The evidence supports Douglas Merritte as Little Albert.

Replies to the comments made by R. A. Powell (see record 2010-08987-015) and H.W. Reese (see record 2010-08987-016) on the authors' original article (see record 2009-18110-004). The authors' recent article summarized the results of a seven-year search to determine the identity and fate of “Little Albert.” Examinations of Watson’s scientific production, correspondence, and public documents suggested that an employee at the Harriet Lane Hospital was Albert’s mother. The child’s birth records and contact with the woman’s descendents led us to Douglas Merritte, the individual we believe to be Watson and Rayner’s (1920) famous participant. Powell (2010, this issue) and Reese (2010, this issue) brought forth considerations that they believe are contrary to our conclusion. We thank these authors for their interest in our work and the American Psychologist for allowing us to elaborate on and provide additional support for the thesis that Douglas was Little Albert. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Regarding little Albert.

Comments on the article by H. P. Beck, S. Levinson., & G. Irons (see record 2009-18110-004). Beck, Levinson, and Irons (October 2009) concluded from intensive detective work that Watson and Rayner’s (1920) “Albert B.” was Douglas Merritte, born at the Johns Hopkins Hospital on March 9, 1919. However, they overlooked one supporting consideration (see paragraph 4c in the article) and some contradictory considerations (see the remaining paragraphs). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reconciling the complexity of human development with the reality of legal policy: Reply to Fischer, Stein, and Heikkinen (2009).

The authors respond to both the general and specific concerns raised in Fischer, Stein, and Heikkinen’s (see record 2009-18110-002) commentary on their article (Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, & Banich) (see record 2009-18110-001), in which they drew on studies of adolescent development to justify the American Psychological Association’s positions in two Supreme Court cases involving the construction of legal age boundaries. In response to Fischer et al.’s general concern that the construction of bright-line age boundaries is inconsistent with the fact that development is multifaceted, variable across individuals, and contextually conditioned, the authors argue that the only logical alternative suggested by that perspective is impractical and unhelpful in a legal context. In response to Fischer et al.’s specific concerns that their conclusion about the differential timetables of cognitive and psychosocial maturity is merely an artifact of the variables, measures, and methods they used, the authors argue that, unlike the alternatives suggested by Fischer et al., their choices are aligned with the specific capacities under consideration in the two cases. The authors reaffirm their position that there is considerable empirical evidence that adolescents demonstrate adult levels of cognitive capability several years before they evince adult levels of psychosocial maturity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Research notes: Little Albert, lost or found: Further difficulties with the Douglas Merritte hypothesis.

In some intriguing detective work, Beck, Levinson, and Irons (see record 2009-18110-004) attempted to solve the mystery of what happened to Little Albert, the infant in whom Watson and Rayner (1920) claimed to have conditioned a rat phobia. They concluded that a child by the name of Douglas Merritte, the son of a wet nurse at Johns Hopkins Hospital, very likely was Albert (the published name, Albert B, apparently having been a pseudonym). Powell (see record 2010-08987-015) and Reese (see record 2010-08987-016) outlined certain difficulties with Beck et al.’s (2009) analysis, the foremost being a comment from Watson (1924/1925) that Albert was later adopted, whereas Douglas had remained with his mother (see Beck, 2010, for his rejoinder to Powell and Reese) (see record 2010-08987-017). The present report presents an additional difficulty with the Douglas Merritte hypothesis which concerns the estimated timeline during which the baseline session (and first film session) of the Albert experiment likely took place. It is the congruence between Douglas’ age and the reported age of Albert during this estimated timeline on which the case for Douglas being Albert largely rests. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Pariser (2005).

The author responds to Michael Pariser's critique (see record 2005-01622-013) of her original article (see record 2003-99989-005) by distinguishing between reduction and reductionism, by refusing to see philosophy and neuroscience as competitors, by rejecting the call to adapt psychoanalysis to the demands of managed care, and by using the ideas of Wittgenstein to point out the problems of too-facile translation between the languages of neuroscience and of emotional-relational experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The neglected 95%, a challenge to psychology.

