Arizona's tobacco control initiative illustrates the need for continuing oversight by tobacco control advocates

BACKGROUND: In 1994, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200 which increased the tobacco tax and earmarked 23% of the new revenues for tobacco education programmes. OBJECTIVE: To describe the campaign to pass Proposition 200, the legislative debate that followed the passage of the initiative, and the development and implementation of the tobacco control programme. DESIGN: This is a case study. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with key players in the initiative campaign and in the tobacco education programme, and written records (campaign material, newspapers, memoranda, public records). RESULTS: Despite opposition from the tobacco industry, Arizonans approved an increase in the tobacco tax. At the legislature, health advocates in Arizona successfully fought the tobacco industry attempts to divert the health education funds and pass preemptive legislation. The executive branch limited the scope of the programme to adolescents and pregnant women. It also prevented the programme from attacking the tobacco industry or focusing on secondhand smoke. Health advocates did not put enough pressure at the executive branch to force it to develop a comprehensive tobacco education programme. CONCLUSIONS: It is not enough for health advocates to campaign for an increase in tobacco tax and to protect the funds at the legislature. Tobacco control advocates must closely monitor the development and implementation of tax-funded tobacco education programmes at the administrative level and be willing to press the executive to implement effective programmes.     

Tobacco control advocates must demand high-quality media campaigns: the California experience

OBJECTIVE: To document efforts on the part of public officials in California to soften the media campaign's attack on the tobacco industry and to analyse strategies to counter those efforts on the part of tobacco control advocates. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with programme participants, direct observation, written materials, and media stories. In addition, internal documents were released by the state's Department of Health Services in response to requests made under the California Public Records Act by Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights. Finally, a draft of the paper was circulated to 11 key players for their comments. RESULTS: In 1988 california voters enacted Proposition 99, an initiative that raised the tobacco tax by $0.25 and allocated 20% of the revenues to anti-tobacco education. A media campaign, which was part of the education programme, directly attacked the tobacco industry, exposing the media campaign to politically based efforts to shut it down or soften it. Through use of outsider strategies such as advertising, press conferences, and public meetings, programme advocates were able to counter the efforts to soften the campaign. CONCLUSION: Anti-tobacco media campaigns that expose industry manipulation are a key component of an effective tobacco control programme. The effectiveness of these campaigns, however, makes them a target for elimination by the tobacco industry. The experience from California demonstrates the need for continuing, aggressive intervention by nongovernmental organisations in order to maintain the quality of anti-tobacco media campaigns.     

Effectiveness of comprehensive tobacco control programmes in reducing teenage smoking in the USA

OBJECTIVE: To describe the extent to which comprehensive statewide tobacco control programmes in the USA have made progress toward reducing teenage smoking. DATA SOURCES: Literature search of Medline for reviews of effectiveness of programme and policy elements, plus journal articles and personal request for copies of publicly released reports and working papers from evaluation staff in each of the state programmes of California, Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, and Florida. STUDY SELECTION: All studies, reports, and commentaries that provided information on aspects of programme implementation and evaluation. DATA SYNTHESIS: Statewide comprehensive programmes show high levels of advertising recall and generally positive improvement in smoking related beliefs and attitudes among teenagers. More fully funded programmes lead to increased mass media campaign advertising and community initiatives; a greater capacity to implement school based smoking prevention programmes; and an increase in the passage of local ordinances that create smoke free indoor environments and reduce cigarette sales to youth. The combination of programme activity and increased tobacco tax reduce cigarette consumption more than expected as a result of price increases alone, and these effects seem to apply to adolescents as well as adults. Programmes are associated with a decline in adult smoking prevalence, with these effects observed to date in California, Massachusetts, and Oregon. Arizona and Florida have yet to examine change in adult prevalence associated with programme exposure. California and Massachusetts have demonstrated relative beneficial effects in teenage smoking prevalence, and Florida has reported promising indications of reduced prevalence. Arizona has yet to report follow up data, and Oregon has found no change in teenage smoking, but has only two years of follow up available. One of the most critical factors in programme success is the extent of programme funding, and consequent level of programme implementation, and the degree to which this is undermined by the tobacco industry and other competitors for funding. CONCLUSIONS: Despite the different strengths and combinations of programme messages and strategies used in these comprehensive programmes, there is evidence that they lead to change in factors that influence teenage smoking, and to reductions in teenage smoking.     

