Preschoolers' understanding of others' desires: Fulfilling mine enhances my understanding of yours.

We developed a gift-giving task requiring children to identify their mother's desire, when her desire differed from theirs. We found a developmental change: 3- and 4-year-olds performed more poorly than 5-year-olds (Experiment 1). A modified version of this task (Experiment 2) revealed that 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds whose desires had been fulfilled chose an appropriate gift for their mothers significantly more often than children whose desires were unfulfilled. Children who merely anticipated desire fulfillment also outperformed children whose desires were unfulfilled. Analysis of children's verbal explanations provides converging evidence that desire fulfillment enhanced children's tendency to adopt the perspective of their mother and justify their choices by referencing her desires. Discussion focuses on why desire fulfillment enhances children's ability to consider the desires of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Connecting the dots: Children's use of a systematic figure to facilitate mapping and search.

Organizing locations into a systematic figure was predicted to facilitate children's use of spatial relations in a mapping task. In Study 1, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds used a map to find a sticker hidden under 1 of 27 locations. The search locations formed a systematic figure, the outline of a dog. Half of the children were shown that the locations formed a dog. Seeing the dog pattern facilitated the performance of 5-year-olds but not that of the younger children. Study 2 indicated that children had to see a systematic figure to gain an advantage; adding lines to an unsystematic figure did not convey an advantage. Study 3 indicated that a verbal label alone could not convey an advantage. Study 4 revealed that seeing the dog pattern could also facilitate performance when the map was rotated relative to the represented space. The importance of organizing spatial information to facilitate relational thinking and mapping is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Make believe and reality: Explorations of the imaginary realm.

Preschool children's ability to distinguish between pretense and reality was examined in 2 studies that adopted a modified version of the design used by P. L. Harris, E. Brown, M. Marriott, S. Whittall, and S. Harmer (1991) in which a pretend creature is assumed to hide inside a box. In Study 1, 19 4-year-olds participated in test conditions that closely followed Harris et al.'s procedures. In Study 2, 75 3- and 4-year-olds were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 emotionally colored pretense play scenarios that included 4 test conditions: an imaginary creature, invented by the adult or the child, whose affective value was either positive or negative. The results of both studies do not support Harris et al.'s interpretation of their data in terms of a breakdown of the distinction between pretense and reality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inference and action in early causal reasoning.

Two experiments investigated whether a simple-to-embedded-rules account can explain the change in causal reasoning in children between 3 and 4 years of age. A marble-and-ramp apparatus that operated in 2 distinct configurations of straight and across was used throughout. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds were able to predict the path of the marble when there was only 1 input hole (a simple if-then rules task), whereas only 4-year-olds could solve the 2-input version (an embedded or conjoint conditional if-then rules task). Experiment 2 found the same 3- to 4-year age difference when children chose where to insert the marble in the 2-input version, indicating that the same rules may underlie causal action as well as causal prediction for the more complicated task. The results of the 2 experiments are discussed in relation to previous findings on causal reasoning, children's theory of mind, and a theory of cognitive complexity in the preschool period. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can being scared cause tummy aches? Naive theories, ambiguous evidence, and preschoolers' causal inferences.

Causal learning requires integrating constraints provided by domain-specific theories with domain-general statistical learning. In order to investigate the interaction between these factors, the authors presented preschoolers with stories pitting their existing theories against statistical evidence. Each child heard 2 stories in which 2 candidate causes co-occurred with an effect. Evidence was presented in the form: AB→E; CA→E; AD→E; and so forth. In 1 story, all variables came from the same domain; in the other, the recurring candidate cause, A, came from a different domain (A was a psychological cause of a biological effect). After receiving this statistical evidence, children were asked to identify the cause of the effect on a new trial. Consistent with the predictions of a Bayesian model, all children were more likely to identify A as the cause within domains than across domains. Whereas 3.5-year-olds learned only from the within-domain evidence, 4- and 5-year-olds learned from the cross-domain evidence and were able to transfer their new expectations about psychosomatic causality to a novel task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers' understanding of the link between thinking and feeling: cognitive cuing and emotional change

