Abstract argumentation

In this paper we explore the thesis that the role of argumentation in practical reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular is to justify the use of defeasible rules to derive a conclusion in preference to the use of other defeasible rules to derive a conflicting conclusion. The defeasibility of rules is expressed by means of non-provability claims as additional conditions of the rules.We outline an abstract approach to defeasible reasoning and argumentation which includes many existing formalisms, including default logic, extended logic programming, non-monotonic modal logic and auto-epistemic logic, as special cases. We show, in particular, that the admissibility semantics for all these formalisms has a natural argumentation-theoretic interpretation and proof procedure, which seem to correspond well with informal argumentation.In the admissibility semantics there is only one way for one argument to attack another, namely by undermining one of its non-provability claims. In this paper, we show how other kinds of attack between arguments, specifically how rebuttal and priority attacks, can be reduced to the undermining of non-provability claims.     

On Resolving Conflicts Between Arguments

Argument systems are based on the idea that one can construct arguments for propositions—structured reasons justifying the belief in a proposition. Using defeasible rules, arguments need not be valid in all circumstances, therefore, it might be possible to construct an argument for a proposition as well as its negation. When arguments support conflicting propositions, one of the arguments must be defeated, which raises the question of which (sub‐) arguments can be subject to defeat. In legal argumentation, metarules determine the valid arguments by considering the last defeasible rule of each argument involved in a conflict. Since it is easier to evaluate arguments using their last rules, can a conflict be resolved by considering only the last defeasible rules of the arguments involved? We propose a new argument system where, instead of deriving a defeat relation between arguments, arguments for the defeat of defeasible rules are constructed. This system allows us to determine a set of valid (undefeated) arguments in linear time using an algorithm based on a JTMS, allows conflicts to be resolved using only the last rules of the arguments, allows us to establish a relation with Default Logic, and allows closure properties such as cumulativity to be proved. We propose an extension of the argument system based on a proposal for reasoning by cases in default logic.     

A new approach to hybrid probabilistic logic programs

This paper presents a novel revision of the framework of Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programming, along with a complete semantics characterization, to enable the encoding of and reasoning about real-world applications. The language of Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programs framework is extended to allow the use of non-monotonic negation, and two alternative semantical characterizations are defined: stable probabilistic model semantics and probabilistic well-founded semantics. These semantics generalize the stable model semantics and well-founded semantics of traditional normal logic programs, and they reduce to the semantics of Hybrid Probabilistic Logic programs for programs without negation. It is the first time that two different semantics for Hybrid Probabilistic Programs with non-monotonic negation as well as their relationships are described. This proposal provides the foundational grounds for developing computational methods for implementing the proposed semantics. Furthermore, it makes it clearer how to characterize non-monotonic negation in probabilistic logic programming frameworks for commonsense reasoning. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Negation as Failure as Resolution

Providing a clean procedural semantics of the Negation As Failure rule in Logic Programming has been an open problem for some time now. This rule has been treated as a technique in nonmonotonic reasoning, not as a rule in classical logic. This paper contains a demonstration of the negation as failure rule as a resolution procedure in first-order logic. We present a sound and complete resolution scheme for negation as failure rule for the larger class of constraint logic programs. The approach is to consider a canonical partition of the completion of a definite (constraint) program into the IF and the FI programs. We show that a negated goal, provable from the completed definite program is provable from just the FI part. The clauses in this program have a structure dual to that of definite Horn clauses. We describe a sound and complete linear resolution rule for this fragment, and show that a resolution proof of the negated goal from the FI part corresponds to a finite failure tree resulting from classical linear resolution applied to the goal on the If part of the original definite program. Our work shows that negation as failure rule can be computationally efficient in the sense that the SLD-resolution on the If part of a definite program along with the negation as failure rule is more efficient than a direct resolution procedure on the completion of that program.     

