Uniform semantic treatment of default and autoepistemic logics

We revisit the issue of epistemological and semantic foundations for autoepistemic and default logics, two leading formalisms in nonmonotonic reasoning. We develop a general semantic approach to autoepistemic and default logics that is based on the notion of a belief pair and that exploits the lattice structure of the collection of all belief pairs. For each logic, we introduce a monotone operator on the lattice of belief pairs. We then show that a whole family of semantics can be defined in a systematic and principled way in terms of fixpoints of this operator (or as fixpoints of certain closely related operators). Our approach elucidates fundamental constructive principles in which agents form their belief sets, and leads to approximation semantics for autoepistemic and default logics. It also allows us to establish a precise one-to-one correspondence between the family of semantics for default logic and the family of semantics for autoepistemic logic. The correspondence exploits the modal interpretation of a default proposed by Konolige. Our results establish conclusively that default logic can be viewed as a fragment of autoepistemic logic, a result that has been long anticipated. At the same time, they explain the source of the difficulty to formally relate the semantics of default extensions by Reiter and autoepistemic expansions by Moore. These two semantics occupy different locations in the corresponding families of semantics for default and autoepistemic logics.     

Autoepistemic logic of first order and its expressive power

We study the expressive power of first-order autoepistemic logic. We argue that full introspection of rational agents should be carried out by minimizing positive introspection and maximizing negative introspection. Based on full introspection, we propose the maximal well-founded semantics that characterizes autoepistemic reasoning processes of rational agents, and show that breadth of the semantics covers all theories in autoepistemic logic of first order, Moore's AE logic, and Reiter's default logic. Our study demonstrates that the autoepistemic logic of first order is a very powerful framework for nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, deductive databases, and knowledge representation.This research is partially supported by NSERC grant OGP42193.     

Sequent calculi for skeptical reasoning in predicate default logic and other nonmonotonic logics

Sequent calculi for skeptical consequence in predicate default logic, predicate stable model logic programming, and infinite autoepistemic theories are presented and proved sound and complete. While skeptical consequence is decidable in the finite propositional case of all three formalisms, the move to predicate or infinite theories increases the complexity of skeptical reasoning to being ₁¹-complete. This implies the need for sequent rules with countably many premises, and such rules are employed. AMS subject classification 03B42, 68N17, 68T27This paper grew directly out of the authors dissertation, written under the direction of Anil Nerode.     

Dualities between alternative semantics for logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning

The Gelfond-Lifschitz operator associated with a logic program (and likewise the operator associated with default theories by Reiter) exhibits oscillating behavior. In the case of logic programs, there is always at least one finite, nonempty collection of Herbrand interpretations around which the Gelfond-Lifschitz operator bounces around. The same phenomenon occurs with default logic when Reiter's operator is considered. Based on this, a stable class semantics and extension class semantics has been proposed. The main advantage of this semantics was that it was defined for all logic programs (and default theories), and that this definition was modelled using the standard operators existing in the literature such as Reiter's operator. In this paper our primary aim is to prove that there is a very interestingduality between stable class theory and the well-founded semantics for logic programming. In the stable class semantics, classes that were minimal with respect to Smyth's power-domain ordering were selected. We show that the well-founded semantics precisely corresponds to a class that is minimal w.r.t. Hoare's power domain ordering: the well-known dual of Smyth's ordering. Besides this elegant duality, this immediately suggests how to define a well-founded semantics for default logic in such a way that the dualities that hold for logic programming continue to hold for default theories. We show how the same technique may be applied to strong autoepistemic logic: the logic of strong expansions proposed by Marek and Truszczynski.     

Strong and uniform equivalence of nonmonotonic theories – an algebraic approach

We show that the concepts of strong and uniform equivalence of logic programs can be generalized to an abstract algebraic setting of operators on complete lattices. Our results imply characterizations of strong and uniform equivalence for several nonmonotonic logics including logic programming with aggregates, default logic and a version of autoepistemic logic. This work was partially supported by the NSF grant IIS-0325063.     

Well-founded and stationary models of logic programs

We investigate the class ofstationary or partial stable models of normal logic programs. This important class of models includes all (total)stable models, and, moreover, thewell-founded model is always its smallest member. Stationary models have several natural fixed-point definitions and can be equivalently obtained as expansions or extensions of suitable autoepistemic or default theories. By taking a particular subclass of this class of models one can obtain different semantics of logic programs, including the stable semantics and the well-founded semantics. Stationary models can be also naturally extended to the class of all disjunctive logic programs. These features of stationary models designate them as an important class of models with applications reaching far beyond the realm of logic programming.Partially supported by the National Science Foundation grant #IRI-9313061.     

Obvious inferences

The notion of obvious inference in predicate logic is discussed from the viewpoint of proof-checker applications in logic and mathematics education. A class of inferences in predicate logic is defined and it is proposed to identify it with the class of obvious logical inferences. The definition is compared with other approaches. The algorithm for implementing the obviousness decision procedure follows directly from the definition.     

Logic programming and Σ-programming

We consider the main similarities and dissimilarities between logic programming and -programming. Particular emphasis is placed on efficient implementation of -programs. Algorithms that translate logic programs into -programs and back are given.Translated from Kibernetika, No. 1, pp. 67–72, January–February, 1989.     

