Spectrum Leasing to Cooperating Secondary Ad Hoc Networks

The concept of cognitive radio (or secondary spectrum access) is currently under investigation as a promising paradigm to achieve efficient use of the frequency resource by allowing the coexistence of licensed (primary) and unlicensed (secondary) users in the same bandwidth. According to the property-rights model of cognitive radio, the primary terminals own a given bandwidth and may decide to lease it for a fraction of time to secondary nodes in exchange for appropriate remuneration. In this paper, we propose and analyze an implementation of this framework, whereby a primary link has the possibility to lease the owned spectrum to an ad hoc network of secondary nodes in exchange for cooperation in the form of distributed space-time coding. On one hand, the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service in terms of either rate or probability of outage, accounting for the possible contribution from cooperation. On the other hand, nodes in the secondary ad hoc network compete among themselves for transmission within the leased time-slot following a distributed power control mechanism. The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of Stackelberg games. We consider both a baseline scenario with full channel state information and information-theoretic transmission strategies, and a more practical model with long-term channel state information and randomized distributed space-time coding. Analysis and numerical results show that spectrum leasing based on trading secondary spectrum access for cooperation is a promising framework for cognitive radio.     

Game-theoretic spectrum sharing for cognitive radio based on the expectation of primary users

Cognitive radio is a new intelligent wireless communication technique for remedying the shortage of spectrum resource in recent years. Secondary users have to pay when they share available spectrum with primary users while price is an important factor in the spectrum allocation. Based on the game theory, an improved pricing function is proposed by considering the expectation of primary users. In this article, expectation represents the positivity of sharing spectrum with primary users. By introducing the positivity, price not only becomes different for different secondary users, but also can be adjusted according to the positivity. It is proved that the Nash Equilibrium of the new utility function exists. The simulation results show that spectrum sharing can not only be determined by the channel quality of secondary users, but also can be adapted according to the expectation of primary users. Besides, the proposed algorithm improves the fairness of sharing.     

改进的认知无线电频谱共享博弈模型

提出了一种改进的认知无线电频谱共享模型.该模型综合考虑了主用户的收益受到所有次用户请求带宽的影响,以及每个次用户的收益受到其他次用户请求带宽的影响;同时,与次用户竞争的主用户能够通过选择最佳带宽定价来获得最大的收益,相互竞争或合作的次用户通过从有限的频谱中改变请求频谱带宽来获得最大收益.对改进模型的静态博弈、动态博弈及其稳定性、帕累托最优等特性的仿真结果证明该模型适应实际情况.     

基于强化学习的合作频谱分配算法

为了解决认知无线电网络中的频谱分配问题,提出了一种基于用户体验质量的合作强化学习频谱分配算法,将认知网络中的次用户模拟为强化学习中的智能体,并在次用户间引入合作机制,新加入用户可以吸收借鉴其他用户的强化学习经验,能够以更快的速度获得最佳的频谱分配方案;并且在频谱分配过程中引入了主用户和次用户之间的价格博弈因素,允许主用...     

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market‐driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well‐designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non‐negative. A near‐optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cooperative spectrum sharing of multiple primary users and multiple secondary users

This paper proposes a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) based cooperative dynamic spectrum access (DSA) framework that enables multiple primary users (PUs) and multiple secondary users (SUs) to cooperate in spectrum sharing. By exploiting MIMO in cooperative DSA, SUs can relay the primary traffic and send their own data at the same time, which greatly improves the performance of both PUs and SUs when compared to the non-MIMO time-division spectrum sharing schemes. Especially, we focus on the relay selection optimization problem among multiple PUs and multiple SUs. The network-wide cooperation and competition are formulated as a bargaining game, and an algorithm is developed to derive the optimal PU-SU relay assignment and resource allocation. Evaluation results show that both primary and secondary users achieve significant utility gains with the proposed framework, which gives all of them incentive for cooperation.     

Hybrid model of inter-stage spectrum trading in multistage game-theoretic framework

Dynamic spectrum access(DSA),consisting of spectrum sharing and spectrum trading stage,becomes a promising approach to increase the efficiency of spectrum usage and system performance.In this paper,from the perspective of individual interest optimization,we focus on strategy adaptation of network users and their interaction in spectrum trading process.Considering adverse effects on decision-making accuracy and the fairness among network users via local information acquirement,a hybrid game model based on global information of relevant spectrum is proposed to formulate intelligent behaviors of both primary and secondary users.Specifically,by using the evolutionary game theory,a spectrum-selection approach for the evolution process of secondary users is designed to converge to the evolutionary equilibrium gradually.Moreover,competition among primary users is modeled as a non-cooperative game and an iterative algorithm is employed to achieve the Nash equilibrium.The simulation results show that the proposed hybrid game model investigates network dynamics under different network parameter settings.     