In 3 studies we investigated 3- through 6-year-olds' knowledge of thinking and feeling by examining their understanding of how emotions can change when memories of past sad events are cued by objects in the current environment. In Study 1, 48 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were presented with 4 illustrated stories in which focal characters experience minor sad events. Later, each story character encounters a visual cue that is related to one of his or her previous sad experiences. Children were told that the character felt sad, and they were asked to explain why. Study 1 suggested considerable competence as well as substantial development in the years between 4 and 6 in the understanding of the influence of mental activity on emotions. Studies 2 and 3 more systematically explored preschoolers' understanding of cognitive cuing and emotional change with different types of situations and cues. Across these 2 studies, 108 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds listened to illustrated stories that featured story characters who each experienced a sad event and who were later exposed to a related cue. Children were not only asked to explain why the characters suddenly felt sad, but in some stories, they were also asked to predict and explain how another character, who was never at the past sad event, would feel. Results of Studies 2 and 3 showed an initial understanding of cognitive cuing and emotion in some children as young as 3, replicated and extended the evidence for significant developmental changes in that understanding during the preschool years, and revealed that the strength and consistency of preschoolers' knowledge of cognitive cuing and emotion was affected by whether cues were the same, or only similar to, parts of the earlier events.     

Causal relations and feature similarity in children's inductive reasoning.

Four experiments examined the development of property induction on the basis of causal relations. In the first 2 studies, 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with triads in which a target instance was equally similar to 2 inductive bases but shared a causal antecedent feature with 1 of them. All 3 age groups used causal relations as a basis for property induction, although the proportion of causal inferences increased with age. Subsequent experiments pitted causal relations against featural similarity in induction. It was found that adults and 8-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, preferred shared causal relations over strong featural similarity as a basis for induction. The implications for models of inductive reasoning and development are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age-related changes in children's use of external representations.

This study explored children's use of external representations. Experiment 1 focused on representations of self. Self-recognition was assessed by a mark test as a function of age (3 vs. 4 years), delay (5 s vs. 3 min), and media (photographs vs. drawings). Four-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds; children performed better with photographs than drawings; and there was no effect of delay. In Experiment 2, 3- and 4-year-olds used a delayed video image to locate a sticker on themselves (self task) or a stuffed animal (other task). The 2 tasks were positively correlated with age and vocabulary partialed out. Experiment 3 used a search task to assess whether children have particular difficulty using external representations that conflict with their expectations: 3- and 4-year-olds were informed of an object's location verbally or through video; on half of the trials, this information conflicted with children's initial belief. Three-year-olds performed worse than 4-year-olds on conflict trials, indicating that assessments of self and other understanding may reflect children's ability to reason about conflicting external representations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parental scaffolding of young children's spatial communication.

Two studies documented and evaluated parental scaffolding of 3- and 4-year-olds' spatial communication. In Study 1, children gave directions to parents about locations of objects. Three-year-olds gave ambiguous directions more often than 4-year-olds, and parents used directive prompts more often with 3-year-olds than 4-year-olds. Study 2 compared the effectiveness of parental prompts in a controlled experiment. Each time children gave ambiguous directions, they were given either a directive prompt, nondirective prompt, or no prompt. Both age groups benefitted from directive prompts, but 3-year-olds benefitted less than 4-year-olds from nondirective prompts. Discussion focuses on parents' sensitivity to children's scaffolding needs and on developmental differences in children's responses to scaffolding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Analogical reasoning in young children.

