Savings in relearning: II. On the formation of behavior-based trait associations and inferences.

Five experiments based on Carlston and Skowronski's (1994) relearning paradigm suggest that people spontaneously derive trait knowledge about actors from behaviors but that this knowledge may reflect either explicit trait inference processes or implicit actor–trait associations. Experiments 1 and 2 found that inference-instructed and control Ss showed equivalent savings in subsequent efforts to learn actor–trait pairs but not when instructed Ss initially inferred the wrong trait. Experiment 3 showed that savings were equivalent for stimuli from different sources, and Experiment 4 showed that savings effects persisted even when the target was only incidentally associated with a stimulus behavior. Finally, Experiment 5 suggests that after several days, even explicit trait inferences can become inaccessible to intentional retrieval, although the earlier experiments show that they continue to exert an implicit effect on learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The interplay of controlled and automatic processing in the expression of spontaneously inferred traits: A PDP analysis.

Inferences made about actors influence subsequent processing about those actors. Three experiments conducted in the context of spontaneous trait inference (STI) making demonstrate that such influences occur can either occur via automatic processes or via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that processing goals manipulated prior to encoding actor behavior affected the extent to which STIs automatically influenced subsequent responses but did not alter the extent to which STIs influenced those responses via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 2 showed that the extent to which STIs affected subsequent responding via the action of controlled processes were more affected by a delay between exposure to an actor behavior and the response task than the extent to which STIs affected task performance via the action of automatic processes. Finally, results from Experiment 3 showed that participants' subjective experience of awareness of their trait inferences is related to estimates of the extent to which controlled processing is involved in the production of their future responses but not to estimates of the extent to which those responses are affected by automatic processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Influence and inference: What the active perceiver overlooks.

We propose that perceivers who engage in social influence tasks (inducers) concentrate primarily on the relation between their influencing behaviors and the responsive behaviors of their target and ignore other important sources of information relevant to social inference (e.g., other concurrent sources of influence on the target person). As a result, inducers' inferences about the target person are biased by their own personal power. In Experiment 1, weak inducers drew more dispositional inferences about the targets of their influence attempts than did strong inducers when the magnitude of the inducers' power was revealed in the course of the social interaction, but not when inducers were informed about the magnitude of their power prior to the social interaction. These results suggest that inducers concentrated on information that they considered relevant to the assessment of their personal power and ignored information about concurrent sources of influence on the target person's behavior. In Experiment 2, inducers' judgments were unaffected by the presence or absence of information about concurrent sources of influence, whereas observers' judgments were significantly affected. The results of both experiments suggest that active perceivers, who are immersed in the social interactions they seek to interpret, differ from passive perceivers in a variety of theoretically predictable ways. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Blurry words and fuzzy deeds: The attribution of obscure behavior.

When people attempt to infer the existence of traits from another's behavior, they categorize the behavior, characterize the actor in trait terms, and then correct that inference with information about situational constraints. The 1st 2 stages require fewer attentional resources than does the 3rd. However, when behavior is obscure (i.e., difficult to categorize because its features are not easily apprehended), the 1st stage should consume resources on which the 3rd stage depends, and undercorrected inferences should result. In 2 experiments, behavior was made obscure by distorting its visual or acoustical parameters. Although the obscure behaviors could logically have been attributed to the constraining situations in which they occurred, Ss who observed such behaviors were especially unlikely to correct their trait characterizations of the actors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perceiving individuals and groups: Expectancies, dispositional inferences, and causal attributions.

Two experiments investigated differences in forming impressions of individual and group targets. Experiment 1 showed that when forming an impression of an individual, perceivers made more extreme trait judgments, made those judgments more quickly and with greater confidence, and recalled more information than when the impression target was a group. Experiment 2 showed that when participants were forming an impression of an individual, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors spontaneously triggered causal attributions to resolve the inconsistency; this was not the case when the impression target was a group. Results are interpreted as reflecting perceivers' a priori assumptions of unity and coherence in individual versus group targets. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The slime effect: Suspicion and dislike of likeable behavior toward superiors.

An actor who is likeable toward superiors and dislikeable toward subordinates is judged as extremely dislikeable and slimy (Experiments 1 and 2). Subsequent experiments addressed several theoretical accounts of this slime effect. Likeable behaviors toward superiors induce suspicion of ulterior motivation, which is confirmed when dislikeable behaviors toward subordinates are observed (Experiment 3). The operation of a slime schema was indicated by the emergence of an illusory correlation between an actor's behavior and the status of the target, such that the actor was erroneously perceived as more likeable toward superiors (Experiment 4). Further, perceivers spontaneously discerned the behavioral pattern of "licking upward-kicking downward," regardless of processing time (Experiment 5). Implications for impression formation and inconsistency resolution, trait inferences and correspondence bias, and lay theories of self-presentational behavior are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's use of frequency information for trait categorization and behavioral prediction.