The IKBALS project: Multi-modal reasoning in legal knowledge based systems

In attempting to build intelligent litigation support tools, we have moved beyond first generation, production rule legal expert systems. Our work integrates rule based and case based reasoning with intelligent information retrieval.When using the case based reasoning methodology, or in our case the specialisation of case based retrieval, we need to be aware of how to retrieve relevant experience. Our research, in the legal domain, specifies an approach to the retrieval problem which relies heavily on an extended object oriented/rule based system architecture that is supplemented with causal background information. We use a distributed agent architecture to help support the reasoning process of lawyers.Our approach to integrating rule based reasoning, case based reasoning and case based retrieval is contrasted to the CABARET and PROLEXS architectures which rely on a centralised blackboard architecture. We discuss in detail how our various cooperating agents interact, and provide examples of the system at work. The IKBALS system uses a specialised induction algorithm to induce rules from cases. These rules are then used as indices during the case based retrieval process.Because we aim to build legal support tools which can be modified to suit various domains rather than single purpose legal expert systems, we focus on principles behind developing legal knowledge based systems. The original domain chosen was theAccident Compensation Act 1989 (Victoria, Australia), which relates to the provision of benefits for employees injured at work. For various reasons, which are indicated in the paper, we changed our domain to that ofCredit Act 1984 (Victoria, Australia). This Act regulates the provision of loans by financial institutions.The rule based part of our system which provides advice on the Credit Act has been commercially developed in conjunction with a legal firm. We indicate how this work has lead to the development of a methodology for constructing rule based legal knowledge based systems. We explain the process of integrating this existing commercial rule based system with the case base reasoning and retrieval architecture.     

System LS: A Three-Tiered Nonmonotonic Reasoning System

In this paper, a formal system of nonmonotonic reasoning is developed, which takes as its inspiration the manner in which some people make logically justifiable conclusions about nonmonotonic reasoning problems. The people, when asked about individuals, compare the logical strength of the arguments relating any sets to which the individual belongs, to other sets. A three-tiered system of rules including rules of System P as well as Transitivity and Monotonicity is developed. The system, known as System LS for logical strength, deals with three levels of non-strict relationships:

• α ₁β  α are normally β ( more than half of the α are β ) ;

       
  
  

Computers and legal reasoning: Developments in Germany

The importance of reasoning in law is pointed out. Law and jurisprudence belong to the reasoning-conscious disciplines. Accordingly, there is a long tradition of logic in law. The specific methods of professional work in law are to be seen in close connection with legal reasoning. The advent of computers at first did not touch upon legal reasoning (or the professional work in law). At first computers could be used only for general auxiliary functions (e.g., numerical calculations in tax law). Gradually, the use of computers for auxiliary functions in law has become more specific and more sophisticated (e.g., legal information retrieval), touching more closely upon professional legal work. Moreover, renewed interest in AI has also fostered interest in AI in law, especially for legal expert systems. AI techniques can be used in support of legal reasoning. Yet until now legal expert systems have remained in the research and development stage and have hardly succeeded in becoming a profitable tool for the profession. Therefore it is hoped that the two lines of computer support, for auxiliary functions in law and for immediate support of legal reasoning, may unite in the future.Herbert Fiedler is professor of Legal Informatics, general theory of law and penal law in the Department of Economics and Law at the University of Bonn.     

An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic

When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation yields a semantics for default logic based on temporal epistemic models. A comparison between the various semantics for default logic will show the differences and similarities of these approaches and ours.     

CAUPS系统中的时空推理机制与算法

动态城市规划方案仿真系统中的一个重要问题就是抽象和提取仿真对象之间涉及到的空间和时间逻辑关系,并以此作为仿真过程的基本准则和规范动态推理演算。为了建立CAUPS系统中的时空推理机制,针对城市规划方案的动态仿真过程中需要应用到的基本准则和规范,在传统时空关系描述和推理规范的基础上定义出适用于面向城市规划动态仿真的时空关系。考虑到城市规划过程中存在的非刚体对象,提出面向城市辅助规划系统方案应用结果仿真的时间空间推理规范,该规范能够非常好的支持如植被、水域等非刚体对象,并给出一个适合多Agent系统采用的时间空间推理规范执行解决方案,包括时间推理规范算法和空间推理规范算法。面向城市规划的时间推理规范算法和空间推理规范算法已经被成功应用于CAUPS系统底层的多Agent交互关系调整中。     

