing policies, namely, fixed-dollar markup and percentage markup, for the dominant retailers facing chain-to-chain competition. Our results demonstrate that the equilibrium pricing strategy for the dominant retailers seeking to maximise their respective profits is [PP]-strategy (i.e. both retailers select the percentage markup pricing policy), no matter what the demand curve and the level of chain-to-chain competition are. Unfortunately, this equilibrium will get in the prisoner’s dilemma since the percentage markup pricing strategy might yield lower profits for the retailers and suppliers compared to its fixed-dollar counterpart when the level of chain-to-chain competition is high enough under the linear demand, which is contrast to the literature. If the criteria for the dominant retailers to select which markup pricing policy to offer is the whole channel’s profit obtained under the decentralised decision-making scenario instead of themselves, [PP]-strategy is the dominant strategy and the unique Nash equilibrium of the pricing policy choice game regardless of the competitive intensity under the iso-elastic demand. This result holds true for the linear demand only when the level of chain-to-chain competition is below certain threshold; otherwise, both [FF] (i.e. both retailers select the fixed-dollar markup pricing policy) and [PP] can be the equilibrium pricing strategy.     

Dual-channel closed loop supply chains: forward channel competition,power structures and coordination

This paper examines the effect of forward channel competition and power structure on dual-channel closed loop supply chains (CLSC), which consists of a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector. The manufacturer can either wholesale products to the retailer or directly sell them to the market, the collector undertakes the collection activity of used products. Under different channel power structures, a centralised and three decentralised models are explored under symmetric and asymmetric relative status between direct and retail channels. Through a comprehensive comparison among these models, the result shows that each channel member has an incentive to play the channel leader’s role. Meanwhile, from the total channel system’s perspective, we find that the manufacturer-led or retailer-led model can either be the most effective CLSC under symmetric relative channel status, which depends on the channel substitution rate between two channels. While under asymmetric relative channel status, the numerical result shows that the whole CLSC should select collector-led, manufacturer-led and retailer-led CLSC model in turn with the retail channel’s relative status becoming stronger. Finally, with the benchmark of the centralised decision-making system, we design modified two-part tariff contracts to coordinate dual-channel CLSCs under different channel power structures.     

Evaluating strategic issues in supply chain scheduling using game theory

This paper deals with the problem of scheduling and batch delivery of orders in a supply chain (SC) including a supplier, a manufacturer and a final customer. First, the individual decisions of partners in the SC and their behaviours are analysed through mathematical models. Second, the best policy is obtained assuming that the SC is vertically integrated and the partners fully cooperate (this is called SC scheduling in the relevant literature). Since this strategy is usually against a partner, it might not be implemented in practice as the authors have observed this condition in real world. Hence, a fair sharing mechanism based on game theory concepts is also introduced which can motivate the partners to cooperate and adopt the best policy of the SC. The numerical examples show the superiority of integrated decisions over independent actions and also the importance of the sharing mechanism.     

Collection channel and production decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruption

Enterprise risk management (ERM) focuses on managing functions of an entire business, with special attention to supply chain uncertainty. Managing supply chain through effective ERM will mitigate firm exposure to risk in operations and ensure the success of the business. We study collection channel and production decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one dominant manufacturer and one retailer, from the perspective of both firm profit and system robustness. A robust system is desired as only minimal changes in production plan are necessary when facing disruption, and is valuable for enterprise risk reduction. We find that without disruption the indirect (retailer) collection channel achieves higher profit than that of the direct (manufacturer) channel, which is also true under some disruption cases. However, the direct channel is more robust when facing disruption, and generates more profits for manufacturers when the positive disruption is large. We also find that the revenue-sharing contracts are effective in coordinating members of the CLSC. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to validate the models and derive managerial insights.     

面向供应链合作的信任维系协调体系的研究

为了保证节点企业合作中信任协调的合作关系,以有效地实现企业经营目标,从信任的视角提出了一个包括目标层、合作层、信任协调层、支撑层在内的供应链合作(SCC)信任维系协调的解决思路.把节点企业内、外部的供应链运作、合作行为、业务目标集成起来,给出了整体框架模型,并对基于企业目标的信任协调机制、信任金字塔和实现协调层的具体方式等关键问题进行了探讨.信任协调体系框架模型对供应链合作运作提供了一定的参照.     

Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers

In this paper, under a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers, we investigate vertical and horizontal information sharing in different channel structures and the manufacturer’s choice on whether or not to keep a direct channel. To this end, we first study the dual-channel structure where uncertain demand is a linear function of price with a generalised-distribution base demand and show that the retailers have incentives to share information horizontally but not vertically, while the manufacturer is better off with vertical information sharing but its expected profit is not affected by horizontal information sharing. We next examine the retail-channel structure and find the basic results remain unchanged. Finally, we provide closed-form internal and external conditions under which the manufacturer can benefit from owning a dual-channel structure. Our study extends the existing literature by combining information sharing and dual-channel choice, introducing channel difference, discussing the impact of channel structure on horizontal and vertical sharing as well as providing interesting managerial insights for channel choice.