Rescuing the Hyperventilation Theory of Panic: Reply to Ley (2005).

In his comment on W. T. Roth, F. H. Wilhelm, and D. Pettit (2005) (see record 2005-01973-002), R. Ley (2005) argued that the authors erred in evaluating the basic, simple hyperventilation theory of panic rather than his theory, which is based on "complex physiological and psychological principles" (p. 197). Indeed, Roth et al. may have overestimated the heuristic value of the basic theory by counting citations to Ley's (1985) article. Furthermore, Roth et al.'s conclusion that the basic theory is falsifiable may not be valid for Ley's theory, which makes categorical distinctions whose application is uncertain. Yet, the authors of the present article maintain the hope that a more nuanced but falsifiable multifactorial respiratory theory can be developed with more explanatory power than that of the basic theory. The relative truth or falsity of such a theory could be expressed in statistical terms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Race--Social, Biological, or Lemonade?

Comments on an article by R. L. Sternberg, E. L. Grigorenko, and K. K. Kidd (see record 2005-00117-006) and another article by H. Tang, T. Quertermous, B. Rodriguez, S. L. Kardia, X. Zhu, X., A. Brown, et al. (2005). On the day that I read Sternberg, Grigorenko, and Kidd's (January 2005) article on race, an article from the American Journal of Human Genetics (Tang et al., 2005) also crossed my desk. As part of their research, the latter authors compared the results of a cluster analysis of people using many genetic markers with the respondent's self-identified race/ethnicity: "Of 3,636 subjects of varying race/ethnicity, only 5 (0.14%) showed genetic cluster membership different from their self-identified race/ethnicity" (Tang et al., 2005, p. 268). I would very much like to hear a response to this finding from Sternberg et al. (2005), who maintained that "race is a socially constructed concept, not a biological one" (p. 49), that reifies those physical correlates of ancient population dispersions "as deriving from some imagined natural grouping of people that does not in fact exist, except in our heads" (p. 51). My take is that if we psychologists could use genetics (or any other biological variables) to distinguish those with schizophrenia from those with bipolar disorder with an error rate even a hundredfold greater than that of Tang et al. (2005), we would announce--and do it with no small fanfare--that there are valid, biological differences between the two disorders. I suspect that much of the difficulty in discussing this issue stems from a tendency to treat "social" and "biological" (or "genetic" and "environmental") phenomena as mutually exclusive. Placing a complicated construct like race into a discrete "social" or "biological" box makes as much sense as asking whether lemonade is (a) lemon juice, (b) water, or (c) sugar. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clarification on Psychological Treatments and Psychotherapy.

In this article, the author responds to a set of comments (see record 2005-11834-009; 2005-11834-010; 2005-11834-011) on his original article, "Psychological Treatments" (see record 2004-21168-001). The author responds to each comment. Hal Arkowitz (2005) misread the proposed distinction between "psychological treatments" and "psychotherapy" by presuming that the author was implying that the former is evidence based and the latter is not. Kwekkeboom et al. (2005), representing the nursing profession, noted quite correctly that nurses often deliver psychological treatments on the frontlines of primary care and are independently licensed to provide nursing services, including many approaches that could be categorized as "psychological." Ahmed and Boisvert (2005) agreed that psychological treatments are a core strength of psychology and also go on to provide additional interesting examples and to identify other areas of practice in which psychologists may be uniquely qualified. Overall, the author notes that only certain well-defined pathologies will be included in any health care system, and treatment for these conditions will increasingly need to be based on evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: Reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010).

Comments on an article by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (see record 2010-14834-005). The authors argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary “valid” versus “invalid” responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working Memory Capacity and Fluid Intelligence Are Strongly Related Constructs: Comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle (2005).