Evolution of a comprehensive tobacco control programme: building system capacity and strategic partnerships--lessons from Massachusetts

BACKGROUND: Since the passage of a voter approved state referendum in 1992 to establish a 25 cent increase on the excise tax on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, Massachusetts has received an average of $40 million annually for its tobacco control programme. This funding allowed Massachusetts to expand and develop its tobacco control programme to become one of the most comprehensive in the world. OBJECTIVES: The development of the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program is outlined, focusing on three stages of development: formation, strategic partnership building, and shared leadership. METHODS: The development of management structures, programmatic infrastructure, communication and partnership networks, and advisory structures are tracked throughout the three phases. RESULTS: The use of pre-existing public health resources, implementation of a strong training component, a geographical management structure, the creation of public and private partnerships, and the development of a shared leadership model contributed to building consensus and provided the foundation for coordinated approaches to tobacco control. CONCLUSION: Other states and countries can use lessons learned from Massachusetts about the organisational development of a comprehensive tobacco control programme as they embark upon similar efforts.     

Smoke and mirrors: how Massachusetts diverted millions in tobacco tax revenues

OBJECTIVE: This study examines the politics of appropriating Question 1 tobacco tax revenues in the first budget year after Massachusetts voters passed the ballot initiative in 1992. The initiative increased the tobacco tax on cigarettes by 25 cents per pack and on smokeless tobacco by 25% of the wholesale price. METHODS: Data were collected from newspapers, letters, memoranda, budgets, press releases, legislative floor debates, government documents, legislative journals, personal interviews, and tobacco industry documents that were downloaded from the Tobacco Archives internet site. RESULTS: During the first budget year, programmes mentioned by the initiative that were not exclusively tobacco related accounted for 27% of total Question 1 expenditures, while 50% of the revenues were allocated for programmes that were neither mentioned by the initiative nor provided any tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Only 23% of Question 1 funds were appropriated for programmes that provided exclusively tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Question 1 revenues were also used to supplant funding for pre-existing programmes, which was explicitly prohibited by the initiative. The first budget year became the template for Question 1 appropriations in subsequent fiscal years. CONCLUSION: Politics did not end after voters passed Question 1. Public health advocates lacked a strategy and budget plan to influence the appropriation of Question 1 funds after the passage of this ballot initiative.     

An analysis of the successful 1992 Massachusetts tobacco tax initiative

In November 1992, voters in Massachusetts (United States) passed a statewide tax initiative adding an extra 25 cents to the price of a pack of cigarettes. The Massachusetts Coalition for a Healthy Future, led by volunteers from the Massachusetts Division of the American Cancer Society, achieved this victory, despite a public anti-tax mood and $7.3 million spent by the tobacco industry. The tax has since generated millions of dollars for tobacco education and control programmes, leading to acceleration of the decline of tobacco consumption in the state. An analysis of the passage of this initiative should help other states considering this approach to tobacco control.


     

Development and destruction of the first state funded anti-smoking campaign in the USA

Background: Minnesota was the first state in the USA to implement a large state funded tobacco control programme (in 1985). Despite evidence of effectiveness, it was dismantled in 1993.

Objective: To describe and analyse how and why these events transpired and identify lessons for tobacco control advocates facing similar challenges in the 21st century.

Design: Case study based on previously secret tobacco industry documents, news reports, research reports, official documents, and interviews with health advocates and state government officials.

