Review of Brave new mind: A thoughtful inquiry into the nature of mental life.

Reviews the book, Brave new mind: A thoughtful inquiry into the nature of mental life by Peter Dodwell (see record 2000-08633-000). The author poses the major question for cognitive science: "Can mental life be exhaustively studied as a purely natural phenomenon, or must we go beyond the mundane, the merely physical, to grasp its reality?" (p. viii). His answer is, that "absolutely no psychological consequence follows from a model couched in exclusively algorithmic, physical, or physiological terms, which is the way contemporary cognitive science proceeds" (p. 190). Planned as a history of cognitive science, and its contributory disciplines of psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, and computing science, and a contemporary survey of its strengths and weaknesses, the project, according to its author, one of this country's most respected researchers, "got out of hand" (p. vii). While documenting the achievements of cognitive science, this volume is much more a mature retrospective on its limitations and, implicitly, its failures of intent, and this by a participant in the enterprise whose reflections reach back more than 40 years to the beginning of his academic career. It is a courageous endeavour and deserves to be read not only as a critique of cognitive science, of the reductionism of the standard model, but as an autobiographical account of the enlightenment of one participant in that science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of How the mind works.

Reviews the book, How the mind works by Steven Pinker (see record 1997-30233-000). In this book, the author writes with optimism and excitement about recent progress in psychology, but with despair about the human condition. The scope of the book is stated briefly: "I will try to explain what the mind is, where it came from, and how it lets us see, think, feel, interact, and pursue higher callings like art, religion, and philosophy" (p. 3). The reader will be disappointed in many of these explanations: the book dwells on the already-expansive topics of what the mind is, and where it came from. As for the rest, we are told that humans have innate knowledge of optics, logic, mathematics, physics, botany (p. 377), and even psychology (p. 329). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The psychology of science and the origins of the scientific mind.

Reviews the book, The psychology of science and the origins of the scientific mind by Gregory Feist (see record 2006-02942-000). In this book, Gregory Feist sets out to show two things: that psychology of science can be its own field and that this field has been growing along side of humanity ever since its inception. Feist divides the book into two parts. First, he argues for the legitimacy of the field of psychology of science, addressing relevant research from many sub fields and their applications for the future. Part two delves into the origins and future of the scientific mind. Overall, this book makes one logically consider what science is and is not. It brings about contemplation about how science developed and how humans embraced it. Feist says he wants to take on the applied implications for the formalized study of both the psychology and science and the properties of the scientific mind. His goal is to move the psychology of science from its implicit methods scattered across domains of psychology and make them explicit. He wants to unite researchers scattered across the world to make up a new psychology of science that actively meets, has its own journal, and can educate future researchers. This is all very interesting and indeed possible, as long as the meetings would follow the same integrative genius that is displayed in this book. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science.

Reviews the book, Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science by Zenon W. Pylyshyn (see record 1986-97211-000). Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of mind based on a computational conception of mind. Computation and cognition is a presentation of Zenon Pylyshyn's position on just what a computational conception of mind is and should be. In the course of the exegesis, the basic, often implicit, assumptions of cognitive science are revealed, and the enterprise as a whole is placed on firm ground. The book is difficult but important. The reviewer cannot recommend it to the intelligent layman. However, it is a book that should be read by cognitive scientists and others with a deep interest in the possibility of a computational view of mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Gold Medal Award for Life Achievement in the Science of Psychology: Wendell R. Garner.

The American Psychological Foundation (APF) Gold Medal Awards recognize distinguished and enduring records of accomplishments in 4 areas of psychology. The 1999 recipient of the Gold Medal Award for Life Achievement in the Science of Psychology is Wendell R. Garner. Garner is known for his work in psychophysics, discrimination, perception, and information processing. A citation, biography, and selected bibliography of Garner's work are presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Note on reductionism in cognitive psychology: Reification of cognitive processes into mind, mind-brain equivalence, and brain-computer analogy.

