中国情境下企业员工网络建构行为量表开发

通过对国内外网络建构行为及相关文献进行梳理,发现网络建构行为这一构念在中国情境下的理论及实证可以做进一步的拓展。从国外文献中选择网络建构行为的可操作定义,在半结构式访谈和开放式问卷的基础上,结合现有文献,形成了拟开发量表的初始维度与条目。通过探索性因子分析、验证性因子分析及相关分析等方法,对424名企业员工样本数据进行了信度和效度检验,最终确定了网络建构行为量表的5个维度和19个题项。研究结果表明,开发的量表具有良好的信度和效度,验证了中国情境下的网络建构行为存在"给予社会支持"与"避免关系冲突"两个与西方不同的维度。     

基于公平偏好的公共文化 PPP 项目政府补偿研究

鉴于公共文化 PPP 项目收益性弱、对私人部门吸引力不足的特点,将私人部门公平偏好引入公共文化 PPP 项目的政府补偿机制设计,构建了以政府为主导的两阶段公私 Stackelberg 博弈模型。 以柳州某文化广场 PPP 项目为例分析了私人部门公平偏好对其初始投资决策、最优投资决策及政府补偿的影响。结果表明:博弈的第一阶段中政府初步许诺的运营期补偿力度较小,私人部门公平偏好与其初始决策投资呈正比;第二阶段确定补偿力度时,政府承诺收入率与私人部门期望收入率之差超过其参照点时,若私人部门公平偏好越高,要求政府最优运营期补偿力度越大,项目最优投资规模亦越大。研究结果可为公共文化 PPP 项目的补偿设计提供理论依据。     

私人部门性质对PPP项目产出绩效监管的影响及其优化建议——基于情境模拟实验研究

现阶段PPP项目产出绩效监管尤为重要。针对私人部门为国有企业和私营企业,通过已构建的PPP项目产出绩效监管框架筛选出实验变量,继而对变量进行情境设计,并进行问卷调查对比分析不同性质私人部门的PPP项目产出绩效监管。最后,为政府部门面对不同性质私人部门类PPP项目产出绩效监管提出三条优化建议。     

基于霍尔三维结构的PPP项目实施路径模型研究

PPP项目的实施过程中,项目参与部门繁多,管理工作流程滞后。在霍尔三维结构模型基础上,充分融合PPP项目的实际实施路径,分析PPP项目实施路径的霍尔三维结构,并且在对其中3个维度(时间维度、逻辑维度、知识维度)分析基础上,构建基于霍尔三维结构的PPP项目实施路径模型。     

基于三方满意的PPP项目动力模型研究

以协同学理论为基础,通过协同学与Logisitic模型相结合,构建政府、私人部门与社会公众共同满意的PPP项目动力模型,并找出在社会公众参与下,政府与私人部门之间的稳态平衡点。结论表明,社会公众参与PPP项目,不会对政府和私人部门产生直接影响,而是间接地对二者之间的关系起到正向促进作用;政府、私人部门与社会公众协同有效发展是实现PPP项目最终目标的有力保证。     

建设项目承包人履约行为的结构维度与测量研究——基于契约参照点理论

契约参照点理论以合同为参照点给出解释承包人履约行为选择的新逻辑,但受到合同参照点效应影响的承包人履约行为的类型及表现形式尚不明确,亟需厘清承包人履约行为的结构维度并进行量化。首先,借鉴已有的承包人履约行为的测量题项,并对相似概念的测量题项进行情境化处理构建承包人履约行为测量的初始维度和量表。然后,通过273份问卷调查数据定量分析确定了承包人履约行为的最终构成维度和量表。研究表明,建设项目承包人履约行为的构念是由字面履约行为、尽善履约行为和机会主义行为等三维二阶因子构成。其中,字面履约行为是最常见的形式,其次是尽善履约行为;字面履约行为维度包含正确履行、充分完成及达到绩效目标等三个因子;尽善履约行为体现在自愿利他、主动控制风险、协同互助和弥补合同漏洞等四个方面;而机会主义行为由隐瞒信息、未完成承诺、逃避非正式协议和利用合同漏洞等四个子维度构成。该量表开发后,可为建设项目承包人履约行为的研究提供完整分析框架并对建设项目履约管理研究提供技术支持。     

城市基础设施建设PPP模式应用研究

在我国基础设施项目建设过程中,采用PPP模式对拓宽融资渠道、减轻地方政府投资压力、增强政府融资透明度、为社会资本进入公共项目领域拓展投资途径等都具有重要意义。建立长期合作伙伴关系,在私人部门获得利益的同时,政府部门也能实现自身职能。本文基于PPP模式的理论框架,详细论述了我国基础设施领域PPP模式概念及内涵、常用的风险分析方法、具体组织机构及运作流程,以期构建一系列机制以规范PPP融资模式。     

