Too much information: The perils of nondiagnostic information in negotiations.

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From self-prediction to self-defeat: Behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of competitive expectations.

Four studies explored behavioral forecasting and the effect of competitive expectations in the context of negotiations. Study 1 examined negotiators' forecasts of how they would behave when faced with a very competitive versus a less competitive opponent and found that negotiators believed they would become more competitive. Studies 2 and 3 examined actual behaviors during a negotiation and found that negotiators who expected a very competitive opponent actually became less competitive, as evidenced by setting lower, less aggressive reservation prices, making less demanding counteroffers, and ultimately agreeing to lower negotiated outcomes. Finally, Study 4 provided a direct test of the disconnection between negotiators' forecasts for their behavior and their actual behaviors within the same sample and found systematic errors in behavioral forecasting as well as evidence for the self-fulfilling effects of possessing a competitive expectation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Negotiation as a form of persuasion: Arguments in first offers.

In this article we examined aspects of negotiation within a persuasion framework. Specifically, we investigated how the provision of arguments that justified the first offer in a negotiation affected the behavior of the parties, namely, how it influenced counteroffers and settlement prices. In a series of 4 experiments and 2 pilot studies, we demonstrated that when the generation of counterarguments was easy, negotiators who did not add arguments to their first offers achieved superior results compared with negotiators who used arguments to justify their first offer. We hypothesized and provided evidence that adding arguments to a first offer was likely to cause the responding party to search for counterarguments, and this, in turn, led him or her to present counteroffers that were further away from the first offer. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Motivated information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement.

The authors tested a motivated information-processing model of negotiation: To reach high joint outcomes, negotiators need a deep understanding of the task, which requires them to exchange information and to process new information systematically. All this depends on social motivation, epistemic motivation (EM), and their interaction. Indeed, when EM (manipulated by holding negotiators process accountability or not) was high rather than low and prosocial rather than proself, negotiators recall more cooperative than competitive tactics (Experiment 1), had more trust, and reached higher joint outcomes (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that under high EM, negotiators who received cooperative, rather than competitive, tactics reached higher joint outcomes because they engaged in more problem solving. Under low EM, negotiators made more concessions and reached low joint outcomes. Implications for negotiation theory and for future work in this area are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An examination of naive and experienced negotiators.

A total of 20 Ss engaged in 7 different, 2-party negotiation tasks to examine the effects of experience on judgment accuracy, behavior, and outcomes in negotiation. Negotiators bargained with naive negotiators who had either no experience or just a single previous experience; the total amount of experience in each bargaining pair was controlled for. Joint outcomes could be increased by trading off pairs of issues (logrolling) and by identifying issues for which both people had compatible interests. Logrolling improved as negotiators gained experience, but negotiators' ability to identify compatible issues did not. Negotiators were more successful in logrolling issues when the naive person had a single previous bargaining experience as opposed to no experience. Highly experienced bargainers claimed a larger share of the joint resources at the expense of their naive opponents. High aspirations, small concessions, and proposing several different offers predicted superior performance. The accuracy of negotiators' judgments about their opponent paralleled their performance, suggesting judgment accuracy is a key ingredient for reaching integrative agreement. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social motives and trust in integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive capability.

Two studies tested the effects of negotiators' social motive (cooperative vs. individualistic) and punitive capability (high vs. low) on trust, negotiation behavior, and joint outcomes. On the basis of structural goal-expectation theory (T. Yamagishi, 1986), it was predicted that in the case of a cooperative motive higher levels of punitive capability lead to less trust, less exchange of information about preferences and priorities, and agreements of lower joint outcome. Study 1 (N?=?41 ) supported this prediction: Cooperative negotiators had lower trust, exchanged less information, and attained lower joint outcomes under high rather than low punitive capability; individualistic negotiators were not influenced by punitive capability, presumably because they have low levels of trust to start with. Study 2 (N?=?21 ) showed that these effects happened because higher levels of punitive capability increase conflict avoidance in negotiators with a cooperative motive. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Online bargaining and interpersonal trust.