A logic for reasoning with inconsistency

Most known computational approaches to reasoning have problems when facing inconsistency, so they assume that a given logical system is consistent. Unfortunately, the latter is difficult to verify and very often is not true. It may happen that addition of data to a large system makes it inconsistent, and hence destroys the vast amount of meaningful information. We present a logic, called APC (annotated predicate calculus; cf. annotated logic programs of [4, 5]), that treats any set of clauses, either consistent or not, in a uniform way. In this logic, consequences of a contradiction are not nearly as damaging as in the standard predicate calculus, and meaningful information can still be extracted from an inconsistent set of formulae. APC has a resolution-based sound and complete proof procedure. We also introduce a novel notion of epistemic entailment and show its importance for investigating inconsistency in predicate calculus as well as its application to nonmonotonic reasoning. Most importantly, our claim that a logical theory is an adequate model of human perception of inconsistency, is actually backed by rigorous arguments.A preliminary report on this research appeared in LICS'89.Work of M. Kifer was supported in part by the NSF grants DCR-8603676, IRI-8903507.Work of E. L. Lozinskii was supported in part by Israel National Council for Research and Development under the grants 2454-3-87, 2545-2-87, 2545-3-89 and by Israel Academy of Science, grant 224-88.     

Jumps and logic in the law

The main stream of legal theory tends to incorporate unwritten principles into the law. Weighing of principles plays a great role in legal argumentation, inter alia in statutory interpretation. A weighing and balancing of principles and other prima facie reasons is a jump. The inference is not conclusive.To deal with defeasibility and weighing, a jurist needs both the belief-revision logic and the nonmonotonic logic. The systems of nonmonotonic logic included in the present volume provide logical tools enabling one to speak precisely about various kinds of rules about rules, dealing with such things as applicability of rules, what is assumed by rules, priority between rules and the burden of proof. Nonmonotonic logic is an example of an extension of the domain of logic. But the more far-reaching the extension is, the greater problems it meets. It seems impossible to make logical reconstruction of the totality of legal argumentation.The lawyers' search for reasons has no obvious end point. Ideally, the search for reasons may end when one arrives at a coherent totality of knowledge. In other words, coherence is the termination condition of reasoning. Both scientific knowledge and knowledge of legal and moral norms progresses by trial and error, and that one must resort to a certain convention to define what error means. The main difference is, however, that conventions of science are much more precise than those of legal scholarship.Consequently, determination of error in legal science is often holistic and circular. The reasons determining that a legal theory is erroneous are not more certain than the contested theory itself. A strict and formal logical analysis cannot give us the full grasp of legal rationality. A weaker logical theory, allowing for nonmonotonic steps, comes closer, at the expense of an inevitable loss of computational efficiency. Coherentist epistemology grasps even more of this rationality, at the expense of a loss of preciseness.     

Probabilistic Reasoning Under Coherence in System P

In this paper we apply a probabilistic reasoning under coherence to System P. We consider a notion of strict probabilistic consistency, we show its equivalence to Adams' probabilistic consistency, and we give a necessary and sufficient condition for probabilistic entailment. We consider the inference rules of System P in the framework of coherent imprecise probabilistic assessments. Exploiting our coherence-based approach, we propagate the lower and upper probability bounds associated with the conditional assertions of a given knowledge base, obtaining the precise probability bounds for the derived conclusions of the inference rules. This allows a more flexible and realistic use of System P in default reasoning and provides an exact illustration of the degradation of the inference rules when interpreted in probabilistic terms. We also examine the disjunctive Weak Rational Monotony rule of System P⁺ proposed by Adams in his extended probabilistic logic. Finally, we examine the propagation of lower bounds with real -values and, to illustrate our probabilistic reasoning, we consider an example.     

Assumption‐Based Argumentation Equipped with Preferences and its Application to Decision Making,Practical Reasoning,and Epistemic Reasoning

The existing approaches that map the given explicit preferences into standard assumption‐based argumentation (ABA) frameworks reveal some difficulties such as generating a huge number of rules. To overcome them, we present an assumption‐based argumentation framework equipped with preferences (p_ABA). It increases the expressive power of ABA by incorporating preferences between sentences into the framework. The semantics of p_ABA is given by extensions, which are maximal among extensions of ABA with regard to the extension ordering “lifted” from the given sentence ordering. As a theoretical contribution of this study, we show that prioritized logic programming can be formulated as a specific form of p_ABA. The advantage of our approach is that not only does p_ABA enable us to express different kinds of preferences such as preferences over rules, over goals, or over decisions by means of sentence orderings but we can also successfully obtain solutions from extensions of the p_ABA expressing the respective knowledge for various applications such as epistemic reasoning, practical reasoning, and decision making with preferences in a uniform and domain‐independent way without suffering from difficulties of the existing approaches.     

