Developmental differences in the use of distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency information for making causal attributions.

Examined developmental differences in the use of distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency information for making causal attributions. 144 1st, 3rd and 6th graders and college students were presented with brief story pairs consisting of an act manifested by an agent toward a target person. Each story in a pair was accompanied by a different level of a particular type of information (e.g., high consensus for one and low consensus for the other). Ss were asked to make causal inferences about both the agents and the targets. Results reveal significant age-related differences in the ability to use each type of information. Young children's use of distinctiveness information yielded the predicted agent attributions significantly more often than it yielded the predicted target attributions, while the reverse was true for consensus information. Findings are interpreted in terms of causal principles: Information was used in the predicted manner at a younger age when a covariation principle was required than when a discounting principle was required. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Schematic approach to the attributional processing of actions and occurrences.

Measured the time 64 undergraduates took to read and comprehend information (consensus vs distinctiveness) regarding a behavioral event (actions vs occurrences) and how long they took to answer various questions about the event. For each of 32 trials, a computer recorded Ss' event-comprehension time, information-comprehension time, and question-answering time. Results indicate that both information-comprehension and question-answering times were relatively shorter for experimental conditions involving actions/distinctiveness and occurrences/consensus. When Ss had to make inferences that were based on person attribution, question-answering times were shorter for actions; when the inferences were based on object attribution, question answering times were shorter for occurrences. Findings are consistent with the model linking actions with reasons and occurrences with causes and support the hypothesis that people develop attributional schemas of the types action–reasons–distinctiveness and occurrences–causes–consensus. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Priming of mediators in causal attribution.

According to H. H. Kelley (1967), the process of making person, stimulus, and circumstance attributions is based on the 3 informational criteria of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness. Two experiments assessed how the relative accessibility of these 3 process-relevant criteria affected the time required to make the 3 attributions. In Exp I, 93 college students were primed for either all 3 process-relevant criteria or 3 pieces of attributionally irrelevant information. 30 sec after the accessibility manipulation, Ss scaled a person, stimulus, or circumstance attribution. Priming the process-relevant information decreased subsequent attribution decision time relative to the control group. In Exp II, 137 college students were primed for consensus, distinctiveness, or consistency after which they were scaled for 1 of 3 attributions. As expected, attribution decision times were lower when all 3 factors were primed (Exp I) than when only 1 of the 3 factors was primed (Exp II). In addition, stimulus and person attributions were made fastest when consensus and distinctiveness, respectively, were primed. Finally, priming cognitive access to a single factor made that factor dominate the scaled attributions. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the process relationship between person and situation judgments in attribution.

Ss were timed in 3 experiments as they answered 2 consecutive questions about stimulus sentences. The measure of interest was the extent to which answering the 1st question speeded-up answering the 2nd. The order of questions about person and situation influences on behavior was manipulated. Results indicated that the person judgment facilitated the situation judgment significantly more than the situation judgment facilitated the person judgment. The pattern of facilitation was reversed when Ss answered questions about themselves. Results are consistent with a model of concurrent resource allocation to person and situation information in conditions where the primary judgment task involves salient information. However, they are not consistent with a unidimensional or automatic view of person and situation judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributional information processing: A response time model of causal subtraction.

Response time measures have been used occasionally in social psychology, but rarely as direct probes of information processing. A study (with 24 undergraduates) collecting response time data in a near-exact replication of L. McArthur's (see record 1972-27156-001) classic attribution study sheds light on the information processing involved in Ss' responses. The process is analyzed into 2 stages: (a) encoding or comprehension of the stimulus sentence and the consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information and (b) attributional processing per se. In the 2nd stage, response time analyses suggest that perceivers operate by subtracting causes from an initial set to arrive at a response, rather than by adding causal components (person, stimulus, and circumstances) until an adequate cause is obtained. Subtraction is theoretically related to the salience model of attribution. Response time measures promise to expand greatly the ability of social psychologists to build process models of causal attribution and other kinds of social perception and cognition. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Covariation and causal attribution: A Logical Model of the intuitive analysis of variance.

In this article, we present and test a formal model of causal attribution that is true to the original conception of attribution theory formulated by Kelley (1967). The Logical Model specifies precisely how information might be encoded from attributional vignettes and how subjects might consider different causal loci as necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an effect. Predictions are derived for each of the eight information configurations on the basis of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information. The model is tested with data from three published experiments and is preferred over a template model of attribution. The Logical Model's limitations are also acknowledged in that responses deviate systematically from its prediction, leading to an analysis of the notion of causality underlying stimulus, person, and circumstance attributions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sampling of similar and dissimilar comparison persons and objects as a function of the generality of attribution goal.