Two experiments examined young children's use of behavioral frequency information to make behavioral predictions and global personality attributions. In Experiment 1, participants heard about an actor who behaved positively or negatively toward 1 or several recipients. Generally, children did not differentiate their judgments of the actor on the basis of the amount of information provided. In Experiment 2, the actor behaved positively or negatively toward a single recipient once or repeatedly. Participants were more likely to make appropriate predictions and attributions after exposure to multiple target behaviors and with increasing age. Overall, children's performance was influenced by age-related positivity and negativity biases. These findings indicate that frequency information is important for personality judgments but that its use is affected by contextual complexity and information-processing biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The referents of trait inferences: The impact of trait concepts versus actor–trait links on subsequent judgments.

The authors investigated the hypothesis that when trait inferences refer to abstract behavior labels they act as a general interpretation frame and lead to assimilation in subsequent judgments of an ambiguous target, whereas when they refer to a specific actor–trait link they will be used as a scale anchor and lead to contrast. Similar to G. B. Moskowitz and R. J. Roman's (see record 1992-31124-001) study, participants who were instructed to memorize trait-implying sentences showed assimilation, and participants who were instructed to form an impression of the actors in these sentences showed contrast. However, exposure to trait-implying sentences that described actors with real names and were accompanied with photos of the actors resulted in contrast under both memorization and impression instructions (Experiment 1). Furthermore, contrast ensued when trait-implying sentences were accompanied with information that suggested a person attribution, whereas assimilation ensued when that information suggested a situation attribution, independent of processing goals (Experiment 2). These findings are interpreted as support for referent-based explanations of the consequences of trait inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The persistent use of negative affect by anxious individuals to estimate risk.

Three experiments investigated how trait anxiety would influence individuals' assumptions about the relevance of their experiences of state anxiety for judgments of risk. Experiment 1 found that attributions of state anxiety to a judgment-irrelevant source reduced the risk estimates of low, but not of high, trait-anxious individuals. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that attribution manipulations reduce the influence of state affect on judgment only when the state affect is inconsistent with participants' trait affect. Experiment 3 revealed that these effects can be controlled by explicitly manipulating participants' assumptions about the relevance of their feelings. Regardless of the level of trait anxiety, attributions were effective at reducing mood effects when facts, but not feelings, were assumed to be the relevant basis for judgment. Overall, the results suggest that trait-consistent affect is more readily assumed to be informative and hence is more likely to be relied on than trait-inconsistent affect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do behavioral observation scales measure observation?

G. Latham and K. Wexley (see record 1980-02200-001) have claimed that behavioral observation scales (BOS) pose a simpler task for the rater than do either behaviorally anchored rating scales or graphic rating scales; with BOS, the rater need only observe and record behavior and need not make complex judgments about performance. Research on person memory suggests that recall for behaviors is structured by the same trait inferences and judgments that BOS are designed to avoid. In 2 experiments, 91 undergraduates rated videotaped lectures; data from the 1st experiment were used to construct BOS measuring clarity and speaking style. In the 2nd experiment, Ss used the BOS and a graphic rating scale to rate videotaped lectures in immediate and delayed rating conditions. As expected, the correlations between BOS ratings and judgmental ratings of performance were stronger when demands were placed on rater's recall. It is suggested that recall of behaviors is determined by the degree to which certain behaviors are representative of general judgments made about Ss being rated, and that BOS measure traitlike judgments rather than behavioral observation. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to actors' faces: Evidence from a false recognition paradigm.

A false recognition paradigm showed that spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) are bound to the person performing a trait-implying behavior. In 6 experiments, participants memorized faces and behavioral sentences. When faces were paired with implied traits in a recognition test, participants falsely recognized these traits more often than unrelated traits paired with the same faces or the same traits paired with familiar faces. The effect was obtained for a large set of behaviors (120), each presented for 5 sec, and for behaviors that participants did not subsequently recognize or recall. Antonyms of the implied traits were falsely recognized less often than unrelated traits, suggesting that STIs have extended implications. Explicit person-trait judgments predicted both false recognition and response times for implied traits. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Informational basis for children's impressions of others.