Results: Unable to defeat funding for this campaign in 1985, the tobacco industry organised groups which eliminated it later. Despite the programme's documented effectiveness, it was dismantled based on claims of fiscal crisis. These claims were not true; the real debate was what to do with the state's surplus. Health advocates failed to challenge the claim of fiscal crisis or mobilise public support for the programme.

Conclusions: Simply quoting evidence that a tobacco control programme is effective does not ensure its continuing survival. Claims of fiscal crisis are an effective cover for tobacco industry efforts to dismantle successful programmes, particularly if health advocates accept these claims and fail to mobilise political pressure to defend the programme.

     

The tobacco settlement: an analysis of newspaper coverage of a national policy debate, 1997-98

OBJECTIVE: To examine the framing of tobacco policy issues in the news media during the national tobacco settlement debate of 1997-98. The major aims were (1) to describe the extent of newspaper coverage of each of the specific components of the proposed tobacco settlement; (2) to identify the tobacco control frames, and the dominant frame, appearing in each newspaper article; and (3) to examine trends in tobacco control frames over time. DESIGN: A content analysis was performed on 117 articles related to national tobacco legislation appearing in the Washington Post from 1 January 1997 through 18 June 1998. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: (1) Major policy themes of the settlement referred to or implied in each article; (2) major frames used to discuss the problem of tobacco in each article. RESULTS: The generation of new revenue was the dominant theme of the articles, appearing as a major focus in 44% (52) of the articles. Other than the issues of Food and Drug Administration regulation of tobacco and restrictions on cigarette advertising, the public health policy aspects of the tobacco settlement received little attention. The problem of tobacco was portrayed as one of youth smoking in 55% (64) of the articles, but as one of a deadly product in none of the articles. CONCLUSIONS: Future discussions of comprehensive tobacco policy should be driven by a more specific discussion of the precise programme and policy mechanisms by which tobacco use can be most effectively prevented and controlled. The public health community must find ways to frame the tobacco issue more broadly than simply as one of youth smoking.     

A randomised controlled trial of a community intervention to prevent adolescent tobacco use

OBJECTIVE: Experimental evaluation of comprehensive community wide programme to prevent adolescent tobacco use. DESIGN: Eight pairs of small Oregon communities (population 1700 to 13 500) were randomly assigned to receive a school based prevention programme or the school based programme plus a community programme. Effects were assessed through five annual surveys (time 1-5) of seventh and ninth grade (ages 12-15 years) students. INTERVENTION: The community programme included: (a) media advocacy, (b) youth anti-tobacco activities, (c) family communications about tobacco use, and (d) reduction of youth access to tobacco. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: The prevalence of self reported smoking and smokeless tobacco use in the week before assessment. RESULTS: The community programme had significant effects on the prevalence of weekly cigarette use at times 2 and 5 and the effect approached significance at time 4. An effect on the slope of prevalence across time points was evident only when time 2 data points were eliminated from the analysis. The intervention affected the prevalence of smokeless tobacco among grade 9 boys at time 2. There were also significant effects on the slope of alcohol use among ninth graders and the quadratic slope of marijuana for all students. CONCLUSION: The results suggest that comprehensive community wide interventions can improve on the preventive effect of school based tobacco prevention programmes and that effective tobacco prevention may prevent other substance use.     

Public health foundations and the tobacco industry: lessons from Minnesota

Objective: To investigate whether private foundations can be created in a way that will insulate them from attacks by the tobacco industry, using the Minnesota Partnership for Action Against Tobacco (MPAAT) as a case study.

Design: Information was collected from internal tobacco industry documents, court documents, newspapers, and interviews with health advocates and elected officials.

Results: The creation of MPAAT as an independent foundation did not insulate it from attacks by tobacco industry allies. During 2001–2002, MPAAT was repeatedly attacked by Attorney General Mike Hatch and major media, using standard tobacco industry rhetoric. This strategy of attack and demands for information were reminiscent of previous attacks on Minnesota's Plan for Nonsmoking and Health and the American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST). MPAAT was ultimately forced to restructure its programme to abandon effective community norm change interventions around smoke-free policies and replace them with less effective individual cessation interventions. Neither MPAAT nor other health advocates mounted an effective public response to these attacks, instead relying on the insider strategy of responding in court.

