How quantity judgment changes as the number of cues increases: An analytical framework and review.

People frequently must make judgments of quantities. This article concerns how increasing the number of cues supporting such judgments affects accuracy as well as the judgment process itself. Research on these issues is sparse. This seems partly due to ambiguity about what it means to say that quantity judgments are accurate. Thus, a major focus of the article is on integrating 2 disparate approaches to analyzing quantity judgment, lens model analysis from psychology and mean squared error analysis from economic forecasting. The resulting extended mean squared error analytical scheme has general applicability. However, it offers special advantages for studying increasing information effects. The proposed scheme is used as a conceptual framework for discussing hypotheses about specific consequences of enlarged cue sets. An especially surprising conclusion is that the variability in people's judgments tends to decrease rather than increase with additional cues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sequential effects in magnitude scaling: Models and theory.

Research on sequential effects in magnitude scaling is reviewed, and its implications about the adequacy of current time series regression models is discussed. A regression model that unifies what at first appears to be contradictory results is proposed. Theoretical models of judgment and perception are introduced, and their relation to alternative regression models is clarified. A theoretical model of relative judgment that clarifies the role of judgmental error and frames of reference in magnitude scaling is examined in detail. Four experiments that test the model are presented. The results, along with recent results presented by L. M. Ward (see record 1987-24003-001) provide support for the model. The importance of being explicit about the relation of theoretical models to regression models and about the role of error in these models is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contrast effects in attitude judgment: An examination of the accentuation hypothesis.

A common finding in attitude judgment is that attitude positions discrepant from an extreme judge's own position are judged as more discrepant than in fact they are. The 2 studies in this article suggest that these contrast effects may be due to accentuation phenomena, as outlined by H. Tajfel (see record 1958-04920-001). Judges may make more polarized pro/anti judgments if they perceive the attitude positions as also differing on an agree/disagree (peripheral) dimension and if the judgment dimension and the peripheral dimension are correlated. In Study 1, a survey was conducted of 290 members of the National Organization for Women and the Massachusetts Federation of Republican Women to test the hypothesis. Strong support was found for the accentuation explanation of contrast effects. To rule out an individual difference alternative explanation for these results, Study 2 with 44 undergraduates experimentally manipulated the salience of the agree/disagree peripheral dimension. Greater contrast was found when the dimension was salient. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Child effects—still unwelcome? Response to Dodge and Wahler.

Commentaries by K. A. Dodge (see record 1991-04756-001) and R. G. Wahler (see record 1991-04823-001) agree with Lytton (see record 1991-04795-001) on the importance of drawing attention to the joint action of biological and environmental factors in conduct disorder (CD). This article is a response restating why it is useful to try to disentangle "child effects" from "parental effects." Although each construct is an amalgam of genetic/biological and environmental factors, child effects will be nearer the biological end, and parental treatment effects nearer the environmental end, of a spectrum of influences. Ten convergent lines of research, taken together, provide evidence that has persuaded me that the child's own tendencies are stronger contributions to CD than are parental influences. Others should at least consider the evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Interpretation versus Reference Framing: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in the Organizational Domain

We examined conditions under which contextually activated information affects strategic decision-making and found that the subjective framing of organizational issues may be affected by variables other than semantic manipulation. Context information may be used as an interpretation frame (and lead to assimilation) or as a reference frame (and lead to contrast). Whether context information instigates assimilative interpretation or contrastive comparison processes may depend on the level of categorical context-target similarity. This is demonstrated in three experiments in which participants read an unambiguous business threat or opportunity scenario prior to judging an ambiguous, strategic issue. Findings are discussed in the light of previous judgment and decision-making studies of framing and context effects. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.     

"The effects of neurotoxic hippocampal lesions on two effects of context after fear extinction": Errata.