The authors agree with P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002) that working memory capacity (WMC) is not isomorphic with general fluid intelligence (Gf) or reasoning ability. However, the WMC and Gf/reasoning constructs are more strongly associated than Ackerman et al. (2005) indicate, particularly when considering the outcomes of latent-variable studies. The authors' reanalysis of 14 such data sets from 10 published studies, representing more than 3,100 young-adult subjects, suggests a strong correlation between WMC and Gf/reasoning factors (median r = .72), indicating that the WMC and Gf constructs share approximately 50% of their variance. This comment also clarifies the authors' "executive attention" view of WMC, it demonstrates that WMC has greater discriminant validity than Ackerman et al. (2005) implied, and it suggests some future directions and challenges for the scientific study of the convergence of WMC, attention control, and intelligence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The consequences of atheoretical, task-driven experimentation: Theoretical comment on Paban, Chambon, Jaffard, and Alescio-Lautier (2005).

V. Paban, C. Chambon, M. Jaffard, and B. Alescio-Lautier (2005; see record 2005-11024-008) concluded that their evidence "demonstrates the independence of aging and cholinergic lesion effects" and stated that "this was quite unexpected" (p. 943). This commentary suggests that the authors' negative findings were predictable, resulting from a focus on behavioral tests and functions unrelated to present evidence and theory concerning the cognitive functions of forebrain cholinergic systems. The article by V. Paban et al. serves as a useful illustration for the importance of theory- and hypothesis-driven assessment of behavioral functions, and for the unproductive consequences of experiments treating behavioral tests as assays used merely for the generation of behavioral correlates. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Repetition effects in word and pseudoword identification: Comment on Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel.

Discusses 2 recent articles by T. C. Feustel et al (see record 1984-08643-001) and A. Salasoo et al (see record 1986-03032-001), which argue that word identification is based on episodic and semantic memory. Feustel et al argued for separate processing stages affected by repetition (episodic memory) and lexicality (semantic memory). To account for the finding that number of repetitions interacts with lexicality, Salasoo et al invoked the same 2 types of memory, operating in parallel rather than serially. It is argued that data by Salasoo et al are compatible with a wide variety of competing theories, including some that do not involve episodic memory. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory and evidence in cognitive neuropsychology: A "radical" response to Robertson, Knight, Rafal, and Shimamura (1993).

L. C. Robertson et al (see record 1993-34225-001) have presented a variety of arguments in opposition to a view of cognitive neuropsychological research put forth by so-called "radical" cognitive neuropsychologists. It is suggested that Robertson et al failed to offer an effective response to "radical" criticisms of group-study methods, because the rationale they propose for patient-group studies rests on untenable assumptions. It is further suggested that Robertson et al object to single-patient studies without foundation, reflecting an impoverished view of cognitive neuropsychology. Finally, it is argued that single patient studies are necessary in research aimed at exploring brain-cognition relationships as well as in research concerned with characterizing normal cognitive mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Avoiding bias in the search for artifact: A reply to Carlopio, Adair, Lindsay, and Spinner.

J. Carlopio et al (see record 1983-31564-001) criticized several aspects of the present authors' (see record 1982-12761-001) procedures and conclusions in a study of S roles and contended that the entire "subject role" approach is misguided. In this reply, the merits of the arguments and follow-up study of Carlopio et al are considered along with the "alternative" conception of S behavior they proposed. (8 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What do we know about typologies of batterers? Comment on Gottman et al. (1995).

The authors address a typology of male batterers presented by J. M. Gottman et al. (1995) based on differences in heart rate reactivity during marital conflict. Limitations of the psychophysiological and marital affect data are discussed. The interpretations offered by Gottman et al. are challenged along conceptual and methodological grounds, and alternatives are offered. The importance and implications of these results for assessment and treatment await clarification of the mechanisms underlying the physiological differences that characterize Type 1 and Type 2 batterers. Until such clarification, it seems premature to render conclusions regarding the treatment of either type of male batterer. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment on ethical issues in Malamuth, Heim and Feshbach's "Sexual responsiveness of college students to rape depictions: Inhibitory and disinhibitory effects."