Assessed the age at which 22 kindergartners, 22 2nd graders, and 22 5th graders used covariation information to form impressions of others when behavioral frequency was held constant or was varied. In Exp I the frequency of aggressive or helpful behavior was held constant, but behavioral consistency or nondistinctiveness was varied. Ss made single-rating and paired comparison judgments about each actor's future behaviors and personal characteristics. Results reveal that 2nd and 5th graders' comparison judgments were appropriately differentiated according to the available covariation information, whereas kindergartners' judgments were not appropriately differentiated. A 2nd experiment was conducted to determine whether 24 kindergartners' failure to use covariation information was simply the result of task demands. Ss made paired comparison judgments about aggressive behavior. Aggression frequency was either held constant (consistency vs nondistinctiveness) or was varied (relative degrees of consistency or nondistinctiveness). Results show that Ss' impressions of others did not vary according to differences in covariation information, at least when frequency was held constant. Findings undermine a task-demand interpretation of the results of Exp I and indicate that young children do use frequency information. There was no evidence that Ss used covariation information independently of differences in frequency. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of intent and harm in judgments of prejudice and discrimination.

Four experiments examined how an actor's intent and the harm experienced by a target influence judgments of prejudice and discrimination. The presence of intent increased the likelihood that participants judged an actor as prejudiced and the actor's behavior as discriminatory. When intent was uncertain, harm influenced judgments of the behavior, which in turn influenced judgments of the actor, and participants were more cautious in their judgments about an actor than an actor's behavior. Harm also played a stronger role in targets' than observers' judgments. Understanding the role of intent and harm on perceptions of prejudice can help explain variations in targets' versus observers', and possibly targets' versus actors', judgments of discrimination and prejudice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Modelling multiple-cause structure using rectification constraints

Two experiments are reported that investigate the influence of motor components of approach versus avoidance behavior on the evaluation of attractive versus unattractive photographs of persons. On the basis of prior body feedback research (Cacioppo, Priester & Berntson, 1993) it could be shown that approach behavior (arm flexion) leads to more positive evaluations than avoidance behavior (arm extension). This effect was obtained for online judgments as well as memory based judgments. Additionally, in Experiment 1, the influence of arm position was more pronounced, when arm position and photograph shared the same valence (arm flexion and attractive photos and arm extension and unattractive photos), whereas no influence on evaluation was observed when the valence of arm position and photograph was unshared (arm flexion and unattractive photos and arm extension and attractive photos). However, in Experiment 2, these results could only be replicated for attractive portraits, whereas for unattractive portraits both arm flexion and arm extension led to lower ratings compared to a control group. The results are discussed within the framework of a proposed contingency model that in general predicts body feedback effects only in the case of compatibility between the valence of expression and information. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 some evidence was obtained that qualifies that effect as automatic, inasmuch as increased distraction from evaluating the photographs bolstered the effect.     

Stereotype formation and endorsement: The role of implicit theories.

Five experiments supported the hypothesis that peoples' implicit theories about the fixedness versus malleability of human attributes (entity versus incremental theories) predict differences in degree of social stereotyping. Relative to those holding an incremental theory, people holding an entity theory made more stereotypical trait judgments of ethnic and occupational groups (Experiments 1, 2, and 5 ) and formed more extreme trait judgments of novel groups ( Experiment 3 ). Implicit theories also predicted the degree to which people attributed stereotyped traits to inborn group qualities versus environmental forces (Experiment 2). Manipulating implicit theories affected level of stereotyping (Experiment 4), suggesting that implicit theories can play a causal role. Finally, implicit theories predicted unique and substantial variance in stereotype endorsement after controlling for the contributions of other stereotype-relevant individual difference variables (Experiment 5). These results highlight the importance of people's basic assumptions about personality in stereotyping. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Activating representations in permanent memory: different benefits for pictures and words

Previous research has suggested that pictures have privileged access to semantic memory (W. R. Glaser, 1992), but J. Theios and P. C. Amrhein (1989b) argued that prior studies inappropriately used large pictures and small words. In Experiment 1, participants categorized pictures reliably faster than words, even when both types of items were of optimal perceptual size. In Experiment 2, a poststimulus flashmask and judgments about internal features did not eliminate picture superiority, indicating that it was not due to differences in early visual processing or analysis of visible features. In Experiment 3, when participants made judgments about whether items were related, latencies were reliably faster for categorically related pictures than for words, but there was no picture advantage for noncategorically associated items. Results indicate that pictures have privileged access to semantic memory for categories, but that neither pictures nor words seem to have privileged access to noncategorical associations.