PPP 限价房项目中合作效率与政府激励效率博弈研究

以限价房项目为例,分析不同产权结构下私人部门自利性和公益性努力水平对PPP 项目合作效率和政府激励效率的影响。结果表明,合理的控制权配置能促进PPP 限价房项目的合作效率,增加公众的满意程度;有效的激励措施能抑制私人部门自利性投入,提高其公益性行为的努力水平,从根本上促进目前限价房在建筑质量、小区治安和环境等方面问题的解决,从而实现社会总效益最大化。为政府缓解财政压力而采用PPP 模式提供限价房的顺利实施提供了理论依据。     

基于霍尔三维结构模型的城市水务业项目融资模式研究

首先,建立BOT、TOT和PPP项目融资模式霍尔三维结构模型,对我国城市水务业外商利用项目融资方式的投资行为进行三个维度的分析;其次,通过案例分析总结出项目融资的三个主要模式BOT、TOT和PPP在我国城市水务业的应用情况;最后,给出BOT、TOT和PPP项目融资模式投资城市水务业的一些建议与意见。     

政府和社会资本间信任对PPP项目绩效的影响——合作行为的中介作用

为解释以往关于信任对项目绩效正向或负向影响的研究分歧，以 PPP 项目为背景，构建以信任（能力信任和善意信任）为自变量、项目绩效为因变量、合作行为（角色内行为和角色外行为）作为中介变量的理论模型。通过结构方程模型分析 286 份有效问卷，结果表明:能力信任和善意信任对 PPP 项目绩效起正向促进作用，角色内行为和角色外行为对 PPP项目绩效起正向促进作用。同时，角色内行为和角色外行为在能力信任、善意信任与 PPP 项目绩效间均发挥部分中介作用。研究结果有助于深入理解中国 PPP 情境下不同维度信任对项目绩效的影响，也为 PPP 项目实践中面临的绩效低下问题提供了管理建议。     

Public–private partnership projects in Greece: risk ranking and preferred risk allocation

Project participants, through experience, have an initial perception and predisposition towards risk and the types of risks they are willing and able to undertake. This is equally true for parties interested in public–private partnership (PPP) projects. These initial positions have been registered for the major Greek PPP market stakeholders potentially involved in a PPP arrangement through a survey covering all candidate construction companies, interested financing institutes and a number of public sector entities to be involved in PPPs. Findings revealed that stakeholders were, for the majority of risks identified, in agreement as to preferred risk allocation. Risk allocation preferences for construction companies were compared with similar findings for the UK, a mature PPP market, indicating a possible learning/maturing process based on the particular country background. Conclusions add to other surveys carried out on the subject and should enable public sector clients to establish a more efficient framework for risk allocation, thus reducing negotiations prior to contract award and minimizing the risk of poor risk distribution.     

PPP模式下对私营部门的财务监管

PPP模式是政府公共部门与私营部门合作共同为社会提供公共产品或服务的一种项目运作模式,其优势在于拓宽融资渠道,但是私营部门资金运作是否正规稳定是项目能否成功的关键。所以,政府公共部门应加强对私营部门的财务监管,确保资金按计划到位使用。本文针对PPP模式的基础设施建设项目,论述了财务监管的意义和具体的手段。     

污水处理PPP项目中市场需求变化风险共担的实现

通过文献分析识别出污水处理PPP项目中市场需求变化风险的共担是通过最低需求保证实现的,且包括总成本和二部制两种收费价格结构。筛选3个代表性案例项目,对比分析其实际处理水量小于等于基础水量、介于基础水量与设计水量之间、大于设计水量时的服务费结算单价构成,并讨论各案例做法的相对合理性。在此基础上,为PPP实践部门提出3点管理启示:①公私双方应在PPP合同中明确、具体地约定共担风险的实现方式;②公私双方风险共担的实现应遵循公平原则,追求风险与收益对等;③公私双方在谈判协商时应考虑社会公众的利益,以实现多方共赢。     

Value for Money and Risk in Public–Private Partnerships

Problem, research strategy, and findings: Delivering improved public services at lower cost, also known formally as value for money (VfM), is often the main rationale for procuring large infrastructure projects through public–private partnerships (PPPs). However, it is unclear whether the ex ante assessments of PPPs account for key planning concerns, including limitations on community consultation, contractual lock-ins that curtail public flexibility to make future plans, and a political preference for PPPs that may influence the way that projects are structured and evaluated. This set of questions is examined for 28 infrastructure PPPs delivered in Ontario, Canada, and interviews with18 senior political, government, and private-sector participants in the province's PPP industry. We find that transferring of construction risks from government to the private-sector partners drives VfM results, and may overvalue the extent to which planning related risks can be transferred.