The presented study explores the effect of interacting over the Internet on interpersonal trust when bargaining online. Relative to face-to-face negotiations, online negotiations were characterized by (a) lower levels of pre-negotiation trust and (b) lower levels of post-negotiation trust. The reduced levels of pre-negotiation trust in online negotiations (i.e., before any interaction took place) demonstrate that negotiators bring different expectations to the electronic bargaining table than to face-to-face negotiations. These negative perceptions of trust were found to mediate another aspect of the relationship, namely, desired future interaction. Those who negotiated online reported less desire for future interactions with the other party. Online negotiators also were less satisfied with their outcome and less confident in the quality of their performance. despite the absence of observable differences in economic outcome quality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus.

Three experiments explored the role of first offers, perspective-taking, and negotiator self-focus in determining distributive outcomes in a negotiation. Across 3 experiments, whichever party, the buyer or seller, made the 1st offer obtained a better outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices. However, when the negotiator who did not make a 1st offer focused on information that was inconsistent with the implications of the opponent's 1st offer, the advantageous effect of making the 1st offer was eliminated: Thinking about one's opponent's alternatives to the negotiation (Experiment 1), one's opponent's reservation price (Experiment 2), or one's own target (Experiment 3) all negated the effect of 1st offers on outcomes. These effects occurred for both face-to-face negotiations and E-mail negotiations. Implications for negotiations and perspective-taking are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Negotiators' Bargaining Histories and Their Effects on Future Negotiation Performance.

In 2 studies the authors show that the quality of deals negotiators reach are significantly influenced by their previous bargaining experiences. As predicted, negotiators who reached an impasse on a prior negotiation were more likely either to impasse in their next negotiation or to reach deals of low joint value compared to those who had reached an initial agreement. Notably, the impact of past performance on subsequent deals was just as strong for negotiators who changed partners on the 2nd occasion. Results highlight the role of bargaining histories as significant predictors of negotiation behavior. Moreover, they suggest that, at least in some cases, negotiations should be conceptualized as interrelated exchanges rather than separable incidents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cultural values and authority relations: The psychology of conflict resolution across cultures.

The findings of 4 studies suggest that cultural values about power distance influence the way that people react to third-party authorities in a manner predicted by the relational model of authority (T. R. Tyler & E. A. Lind, 1992). Power-distance values reflect beliefs about the appropriate power relationship between authorities and their subordinates. As predicted, when making evaluations of authorities, those lower in their power-distance values placed more weight on the quality of their treatment by authorities. In contrast, those with higher power-distance values focused more strongly on the favorability of their outcomes. These findings suggest that the degree to which authorities can gain acceptance for themselves and their decisions through providing dignified, respectful treatment is influenced by the cultural values of the disputants. Informal "alternative" dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation, are more likely to be effective among those who have low power-distance values. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Paying a price: Culture, trust, and negotiation consequences.

Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators' self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators' reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation.

Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs, which is consistent with a motivated information processing model of negotiation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relinquishment of control and the Type A behavior pattern: The role of performance evaluation.

Investigated the role of information processing in the control relinquishment decisions of individuals with Type A (coronary prone) and Type B (noncoronary prone) personalities. Pairs of undergraduates (N?=?147) who had previously completed the Jenkins Activity Survey worked independently on a task and received feedback indicating that their partner had performed at a comparable or superior level. On a 2nd task, Ss combined their efforts and made decisions concerning who would work on different parts of that task. One-third of the Ss made this decision before completing an evaluation of the initial performances. Another third completed the evaluation without knowing that they would subsequently make a control decision. The final third of the Ss completed their evaluations knowing that a control decision would follow. Results indicate that when the evaluations were completed last, or when the evaluations were completed first but without knowledge of the impending decision, Type A's relinquished less control to a superior partner than did Type B's. When evaluations were completed with knowledge of an impending control decision, Type A's and B's did not differ in their decisions. Results suggest that under certain conditions, Type A's use an automatic or mindless decision style with potentially maladaptive consequences. (33 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moderating Effect of Equity Sensitivity on Behavior-Outcome Relationships in Construction Dispute Negotiation