The concern of N. M. Malamuth et al (see record 1981-09143-001) about presenting "totally false" rape depictions to students is reviewed in terms of (a) possible effects of exposure and debriefing, which were not evaluated; (b) responsibilities in interpretation when data differ from expectations and for males and females; and (c) communications to the public. Classroom testing on rape depictions is questioned. (7 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Resource collaboration, feminist therapy, and models.

Comments on an article by F. B. Tyler et al (see record 1984-02406-001), arguing that in presenting a collaborative model for psychologists, Tyler et al are perhaps unaware that the essential characteristics of the model they propose were developed over 10 yrs ago as part of feminist therapy by A. M. Brodsky and R. T. Hare-Mustin (1980). The feminist therapy model, which is based on the qualities Tyler et al promote (such as being more self-help oriented, more self-sustaining, more prosocial, and more egalitarian), has influenced other therapeutic approaches concerned with client's rights. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Racial groups and test fairness, considering history and construct validity.

According to Helms (see record 2006-21079-024), "test fairness" is defined as "removal from test scores of systematic variance attributable to experiences of racial or cultural socialization." Some of Helms's reasoning is based on earlier work, which recommended that racial group or category variables be replaced entirely with individual-level constructs, to reflect racial socialization experiences that vary within racial groups. Treatment of the test fairness issue--a social and political issue--will benefit from explicitly considering historical events that contributed to group-level race differences. In light of this history, D. A. Newman et al suggest (a) retaining a group-level conceptualization of race/racial socialization and also (b) focusing on criterion-irrelevant variance in test scores that is attributable to race. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the relation between IQ, impulsivity, and delinquency: Remarks on the Lynam, Moffitt, and Southamer-Loeber (1993) interpretation.

A recent report by D. Lynam, M. Moffitt, & M. Stouthamer-Loeber (see record 1993-29924-001) examined the inverse relation between IQ and delinquency and concluded that the observed relation represents "an influence of compromised intelligence on delinquent behavior" (p. 193). Specifically, the role of impulsivity in understanding this relation was discounted. The author considers the conceptual, operational, and analytical bases of the Lynam et al. report and argues that their neurologically based view of "executive dysfunction" as underlying delinquency is selectively portrayed. It is further contended that IQ scores, used as their index of brain–behavior relations, are only remotely related to specifiable neurological functioning. The Lynam et al. conclusion that impulsivity cannot appreciably explain the relation between IQ and delinquency is shown to depend on the analytical approach used. Analyzed alternatively, impulsivity emerges as the more important predictor that can mediate the observed IQ and delinquency relation. Social policy implications of these differing interpretations are noted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: Comment on Behrmann, Zemel, and Mozer (1998).

The validity of M. Behrmann, R. Zemel, and A Mozer's (see record 1998-04674-001) finding that object-based attention can be directed toward occluded objects is examined in 3 experiments. In A Behrmann et al.'s original study, participants made speeded judgments of whether the numbers of bumps attached to 2 arms of an X shape were the same or different. The 2 sets of bumps belonged either to a single object, 2 different objects, or 2 separated parts of an occluded object. Unfortunately, this objecthood manipulation was confounded by the symmetry of the stimuli. Experiment 1 replicated M. Behrmann et al.'s main results using identical stimuli. Experiments 2a and 2b dissociated objecthood from symmetry. The results suggest that the effects of object-based attention found by A Behrmann et al. are largely due to symmetry. The stimuli used in M. Behrmann et al. are not appropriate for examining the relation between object-based attention and occlusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Am I the fifth horseman of the apocalypse? Comment on Galassi, Crace, Martin, James, and Wallace (1992) and comments on research concerning expectations about counseling.