Dynamics of Multiple-Seller and Multiple-Buyer Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Game-Theoretic Modeling Approach

We consider the problem of spectrum trading with multiple licensed users (i.e., primary users) selling spectrum opportunities to multiple unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users). The secondary users can adapt the spectrum buying behavior (i.e., evolve) by observing the variations in price and quality of spectrum offered by the different primary users or primary service providers. The primary users or primary service providers can adjust their behavior in selling the spectrum opportunities to secondary users to achieve the highest utility. In this paper, we model the evolution and the dynamic behavior of secondary users using the theory of evolutionary game. An algorithm for the implementation of the evolution process of a secondary user is also presented. To model the competition among the primary users, a noncooperative game is formulated where the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution (in terms of size of offered spectrum to the secondary users and spectrum price). For a primary user, an iterative algorithm for strategy adaptation to achieve the solution is presented. The proposed game-theoretic framework for modeling the interactions among multiple primary users (or service providers) and multiple secondary users is used to investigate network dynamics under different system parameter settings and under system perturbation.     

Quality of service assurance-based auction for spectrum sharing systems

Spectrum sharing has emerged as a promising solution to address the radio frequency spectrum bottleneck. The FCC has recently proposed a spectrum sharing framework that introduces a spectrum access system as the governing entity that manages access to spectrum for primary and secondary users to coexist. An important aspect of dynamic spectrum management is the pricing of spectrum from the perspective of both the primary and secondary users. Existing auction-based spectrum sharing models do not take into consideration an important aspect of successful secondary user operation: the duration of the available spectrum opportunity. In this paper we propose an auction-based spectrum sharing framework that statistically accounts for the accuracy of the estimates of spectrum availability duration. The proposed auctioning process allows both the PU and the SU to iteratively adjust their evaluation about the available spectrum opportunities over time and to achieve a price combination that maximizes their objectives. A method is proposed to statistically assure spectrum availability, supplementing the reporting method. Hidden Markov models and non-stationary hidden Markov models are used to estimate the activity of the spectrum, with simulation results showing high prediction accuracy.     

Study on optimization strategy for hybrid underlay/overlay spectrum sharing based on queuing model

In order to improve the licensed spectrum utilization in cognitive radio networks,and provide higher experience quality to system users,the optimizing strategies of the hybrid underlay/overlay spectrum sharing mode was studied.For secondary users,a queuing model with service time following two phase order exponential distribution was constructed,and a method to obtain the steady state distribution was presented for the system model.Based on reward-cost structure,individual optimization strategy with observable case and the Nash equilibrium strategy with unobservable case were discussed.With purpose of optimal social benefit and maximal spectrum incomes,the pricing policies for secondary users to use licensed spectrum were formulated.Using the system experiment,the relations among the different optimal strategies were investigated,and the rationality of the price mechanism was verified.By contrasting the optimal social benefits gained by hybrid underlay/overlay spectrum sharing mode,overlay spectrum sharing mode and underlay spectrum sharing mode,it is further shown that the social optimization strategy of hybrid overlay/underlay sharing mode is more effective and stable to fully use the spectrum resource.     

Dynamic spectrum access in IEEE 802.22- based cognitive wireless networks: a game theoretic model for competitive spectrum bidding and pricing [accepted from open call]

The emerging IEEE 802.22-based wireless regional area network technology will use the same radio spectrum currently allocated for TV service. This standard will use the concept of cognitive radio based on dynamic spectrum access to provide wireless access services in a large coverage area. A brief overview of the current state of the IEEE 802.22 standard is provided with a particular emphasis on the spectrum management (i.e., spectrum sensing and dynamic spectrum access) in this standard. Key research issues related to spectrum trading among TV broadcasters, WRAN service providers, and IEEE 802.22-based cognitive radio users are identified. To this end, a hierarchical spectrum trading model is presented to analyze the interaction among WRAN service providers, TV broadcasters, and WRAN users. In this model a double auction is established among multiple TV broadcasters and WRAN service providers who sell and buy the radio spectrum (i.e., TV bands), respectively. Again, multiple WRAN service providers compete with each other by adjusting the service price charged to WRAN users. We propose a joint spectrum bidding and service pricing model for WRAN service providers to maximize their profits. A non-cooperative game is formulated to obtain the solution in terms of the number of TV bands and the service price of a service provider. Numerical results are presented on the performance of this joint spectrum bidding and pricing model.     

