Reasoning, Integration, Inference Alteration, and Text Comprehension.

This paper reports how the study of formal logical reasoning provides insight into more everyday types of reasoning, such as that involved in language comprehension. Both of these types of cognition are thought to involve the use of mental models, and so it is reasonable to think that the cognitive operations needed for formal logical reasoning would be involved in everyday reasoning as well. We focused on three aspects of formal reasoning: (a) the integration of information into a common mental model, (b) the drawing of inferences, and (c) the coordination of alternative possibilities. We were able to show that the integration and inference components were related to narrative comprehension processes, but the coordination of alternative models was not. Thus, there is evidence for some overlap in the mental processes used in formal and everyday reasoning. This further justifies the study of formal logical reasoning as a window into certain types of everyday reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.

The study of deductive reasoning has been a major paradigm in psychology for approximately the past 40 years. Research has shown that people make many logical errors on such tasks and are strongly influenced by problem content and context. It is argued that this paradigm was developed in a context of logicist thinking that is now outmoded. Few reasoning researchers still believe that logic is an appropriate normative system for most human reasoning, let alone a model for describing the process of human reasoning, and many use the paradigm principally to study pragmatic and probabilistic processes. It is suggested that the methods used for studying reasoning be reviewed, especially the instructional context, which necessarily defines pragmatic influences as biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning With Premises That Are Not Empirically True: Evidence for the Role of Inhibition and Retrieval.

Two studies examined conditional reasoning with false premises. In Study 1, 12- and 16-year-old adolescents made "if-then" inferences after producing an alternative antecedent for the major premise. Older participants made more errors on the simple modus ponens inference than did younger ones. Reasoning with a false premise reduced this effect. Study 2 examined the relation between performance on a negative priming task (S. P. Tipper, 1985) and reasoning with contrary-to-fact premises in 9- and 11-year-olds. Overall, there was a correlation between the relative effect of negative priming on reaction times and the number of knowledge-based responses to the reasoning problems. The results of these studies are consistent with the idea that reasoning with premises that are not true requires an interaction between information retrieval and inhibition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond belief bias: reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation

Mental models constitute an alternative to the rule-based systems in the explanation of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In this paper, we claim that the concept of believability generally used to categorize content and context effects is of little use within a semantic theory. Thus, we propose the use of categories that are directly extracted from subjective relations among concepts within the reasoning problem. We demonstrate that manipulations based on this kind of categorization produce predictable patterns of responses in reasoning problems. We present two experiments to test our predictions, using conditional and syllogistic reasoning problems, and in both cases, we demonstrate the influence of conceptual knowledge not only in natural contexts, but also in experimentally created artificial contexts.     

Inferential reasoning and modality dependent discrimination learning in olive baboons (Papio hamadryas anubis).

Apes use inferential reasoning by exclusion to locate food both in the visual and auditory domain. To test whether olive baboons (Papio hamadryas anubis) show similar abilities as the apes object choice experiments with differing information about food located in 1 of 2 cups were conducted in the visual and auditory modality. Although all baboons (N = 7) were able to locate the reward when they had previously seen it, they failed to make use of auditory cues or arbitrary acoustic signals. When only partial information was given (i.e., only 1 cup was opened) 4 of the baboons were apparently able to infer the location of the reward by reasoning, whereas the other 3 may have adopted an alternative strategy (“avoid the empty cup”). In addition, 3 of the baboons were able to use arbitrary visual markers to locate the food reward. The results suggest that inferential reasoning is not restricted to apes but is shared with Old World monkeys. Furthermore, they also highlight some important differences in the processing of auditory versus visual information in operant conditioning settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory and Data Interactions of the Scientific Mind: Evidence From the Molecular and the Cognitive Laboratory.

A number of researchers and scholars have stressed the importance of disconfirmation in the quest for the development of scientific knowledge (e.g., Popper, 1959). Paradoxically, studies examining human reasoning in the laboratory have typically found that people display a confirmation bias in that they are more likely to seek out and attend to data consistent rather than data inconsistent with their initial theory (Wason, 1968). We examine the strategies that scientists and students use to evaluate data that are either consistent or inconsistent with their expectations. First, we present findings from scientists reasoning "live" in their laboratory meetings. We show that scientists often show an initial reluctance to consider inconsistent data as "real." However, this initial reluctance is often overcome with repeated observations of the inconsistent data such that they modify their theories to account for the new data. We further examine these issues in a controlled scientific causal thinking simulation specifically developed to examine the reasoning strategies we observed in the natural scientific environment. Like the scientists, we found that participants in our simulation initially displayed a propensity to discount data inconsistent with a theory provided. However, with... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making.