Operational Concepts of Nonmonotonic Logics Part 2: Autoepistemic Logic

The subject of nonmonotonic reasoning is reasoning with incompleteinformation. One of the main approaches is autoepistemic logic inwhich reasoning is based on introspection. This paper aims at providing a smooth introduction to this logic,stressing its motivation and basic concepts. The meaning (semantics)of autoepistemic logic is given in terms of so-called expansionswhich are usually defined as solutions of a fixed-point equation. Thepresent paper shows a more understandable, operational method fordetermining expansions. By improving applicability of the basicconcepts to concrete examples, we hope to make a contribution to awider usage of autoepistemic logic in practical applications.     

Complexity of computing with extended propositional logic programs

In this paper we introduce the notion of anF-program, whereF is a collection of formulas. We then study the complexity of computing withF-programs.F-programs can be regarded as a generalization of standard logic programs. Clauses (or rules) ofF-programs are built of formulas fromF. In particular, formulas other than atoms are allowed as building blocks ofF-program rules. Typical examples ofF are the set of all atoms (in which case the class of ordinary logic programs is obtained), the set of all literals (in this case, we get the class of logic programs with classical negation [9]), the set of all Horn clauses, the set of all clauses, the set of all clauses with at most two literals, the set of all clauses with at least three literals, etc. The notions of minimal and stable models [16, 1, 7] of a logic program have natural generalizations to the case ofF-programs. The resulting notions are called in this paperminimal andstable answer sets. We study the complexity of reasoning involving these notions. In particular, we establish the complexity of determining the existence of a stable answer set, and the complexity of determining the membership of a formula in some (or all) stable answer sets. We study the complexity of the existence of minimal answer sets, and that of determining the membership of a formula in all minimal answer sets. We also list several open problems.This work was partially supported by National Science Foundation under grant IRI-9012902.This work was partially supported by National Science Foundation under grant CCR-9110721.     

A Critical Reexamination of Default Logic, Autoepistemic Logic, and Only Knowing

Fifteen years of work on nonmonotonic logic has certainly increased our understanding of the area. However, given a problem in which nonmonotonic reasoning is called for, it is far from clear how one should go about modeling the problem using the various approaches. We explore this issue in the context on two of the best–known approaches, Reiter's default logic and Moore's autoepistemic logic, as well as two related notions of "only knowing," due to Halpern and Moses and to Levesque. In particular, we return to the original technical definitions given in these papers and examine the extent to which they capture the intuitions they were designed to capture.     

A theory of nonmonotonic rule systems I

We introduce here the study of generalnonmonotonic rule systems. These deal with situations where a conclusion is drawn from a system of beliefsS (and seen to be inS), basedboth on some premises being inS and on some restraints not being inS. In the monotone systems of traditional logic there are no restraints, conclusions are drawn solely based on premises being inS. Nonmonotonic rule systems capture the essential syntactic, semantic, and algorithmic features of many nonmonotone systems such as default logic, negation as failure, truth maintenance, autoepistemic logic, and also important combinatorial questions from mathematics such as the marriage problem. This reveals semantics and syntax and proof procedures and algorithms for computing belief sets in many cases where none were previously available and entirely uniformly. In particular, we introduce and study deductively closed sets, extensions and weak extensions. Semantics of nonmonotonic rule systems is studied in part II of this paper and extensions to predicate classical, intuitionistic, and modal logics are left to a later paper.Work partially supported by NSF grant RII-8610671 and Kentucky EPSCoR program and ARO contract DAAL03-89-K-0124.Work partially supported by NSF grant DMS-8902797 and ARO contract DAAG629-85-C-0018.Work partially supported by NSF grant DMS-8702473.     

Defaults as restrictions on classical Hilbert-style proofs

Since the earliest formalisation of default logic by Reiter many contributions to this appealing approach to nonmonotonic reasoning have been given. The different formalisations are here presented in a general framework that gathers the basic notions, concepts and constructions underlying default logic. Our view is to interpret defaults as special rules that impose a restriction on the juxtaposition of monotonic Hubert-style proofs of a given logicL. We propose to describe default logic as a logic where the juxtaposition of default proofs is subordinate to a restriction condition . Hence a default logic is a pair (L, ) where properties of the logic , like compactness, can be interpreted through the restriction condition . Different default systems are then given a common characterization through a specific condition on the logicL. We also prove cumulativity for any default logic (L, ) by slightly modifying the notion of default proof. We extend, in fact, the language ofL in a way close to that followed by Brewka in the formulation of his cumulative default system. Finally we show the existence of infinitely many intermediary default logics, depending on and called linear logics, which lie between Reiter's and ukaszewicz' versions of default logic.Work carried out in the framework of the agreement between Italian PT Administration and FUBLaforia, Université Paris VI Pierre et Marie Curie, 4 Place Jussieu,Tour 46, 75252 Paris, France     

Finiteness in Infinite-Valued Łukasiewicz Logic

In this paper we deepen Mundici's analysis on reducibility of the decision problem from infinite-valued ukasiewicz logic to a suitable m-valued ukasiewicz logic _m , where m only depends on the length of the formulas to be proved. Using geometrical arguments we find a better upper bound for the least integer m such that a formula is valid in if and only if it is also valid in _m. We also reduce the notion of logical consequence in to the same notion in a suitable finite set of finite-valued ukasiewicz logics. Finally, we define an analytic and internal sequent calculus for infinite-valued ukasiewicz logic.