RGITL: A temporal logic framework for compositional reasoning about interleaved programs

This paper gives a self-contained presentation of the temporal logic Rely-Guarantee Interval Temporal Logic (RGITL). The logic is based on interval temporal logic (ITL) and higher-order logic. It extends ITL with explicit interleaved programs and recursive procedures. Deduction is based on the principles of symbolic execution and induction, known from the verification of sequential programs, which are transferred to a concurrent setting with temporal logic. We include an interleaving operator with compositional semantics. As a consequence, the calculus permits proving decomposition theorems which reduce reasoning about an interleaved program to reasoning about individual threads. A central instance of such theorems are rely-guarantee (RG) rules, which decompose global safety properties. We show how the correctness of such rules can be formally derived in the calculus. Decomposition theorems for other global properties are also derivable, as we show for the important progress property of lock-freedom. RGITL is implemented in the interactive verification environment KIV. It has been used to mechanize various proofs of concurrent algorithms, mainly in the area oflinearizable and lock-free algorithms.     

A model of legal reasoning with cases incorporating theories and values

Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted to model legal reasoning. In this paper we put forward a formal model of reasoning with cases which captures many of the insights from that previous work. We begin by stating our view of reasoning with cases as a process of constructing, evaluating and applying a theory. Central to our model is a view of the relationship between cases, rules based on cases, and the social values which justify those rules. Having given our view of these relationships, we present our formal model of them, and explain how theories can be constructed, compared and evaluated. We then show how previous work can be described in terms of our model, and discuss extensions to the basic model to accommodate particular features of previous work. We conclude by identifying some directions for future work.     

Defeasible logic versus Logic Programming without Negation as Failure

Recently there has been increased interest in logic programming-based default reasoning approaches which are not using negation-as-failure in their object language. Instead, default reasoning is modelled by rules and a priority relation among them. In this paper we compare the expressive power of two approaches in this family of logics: Defeasible Logic, and sceptical Logic Programming without Negation as Failure (LPwNF). Our results show that the former has a strictly stronger expressive power. The difference is caused by the latter logic's failure to capture the idea of teams of rules supporting a specific conclusion.     

A Mechanization of Unity in PC-NQTHM-92

This paper presents in detail how the Unity logic for reasoning about concurrent programs was formalized within the mechanized theorem prover PC-NQTHM-92. Most of Unitys proof rules were formalized in the unquantified logic of NQTHM, and the proof system has been used to mechanically verify several concurrent programs. The mechanized proof system is sound by construction, since Unitys proof rules were proved about an operational semantics of concurrency, also presented here. Skolem functions are used instead of quantifiers, and the paper describes how proof rules containing Skolem function are used instead of Unitys quantified proof rules when verifying concurrent programs. This formalization includes several natural extensions to Unity, including nondeterministic statements. The paper concludes with a discussion of the cost and value of mechanization.     

Comparing Alternatives in the law*

This paper argues the thesis that a particular style of reasoning, qualitative comparative reasoning (QCR), plays a role in at least three areas of legal reasoning that are central in AI and law research, namely legal theory construction, case-based reasoning in the form of case comparison, and legal proof. The paper gives an informal exposition of one particular way to deal with QCR, based on the author’s previous work on reason-based logic (RBL). Then it contains a substantially adapted formalisation of RBL, to make RBL suitable for dealing with QCR. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of related work. *This paper is based on the chapters 3 and 4 of Hage 2005.     

Modelling default and likelihood reasoning as probabilistic reasoning

This paper presents a probabilistic analysis of plausible reasoning about defaults and about likelihood. Likely and by default are in fact treated as duals in the same sense as possibility and necessity. To model these four forms probabilistically, a logicQDP and its quantitative counterpartDP are derived that allow qualitative and corresponding quantitative reasoning. Consistency and consequence results for subsets of the logics are given that require at most a quadratic number of satisfiability tests in the underlying prepositional logic. The quantitative logic shows how to track the propagation error inherent in these reasoning forms. The methodology and sound framework of the system highlights their approximate nature, the dualities, and the need for complementary reasoning about relevance.Much of this research was done while at the University of Technology, Sydney, Broadway, NSW, Australia, and some at the Turing Institute, 36 Nth. Hanover Str., Glasgow, Scotland.