Conclusion: It is not possible to avoid attacks by the tobacco industry or its political allies. Like programmes administered by government agencies, tobacco control foundations must be prepared for these attacks, including a proactive plan to educate the public about the principles of community based tobacco control. Public health advocates also need to be willing to take prompt action to defend these programmes and hold public officials who attack tobacco control programmes accountable for their actions.

     

论“反吸烟运动”在烟草科技进步中的地位和作用

本世纪５０年代以来,反吸烟运动的不断高涨对烟草业的生产和发展产生了巨大影响,为此,烟草业着力于降低烟草中的有害物质,烟草科技突飞猛进。本文对此进行了深入研究,并对烟草未来的发展走向作了宏观的预测和展望。     

Tobacco cessation skills certification in Arizona: application of a state wide, community based model for diffusion of evidence based practice guidelines

OBJECTIVE: To describe the development and preliminary results from a community based certification model for training in tobacco cessation skills in Arizona. DESIGN: A programme evaluation using both quantitative pre-post measures and qualitative methods. SETTING: Arizona's comprehensive tobacco control programme of state funded, community based local projects and their community partners providing tobacco treatment services for geographically, socioeconomically, and ethnically diverse communities. INTERVENTION: A three tiered model of skills based training emphasising Agency for Health Care Policy and Research guidelines, and utilising a training of trainers approach to build community capacity. Certification roles addressed basic tobacco cessation skills, tobacco cessation specialist, and tobacco treatment services manager. PARTICIPANTS: Initial target audience was community based local project personnel and their community partners, with later adoption by community organisations unaffiliated with local projects, and the general public. MAIN EVALUATION MEASURES: Process measures: participant satisfaction, knowledge, skills, and self-efficacy. Outcome: participant demographics, community organisations represented, post-training, cessation related activities. RESULTS: During the model's implementation year, 1075 participants attended certification training, 947 participants received basic skills certificates and 82 received specialist certificates. Pre, post, and three month measures of self efficacy showed significant and durable increases. Analysis of participant characteristics demonstrated broad community representation. At post-training follow up, 80.9% of basic skills trainees had performed at least one brief intervention and 74.8% had made a referral to intensive services. Among cessation specialists, 48.8% were delivering intensive services and 69.5% were teaching basic skills classes. CONCLUSIONS: Initial experience with Arizona's state wide, community based model for certification of tobacco cessation skills training suggests this model may be a promising method for broad, population based diffusion of evidence based tobacco cessation guidelines.     

British Columbia capital regional district 100% smokefree bylaw: a successful public health campaign despite industry opposition

Objective: To describe how the British Columbia Capital Regional District successfully passed, implemented, and enforced a 100% smokefree bylaw in all public places, including restaurants and bars, despite an aggressive campaign by the tobacco industry (acting through the hospitality industry) to stop it. Methods: Information was obtained from news reports, internal tobacco industry documents, reports, public documents, and interviews with key players. Tobacco industry documents were accessed between February and April 2002. This project was approved by the University of California San Francisco committee on human research. Results: As in the USA and elsewhere in the world, the tobacco industry in British Columbia, Canada, recruited and created hospitality associations to fight against the district smokefree bylaw. They used the classic industry rhetoric of individual rights and freedoms, economic devastation, and ventilation as a solution. Public health authorities were able to counter industry strategies with a strong education campaign, well written bylaws, and persistent enforcement. Conclusion: It is possible to overcome serious opposition orchestrated by the tobacco industry and develop and implement a 100% smokefree bylaw in Canada. Doing so requires attention to detail in drafting the bylaw, as well as a public education campaign on the health dangers of secondhand smoke and active enforcement to overcome organised resistance to the bylaw. Jurisdictions considering smokefree bylaws should anticipate this opposition when developing and implementing their bylaws.     