Reports an error in the original article by R. J. Frohardt et al (Behavioral Neuroscience, 2000 [Apr], Vol 114[2], 227-240). On page 229, there is an error in the Method section. The second full sentence on that page should read: Neurotoxic lesions of hippocampus were produced by injections of a mixture of 5.0 μg ibotenic acid and 5.0 μg NMDA per 0.5 ml of normal saline. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2000-15286-001): Three conditioned suppression experiments with rats examined the role of the hippocampus in 2 effects of context after extinction. Reinstatement is the context-specific recovery of fear to an extinguished conditioned stimulus (CS) that occurs following independent presentations of the unconditioned stimulus (UCS), after extinction. Renewal is the recovery of fear when the CS is presented in the context in which it was conditioned, after extinction in a different context. Results indicated that neurotoxic lesions of the hippocampus, performed before conditioning, abolished reinstatement, which depends on context-UCS associations, but not renewal, which does not. This dissociation is not the result of differences in the recentness of context learning that ordinarily governs the two effects… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Should observed overconfidence be dismissed as a statistical artifact? Critique of Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994).

I. Erev, T. S. Wallsten, and D. V. Budescu (see record 1994-36026-001) showed that the same probability judgment data can reveal both apparent overconfidence and underconfidence, depending on how the data are analyzed. To explain this seeming paradox, I. Erev et al. proposed a general model of judgment in which overt responses are related to underlying "true judgments" that are perturbed by error. A central conclusion of their work is that observed over- and underconfidence can be split into two components: (a) "true" over- and underconfidence and (b) "artifactual" over- and underconfidence due to error in judgment. It is argued in the present article that decomposing over- and underconfidence into true and artifactual components is inappropriate. The mistake stems from giving primacy to ambiguously defined model constructions (true judgments) over observed data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Harmful effects of posttermination sexual romantic relationships between therapists and their former clients": Erratum.

Reports an error in "Harmful effects of posttermination sexual and romantic relationships between therapists and their former clients" by Laura S. Brown (Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 1988[Sum], Vol 25[2], 249-255). Reference was made to the Minnesota law regarding reporting of "any sexual or romantic relationship in which the parties were once therapist and client" (p. 250). Upon further review by the author, it was determined that the law is more complicated than conveyed in the article. A detailed explanation of the law is provided in the erratum, although legal counsel is suggested for further interpretation. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1989-02991-001.) Examines anecdotal evidence regarding the harmful effects of posttermination sexual or romantic relationships between therapists and clients, focusing on relationships between female therapists and former clients who are also women. The question of equality of power between therapists and former clients is addressed. The impact of these relationships on the community in which they occur is considered. It is concluded that posttermination relationships between therapists and clients have the potential to do as much harm as relationships initiated during therapy and that such relationships should be defined as unethical. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development in moral judgment research.

Two recent articles challenge cognitive developmental interpretations given to moral judgment research using preference data. One article, by J. J. Moran et al (see record 1979-28407-001), suggests that preference data may reflect preference for language sophistication rather than for levels of moral reasoning. The other article, by R. M. Martin (see record 1978-11439-001), suggests that preference for statements of moral reasoning may reflect a prior commitment to an action choice rather than an evaluation of moral reasoning. The evidence in both articles is critiqued, subsequent research dealing with the problems raised is cited, and a reconceptualization of the issues is recommended. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis

In framing studies, logically equivalent choice situations are differently described and the resulting preferences are studied. A meta-analysis of framing effects is presented for risky choice problems which are framed either as gains or as losses. This evaluates the finding that highlighting the positive aspects of formally identical problems does lead to risk aversion and that highlighting their equivalent negative aspects does lead to risk seeking. Based on a data pool of 136 empirical papers that reported framing experiments with nearly 30,000 participants, we calculated 230 effect sizes. Results show that the overall framing effect between conditions is of small to moderate size and that profound differences exist between research designs. Potentially relevant characteristics were coded for each study. The most important characteristics were whether framing is manipulated by changing reference points or by manipulating outcome salience, and response mode (choice vs. rating/judgment). Further important characteristics were whether options differ qualitatively or quantitatively in risk, whether there is one or multiple risky events, whether framing is manipulated by gain/loss or by task-responsive wording, whether dependent variables are measured between- or within- subjects, and problem domains. Sample (students vs. target populations) and unit of analysis (individual vs. group) was not influential. It is concluded that framing is a reliable phenomenon, but that outcome salience manipulations, which constitute a considerable amount of work, have to be distinguished from reference point manipulations and that procedural features of experimental settings have a considerable effect on effect sizes in framing experiments. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.     