This note brings together three phenomena leading to a tendency toward reductionism in cognitive psychology. They are (1) the reification of cognitive processes into an entity called mind; (2) the identification of the mind with the brain; and (3) the congruence by analogy of the brain with the digital computer. Also indicated is the need to continue studying the effects upon behavior of variables other than brain function. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Psychologie génétique et sciences cognitives.

Reviews the book, IPsychologie génétique et sciences cognitives by J. Montangero and A. Tryphon (1991). The chapters which form this book, individually taken, are of good quality. Nevertheless, the book suffers from two defects. The first, like many books of this style, concerns the lack of cohesion of the subjects, which are indeed very disparate. The second, which is more critical, touches the lack of theoretical coherence demonstrated by the authors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment: Mental Health Is Not a Fearsome Thing.

Letter comments on the June 1963 American Psychologist. According to the author, there is a great deal of experimentation and research to be done and an opportunity to funnel into mental health the many behavioral science and technological advances and apply them toward the needs of a growing and problem-wracked society. He states that psychology has a challenge of actively participating, or abdicating and letting other professional groups pre-empt the area of mental health. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Psychology of reading.

Reviews the book, Psychology of reading by John Downing and Che Kan Leong (1982). This book is a comprehensive survey of the wide range of topics related to reading, including the role of perceptual, cognitive, and linguistic processes in reading, environmental influences on reading, and disorders of reading. The book is well organized and the writing is clear. Many of the sections are quite informative--for example, those involving orthography, reading in different languages, and the social and cultural aspects of reading. The authors provide an up-to-date account of what is known about the neurological basis of reading but wisely caution against excessive "neurologizing" and assigning each hemisphere completely distinctive functions. This book is well organized and covers most areas in depth. It could form the basis of a graduate seminar or advanced undergraduate course. It can also provide a comprehensive view of the field for the specialist. The authors have done a fine job of integrating many different kinds of studies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The Mind in Therapy: Cognitive Science for Practice.

Reviews the book, The Mind in Therapy: Cognitive Science for Practice by Katherine D. Arbuthnott, Dennis W. Arbuthnott and Valerie A. Thompson (see record 2005-13477-000). In this text, the authors apply the conceptual underpinnings of cognitive science, and its empirical findings, to particular practical issues. In 16 chapters, the authors review different areas of cognitive research and emphasize findings relevant to the theoretical and applied aspects of psychotherapy. Each chapter begins with general definitions of key terms and explains how various cognitive constructs, and the research literature surrounding them, are important to psychotherapy. Many chapters also include case illustrations to translate these concepts into application. The goal of the book--to increase clinicians' understanding of the cognitive processes and mechanisms involved in therapy and to encourage practitioners to integrate this knowledge within the treatments that they provide--is certainly achieved. Practitioners who read this text will be more cognizant of the cognitive processes that influence treatment and may be more deliberate in their use of cognitive mechanisms in therapy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Estes Park report and Hebb's remarks.

Replies to Hebb's comment regarding the Estes Park Report (see record 2005-11054-001). The commenting author argues that he has shown on simple, low level, worked out examples how "intellectual paraphernalia" be used in crucial roles. He follows up on his initial examinations of Curie, Einstein, and Pavlov as examples of how a similar epistemological approach works at a high level. He concludes, as before, that formal paraphernalia do sometimes make a difference in significant research and should be taught to prospective researchers. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aristotle, teleology, and modern psychology.

After first discussing the symbiotic relationship between science and philosophy of science in mind, the author then presents a very selective glimpse of the path that science traversed from Aristotle and the ancients to the modern science of psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The challenge from biology to cognitive science.