Comparison of physician based reporting of tobacco attributable deaths and computer derived estimates of smoking attributable deaths, Oregon, 1989 to 1996

BACKGROUND: Tobacco use prevention programmes need accurate information about smoking related mortality. Beginning in 1989, Oregon began asking physicians to report on death certificates whether tobacco use contributed to the death. OBJECTIVE: To determine the long term comparability of this method of estimating tobacco attributable mortality to estimates of smoking attributable mortality derived from a computer model. DESIGN: For the period 1989 to 1996, we compared mortality resulting from tobacco use reported by Oregon physicians to estimates of smoking attributable deaths (SADs) derived by "Smoking attributable mortality, morbidity and economic costs" software version 3.0 (SAMMEC 3.0), a widely used software program that estimates SADs on the basis of smoking prevalence and relative risks of specific diseases among current and former smokers. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Numbers of deaths, age, sex, and category of disease. RESULTS: Of 212, 448 Oregon deaths during 1989-1996, SAMMEC 3.0 estimated that 42, 778 (20.1%) were attributable to cigarette smoking. For the same 27 diagnoses, physicians reported that tobacco contributed to 42, 839 (20.2%) deaths-a cumulative difference of only 61 deaths over the eight year period. The age and sex distributions of tobacco and smoking attributable deaths reported by the two systems were also similar. By category of disease, the ratio of SAMMEC 3.0 estimates to physician reported deaths was 1.11 for neoplasms, 0.88 for heart disease, and 1.04 for respiratory disease. CONCLUSIONS: Physician reporting provides comparable estimates of smoking attributable mortality and can be a valuable source of data for communicating the risks of tobacco use to the public.     

The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy

Objectives: To propose criteria to help advocates: (1) determine when tobacco related boycotts may be useful; (2) select appropriate targets; and (3) predict and measure boycott success. Methods: Analysis of tobacco focused boycotts retrieved from internal tobacco industry documents websites and other scholarship on boycotts. Results: Tobacco related boycotts may be characterised by boycott target and reason undertaken. Most boycotts targeted the industry itself and were called for political or economic reasons unrelated to tobacco disease, often resulting in settlements that gave the industry marketing and public relations advantages. Even a lengthy health focused boycott of tobacco industry food subsidiaries accomplished little, making demands the industry was unlikely to meet. In contrast, a perimetric boycott (targeting institutions at the perimeter of the core target) of an organisation that was taking tobacco money mobilised its constituency and convinced the organisation to end the practice. Conclusions: Direct boycotts of the industry have rarely advanced tobacco control. Perimetric boycotts of industry allies offer advocates a promising tool for further marginalising the industry. Successful boycotts include a focus on the public health consequences of tobacco use; an accessible point of pressure; a mutual interest between the target and the boycotters; realistic goals; and clear and measurable demands.     

Was there significant tax evasion after the 1999 50 cent per pack cigarette tax increase in California?

OBJECTIVES: Several states, including California, have implemented large cigarette excise tax increases, which may encourage smokers to purchase their cigarettes in other lower taxed states, or from other lower or non-taxed sources. Such tax evasion thwarts tobacco control objectives and may cost the state substantial tax revenues. Thus, this study investigates the extent of tax evasion in the 6-12 months after the implementation of California's 0.50 dollars/pack excise tax increase. DESIGN AND SETTING: Retrospective data analysis from the 1999 California Tobacco Surveys (CTS), a random digit dialled telephone survey of California households. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Sources of cigarettes, average daily cigarette consumption, and reported price paid. RESULTS: Very few (5.1 (0.7)% (+/-95% confidence limits)) of California smokers avoided the excise tax by usually purchasing cigarettes from non- or lower taxed sources, such as out-of-state outlets, military commissaries, or the internet. The vast majority of smokers purchased their cigarettes from the most convenient and expensive sources: convenience stores/gas (petrol) stations (45.0 (1.9)%), liquor/drug stores (16.4 (1.6)%), and supermarkets (8.8 (1.2)%). CONCLUSIONS: Despite the potential savings, tax evasion by individual smokers does not appear to pose a serious threat to California's excise tax revenues or its tobacco control objectives.     

