Narrow assessments misrepresent development and misguide policy: Comment on Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, and Banich (2009).

Intellectual and psychosocial functioning develop along complex learning pathways. Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, and Banich (see record 2009-18110-001) measured these two classes of abilities with narrow, biased assessments that captured only a segment of each pathway and created misleading age patterns based on ceiling and floor effects. It is a simple matter to shift the assessments to produce the opposite pattern, with cognitive abilities appearing to develop well into adulthood and psychosocial abilities appearing to stop developing at age 16. Their measures also lacked a realistic connection to the lived behaviors of adolescents, abstracting too far from messy realities and thus lacking ecological validity and the nuanced portrait that the authors called for. A drastically different approach to assessing development is required that (a) includes the full age-related range of relevant abilities instead of a truncated set and (b) examines the variability and contextual dependence of abilities relevant to the topics of murder and abortion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are adolescents less mature than adults?: Minors' access to abortion, the juvenile death penalty, and the alleged APA "flip-flop."

The American Psychological Association’s (APA’s) stance on the psychological maturity of adolescents has been criticized as inconsistent. In its Supreme Court amicus brief in Roper v. Simmons (2005), which abolished the juvenile death penalty, APA described adolescents as developmentally immature. In its amicus brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990), however, which upheld adolescents’ right to seek an abortion without parental involvement, APA argued that adolescents are as mature as adults. The authors present evidence that adolescents demonstrate adult levels of cognitive capability earlier than they evince emotional and social maturity. On the basis of this research, the authors argue that it is entirely reasonable to assert that adolescents possess the necessary skills to make an informed choice about terminating a pregnancy but are nevertheless less mature than adults in ways that mitigate criminal responsibility. The notion that a single line can be drawn between adolescence and adulthood for different purposes under the law is at odds with developmental science. Drawing age boundaries on the basis of developmental research cannot be done sensibly without a careful and nuanced consideration of the particular demands placed on the individual for “adult-like” maturity in different domains of functioning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mapping the structure and dynamics of psychological knowledge: Forty years of APA journal citations (1970–2009).

To understand how subfields of psychology relate to each other as a whole, we analyzed 40 years (from 1979 to 2009) of journal citation data collected from 17 American Psychological Association journals. The results reveal two stable underlying dimensions of psychological knowledge—basic versus applied, and population-specific versus population-general—that organize subfields of psychology. Within the structure, personality and social psychology is located at the heart of psychological knowledge. Analysis of the dynamic flow of knowledge between subfields of psychology further reveals that although the subfields engage in clear division of labor, they also engage in dynamic transactions of knowledge. Finally, an emergent subfield would first obtain its intellectual nutrients from the established disciplines. Once it has found its own niche, it turns into a spin-off and starts to assume the role of knowledge supplier. The implications of these results for psychology as a science are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty.

The authors use a developmental perspective to examine questions about the criminal culpability of juveniles and the juvenile death penalty. Under principles of criminal law, culpability is mitigated when the actor's decision-making capacity is diminished, when the criminal act was coerced, or when the act was out of character. The authors argue that juveniles should not be held to the same standards of criminal responsibility as adults, because adolescents' decision-making capacity is diminished, they are less able to resist coercive influence, and their character is still undergoing change. The uniqueness of immaturity as a mitigating condition argues for a commitment to a legal environment under which most youths are dealt with in a separate justice system and none are eligible for capital punishment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selected Division 22 symposia and paper/poster presentations from the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association: (August 24-28, 2001).

Presents an abstract collection of selected Division 22 Symposia and paper/poster presentations from the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (August 24-28, 2001). Topics include: Innovations in understanding and assisting families living with disability; SSA's TWWIIA: Implications for rehabilitation psychology policy and practice; The psychology of assistive technology; Self-Definitions of health and wellness among people with disabilities; and Coping in parents of children with traumatic brain injury. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Validity of the salience asymmetry account of the Implicit Association Test: Reply to Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, and Klauer (2005).

In their comment on K. Rothermund and D. Wentura (see record 2004-14313-001), A. G. Greenwald, B. A. Nosek, M. R. Banaji, and K. C. Klauer (see record 2005-09704-008) agreed that salience asymmetries can be a source of Implicit Association Test (IAT) effects. The authors applaud this conclusion but point to problems with the other points that Greenwald et al. made. The authors have difficulties understanding the nominal feature account that Greenwald et al. put forward and have doubts about the usefulness of their broad conception of the concept association. The authors also argue that existing evidence concerning the construct validity of the IAT does not allow one to discriminate between the association and the salience accounts. In addition, the new studies that were presented by Greenwald et al. do not provide insights into what the IAT measures because they are either irrelevant for a decision between the different accounts or contain methodological problems that prevent a meaningful interpretation in terms of the models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An attentional learning account of the shape bias: Reply to Cimpian and Markman (2005) and Booth, Waxman, and Huang (2005).

Recently, Developmental Psychology published 2 articles on the shape bias; both rejected the authors' previous proposals about the role of attentional learning in the development of a shape bias in object name learning. A. Cimpian and E. Markman (2005; see record 2005-14938-017) did so by arguing that the shape bias does not exist but is an experimental artifact. A. E. Booth, S. R. Waxman, and Y. T. Huang (2005; see record 2005-05098-004), in contrast, concluded that the shape bias (and its contextual link to artifact categories) does exist but that the mechanisms that underlie it are conceptual knowledge and not attentional learning. In response, in this article the authors clarify the claims of the Attentional Learning Account (ALA) and interpretations of the data under question. The authors also seek to make explicit the deeper theoretical divide: cognition as sequestered from processes of perceiving and acting versus as embedded in, and inseparable from, those very processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Dynamic links of cognitive functioning among married couples: Longitudinal evidence from the Australian Longitudinal Study of Ageing": Correction to Gerstorf, Hoppmann, Anstey, and Luszcz (2009).

Reports an error in "Dynamic links of cognitive functioning among married couples: Longitudinal evidence from the Australian Longitudinal Study of Ageing" by Denis Gerstorf, Christiane A. Hoppmann, Kaarin J. Anstey and Mary A. Luszcz (Psychology and Aging, 2009[Jun], Vol 24[2], 296-309). Figure 1 was printed incorrectly due to an error in the production process. The correct version is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-08094-004.) Development does not take place in isolation; close others form an important dyad for exploring interrelationships. To examine spousal interrelations in level and change of cognitive functioning in old age, the authors applied dynamic models to 11-year longitudinal data of, initially, 304 married couples from the Australian Longitudinal Study of Ageing (aged 64–98 years at Time 1; M = 76 years). Findings revealed that perceptual speed for husbands predicted subsequent perceptual speed decline for wives (time lags of 1 year). There was little evidence for the opposite unidirectional effect or a bidirectional association between husbands and wives. Potential covariates (age, education, medical conditions, functional limitations, and depressive symptoms) did not account for differential lead–lag associations. A similar, though less pronounced, pattern was found for memory, which held except when functional limitations were controlled. Findings suggest that late-life cognitive development is not solely a product of intraindividual resources and are consistent with conceptual notions that development actively influences, and is influenced by, contextual factors such as close relationships. The authors discuss possible underlying mechanisms and further steps to substantiate the findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)