Responds to the comments of LoSchiavo F. M. and Shatz M. A. (see record 2009-13007-013); Webster G. D., Nichols A. L., and Schember T. O. (see record 2009-13007-014); Stroebe W. and Nijstad B. (see record 2009-13007-015); and Haeffel et al. (see record 2009-13007-016) on the author's original article (see record 200814338-003) regarding the assertion that American psychology focuses too narrowly on Americans while neglecting the other 95% of the world’s population. The author indicates that the four comments were well chosen in that they represent quite different reactions to his article. In this rejoinder the author addresses the issues raised in each of the comments, first the two supporting comments and then the two opposing comments. Following this, he addresses the more general problem that cuts across the comments: American psychology’s dominant philosophy of science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The problem with a Darwinian view of humanity.

Comments on the special issue on Charles Darwin and psychology (Dewsbury, February–March 2009) (see record 2009-01602-013), in which the authors present evidence supporting the validity of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution and how generations of psychologists have viewed the natural world through its light, taking Darwinian theories for granted as being a literal interpretation of the origins of species and attempting to make human nature conform to the picture of evolution as Darwin conceived it. In certain terms, Darwinian evolutionary theory, as conventionally held, has played an important negative role in present world conditions. There is no possibility of spiritual survival as far as evolutionary theory is concerned, because evolutionary Darwinian man and woman are not created with souls. All psychological activity is scaled down in between life and death. Death becomes an affront to life and comes to imply a certain kind of weakness, for is it not said that only the strong survive? Unfortunately, there are just not many good alternative theories to choose from. From the point of view of a transpersonal psychologist, however, Darwin’s theory ignores too much. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Science or ideology?

Responds to the comments by D. McKay (see record 2011-02175-008); B. D. Thombs, L. R. Jewett, and M. Bassel (see record 2011-02175-009); M. D. Anestis, J. C. Anestis, and S. O. Lilienfeld (see record 2011-02175-010); and W. W. Tryon and G. S. Tryon (see record 2011-02175-011) on the current author's original article, "The efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy" (see record 2010-02208-012). The academic psychology literature is filled with pronouncements about psychodynamic theory, often stated in authoritative tones, that present a picture of psychodynamic treatment that is unrecognizable to me and to other contemporary psychodynamic practitioners. Several of the comments about my article perpetuate this tradition and, I am sorry to say, introduce disinformation into the pages of the American Psychologist. Before addressing some specifics, I want to say a few words about my understanding of how such misrepresentations can find their way into scholarly academic journals. Three of the four comments on my article appear to have the intent of reasserting the master narrative by creating a smokescreen of doubt and confusion (Anestis, Anestis, & Lilienfeld, 2011; McKay, 2011; Thombs, Jewett, & Bassel, 2011). Two of the four comments (McKay, 2011; Tryon & Tryon, 2011) cite a metaanalysis indicating that there is no empirical support for the concept of “symptom substitution.” Two of the comments (Anestis et al., 2011; Thombs et al., 2011) note that the effect size from the meta-analysis by Leichsenring and Rabung (2008)—one of eight meta-analyses showing substantial benefits for psychodynamic therapy reported in my Table 1 (Shedler, 2010)—has been the target of criticism and reflects a computational error. Three of the comments (Anestis et al., 2011; McKay, 2011; Thombs et al., 2011) imply that the methods used in empirical studies of psychodynamic therapies are somehow inadequate relative to studies of other evidence-based therapies. Unlike the other comments, the comment of Tryon and Tryon (2011) appears to be a sincere effort to engage with my arguments. What disturbs me about the three other comments is not that the authors disagree with my conclusions but that they portray themselves as objective investigators who desire only to promote good science. While Anestis et al. (2011), McKay (2011), and Thombs et al. (2011) imply or explicitly state that I am the one who marshals evidence selectively, from my angle of vision they appear to value only evidence that supports an a priori agenda while ignoring, dismissing, or attacking evidence that does not. If so, this is not science, but ideology masquerading as science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Framing the question: Psychoanalytic process, the unconscious, and home offices--An alternate perspective.

