Social value orientations and impressions of partner's honesty and intelligence: A test of the might versus morality effect.

This research evaluates the might vs morality effect (W. B. G. Liebrand et al; see record 1987-34399-001) by examining whether the manipulation of the perception of partner's honesty and intelligence interacts with the observer's own social value orientation to influence the latter's expectations regarding partner cooperation and own cooperation in a social dilemma. Results reveal that greater cooperation was expected from an honest partner than from a dishonest partner and that this effect was stronger for prosocial Ss than for individualists and competitors. Conversely, individualists and competitors expected greater cooperation from an unintelligent partner than from an intelligent partner, whereas prosocial Ss did not expect differences between these partners. Similar findings were obtained for own cooperation, although social value orientations did not interact with partner intelligence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ambivalence over emotional expression and well-being: Nomothetic and idiographic tests of the stress-buffering hypothesis.

Examined nomothetic and idiographic relations between ambivalence over emotional expression (as expressed by the Ambivalence Over Emotional Expression Questionnaire; AEQ) and well-being in a 4-mo study with an interim 2-wk diary component. Ss were 66 undergraduates. Nomothetic and idiographic analyses both revealed that AEQ was related to psychological health but not to physical well-being. The nomothetic test of stress-buffering showed that AEQ was more predictive of depression among Ss who had experienced higher levels of positive life-event stress. In contrast, the idiographic test of stress-buffering revealed that Ss higher in AEQ exhibited less covariation between daily stress and negative affect over time. It is proposed that AEQ may reflect 2 types of emotional vulnerability: emotional reactivity and emotional perseveration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributions of responsibility for group tasks: The egocentric bias and the actor–observer difference.

In each of 3 experiments it was demonstrated that under certain conditions individuals who work on a task in a dyad will tend to attribute greater responsibility for a positive outcome to their partners than to themselves. In Exp I 56 college students, who had qualifying scores on the Beck Depression Inventory, working in dyads on a crossword puzzle attributed more responsibility to their partners than to themselves for an outcome they were led to believe was quite good, thus contradicting the expected "egocentric bias" effect. This was true across depression categories. In Exp II, 100 college students working in dyads on the puzzle attributed more responsibility to their partners than to themselves for a positive outcome when asked immediately after the task to make the attribution. However, Ss attributed greater responsibility to themselves than to their partners when asked to make the attribution 3 days later, thus replicating the egocentric bias effect. Half of the 30 dyads in Exp III believed they were being videotaped while working on the puzzle, whereas the other half did not. "Videotaped" Ss attributed more responsibility for the positive outcome to themselves than to their partners, whereas the nonvideotaped Ss attributed more responsibility to their partners than to themselves when both groups were asked to give their attributions immediately after the task. The relationship between the egocentric bias effect and the actor–observer difference phenomenon is discussed. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Test of the cultural bias hypothesis: Some Israeli findings.

The major aim of this study was to examine the cross-cultural validity of the test bias contention, with particular concern for possible sociocultural group differences in the construct and predictive validity of college entrance scholastic aptitude tests in Israel. The analyses were based on the test scores of 1,538 Israeli college student candidates of varying ethnic group membership, applying for admission to a major Israeli campus. The psychometric properties of the test battery were compared by ethnic group via a variety of internal (factor structure, reliability, etc.) and external (predictive validity, homogeneity of regression, etc.) test bias criteria. On the whole, the data provided little evidence for differential construct or predictive validity of aptitude test scores as a function of ethnic group membership, thus lending a greater deal of generality to previous research on test bias, generally negating the cultural bias hypothesis. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social class, conditional communication, and egocentric speech.

Studied social class differences in ability to communicate conditional information using 132 5th-grade white children, who were divided into lower- and middle-socioeconomic-status (SES) groups of approximately equal IQ. Dyadic groupings were formed by combining lower- and middle-SES children into the 4 possible speaker-listener combinations. The task required speakers to use a conditional communication in describing the rules of a game to a listener. Results showed that as listeners, lower- and middle-SES children responded equally well to the communications of both lower- and middle-SES speakers. However, as communicators, the lower-SES children performed more poorly than the middle-SES children. Both lower- and middle-SES listeners had equally great difficulty complying with the instructions provided by the lower-SES communicators. The data suggest that SES differences cannot be attributed to lack of comprehension of the conditional logic. Instead, it appears that the lower-SES children were difficult to understand because of strong tendencies toward egocentric communication patterns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contrast tests of interaction hypothesis.