Assessed the performance of 4- and 5-year-olds on geometric analogy tasks. Each task consisted of 16 analogy problems that were presented in a manipulative, gamelike context and that used attribute blocks that varied on the dimensions of color, size, and shape. Experiment 1 demonstrated that many of the preschoolers were capable of applying analogical reasoning in the solution of geometric analogy problems of the form A:B::C:?. We also found that children who did not consistently reason analogically showed evidence of a reasoning strategy that was governed by a hierarchical rule structure. Experiment 2, in which a modified version of the geometric analogy task in Experiment 1 was used, confirmed the findings of the initial experiment with regard to the analogical reasoning ability of 4- and 5-year-olds. The rule structure was verified for nonanalogical reasoners, whereas analogical reasoners generally exhibited no consistent pattern in their response errors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Young children's responses to guilt displays.

Displaying guilt after a transgression serves to appease the victim and other group members, restore interpersonal relationships, and indicate the transgressors' awareness of and desire to conform to the group's norms. We investigated whether and when young children are sensitive to these functions of guilt displays. In Study 1, after 4- and 5-year-old children watched videos of transgressors either displaying guilt (without explicitly apologizing) or not displaying guilt, 5-year-olds appropriately inferred that the victim would be madder at the unremorseful transgressor and would prefer the remorseful transgressor. They also said that they would prefer to interact with the remorseful transgressor, judged the unremorseful transgressor to be meaner, and, in a distribution of resources task, gave more resources to the remorseful transgressor. The 4-year-olds did not draw any of these inferences and distributed the resources equally. However, Study 2 showed that 4-year-olds were able to draw appropriate inferences about transgressors who explicitly apologized versus those who did not apologize. Thus, 4-year-olds seem to know the appeasement functions that explicit apologies serve but only when children have reached the age of 5 years do they seem to grasp the emotions that apologies stand for, namely, guilt and remorse, and the appeasement functions that displaying these emotions serve. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

When three is less than two: Early developments in children's understanding of fractional quantities.

Four experiments examined young children's understanding of the inverse relation between the number of parts into which a quantity is to be divided and the size of each part. In Experiment 1, 5-, 6-, and 7-year-old children tended to judge, incorrectly, that bigger shares would result from sharing with more, rather than fewer, recipients. In Experiment 2, 5-year-olds correctly recognized the inverse effect of additional recipients when the sharing was based on subtraction rather than on equal partitioning. In Experiment 3, a modification of the equal-sharing task from Experiment 1 designed to reduce cognitive complexity successfully elicited correct performance from 7-year-olds but not from 5-year-olds. However, 5-year-olds markedly improved when they were given a chance to compare the outcomes of sharing with different numbers of recipients. Experiment 4 corroborated and extended this evidence of learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emergence of the ability to track a character's mental perspective in narrative.

In comprehending stories, adults create mental models from which they follow the actions of the characters from the characters' different mental vantage points. Using a novel methodology, this study is the first to examine when children attain the narrative ability to track the mental perspective of characters. That is, when do children follow the actions of a story to different locations that a character is thinking about? The results of Study 1 demonstrate that this ability is nascent in 3-year-olds but adult-like by age 5. Study 2 demonstrates that 3-year-olds' difficulty is the result of the mention of the character's mental state per se rather than task complexity. Together, these studies shed new light on the development of narrative cognition in humans. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Looking and search measures of object knowledge in preschool children.

The same preschoolers were tested on an observation task and a search task involving the invisible displacement of an object. In the observation task, children watched an object roll behind a screen from which protruded the top of a solid wall. Analyses revealed significantly longer looking to impossible than to possible outcomes in all children. In search, the child was allowed to retrieve the rolled object. Most 3-year-olds but significantly fewer 2.5-year-olds completed the search successfully. An unexpected sex difference was found, with boys outperforming girls. Search performance was not associated with observation measures. The findings indicate that children visually discriminate violations of solidity but that this sensitivity is not associated with successful search performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Antecedents and outcomes of coping behaviors among unemployed and reemployed individuals