The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of proportional reasoning: Where young children go wrong.

Previous studies have found that children have difficulty solving proportional reasoning problems involving discrete units until 10 to 12 years of age, but can solve parallel problems involving continuous quantities by 6 years of age. The present studies examine where children go wrong in processing proportions that involve discrete quantities. A computerized proportional equivalence choice task was administered to kindergartners through 4th-graders in Study 1, and to 1st- and 3rd-graders in Study 2. Both studies involved 4 between-subjects conditions that were formed by pairing continuous and discrete target proportions with continuous and discrete choice alternatives. In Study 1, target and choice alternatives were presented simultaneously; in Study 2, target and choice alternatives were presented sequentially. In both studies, children performed significantly worse when both the target and choice alternatives were represented with discrete quantities than when either or both of the proportions involved continuous quantities. Taken together, these findings indicate that children go astray on proportional reasoning problems involving discrete units only when a numerical match is possible, suggesting that their difficulty is due to an overextension of numerical equivalence concepts to proportional equivalence problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning about emotional contents following shocking terrorist attacks: A tale of three cities.

The authors examined reasoning following the terrorist attacks carried out in London in July 2005. They tested participants in London (United Kingdom), Manchester (United Kingdom), and London (Canada) within 1 week of the attacks and again 6 months later. Participants reasoned about syllogisms of 3 types: neutral, generally emotional, and emotionally related to terrorism. Participants also provided self-reports of emotion and risk estimates. Participants generally reasoned more accurately on neutral problems, compared with generally emotional and terrorism-related problems. However, participants in London (United Kingdom) provided more logically valid answers when reasoning about problems related to terrorism and were less likely to answer on the basis of beliefs, despite reporting higher levels of emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Form and content in the development of deductive reasoning.

Three experiments explored the development of formal logical reasoning between Grades 4 and 12 and the role of semantic content in the solution of Wason's (1966) selection task problems. In Experiment 1, subjects in the 8th, 10th, and 12th grades were tested on several familiar-content and several abstract-content selection problems. In Experiment 2, subjects in Grades 4, 8, and 12 were assessed on the familiar problems used in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, subjects in Grades 4, 6, and 8 were tested on novel familiar-content problems, familiar-content problems with conditional clauses reversed, a meaningful but unfamiliar problem, and an abstract problem. The results suggested that formal logical reasoning is not generally present during the 4th or 6th grades and that formal logical competence becomes available in adolescence. A general facilitation effect was found for familiar semantic content, but this was qualified by one anomalous familiar-content problem in each experiment. The results are discussed in the context of the competence-moderator-performance model, which maintains that both logical knowledge and world knowledge are necessary but distinct features of adequate reasoning performance. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hemispheric contributions to nonverbal abstract reasoning and problem solving.

Hemispheric involvement in reasoning abilities has been debated for some time, and it remains unclear whether the right hemisphere's involvement in problem solving is modality specific or dependent on the type of spatial reasoning required. In the current study, 2 types of nonverbal reasoning abilities were examined, spatial reasoning and proportional reasoning, in 109 patients with cerebrovascular disease that was confined to either the right or the left hemisphere or was diffuse in nature. Results indicated that no lateralizing effects were present based on type of spatial reasoning. Findings are consistent with the suggestion that higher order cognitive processes involved in nonverbal abstraction and problem solving are not strongly lateralized to the right hemisphere but rather are more generally distributed throughout the cortex. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When less is not always more: Stereotype knowledge and reasoning development.

Developmental studies on heuristics and biases have reported controversial findings suggesting that children sometimes reason more logically than do adults. We addressed the controversy by testing the impact of children's knowledge of the heuristic stereotypes that are typically cued in these studies. Five-year-old preschoolers and 8-year-old children were tested with a card game version of the classic base-rate task. Problems were based on stereotypes that were familiar or unfamiliar for preschoolers. We also manipulated whether the cued stereotypical response was consistent (no-conflict problems) or inconsistent (conflict problems) with the correct analytic response that was cued in the problem. Results showed that an age-related performance decrease on the conflict problems was accompanied by an age-related performance increase on the no-conflict problems. These age effects were most pronounced for problems that adopted stereotypes that were unfamiliar for the 5-year-old preschoolers. When preschoolers were familiar with the stereotypes, their performance also started being affected. Findings support the claim that previously reported age-related performance decreases on classic reasoning tasks need to be attributed to the increased need to deal with tempting heuristics and not to a decrease in analytic thinking skills per se. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the difficulties underlying Bayesian reasoning: A comment on Gigerenzer and Hoffrage.