This article argues for the use of contrasts to test a priori interaction hypotheses in 2-way analysis of variance designs. It focuses on 3 underused types of interaction contrast tests: a "matching" pattern for cognate levels of row and column factors; the "qualitative quadratic" for monotonic profiles of means in the same direction but with opposed concavities; and a "differential curvilinearity" test for differences in the curvature of two profiles with the same direction of concavity. The circumstances that best capitalize on the potential advantages of a priori contrast tests are indicated and an effect size measure for contrasts is presented. Investigators are urged to examine residuals after accounting for the variation attributable to the chosen contrast for patterns that may provide hints for more textured hypotheses in further research. If a posteriori contrasts are used, their effect sizes should be noted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decision-making bias in psychotherapy: Effects of hypothesis source and accountability.

Hypothesis-testing strategies used by 72 psychology doctoral students were assessed after these therapists viewed and responded to a videotaped client–therapist interaction. The results of the present study indicate that the therapists who were provided with a plausible hypothesis or who were allowed to develop their own hypothesis were more likely to rely on confirmatory hypothesis-testing strategies than were therapists provided with a less plausible hypothesis about the client. In addition, it was found that the type of decision-making strategy used by the therapists was not influenced by whether they were held highly accountable for their responses or minimally accountable for their responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

p values, hypothesis tests, and likelihood: implications for epidemiology of a neglected historical debate

It is not generally appreciated that the p value, as conceived by R. A. Fisher, is not compatible with the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test in which it has become embedded. The p value was meant to be a flexible inferential measure, whereas the hypothesis test was a rule for behavior, not inference. The combination of the two methods has led to a reinterpretation of the p value simultaneously as an "observed error rate" and as a measure of evidence. Both of these interpretations are problematic, and their combination has obscured the important differences between Neyman and Fisher on the nature of the scientific method and inhibited our understanding of the philosophic implications of the basic methods in use today. An analysis using another method promoted by Fisher, mathematical likelihood, shows that the p value substantially overstates the evidence against the null hypothesis. Likelihood makes clearer the distinction between error rates and inferential evidence and is a quantitative tool for expressing evidential strength that is more appropriate for the purposes of epidemiology than the p value.     

The truly false consensus effect: an ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception

Consensus bias is the overuse of self-related knowledge in estimating the prevalence of attributes in a population. The bias seems statistically appropriate (Dawes, 1989), but according to the egocentrism hypothesis, it merely mimics normative inductive reasoning. In Experiment 1, Ss made population estimates for agreement with each of 40 personality inventory statements. Even Ss who had been educated about the consensus bias, or had received feedback about actual consensus, or both showed the bias. In Experiment 2, Ss attributed bias to another person, but their own consensus estimates were more affected by their own response to the item than by the other person's response. In Experiment 3, there was bias even in the presence of unanimous information from 20 randomly chosen others. In all 3 experiments, Ss continued to show consensus bias despite the availability of other statistical information.     

Racial and ethnic bias in psychological tests: Divergent implications of two definitions of test bias.

Examines the 2 most widely accepted definitions of unfair test bias. A. Cleary in 1968 defined unfair test bias in terms of consistent under- or overprediction of actual performance levels of minority or majority groups. R. L. Thorndike's 1971 definition holds that a test is unfairly biased whenever the difference between the minority and majority groups is greater on the test than on actual performance. These 2 definitions, which superficially appear to be similar, are shown to be very different in their implications for minority selection. It is demonstrated that whenever test validity is less than perfect and mean majority criterion performance is higher than that of the minority group, Thorndike's definition leads to acceptance of a larger percentage of minority group members than does the Cleary definition. A review and reanalysis of published research on test bias suggests that most conventional test usages are unbiased by Cleary's definition but unfair by Thorndike's criteria. Advantages and disadvantages of both concepts of unfair test bias are discussed. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social pressures and the values of psychologists.