Four experiments examined young children's understanding of the inverse relation between the number of parts into which a quantity is to be divided and the size of each part. In Experiment 1 5-, 6-, and 7-year-old children tended to judge, incorrectly, that bigger shares would result from sharing with more, rather than fewer, recipients. In Experiment 2, 5-year-olds correctly recognized the inverse effect of additional recipients when the sharing was based on subtraction rather than on equal partitioning. In Experiment 3, a modification of the equal-sharing task from Experiment 1 designed to reduce cognitive complexity successfully elicited correct performance from 7-year-olds but not from 5-year-olds. However, 5-year-olds markedly improved when they were given a chance to compare the outcomes of sharing with different numbers of recipients. Experiment 4 corroborated and extended this evidence of learning.     

The Ontogeny of Serial-Order Behavior in Humans (Homo sapiens): Representation of a List.

The authors trained 3-, 4-, 7-, and 10-year-old children and adults (Homo sapiens) on a nonverbal serial-order task to respond to 5 items in a specific order. Knowledge of each item's sequential position was then examined using pairwise and triplet tests. Adults and 7- and 10-year-olds performed at high levels on both tests, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds did not. The latency to respond to the first item of a test pair or triplet was linearly related to that item's position in the training series for the 7- and 10-year-olds and adults, but not for the 3- and 4-year-olds. These data suggest that older children and adults, but not younger children, developed a well-integrated internal representation of the serial list. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Young children's judgments of relative mass of two objects in a head-on-collision event

The purpose in this study was to investigate the ability of young children to judge the relative mass of two objects depicted on a CRT monitor as colliding head-on with each other, and to determine which feature of a collision event they depend on for their judgments. In the first experiment it was shown that half of the 4-year-olds and most of the 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds consistently judged the slower object to be heavier when the velocities of the two objects before collision were the same and those after collision were different. In the second experiment young children's judgements of relative mass in noncollision events in which two objects only moved in opposite directions at different speeds were examined. Results showed that half of the 5-year-olds and most of the 6-year-olds tended to assume consistently that the slower object was heavier. However, the 4-year-olds did not show any clear tendency. The third experiment was planned to examine young children's judgments of relative mass in different collision events in which only the precollision velocities of two colliding objects were different: half of the 6-year-old children judged the slower object to be heavier, but the rest of them and half of the 5-year-old children consistently gave the opposite responses. These were based upon the delay between the starts of motion of the two objects. The 4-year-olds did not show any tendency, as in experiment 2. The results indicate that young children can specify the kinetic information about relative mass from the kinematics of collision events when viewing an appropriate collision event, and that both the precollision phase and the postcollision phase contribute to the judgement of relative mass.     

Routine and the Perception of Time.

The authors investigated the influence of routine on people's estimation of time, testing the hypothesis that duration is remembered as being shorter when time is spent in a routine activity. In 4 experiments and 2 field studies, the authors compared time estimations in routine and nonroutine conditions. Routine was established by a sequence of markers (Study 1), variation of the task (Studies 2 and 3), or the number of repetitive blocks (Study 4). As hypothesized, the duration of the task was remembered as being shorter in routine conditions than in nonroutine ones. This trend was reversed in experienced (prospective) judgments when participants were informed beforehand of the duration-judgment task (Study 3). In Studies 5 and 6, the authors examined remembered duration judgments of vacationers and kibbutz members, which provided further support for the main hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mechanisms of predictive and diagnostic causal induction.

In predictive causal inference, people reason from causes to effects, whereas in diagnostic inference, they reason from effects to causes. Independently of the causal structure of the events, the temporal structure of the information provided to a reasoner may vary (e.g., multiple events followed by a single event vs. a single event followed by multiple events). The authors report 5 experiments in which causal structure and temporal information were varied independently. Inferences were influenced by temporal structure but not by causal structure. The results are relevant to the evaluation of 2 current accounts of causal induction, the Rescorla-Wagner (R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972) and causal model theories (M. R. Waldmann & K. J. Holyoak, 1992). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)