This study builds on Adam’s equity theory by examining the moderating effects of equity sensitivity (i.e., a person’s perception of what is equitable or inequitable) on behavior-outcome relationships among negotiators in construction dispute negotiation. First, an equity sensitivity construct is developed. This construct reveals that most construction negotiators are entitleds, also known as “takers,” at the negotiation table. Moderated multiple regression (MMR) is used to test the moderating effects of equity sensitivity. The MMR models affirm that the nature of behavior-outcome relationships varies, depending on the perception of equity. An entitled construction negotiator is found to be a versatile moderator who fosters satisfactory negotiation outcomes. The models show that negotiators are able to predict inequitable responses and to take measures to forestall or deal with different inequitable situations. This study indicates the merit of further study of equity theory in the context of construction dispute negotiation. Future challenges in this area include the examination of the equity restoration responses of negotiators to create an equitable environment.     

Application of Equity Sensitivity Theory to Problem-Solving Approaches in Construction Dispute Negotiation

This study applies equity sensitivity theory to investigate how the sensitivity of negotiators to perceived equity or inequity varies with their perception of the adoption of problem-solving approaches (PSAs) in negotiation in the construction industry. Drawing upon this theory, we identify three classes of negotiators: benevolents (known as “givers”), equity sensitives, and entitleds (known as “takers”). Our results suggest that most of the negotiators in our sample are entitleds. The study also provides statistical evidence that the perception of the adoption of PSAs appears to be associated with the degree of equity sensitivity of negotiators. For instance, benevolents demonstrate a significantly stronger preference for the adoption of PSAs and are thus able to obtain a higher level of negotiation satisfaction compared to the other types of negotiators. These findings are particularly relevant to the corporate managers of construction organizations, who may want to consider the inherent equity sensitivity traits of their negotiators before sending them to the negotiating table.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: Experimental and longitudinal evidence.

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Schmooze or lose: Social friction and lubrication in e-mail negotiations.

Past research has indicated that rapport helps negotiators overcome interpersonal friction and find cooperative agreements. Study 1 explored differences in the behavioral dynamics evoked by e-mail versus face-to-face negotiation. Although some behavioral content categories differed in ways pointing to strengths of e-mail, the strongest patten was that e-mail inhibited the process of exchanging personal information through which negotiators establish rapport. The authors hypothesized that the liabilities of e-mail might be minimized by a pre-negotiation intervention of social lubrication. To test this in Study 2, half of dyads had a brief personal telephone conversation ("schmoozed") before commencing e-mail negotiations, and half did not. Schmoozers felt more rapport, their plans were more trusting (although no less ambitious), and their economic and social outcomes were better. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of self- and competitor goals on performance in an interdependent bargaining task.

We investigated the relation between goal specificity and difficulty and performance on an interdependent bargaining task. In all, 102 subjects competed as buyers and sellers in a 25-min market simulation in which each negotiator was assigned either a nonspecific do-your-best objective or a specific easy, moderate, or difficult goal. Results showed that negotiators who were assigned specific, difficult goals were individually more profitable than negotiators who were assigned easier or nonspecific goals. Concerning dyadic performance, nonspecific or easy goals led to compromise agreements. Integrative agreements that benefited both parties to the transaction were facilitated by assigning both negotiators a moderate goal or difficult-moderate disparate goals. When both negotiators had difficult goals, dyadic performance did not approach the integrative level. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social pursuit of academics: Side effects and spillover of strategic reassurance seeking.

Using both experience sampling and questionnaire data, this study examined a group of women who were focused on outcomes in their academic work as they attempted to handle setbacks in academics and pursue social activities at the same time. Consistent with their heightened concern with academic outcomes, they addressed academic concerns in the company of friends following negative academic events and sought reassurance when things were not going well academically. This spillover of academic concerns into the social domain allowed social satisfaction to become contingent on academic events. This linking of social life to the relatively more difficult domain of academics was associated with considerably lower social life satisfaction over the course of a college semester, suggesting unintended social costs of their academic reassurance-seeking strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)