The criticisms by J. P. Galassi et al (see record 1992-17938-001) of H. E. Tinsley and B. L. Benton (1978) and the Expectations About Counseling instrument are shown to be unfounded, problems with the terminology of Galassi et al are discussed, and the technical adequacy and findings of Galassi et al are analyzed. Problems that have occurred frequently in research on expectations about counseling are attributed to lack of programmatic research, failure to critically analyze existing literature, and use of instruments designed for a single study. The devotion of too much attention to "let's change a word" and "let's change a demographic variable" research is criticized. More effort is called for (1) to identify and measure theoretically relevant expectations, (2) to examine the relations between expectations and related constructs, (3) to determine how expectations can be modified, and (4) to investigate the relation of expectations to aspects of the counseling process and outcome. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Reminder About Procedures Needed to Reliably Produce Perfect Timesharing: Comment on Lien, McCann, Ruthruff, and Proctor (2005).

M.-C. Lien, R. S. McCann, E. Ruthruff, and R. W. Proctor (see record 2005-01366-010) argued that simultaneous ideomotor-compatible choice tasks cannot be perfectly timeshared. Their conclusion is limited in generalizability for 2 reasons: (a) Their experiments did not include procedures that previous research has shown to be necessary for obtaining perfect timesharing (motivating subjects to perform the 2 tasks rapidly and simultaneously; homogeneous blocks of simultaneous stimuli for the 2 tasks), and (b) their experiments included a procedure that previous research has shown to interfere with perfect timesharing of simultaneous tasks (within-block variation of task interstimulus intervals). Also discussed here are problems in M.-C. Lien et al.'s (2005) analysis of slopes relating Task 2 latency to Task 1 latency and their advocacy of a central bottleneck theory that may not be disconfirmable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The limitations of behavior-genetic analyses: Comment on McGue, Elkins, Walden, and Iacono (2005).

This article takes issue with the behavior-genetic analysis of parenting style presented by M. McGue, I. Elkins, B. Walden, and W. G. Iacono (see record 2005-14938-011). The author argues that the attribution of their findings to inherited genetic effects was without basis because McGue et al. never indicated how those genetic effects manifested themselves. Instead, McGue et al. neglected important, and inevitable, developmental effects that most developmental psychologists understand to influence parent and adolescent behavior. The author also suggests that there is great merit in adopting the approach of developmental systems theory in understanding McGue et al.'s findings in particular and all developmental phenomena in general. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Should observed overconfidence be dismissed as a statistical artifact? Critique of Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994).

I. Erev, T. S. Wallsten, and D. V. Budescu (see record 1994-36026-001) showed that the same probability judgment data can reveal both apparent overconfidence and underconfidence, depending on how the data are analyzed. To explain this seeming paradox, I. Erev et al. proposed a general model of judgment in which overt responses are related to underlying "true judgments" that are perturbed by error. A central conclusion of their work is that observed over- and underconfidence can be split into two components: (a) "true" over- and underconfidence and (b) "artifactual" over- and underconfidence due to error in judgment. It is argued in the present article that decomposing over- and underconfidence into true and artifactual components is inappropriate. The mistake stems from giving primacy to ambiguously defined model constructions (true judgments) over observed data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The essential role of behavioral genetics in developmental psychology: Reply to Partridge (2005) and Greenberg (2005).

The authors address the methodological, theoretical, and ideological criticisms of their article on adolescent perceptions of parenting behavior (see record 2005-14938-011) made by G. Greenberg (see record 2005-14938-013) and T. Partridge (see record 2005-14938-012). Behavioral genetic methods have provided unique insights on the origins of individual differences in behavior and, when applied to parenting and other putative psychosocial influences, challenge conventional developmental theory. McGue et al.'s goal was not, as Greenberg and Partridge appeared to believe, to establish the heritability of parenting--that was already known; rather, McGue et al. showed how the relationship between inherited factors and an individual's environment changes during a critical developmental transition. There is a great need for developmental researchers to explore the combined influence of genetic and environmental factors using a range of approaches, including that of McGue et al. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)