Towards trustworthy collaboration in spectrum sensing for ad hoc cognitive radio networks

Cognitive radio networks (CRN) make use of dynamic spectrum access to communicate opportunistically in frequency bands otherwise licensed to incumbent primary users such as TV broadcast. To prevent interference to primary users it is vital for secondary users in CRNs to conduct accurate spectrum sensing, which is especially challenging when the transmission range of primary users is shorter compared to the size of the CRN. This task becomes even more challenging in the presence of malicious secondary users that launch spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks by providing false spectrum reports. Existing solutions to detect such malicious behaviors cannot be utilized in scenarios where the transmission range of primary users is limited within a small sub-region of the CRN. In this paper, we present a framework for trustworthy collaboration in spectrum sensing for ad hoc CRNs. This framework incorporates a semi-supervised spatio-spectral anomaly/outlier detection system and a reputation system, both designed to detect byzantine attacks in the form of SSDF from malicious nodes within the CRN. The framework guarantees protection of incumbent primary users’ communication rights while at the same time making optimal use of the spectrum when it is not used by primary users. Simulation carried out under typical network conditions and attack scenarios shows that our proposed framework can achieve spectrum decision accuracy up to 99.3 % and detect malicious nodes up to 98 % of the time.     

基于合约制的认知网络协作频谱共享模型

为了提高认知无线电网络中主用户的能效和谱效,提出了一种基于合约制的协作频谱共享新模型。在该模型中,当主用户信道质量差时,次用户为其提供中继服务;作为回报,在主用户信道质量好时,次用户可以在一定的干扰约束下以underlay的模式和主用户共享频谱。在此框架下引入经济学中的合约理论,将主次用户间的协作问题建模为合约设计问题,并建立了主次用户评价合约收益的效用函数,将提高主用户的能效和谱效问题转变为设计合约使主用户获得最大效用的优化问题,并利用差分进化算法对该问题求解。最后,在不同的环境下,将主用户协作与不协作获得的效用进行对比,结果表明,主用户在没有额外投入频谱资源的条件下,不仅节省了发送功率,而且有效地提高了数据传输速率,进而提高了能效和谱效。     

Optimisation of sensing time and transmission time in cognitive radio-based smart grid networks

Cognitive radio (CR)-based smart grid (SG) networks have been widely recognised as emerging communication paradigms in power grids. However, a sufficient spectrum resource and reliability are two major challenges for real-time applications in CR-based SG networks. In this article, we study the traffic data collection problem. Based on the two-stage power pricing model, the power price is associated with the efficient received traffic data in a metre data management system (MDMS). In order to minimise the system power price, a wideband hybrid access strategy is proposed and analysed, to share the spectrum between the SG nodes and CR networks. The sensing time and transmission time are jointly optimised, while both the interference to primary users and the spectrum opportunity loss of secondary users are considered. Two algorithms are proposed to solve the joint optimisation problem. Simulation results show that the proposed joint optimisation algorithms outperform the fixed parameters (sensing time and transmission time) algorithms, and the power cost is reduced efficiently.     

Economic Approaches for Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

Efficient resource allocation is one of the key concerns of implementing cognitive radio networks. Game theory has been extensively used to study the strategic interactions between primary and secondary users for effective resource allocation. The concept of spectrum trading has introduced a new direction for the coexistence of primary and secondary users through economic benefits to primary users. The use of price theory and market theory from economics has played a vital role to facilitate economic models for spectrum trading. So, it is important to understand the feasibility of using economic approaches as well as to realize the technical challenges associated with them for implementation of cognitive radio networks. With this motivation, we present an extensive summary of the related work that use economic approaches such as game theory and/or price theory/market theory to model the behavior of primary and secondary users for spectrum sharing and discuss the associated issues. We also propose some open directions for future research on economic aspects of spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks.     

Bandwidth Resource Competition in Cooperative Cognitive Wireless Communications

In this paper, we analyze the behavior of Cooperative Cognitive Wireless nodes for the bandwidth resource competition using the ecological models of mutualism. We transform our cooperative cognitive wireless communication (CCWC) system as mutually interacting species. The two types of species are primary and secondary users. The Primary users have under-utilized licensed bandwidth to be shared with the secondary users. On the other hand, secondary users are willing to behave as possible relays for cognitive primary users, in exchange of shared licensed bandwidth. So, instead of pricing model, the proposed system is analyzed with the traditional barter system (exchange of commodities). We analyzed our proposed system based on three ecological models. Our first model is based on the coalitional form of Lotka–Volterra equations, where predator-prey role of mobile nodes are replaced with cooperation as in symbiosis. The second model deals with the population dynamism of strategically interacting partner for conflicting bandwidth resource. The third model adds the dynamism for the varying amount of bandwidth to be shared among the individual mobile users. For each type, a mathematical model is derived and then simulated for the equilibrium position analysis. The obtained results show that sharing of bandwidth resource is essential for the existence of CCWC systems.     