Conducted an information-search procedure in which Ss were asked to seek information regarding persons and objects in order to validate a given person or object cause. Four hypotheses were tested: When asked to validate a person cause, Ss are more likely to select distinctiveness information than target-object consensus information. When asked to validate an object cause, Ss are more likely to select target-object consensus information than distinctiveness information. As the generality of person inference increases, progressively dissimilar object comparisons are sought. As the generality of object inference increases, progressively dissimilar person comparisons are sought. In Exp I, 26 undergraduates read attitude statements and answered judgment goals or questions about the statement's generality or object inference. 52 undergraduates in Exp II completed a similar task. The first 3 hypotheses were supported in both Exp I and Exp II, whereas the 4th hypothesis received only mixed support in Exp I and was not supported in Exp II. Unlike Exp I, Exp II did not include cues suggesting the relevant type of information to be sought. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mechanisms that facilitate the effectiveness of elaboration strategies.

The authors examined the role of distinctiveness in the differential memory performance of visual and verbal elaboration strategies. Twenty-eight undergraduates learned information about familiar and unfamiliar animals while using either the visual (imagery) or verbal (answering why questions) elaboration strategies. There was no difference between the 2 strategies in level of organization for the familiar animal material, but imagery students organized unfamiliar animal information into intact sets more than verbal elaboration students. Imagery easily permits the generation of relations and distinctions for unfamiliar material through the creation of unique mental images. In contrast, learners using verbal elaboration, may be more likely to access general rather than specific information when answering why questions for unfamiliar information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Actor–observer differences in information inference and causal attribution.

Conducted 2 experiments with 144 undergraduates to assess (a) differences in the information available to persons trying to understand the causes of their own behavior (actors) vs those trying to understand the causes of another's behavior (observers) and (b) the effects of information differences on causal explanations. In Exp I, actors reported positive behaviors to be less distinctive and more consistent with past behavior than did observers, whereas the reverse was true for negative behaviors. Consistent with this difference, actors attributed desirable behaviors more to their own internal dispositions than did observers, whereas the opposite occurred for undesirable behaviors. In Exp II, when all Ss were given the consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information generated by actors in Exp I, both actors and observers attributed positive acts more to internal factors than negative acts. When given the information generated by the observers, neither actors nor observers exhibited this bias. Thus, when given the same information, actors and observers no longer showed differences in causal explanations. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The attribution cube and reactions to educational outcomes.

Hypotheses derived from H. H. Kelley's (1967, 1971) cube model of causal inferences were tested in an educational setting by relating high and low students' attributions to reported affect and expectations. In general, 232 low- and high-scoring college students clustered in different cells of the cube with high-scoring Ss claiming their scores were nondistinctive, but low scorers emphasizing (a) distinctiveness, (b) high consensus and consistency, or (c) low consensus and consistency. Predictions concerning estimates of distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus and their relation to affect and expectations were also supported, since the cube model appeared to adequately summarize sources of causal information found in the classroom. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Covariation information and cognitive processing: Effects of causal implications on memory.

Investigated the impact of attributional implications of covariation information on memory for the implied causal agent. 118 undergraduates read summary paragraphs of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency (CDC) information and were then timed as they verified from memory whether certain probe words, including the name of the implied causal agent, had appeared in the paragraph. In Exps I and II, Ss were not instructed to attend to attributional implications but merely to study the information for the subsequent memory test. In Exp III, Ss made attributions to each paragraph just prior to the probe task. Results indicate that (a) the names of implied causal agents were verified more slowly than names of noncausal entities if the order of CDC components facilitated attributional processing and (b) this effect was obtained regardless of Ss' immediate need to make an attributional judgment. Data are consistent with the interpretation that the implied causal agent was automatically integrated more thoroughly into the memory representation of the information, which had to be "decomposed" to allow verification of the agent's identity. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Difficulties in Comprehending Causal Relations Among Children With ADHD: The Role of Cognitive Engagement.

The present study examined whether time spent in long looks (i.e., ≥15 s), an index of cognitive engagement, would account for differences between children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and comparison children in understanding causal relations. Children viewed two televised stories, once in the presence of toys and once in their absence. Dependent variables were visual attention and questions tapping factual information and causal relations. Comparison children answered significantly more causal relations questions than did the children with ADHD, but only in the toys-present condition. Four lines of evidence revealed that the difficulties children with ADHD had in answering causal relations questions in the toys-present condition could be linked specifically to this group's decreased time spent in long looks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attribution difficulty and memory for attribution-relevant information.

Compared the processing and retrieval of attribution-relevant information when the attributional inference is easy or difficult to make. Ss attributed behavioral events to the person or to the situation, based on several items of context information. Each context sentence implied either the person or the entity as causal agent. When the attributional inference was difficult to make (an equal number of context sentences implied actor and entity as the causal agent), Ss recalled more of the behavioral events, recalled more context sentences, and were less confident in their attributions than when the attributional inference was easy to make (most context sentences implied the same causal agent). Ss also recalled context information that was implicationally incongruent with the majority of the other context sentences with a higher probability than when that same information was implicationally congruent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Extension of the Kelley attribution model: The role of comparison-object consensus, target-object consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency.