Reanalysis of experimental halo effects.

Data on ratings of individuals, obtained under 2 conditions of judgment and published in 1956, were reanalyzed by a more complete analysis of variance. The usual interaction between raters and individuals, called a halo effect, was found but it was not influenced by judgment conditions intended to maximize it. Hence, the evidence for halo effect due to judging operations remains questionable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correcting for measurement error in detecting unconscious cognition: Comment on Draine and Greenwald (1998).

A. G. Greenwald, M. R. Klinger, and E. S. Schuh (1995) have proposed a regression method for detecting unconscious cognition in experiments that obtain measures of indirect and direct effects of stimuli with suspected unconscious effects. Their indirect-on-direct-measure regression approach can produce misleading evidence for indirect effects in the absence of direct effects when the direct-effect measure has typical measurement error. This article describes an errors-in-variables variant of the regression method that corrects for error in the direct-effect measure. Applied to the uses of the regression method by S. C. Draine and A. G. Greenwald (see record 1999-10824-004), the errors-in-variables method affirms substantial evidence for indirect effects in the absence of direct effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reducing the effects of juror bias.

Proposes a theoretical framework for relating bias to a juror's ultimate judgment. In this framework, bias, in the sense of positivity or negativity of a prejudgmental disposition, is integrated with the degree of guilt appearance of the evidential information. The 2 components, bias and evidence, are inversely weighted, so that increasing the importance of one decreases the effective importance of the other. In 2 experiments with 192 undergraduates, the effects of trait biases in simulated jurors, selected for their harshness or leniency toward criminals, were reduced by conditions that increased the reliability and trustworthiness of trial evidence. Situational biases were induced in a 3rd experiment with 96 undergraduates by trial conditions designed to annoy jurors, but their effects were ameliorated by a short period of deliberation. These bias-reducing procedures are interpreted as indirectly dealing with bias by increasing the salience of the information taken into account in judgment formation. Some implications regarding trial conditions that facilitate or inhibit manifestation of bias are discussed. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Direct-comparison judgments: When and why above- and below-average effects reverse.

Above-average and below-average effects appear to be common and consistent across a variety of judgment domains. For example, several studies show that individual items from a high- (low-) quality set tend to be rated as better (worse) than the other items in the set (e.g., E. E. Giladi & Y. Klar, 2002). Experiments in this article demonstrate reversals of these effects. A novel account is supported, which describes how the timing of the denotation of the to-be-judged item influences attention and ultimately affects the size or direction of comparative biases. The authors discuss how this timing account is relevant for many types of referent-dependent judgments (e.g., probability judgments, resource allocations) and how it intersects with various accounts of comparative bias (focalism, generalized-group, compromise between local and general standards [LOGE]). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The importance of theory: Response to Brenner (2000).

L. Brenner's (see record 2000-02818-011) critique of I. Erev, T. S. Wallsten and D. V. Budescu (see record 1994-36026-001) focuses on their (a) use of a model to explain the paradox of the same data appearing to suggest over- and underconfidence, depending on how they are analyzed; (b) definitions of true judgment and error; and (c) specific use of judgments transformed to log-odds and a model formulated in those terms. The authors of the present article strongly disagree with the first point and discuss the importance of using models to interpret data. With regard to the second, the authors admit that the constructs of true judgment and error are poorly named but dispute L. Brenner's specific criticisms. Concerning the third, the authors had not claimed that the log-odds metric has any special status in judgment research and thus agree with L. Brenner's basic point. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparing effects of the horizontal-vertical illusion on grip scaling and judgment: Relative versus absolute, not perception versus action.