Cross‐layer design of partial spectrum sharing for two licensed networks using cognitive radios

To utilize spectrum resources more efficiently, dynamic spectrum access attempts to allocate the spectrum to users in an intelligent manner. Uncoordinated sharing with cognitive radio (CR) users is a promising approach for dynamic spectrum access. In the uncoordinated sharing model, CR is an enabling technology that allows the unlicensed or secondary users to opportunistically access the licensed spectrum bands (belonging to the so‐called primary users), without any modifications or updates for the licensed systems. However, because of the limited resources for making spectrum observations, spectrum sensing for CR is bound to have errors and will degrade the grade‐of‐service performance of both primary and secondary users. In this paper, we first propose a new partial spectrum sharing policy, which achieves efficient spectrum sharing between two licensed networks. Then, a Markov chain model is devised to analyze the proposed policy considering the effects of sensing errors. We also construct a cross‐layer design framework, in which the parameters of spectrum sharing policy at the multiple‐access control layer and the spectrum sensing parameters at the physical layer are simultaneously coordinated to maximize the overall throughput of the networks, while satisfying the grade‐of‐service constraints of the users. Numerical results show that the proposed spectrum sharing policy and the cross‐layer design strategy achieve a much higher overall throughput for the two networks. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coopetive Spectrum Trading – Creating Endogenous Spectrum Holes

Dynamic spectrum access has been proposed to address the spectrum scarcity. Based on this access mode, secondary users are allowed to opportunistically operate when primary users are absent. Secondary Users are, however, required to relinquish the spectrum upon return of the incumbent spectrum holder. Although it improves spectrum utility, opportunistic spectrum access limits secondary users’ access to exogenous spectrum holes vacated by primary users. We argue that spectrum holes should be endogenous, enabled by incentives to incumbent users to increase spectrum availability, while mitigating risk. To this end, we take a different perspective on dynamic spectrum sharing and propose a coopetive framework, whereby primary and secondary users engage in a cooperative, yet competitive, auction-driven spectrum sharing to enhance spectrum usage. In this framework, the primary users’spectrum is organized in three bands, namely exclusive usage, usage right and management right bands. Based on this structure, spectrum is traded as financial options to increase trading flexibility and capture the value primary and secondary users attach to spectrum access and usage. Spectrum trading between primary and secondary users is formalized as a utility maximization problem. Approximate solutions to this problem are derived and their performance is analyzed. The results show that spectrum trading, which combines revocable and exclusive leasing, provides higher utilities for both primary and secondary users.     

Dynamic spectrum access using the interference temperature model

To combat spectral overcrowding, the FCC investigated new ways to manage RF resources. The idea was to let people use licensed frequencies, provided they can guarantee interference perceived by the primary license holders will be minimal. With advances in software and cognitive radio, practical ways of doing this are on the horizon. In 2003, the FCC released a memorandum seeking comment on the interference temperature model for controlling spectrum use. Analyzing the viability of this model and developing a medium access protocol around it are the main goals of this article. A model consisting of interference sources, primary licensed users, and secondary unlicensed users is modeled stochastically. If impact on licensed users is defined by a fractional decrease in coverage area, and this is held constant, the capacity achieved by secondary users is directly proportional to the number of unlicensed nodes, and is independent of the interference and primary users’ transmissions. Using the basic ideas developed in the system analysis, interference temperature multiple access, a physical and data-link layer implementing the interference temperature model, was formulated, analyzed, and simulated. A system implementing this model will measure the current interference temperature before each transmission. It can then determine what bandwidth and power it should use to achieve a desired capacity without violating an interference ceiling called the interference temperature limit. Ultimately, the resulting performance from the interference temperature model is low, compared to the amount of interference it can cause to primary users. Partly due to this research, in May 2007, the FCC rescinded its notice of proposed rule-making implementing the interference temperature model.     

Centralized spectrum leasing via cooperative SU assignment in cognitive radio networks

As the increasing demand of the radio spectrum, the researchers pay more attention to the technology of cognitive radio networks to improve the use of the scarce spectrum resources. Recently, cooperative communications combining with cognitive radio have been proposed in many literatures to improve the channel capacity. The primary users with poor transmission environment transmit their packets with the assistance of the secondary users (SUs) by offering them spectrum resources. This paper first raises issues in existing works, such as non‐optimal selection, selection collision, and transmission interruption. Aiming at these issues, we design a centralized system model and a cooperative relaying protocol for multiple primary user pairs to dynamically lease spectrum in exchange for the transmission assistance of SUs. Then we define 2 problems of the cooperative SU assignment to maximize total rate and maximize number of assigned SUs. We prove they are NP‐hard and propose a local search algorithm for the objective of maximize total rate and a ‐approximation algorithm for another objective. Our simulation results show that our system and algorithms can effectively improve the performance of the wireless networks.