Concepts from cognitive science have largely replaced behaviorist concepts as the primary explanatory tools of contemporary psychology. However, cognitive science is not without its critics and shortcomings. It would therefore be a mistake for psychologists to uncritically accept cognitive science as it uncritically accepted the logical positivism that undergirded behaviorism for so many decades. Effective philosophical criticisms of cognitive science have been offered by Searle (1980) and Dreyfus (1979). In this paper I will present difficulties with cognitive science that arise from the science of biology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Estes Park report and Cervin's comments.

Responds to criticism of the validity of the main conclusions of the Estes Park seminar (see record 1960-03707-001) made by Cervin (American Psychologist, 1960, 15, 158-159) suggesting that the seminar participants took to narrow a view in reaching their conclusions about research in psychology. The seminar did not deny that the formal paraphernalia of science are of value, but it did deny that they tell the whole story; intuitive conclusions and illogical processes have their part too, and may have the decisive part in many cases. While intellecutal paraphernalia does help in creative thinking, the quesiton remains: is that what makes the difference between significant and insignificant research, the main thing that needs to be communicated to the prospective researcher? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Not all psychologists are classist.

Comments on the article by B. Lott (see record 2002-10716-002) which argues that distancing is the dominant response to poor people on the part of those who are not poor and that distancing, separation, exclusion, and devaluing operationally define discrimination. Such responses, together with stereotypes and prejudice, define classism. The authors of this commentary believe that Lott is to commended for bringing greater attention to social social class as a conceptual problem, for questioning psychologists' potential roles in perpetuating or understanding classism, and for describing the many ways in which economically disadvantaged people are marginalized within US society. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The unconscious status of defense mechanisms.

Responds to L. S. Newman's and M. H. Erdelyi's comments (see records 2001-18061-011 and 2001-18061-012, respectively) on the P. Cramer article (see record 2000-15774-007). The author maintains that to consciously and intentionally modify one's thinking, affect, or behavior (i.e., to cope) so as to manage a stressful situation is an inherently different process than the unintentional cognitive distortion that occurs on an unconscious level when a defense mechanism is used. Furthermore, it is argued that the features of being unconscious and unintentional are critical for defining the defense mechanism and for differentiating this process from other methods of adaptation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Coping and defense: No clear distinction.

Comments on an article by P. Cramer (see record 2000-15774-007) which discussed renewed interest in the concept of defense mechanisms and presented criteria for distinguishing between coping processes and defense mechanisms. The author argues that it is unlikely that Cramer's criteria could be successfully used to define distinctive sets of psychological processes. It is maintained that the most basic problem with the proposed distinction is that intentionally and awareness are independent features of cognitive processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The 1988 Banff Annual Seminar in Cognitive Science.

The Banff Annual Seminar in Cognitive Science (BASICS) was founded in 1982 and has met each spring since then in Banff, Alberta. BASICS was originated to provide an informal atmosphere for the in-depth discussion of a wide variety of research topics within the broadly defined domain of cognitive psychology. Topics of discussion have often revolved around the relationship between cognition and basic perceptual processes. The structure of the BASICS conference provides each speaker with 90 minutes to present his or her research, which is then followed by an extensive question-and-answer period. This format has been received enthusiastically by speakers and audience alike. Although there was no nominal theme to the 1988 BASICS conference, most of the talks concerned the relationship between visual information processing and higher-level cognitive processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The neglected 95%, a challenge to psychology.

Responds to the comments of LoSchiavo F. M. and Shatz M. A. (see record 2009-13007-013); Webster G. D., Nichols A. L., and Schember T. O. (see record 2009-13007-014); Stroebe W. and Nijstad B. (see record 2009-13007-015); and Haeffel et al. (see record 2009-13007-016) on the author's original article (see record 200814338-003) regarding the assertion that American psychology focuses too narrowly on Americans while neglecting the other 95% of the world’s population. The author indicates that the four comments were well chosen in that they represent quite different reactions to his article. In this rejoinder the author addresses the issues raised in each of the comments, first the two supporting comments and then the two opposing comments. Following this, he addresses the more general problem that cuts across the comments: American psychology’s dominant philosophy of science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)