The discovery that the prehension component of an open-loop, two-fingered reach is largely immune to certain salient pictorial illusions has been used to suggest that humans possess 2 distinct visual systems, 1 that subserves perceptual judgment and 1 that mediates visually controlled action. In this article, the authors present evidence that suggests that the critical distinction is not that of reaching and judgment but of relative and absolute perception. Experiment 1 extends the findings of S. Aglioti, J. F. X. DeSouza, and M. A. Goodale (1995) and suggests that the manual prehension component of open-loop reaching is affected by the horizontal-vertical illusion to a much smaller degree than perceptual size judgments. In Experiments 2 and 3, however, when perceptual size judgment is directed at a single element of the display, this difference vanishes. Experiment 4 demonstrates that grip scaling is strongly affected by the illusion when a single reach is scaled to both the horizontal and vertical components of a triangular figure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Framing of task performance strategies: effects on performance in a multiattribute dynamic decision making environment

It is well documented that the way a static choice task is "framed" can dramatically alter choice behavior, often leading to observable preference reversals. This framing effect appears to result from perceived changes in the nature or location of a person's initial reference point, but it is not clear how framing effects might generalize to performance on dynamic decision making tasks that are characterized by high workload, time constraints, risk, or stress. A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that framing can introduce affective components to the decision making process and can influence, either favorably (positive frame) or adversely (negative frame), the implementation and use of decision making strategies in dynamic high-workload environments. Results indicated that negative frame participants were significantly impaired in developing and employing a simple optimal decision strategy relative to a positive frame group. Discussion focuses on implications of these results for models of dynamic decision making.     

Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment.

Laboratory research on "error" in social judgment has largely supplanted research that addresses accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a "mistake." An error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent an incorrect judgment. A mistake, by contrast, is an incorrect judgment of a real-world stimulus and therefore more difficult to determine. Although errors can be highly informative about the process of judgment in general, they are not necessarily relevant to the content or accuracy of particular judgments, because errors in a laboratory may not be mistakes with respect to a broader, more realistic frame of reference and the processes that produce such errors might lead to correct decisions and adaptive outcomes in real life. Several examples are described in this article. Accuracy issues cannot be addressed by research that concentrates on demonstrating error in relation to artificial stimuli, but only by research that uses external, realistic criteria for accuracy. These criteria might include the degree to which judgments agree with each other and yield valid predictions of behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight: Biased judgments of past events after the outcomes are known.

The hindsight bias is the tendency for people with outcome knowledge to believe falsely that they would have predicted the reported outcome of an event. This article reviews empirical research relevant to hindsight phenomena. The influence of outcome knowledge, termed creeping determinism, was initially hypothesized to result from the immediate and automatic integration of the outcome into a person's knowledge of an event. Later research has identified at least 4 plausible, general strategies for responding to hindsight questions. These explanations postulate that outcome information affects the selection of evidence to make a judgment, the evidence evaluation, the manner in which evidence is integrated, or the response generation process. It is also likely, in some situations, that a combination of 2 or more of these mechanisms produces the observed hindsight effects. We provide an interpretation of the creeping determinism hypothesis in terms of inferences made to reevaluate case-specific evidence once the relevant outcome is known and conclude that it is the most common mechanism underlying observed hindsight effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of lens model studies": Correction.

Reports an error in "Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of lens model studies" by Natalia Karelaia and Robin M. Hogarth (Psychological Bulletin, 2008[May], Vol 134[3], 404-426). In this article, two columns of data were inadvertently transposed and thus listed under their incorrect column headers. The correct version is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-04614-003.) The mathematical representation of E. Brunswik's (1952) lens model has been used extensively to study human judgment and provides a unique opportunity to conduct a meta-analysis of studies that covers roughly 5 decades. Specifically, the authors analyzed statistics of the "lens model equation" (L. R. Tucker, 1964) associated with 249 different task environments obtained from 86 articles. On average, fairly high levels of judgmental achievement were found, and people were seen to be capable of achieving similar levels of cognitive performance in noisy and predictable environments. Further, the effects of task characteristics that influence judgment (numbers and types of cues, inter-cue redundancy, function forms and cue weights in the ecology, laboratory versus field studies, and experience with the task) were identified and estimated. A detailed analysis of learning studies revealed that the most effective form of feedback was information about the task. The authors also analyzed empirically under what conditions the application of bootstrapping--or replacing judges by their linear models--is advantageous. Finally, the authors note shortcomings of the kinds of studies conducted to date, limitations in the lens model methodology, and possibilities for future research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)