Takeaway for practice: PPP contract structures should permit more transparency during the project planning process and preserve the flexibility of governments to control key planning tasks such as user fees, service coordination and facility expansion. Strategies might include: the unbundling of construction and operation phases of the PPP in all but the most unique situations, the use of competitive dialogue tendering to deepen public–private collaboration earlier in the planning process, and the inclusion of contract rebalancing terms to better share rather than transfer project risks.

Research support: This research was funded through a Standard Research Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Application Number: 110998).     

Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects

The success of public–private partnership (PPP)–build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impact of a variety of risks and uncertainties, especially those influencing the revenue over time. Revenue instability is one of the main obstacles of PPP form of procurement. Government support, which is established as a clause in the concession agreement, should be carefully designed and well formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses in the contract are more valuable for risky projects. The purpose of this paper’s proposed model is to evaluate early fund generation options and also to calculate equitable bounds for a guaranteed revenue for the project sponsor under uncertainty and risk. The model is specially designed to alleviate the concern of revenue risk. To illustrate its applicability the methodology is then applied to a freeway PPP project and a power plant PPP project in Iran. The results show that the value of these options can indeed be significant and by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and private sectors can take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms can facilitate negotiations on the verge of a break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have become moribund.     

Preferred risk allocation in China’s public–private partnership (PPP) projects

As part of a comprehensive research into PPP implementation, a two-round Delphi survey was conducted with experienced practitioners to identify the preference of risk allocation in China’s PPP projects. The results show that the public sector would take sole responsibility for the risk “Expropriation and nationalization”, and take the majority of responsibility for 12 other risks related to government or government officials and their actions. Fourteen risks which neither the public nor private sector may be able to deal with them alone are preferred to be shared equally. The private sector would take the majority of responsibility for 10 risks that are at the project level. Interestingly, no risk fell into the category that should be solely allocated to the private sector. Further analysis of the reasons behind these allocation preferences was then conducted. Recommendations on commercial principles and contract terms between the public authorities and private consortia are also made.     

柔性合同下交通 PPP 再谈判行为抑制研究

为了抑制交通 PPP 再谈判的频繁发生,在 PPP 初始合同中引入柔性合同条款,并以交通量波动作为判断社会资本方是否发起再谈判的量化指标,对社会资本方再谈判行为演化规律展开研究。通过构建演化博弈模型分析资本方再谈判行为的演化规律,得到社会资本方再谈判行为的演化与交通量波动的关系;设计基于交通需求风险共担的柔性合同,对比分析有无柔性合同条款下交通 PPP 项目社会资本方再谈判行为的演化规律。研究表明柔性合同可以促使社会资本方在实际交通量低于预期时的策略选择朝着不发起再谈判演化,从而有效抑制交通 PPP 再谈判的发生。研究结论可以为 PPP 柔性合同的设计及社会资本方再谈判行为的治理提供技术支持。     

PPP 项目再谈判关键风险因素识别与操作规程设计

为更有效地提供基础设施与公共服务,PPP 项目在我国开始大力推广。但由于 PPP 合同的不完善性以及长特许期内的不可预测风险,PPP 项目再谈判在实施过程中极易发生。为了减少不必要的再谈判,避免 PPP 再谈判带来的管理效率降低、公共资源浪费等问题,识别了 PPP 项目再谈判关键风险因素,并基于中国的实情与国际经验,设计了 PPP 项目再谈判的操作规程,包括发起预审机制、再谈判流程、监管机制等。邀请具有 PPP 项目管理实践经验的政府管理人员、私人投资者、咨询公司与学者,对设计的操作规程进行验证。该谈判操作规程能为政府提供借鉴,以促进 PPP 健康有序的发展。     

Flexibility in PPP contracts – Dealing with potential change in the pre-contract phase of a construction project

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) cover a range of possible relationships between public and private parties. PPP contracts are typically used in contexts of great uncertainty, such as large construction and infrastructure projects that are realized over a longer period of time. Hence, a major challenge in PPPs is to keep construction progress cost-efficient and on schedule, under continuously changing circumstances. One way to achieve this is through clever contracting, by proactively anticipating potential change in the planning phase and providing flexible contract mechanisms that enable an effective response. The purpose of this article is to discuss potential changes and the subsequent requirement of flexibility in PPP contracts. By flexibility, we mean the ability of the contract to deal with changing circumstances. We set out to do so by studying the available literature on the subject and by analysing the case study of the Blankenburgverbinding in the Netherlands, a Design, Build, Finance and Maintain (DBFM) project that is currently in its planning phase based on 32 interviews. Our main findings are that the timely and accurate recognition of potential changes, combined with the availability of flexible coping mechanisms, provide the stakeholders with a better understanding of the challenges they face in realizing their aims in the pre-contract phase of projects. This understanding helps to better prepare a PPP contract for potential changes.