Conducted 2 experiments with 544 university students to demonstrate the desirability of refining H. H. Kelley's (see record 1973-24800-001) causal attribution model. The 1st experiment demonstrated the importance of comparison-object consensus as well as the usual factors of target-object consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency. These 4 factors all follow from a "diamond" model that delineates 4 elements (person, target object, other people, comparison object) and the possible relations between all possible pairs of these elements. The 2nd experiment described the types of causal explanations that Ss offer and studied the situations in which causal attributions are formulated. A classification scheme was developed to describe the various types of causal attributions. Ss made more causal attributions in those situations in which person causes were more salient. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of communication, information overlap, and behavioral consistency on consensus in social perception.

Three experiments (N?=?69, 162, and 201, respectively) were conducted to test the mathematically derived predictions of the Weighted Average Model (D. A. Kenny, 1991) of consensus in interpersonal perception. Study 1 estimated the effect of perceiver communication, Study 2 estimated the effects of communication and stimulus overlap, and Study 3 estimated the effects of communication, overlap, and target consistency on consensus. The strongest consensus was found when perceivers communicated about highly overlapping information about targets who were cross-situationally consistent. Conversely, the lowest level of consensus was observed when perceivers did not communicate and had nonoverlapping information about targets who were cross-situationally inconsistent. Both stimulus variables (overlap and consistency) and an interpersonal variable (communication) affected consensus as predicted by the Weighted Average Model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The cognitive organization of social information: A converging-operations approach.

Investigated the assumption that social information is automatically organized on a person-by-person basis, that the information items about each person are cognitively grouped into one person-category that is separate from the other person-categories. Using a converging-operations approach, the notion that familiarity mediates this cognitive organization of person information was examined in 3 experiments with 96 undergraduates. Three distinct methodologies were used to study the relationship between familiarity and person organization: (a) a speeded-sorting task, (b) a recognition RT task, and (c) a free-recall task. Results indicate that this tendency to organize social information on a person-by-person basis was greater for familiar than for unfamiliar persons. Two of the tasks provided evidence that social information is not organized by person when the stimulus persons are completely unfamiliar. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Actions and occurrences in attribution theory.

Hypothesized that judging behaviors as either voluntary (actions) or nonvoluntary (occurrences) will affect both (a) choosing between consensus and distinctiveness information for the purpose of making an attribution about these behaviors and (b) estimating consensus and distinctiveness drawn from attributions already made. The rationale for these hypotheses was that consensus provides information that may be viewed as the cause of the (nonvoluntary) behavior, whereas distinctiveness provides information that may be viewed as the reason for the (voluntary) behavior. Exp I, with 90 undergraduates, showed that consensus information was seen as more important for interpreting occurrences, whereas distinctiveness information was perceived as more important for interpreting actions. Exp II, with 144 Ss, showed that attributed causes for a given behavior affected inferences about generalizability of the behavior over persons (consensus), objects (distinctiveness), and circumstances (consistency). The effect of attribution on consensus inferences was more emphasized for occurrences than for actions; the effect of attribution on inferences of distinctiveness was somewhat more pronounced for actions, but this effect was not significant; the effect of attribution on inferences of consistency was more pronounced for occurrences than for actions. An unexpected finding was that, in general, Ss viewed actions as more generalizable (behaviors performed by other people, with other objects, and under other circumstances) than occurrences. (21 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pavlovian contingencies and temporal information.

The effects of altering the contingency between the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US) on the acquisition of autoshaped responding was investigated by changing the frequency of unsignaled USs during the intertrial interval. The addition of the unsignaled USs had an effect on acquisition speed comparable with that of massing trials. The effects of these manipulations can be understood in terms of their effect on the amount of information (number of bits) that the average CS conveys to the subject about the timing of the next US. The number of reinforced CSs prior to acquisition is inversely related to the information content of the CS. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Context effects in judgments of causation.

It is hypothesized that causal explanations for an occurrence vary as a function of the causal background against which the occurrence is considered. Three experiments are presented that test propositions regarding the operation of the causal background in the selection of causal explanations. Findings indicate that factors previously shown to affect subjects' attributions—specifically, role (actor vs. observer), covariation information (consensus and distinctiveness), and quality of performance (positive vs. negative)—may do so by guiding subjects' selection of a causal background. Evidence indicates that these factors may not have the predicted effect on subjects' attributions when competing cues, such as context or wording of the causal question, suggest the relevance of conflicting causal backgrounds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)