Speaking in connection with the APA Code of Ethics, the author discusses the social roles of psychologists and the social pressures associated with such roles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Science and morality: The role of values in science and the scientific study of moral phenomena.

This article contributes to the debate over values in science. A critical co-constructivist framework is proposed for conceptualizing the role that debate over values plays in all science. Using the psychological literature on moral development, it is shown that although debate over values is an integral part of all scientific discourse, it plays a more explicit role in fields within the human sciences (e.g., anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.) that touch on moral phenomena. Debate over values thus raises a central issue for modern science, namely the need to develop consensually agreed-on methods for resolving such debate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The truly false consensus effect: An ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by J. Krueger and R. W. Clement (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1994[Oct], Vol 67[4], 596–610). A correction to the equation on page 605 is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in PA, Vol 82:5338.) Consensus bias is the overuse of self-related knowledge in estimating the prevalence of attributes in a population. The bias seems statistically appropriate (R. M. Dawes; see record 1989-25841-001), but according to the egocentrism hypothesis, it merely mimics normative inductive reasoning. In Exp 1, Ss made population estimates for agreement with each of 40 personality inventory statements. Even Ss who had been educated about the consensus bias, or had received feedback about actual consensus, or both showed the bias. In Exp 2, Ss attributed bias to another person, but their own consensus estimates were more affected by their own response to the item than by the other person's response. In Exp 3, there was bias even in the presence of unanimous information from 20 randomly chosen others. In all 3 experiments, Ss continued to show consensus bias despite the availability of other statistical information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Two dimensions of tests: Psychometric and edumetric.

Notes that because of design and development techniques, most tests focus upon either between-individual differences or within-individual gain. These 2 primary dimensions of tests have been called psychometric and edumetric. The psychometric dimension has been focused upon traditionally, so that most of the standardized tests being used to measure gain or growth have not been developed or evaluated from an edumetric standpoint. The danger inherent in this practice is that a treatment effect may appear to be small or insignificant simply because the test was designed to be sensitive to individual differences rather than gain. The differences between psychometric and edumetric dimensions on the Sequential Tests of Educational Progress (Reading) are compared with respect to the purpose of the test, item selection, reliability, validity, and interpretation of scores. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Shyness and alcohol response expectancy hypothesis: Social situations.

Suggests a possible link between the use of alcohol to reduce shyness and I. Kirsch's (see record 1986-13702-001) response expectancy hypothesis. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social evaluation and the empathy–altruism hypothesis.

Tested the claim of R. L. Archer et al (see record 1982-05783-001) that empathy leads to increased helping only under socially evaluative circumstances. In Exp I, 22 female undergraduates were led to believe that no one (including the person in need) would ever know if they declined to help. In this situation, which was designed to be devoid of the potential for negative social evaluation for not helping, there was still a positive relationship between self-reported empathic emotion and offering help. In Exp II, empathy (low vs high) and social evaluation (low vs high) were manipulated with 32 Ss. Once again there was a positive relationship between empathy and offering help when the potential for social evaluation was low as well as high. Results of both studies suggest that the motivation to help evoked by empathy is not egoistic motivation to avoid negative social evaluation. Instead, the observed pattern was what would be expected if empathy evokes altruistic motivation to reduce the victim's need. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The spotlight effect in social judgment: An egocentric bias in estimates of the salience of one's own actions and appearance.

This research provides evidence that people overestimate the extent to which their actions and appearance are noted by others, a phenomenon dubbed the spotlight effect. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who were asked to don a T-shirt depicting either a flattering or potentially embarrassing image overestimated the number of observers who would be able to recall what was pictured on the shirt. In Study 3, participants in a group discussion overestimated how prominent their positive and negative utterances were to their fellow discussants. Studies 4 and 5 provide evidence supporting an anchoring-and-adjustment interpretation of the spotlight effect. In particular, people appear to anchor on their own rich phenomenological experience and then adjust insufficiently—to take into account the perspective of others. The discussion focuses on the manifestations and implications of the spotlight effect across a host of everyday social phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)