Tobacco industry manipulation of the hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places

OBJECTIVE: To describe how the tobacco industry used the "accommodation" message to mount an aggressive and effective worldwide campaign to recruit hospitality associations, such as restaurant associations, to serve as the tobacco industry's surrogate in fighting against smoke-free environments. METHODS: We analysed tobacco industry documents publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA. Documents were accessed between January and November 2001. RESULTS: The tobacco industry, led by Philip Morris, made financial contributions to existing hospitality associations or, when it did not find an association willing to work for tobacco interests, created its own "association" in order to prevent the growth of smoke-free environments. The industry also used hospitality associations as a vehicle for programmes promoting "accommodation" of smokers and non-smokers, which ignore the health risks of second hand smoke for employees and patrons of hospitality venues. CONCLUSION: Through the myth of lost profits, the tobacco industry has fooled the hospitality industry into embracing expensive ventilation equipment, while in reality 100% smoke-free laws have been shown to have no effect on business revenues, or even to improve them. The tobacco industry has effectively turned the hospitality industry into its de facto lobbying arm on clean indoor air. Public health advocates need to understand that, with rare exceptions, when they talk to organised restaurant associations they are effectively talking to the tobacco industry and must act accordingly.     

中国烟草重税政策对增加政府收入和减少烟草消费的影响

从历史的角度阐述了政府对烟草产品长期实行重税政策在增加政府收入中做出的重要贡献,分析了政府对烟草产品征收重税的基本理由是增加政府收入和减少烟草消费,找出了在减少烟草消费方面效果并不明显的原因,主要是烟草税收对各级政府的内在激励、卷烟价格结构的多层次性和卷烟承载的社会交往功能。      

Tobacco industry strategies to undermine the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health

Objective: To demonstrate that Philip Morris and British American Tobacco Company attempted to initiate a wide ranging campaign to undermine the success of the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992.

Data sources: Publicly available tobacco industry documents housed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; Guilford, UK; on-line document websites; and telephone interviews with informed parties.

Study selection: Those documents determined to be relevant to the companies' campaigns against the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health.

Data extraction: Revision of chapter VIII of the July 2000 WHO report by a committee of experts, entitled: Tobacco company strategies to undermine tobacco control activities at the World Health Organization: report of the committee of experts on tobacco industry documents.

Data synthesis: Internal documents describe proposed media and science orientated campaigns developed by BAT, Philip Morris, and their consultants to divert attention away from the conference.

Results and conclusion: This work shows that the tobacco industry has the resources and vested interest to combat perceived threats in its regional operating markets, in this case its Latin American market. It is important for the worldwide public heath community to become aware of the numerous ways in which the tobacco industry and its front groups can work against international tobacco control meetings, even including the manipulation of or working with other public health groups to oppose tobacco control efforts. Future world conference planners and participants should be aware that the tobacco industry is likely to continue to employ such methodology. There is no reason to think that the industry is paying less attention to such conferences in the present or future. Rather, it is likely the industry will adopt and expand strategies that were successful while abandoning those that were not effective. Required disclosure of financial support by all participants at all tobacco scientific conferences is recommended. For the tobacco control community, we also recommend careful coalition building and networking with other public health groups on the ways tobacco is implicated in other public health issues.

     

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

BACKGROUND: Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda. OBJECTIVE: To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. DESIGN: This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. RESULTS: In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political effort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These efforts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted in several states. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence in state legislatures. Because of the poor public image of the tobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this power quietly and behind the scenes. State and local health advocates, who often have high public credibility, can use this fact against the tobacco lobby by focusing public attention on the tobacco lobby's political influence and policy goals and expose links between the tobacco lobby and its legislative supporters.