G. Gigerenzer and U. Hoffrage (1995) suggested that formulating problems in frequentistic terms would facilitate the practice of Bayesian inference. The authors of the present article propose that there are two different factors at work in this context: the use of frequency or probability statements and the use of joint or conditional sampling information. An experiment is reported demonstrating that, even with the use of frequency statements, Bayesian reasoning is more difficult with conditional than with joint information. Broader implications of the proposed distinction are briefly discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bayesian inference for hierarchical mixtures-of-experts with applications to regression and classification

This paper studies the problems of inference and prediction in a class of models known as hierarchical mixtures-of-experts (HME). The statistical model underlying an HME is a mixture model in which both the mixture coefficients and the mixture components are generalized linear models. Bayesian inference regarding an HME's parameters is presented in the contexts of regression and classification using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. A benefit of this Bayesian approach is the ability to obtain a sample from the posterior distribution of any functional of the parameters of the given model. In this way, more information is obtained than provided by a point estimate. The methods are illustrated on a nonlinear regression problem and on a breast cancer classification problem. The results indicate that the HME showed good prediction performance, and also gave the additional benefit of providing for the opportunity to assess the degree of certainty of the model in its predictions.     

Mechanisms of spontaneous activity in developing spinal networks

Developmental ordering, 1 item preceding another in development, is a primary piece of evidence in developmental research. However, testing developmental ordering hypotheses is remarkably difficult; the problem is that researchers rarely have absolute measures (ratio scales). Therefore, directly comparing 2 measures is often not sensible. This article demonstrates that, depending on the type of scale, the observed data pattern is constrained by the underlying relationship. Although the observed data pattern may not reflect the exact relationship, it does limit the possible relationships. Researchers can use this information to reject potential underlying relationships. An application of the method of strong inference (J. R. Platt, 1964) is outlined whereby researchers can use observed data patterns to systematically reject competing developmental ordering hypotheses. The approach requires only standard statistical methods and assumptions.     

Automated reasoning system in histopathologic diagnosis and prognosis of prostate cancer and its precursors

OBJECTIVE: This article presents the rationale and options offered to diagnostic and prognostic decision support systems for prostate pathology by automated reasoning capabilities. METHODS: The symbolic information used in diagnostic decision-making is systematically ordered, compared, numerically assessed in its probability, and combined such that a conclusion can be drawn. The framework for the processing of such symbolic information may be an expert system, an inference network or a case-based reasoning system. Automated reasoning is implemented by the use of a rule base and information flow control modules. RESULTS: Automated reasoning allows decision support systems to follow highly adaptive decision sequences, capable of handling contradictory evidence, exceptions in diagnostic clue expression, and nonmonotonic decision-making. CONCLUSIONS: Automated reasoning capability in diagnostic and prognostic decision support systems allows highly flexible decision development, very close to human decision procedures.     

Interventions for students with traumatic brain injury: managing behavioral disturbances

The present article provides information about the behavioral sequelae that are commonly seen in children and adolescents following a traumatic brain injury (TBI) and ways that educators can begin to address these problems. Because, for the most part, behavioral interventions have not been empirically validated for use with TBI populations, this article focuses on the unique needs of these students and the factors that should be considered in designing intervention strategies. Emphasis is placed on the cognitive sequelae of TBI that can cause further behavioral problems and interfere with interventions (e.g., impaired attention, executive function, reasoning and problem solving, and learning and memory).     

Developmental ordering, scale types, and strong inference.

Developmental ordering, 1 item preceding another in development, is a primary piece of evidence in developmental research. However, testing developmental ordering hypotheses is remarkably difficult; the problem is that researchers rarely have absolute measures (ratio scales). Therefore, directly comparing 2 measures is often not sensible. This article demonstrates that, depending on the type of scale, the observed data pattern is constrained by the underlying relationship. Although the observed data pattern may not reflect the exact relationship, it does limit the possible relationships. Researchers can use this information to reject potential underlying relationships. An application of the method of strong inference (J. R. Platt, 1964) is outlined whereby researchers can use observed data patterns to systematically reject competing developmental ordering hypotheses. The approach requires only standard statistical methods and assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)