Evaluative judgments of aspects of life as a function of vicarious exposure to hedonic extremes.

In 2 experiments with 156 female undergraduates, the hypothesis was corroborated that vicarious exposure to hedonic extremes—especially the hedonically negative—results in contrast regarding evaluative judgments of aspects of life that have evolved or been acquired in the course of life beyond the laboratory. In Exp I, Ss who wrote about hedonically negative events occurring at the turn of the century expressed greater satisfaction on a composite index of present life quality than Ss who wrote about hedonically positive events. In Exp II, Ss who wrote about hedonically negative events (personal tragedies) scored higher on a composite index of satisfaction with life, health, and physical appearance than Ss who wrote about hedonically positive events. The findings for the composites corroborate a comparison level model of evaluative judgment. The findings for individual items, however, suggest that aspects of life are not evaluated in terms of a single utility scale and standard—the comparison level. Other findings are discussed that appear to contradict a simple affective model of evaluation in which the positivity of evaluations is postulated to increase with the positivity of affective states. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk.

Investigated the role of affect in judgments of risk in 4 experiments. 557 Ss were recruited on college campuses and read paragraphs modeled after newspaper reports that described fatal or nonfatal accidents or (Exp III) positive events. Ss were later asked to estimate the chances of specific fatal or nonfatal accidents happening to them and/or to the population in general. Experimental manipulations of affect induced by report of a tragic event produced a pervasive increase in Ss' estimates of the frequency of many risks and other undesirable events. Contrary to expectation, the effect was independent of the similarity between the report and the estimated risk: An account of a fatal stabbing did not increase the frequency estimate of homicide more than the estimates of unrelated risks such as natural hazards. An account of a happy event that created positive affect produced a comparable global decrease in judged frequency of risks. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Role of out-group cues in determining social identity.

Examined the role of out-group cues in determining social identity and guiding behavior in 2 experiments with 131 undergraduates. In Exp I, Ss were exposed to a cue either of an in-group (Ss' college), a relevant out-group (a rival college), or an irrelevant out-group (a baseball team). Ss examined a list of words and were later asked to recognize those they had seen from a larger list in which words related to the 3 groups were embedded. Results indicate that Ss made more false recognitions of in-group related words when a relevant out-group was salient than when an irrelevant out-group was salient. Exp II tested a behavioral implication of Exp I: Out-group salience increases adherence to an in-group norm. In the 1st phase of Exp II, Ss were divided into 2 groups and deliberated 2 civil suits. Ss' in-group favored the plaintiffs for both cases. Ss were divided into new groups for the 2nd phase, and the same procedure was followed. This time, however, the in-group favored the defendants. In the 3rd phase, Ss were exposed to a cue either of the out-group in Phase 1 or Phase 2. Ss' judgments for 2 new cases were biased in the direction of the norm of the in-group that was associated with the salient out-group. Ss favored the plaintiff (or defendant) when the 1st (or 2nd) out-group was salient. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Some psychological effects associated with positive and negative thinking about stressful event outcomes: Was Pollyanna right?

173 undergraduates completed an event-outcome appraisal questionnaire designed to make salient positive and negative thoughts about the outcomes of recent stressful events. Ss' well-being was assessed both immediately after the salience manipulation and again 8 wks later. Results show that positive thinking increased the well-being that Ss reported immediately after their thoughts were assessed but was unrelated to the well-being they reported after the 8-wk delay. It is suggested that although thinking positively about past event outcomes may temporarily lead to perceptions of increased well-being while the thoughts are salient, it has no enduring influence. In contrast, negative thinking was associated with lower reported well-being not only when the thoughts were salient but after a delay as well. Psychological effects associated with both types of thinking were due mostly to self-relevant thoughts rather than to externally relevant ones. Negative thinking about prior stressor outcomes appeared to increase vulnerability to the impact of later ones on several aspects of well-being. It is concluded that the absence of negative thinking, rather than the presence of positive thinking, is beneficial. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response biases and the relation between negative life events and psychological symptoms.

Investigated whether reporting biases can account for the correlation between negative life events and subclinical psychological symptoms. 73 undergraduates each brought a close friend to the experiment. Ss completed the Beck Depression Inventory, the Brief Symptom Inventory, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and a college student life events schedule. Friends were asked to report about life events experienced by the Ss. Findings did not support an S reporting bias associated with social desirability, depression, or symptoms. For one of the life events scales, depression was significantly associated with a higher rate of agreement between Ss and friends as to which negative events occurred to Ss. There were significant correlations between symptom and depression measures and life events measures that were free of S-reporting biases (Ss' negative life events reported by both Ss and their significant others, as well as Ss' negative life events as reported by significant others alone). Data suggest that response biases may not be able to account for the relation between negative events and psychological symptoms. It is contended, however, that the hypothesis that negative life events play a significant role in symptom development remains plausible. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Misleading postevent information and recall of the original event: Further evidence against the memory impairment hypothesis.