This essay is a personal reflection on articles by Karen Maroda (see record 2007-00135-012) and Robert Langs (see record 2007-00135-013) that concluded that home offices were an example of a self-serving and possibly unethical frame violation on the part of the therapist. In contradistinction to Maroda and Langs, I argue that such an approach misconceives the essence of psychoanalysis in both its practice and in its theory, particularly at issue is Langs' understanding of the unconscious. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the logic of logical form: A criticism of Tryon's models of behavior disorder.

Comments on the model of behavior disorder of W. W. Tryon (see record 1977-04654-001), agreeing that a systematic examination of the binary combinations of P. J. Woods's (see record 1975-00351-001) taxonomic classes of operant conditioning is of potential profit. However, Tryon has leapt from this beginning far too rapidly into models of behavior disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Guidelines for assessments: Reactions to the commentators.

In this short article, the authors respond to the critiques of the four commentators (see records 2001-17060-010, 2001-17060-011, 2001-17060-012, 2001-17060-013 respectively) on the original "Guidelines" article (see record 2001-17060-009). They highlight areas of agreement and disagreement with the other authors in an effort to move the discussion forward. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychoanalysis, feminism, and the politics of exclusion: A rejoinder.

In a book review published in this journal, Fine (see record 2003-05429-013) criticized Lerner's (see record 2006-00700-000) The Dance of Anger: A Woman's Guide to Changing the Patterns of Intimate Relationships and raised broader concerns about the popularization of psychological ideas and about feminist psychoanalytic theory. This rejoinder takes issue with his criticisms, arguing that there is a legitimate place for careful popular presentation of psychological knowledge and that feminist psychoanalytic writings represent a serious and thoughtful body of theoretical work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On not being heard: Response to Gargiulo (2007) and Mills (2007).

Replies to comments made by G. Gargiulo (see record 2007-16468-013) and J. Mills (see record 2007-16468-014) on the current author's original comments (see record 2007-00135-013) on an article by K. Maroda (see record 2007-00135-012). I stand by the extensive clinical evidence that I have garnered, which indicates that a revised version of Freud's topographic theory is superior to his structural theory as a platform for psychoanalytic understanding and technique. I support my position here by citing some original contributions made by the adaptive approach and then highlight adaptive insights into patients' archetypal, unconscious perceptions of the moral implications of a therapist's use of a home office. I conclude with a discussion of why psychoanalysts have rejected the adaptive approach out of hand. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A further look at wrong reasons to abandon statistical testing.

Responds to comments by W. W. Tryon, R. E. McGrath, R. G. Malgady, R. Falk, B. Thompson, and M. M. Granaas (see records 1998-04417-011, 1998-04417-012, 1998-04417-013, 1998-04417-014, 1998-04417-015, and 1998-04417-016, respectively) on the author's article (see record 1997-02239-002) defending use of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). The logic of NHST has been challenged by 3 claims: (1) the null hypothesis is always false; therefore, a test of the null hypothesis is only a search for what is already known to be true; (2) the form of logic on which NHST rests is flawed; and (3) NHST does not tell one what one wants to know. In attempting to rebut these claims, while there may be good reasons to give up NHST, these particular points are not the reason why. Key points of each commentary are addressed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spirituality, Health, and the Discipline of Psychology.

Replies to comments by D. J. McCormick (see record 2004-10043-013), L. J. Richmond (see record 2004-10043-014), C. A. Rayburn (see record 2004-10043-015), and F. J. Kier and D. S. Davenport (see record 2004-10043-016) on the special section on spirituality, religion, and health in the January 2003 issue of American Psychologist (2003, Vol 58, 24-74). Each of the comments is addressed in turn. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Responses to issues raised about validity, bias, and fairness in high-stakes testing.

We are pleased that our article (see record 2008-05553-001) prompted this series of four commentaries and that we have this opportunity to respond. We address each in turn. Duckworth (see record 2009-06923-012) and Kaufman and Agars (see record 2009-06923-013) discussed, respectively, two broad issues concerning the validity of selection systems, namely, the expansion of the predictor domain to include noncognitive predictors of performance and the expansion of the criterion domain to include additional criteria (e.g., creativity). We agree with these arguments, noting that they expand on points made in our original article. Wicherts and Millsap (see record 2009-06923-014) rightly noted the distinction between measurement bias and predictive bias and the fact that a finding of no predictive bias does not rule out the possibility that measurement bias still exists. They took issue with a statement we cited from Cullen, Hardison, and Sackett (2004) that if motivational mechanisms, such as stereotype threat, result in minority group members obtaining lower observed scores than true scores (i.e., a form of measurement bias), then the performance of minority group members should be under predicted. Our characterization of Cullen et al.’s (2004) statement was too cryptic; what was intended was a statement to the effect that if the regression lines for majority and minority groups are identical at the level of true predictor scores, then a biasing factor resulting in lower observed scores than true scores for minority group members would shift the minority group regression line to result in under prediction for that group. We do agree with Helms’s (see record 2009-06923-015) call for studying the reasons why racial- group differences are found and encourage this line of research; however, we view the study of racial-group differences and the study of determinants of those differences as complementary. We thank the authors for contributing these commentaries and for stimulating this discussion. Duckworth (2009) and Kaufman and Agars (2009) discussed important issues regarding expanding the predictor and criterion domains. Wicherts and Millsap (2009) correctly noted distinctions between predictive and measurement bias and used stereotype threat as a mechanism to discuss these issues. Helms (2009) raised several issues regarding the validity and fairness of standardized tests. In all cases, we welcomed the opportunity to discuss these topics and provide more detail on issues relating to high-stakes standardized testing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Elaborating the constructionist thesis.

Responds to comments from G. Nettler (see record 1986-20944-001) and A. Kukla (see record 1986-20940-001) regarding the present author's (see record 1986-00014-001) article on social constructionist theory by acknowledging potential ambiguities in the article and by clarifying and extending previous arguments related to empiricism, conventional constraints, and reductionism. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personality traits across cultures and research on obedience.

Comments on an article by Twenge (see record 2008-19206-004) on the issue of psychological traits that may differ with culture and ethnicity in discussing the partial replication of Milgram’s obedience research (Burger, January 2009) (see record 2008-19206-001). But since a major stimulus for Milgram’s research was the destruction of European Jewry (Benjamin & Simpson, January 2009 (see record 2008-19206-002); Blass, 2009 (see record 2008-19206-006)), what about the “elephant in the room” of differences in European national groups on obedience, aggression, locus of control, and related factors? The five-factor model as applied across cultures offers a way of looking at European national differences in personality (Allik & McCrae, 2004). The results can be used to explore the possibility that personality traits that may be related to obedience might differ partly along cultural lines, with the considerable caveats that such traits probably change over time and generations, are subject to situational and historical variables, and interact with individual differences. The emphasis on situational determinants in discussions of the Milgram paradigm and its partial replication by Burger (2009) should not obscure possible cultural factors. Cultural factors in obedience to authority are worthy of further exploration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adequately predicting emotional eating with self-reports: Not as easy as pie.

Responds to the comments by T. van Strien (see record 2010-14873-003) on the current authors' original article, "Assessing yourself as an emotional eater: Mission impossible?" (see record 2009-20990-009). In her commentary, van Strien suggests that it may not be "impossible" to self assess for emotional eating, as a close inspection of the results of Evers et al reveals that their “no emotional eaters” did not show the typical stress response of eating less. This opens the possibility that the null findings of Evers et al may be simply explained by misclassification of “no emotional eaters” versus “emotional eaters” because of their use of median splits (a procedure notorious for possible misclassification of subjects into distinct groups). In this reply Evers et al address this criticism and other critiques of their study, and conclude that their results are in line with studies that have indicated that self-assessed emotional eating may reflect beliefs about emotional eating rather than one’s actual eating behavior when being emotional. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Symposium: Three perspectives on Paul Dewald's The psychoanalytic process: A case illustration": Author's discussion.

Responds to the critiques by H. K. Golden (see record 1993-10605-001), J. Newirth (see record 1993-10620-001), and I. Hirsch (see record 1993-10607-001) concerning P. A. Dewald's (1972) patient analysis. Dewald confirms the influence of the analyst's theory and technique on the flow of the analysis and on the analyst's subsequent interpretation of the analysis and recognizes the multiplicity of approaches to analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)