Evaluated the hypothesis that misleading postevent information impairs memory for the original event using 174 undergraduates in Exp I and 228 Ss in Exp II. Ss were assigned either to a recall test condition or an original recognition test condition. Ss viewed a sequence of slides depicting an event, read a postevent narrative that presented neutral or misleading information about critical details, and were tested on their ability to recall the critical details. No difference in recall performance between misled and control conditions was found. These results, in conjunction with the finding of M. McCloskey and M. Zaragoza (see record 1986-03053-001) that misleading information did not affect Ss' ability to recognize original information, argue strongly against the memory impairment hypothesis. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social reference points.

Conducted 2 experiments in which a total of 324 undergraduates were asked to make similarity judgments about social concepts, varying the direction of the comparison specified by the question. Asymmetries in rated similarity were used to diagnose concepts that function as habitual reference points. In Exp I, after completing the Self-Monitoring Scale, Ss were asked to make directional judgments about themselves vs a friend along various dimensions (social and physical). Ss were found to rate a friend as more similar to themselves than vice versa along both social and physical dimensions, suggesting that the self served as a reference point. In Exp II Ss made global similarity comparisons between themselves and typical examples of various social stereotypes. Directional asymmetries were inversely related to the extent of Ss' knowledge about the stereotypes: The self acted as a reference point with respect to stereotypes with few known attributes but not with respect to those with many attributes. The relation between level of self-monitoring and asymmetry effects was weak and inconsistent in both experiments. Results suggest that concepts serving as social reference points vary across judgment contexts in accord with general cognitive models of similarity comparisons. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Race, class, and the attributional process.

Two experiments examined the process and content of attributional thinking in Black and White children who differed in socioeconomic status (SES). In Exp I, 171 7th graders subdivided into middle-SES Black, middle-SES White, low-SES Black, and low-SES White groups imagined that they succeeded or failed at an examination, with the cause of the outcome specified. Their perceptions of the dimensional properties of causes (locus, stability, and controllability), expectancy for success, teacher evaluation, and affective reactions were reported. Similar judgments were made in Exp II, with 148 of the Ss from Exp I, in response to actual rather than hypothetical success and failure, and Ss' causal attributions for their performance were reported. Analyses revealed that Blacks did not display a less adaptive attributional pattern than did Whites following actual performance, and no differences existed in Ss' understanding of the meaning (dimensional placement) of causes. A linkage between the locus of causes and affect also was documented in all race?×?SES groups. In contrast, race and class differences occurred in Ss' perceptions of predicted stability–expectancy and controllability–evaluation causal linkages. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Referencing and bias in social interaction.

Examined the consequences of schematic referencing for social behavior. In Exp I, 23 female and 21 male undergraduates worked in pairs on a word association task. In the self-referencing condition, Ss were told that their partner would judge their personality; in the other-referencing condition, Ss were asked to judge their partner's personality. Results show biased recall of Ss' own behavior over another person's behavior in a dyadic interaction. Exp II employed an alternative, more realistic manipulation of self-referencing using situational cues. 16 pairs of undergraduate Ss performed the same word association task either in front of judges or by themselves. The biased recall effect was replicated. Moreover, corresponding biases in Ss' attributions about the quality of their performance were found. Results confirm that self-referencing cues can cause the sort of egocentric reactions that have been observed in previous studies in which members of an interaction remember more of their own contributions and attribute more responsibility for joint tasks to themselves. (9 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social judgeability: The impact of meta-informational cues on the use of stereotypes.

According to a social judgeability analysis, a crucial determinant of impression formation is the extent to which people feel entitled to judge a target person. Two experiments, with a total of 113 undergraduates, tested the impact of the subjective availability of individuating information on a social judgment independent of its actual presence. In Exp 1, Ss made a stereotypical judgment when they believed individuating information was present even if no information was in fact given. In Exp 2, Ss who thought they received individuating information made more extreme and confident judgments than Ss who thought they received category information. This indicates that Ss' judgments were not simply a function of implicit demand: The illusion of receiving individuating information led Ss to believe they possessed the necessary evidence for legitimate decision making. This result supports the existence of rules in the social inference process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affect, accessibility of material in memory, and behavior: A cognitive loop?

Conducted 2 studies to investigate the effect of good mood on cognitive processes. In Exp I, which was conducted in a shopping mall, a positive feeling state was induced by giving Ss a free gift; good mood, thus induced, was found to improve Ss' evaluations of the performance and service records of products they owned. In Exp II, with 47 undergraduates, affect was induced by having Ss win or lose a computer game in a laboratory setting; Ss who had won the game were better able to recall positive material in memory. Results are discussed in terms of the effect that feelings have accessibility of cognitions. In addition, the nature of affect and the relationship between good mood and behavior (such as helping) are discussed in terms of this proposed cognitive process. (38 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschool children's conceptions of transgressions: Effects of varying moral and conventional domain-related attributes.

57 38–76 mo old Ss enrolled in preschool and/or day care centers were assigned to either 6 story-stimulus conditions or to a word-evaluation condition. Ss in the 6 story-stimulus conditions either heard stories describing familiar moral or conventional transgressions or stories varying in the consistency of prohibitions regarding actions and responses to events. Some events were unspecified. Ss were asked to justify the events' wrongness and make a series of judgments on criteria previously found to be associated with the domains. Ss' judgments and justifications were reassessed 1 wk later. Results show that Ss differentiated between familiar moral and social-conventional transgressions and that they treated stories having attributes associated with each domain like prototypical moral or conventional transgressions. The presence or absence of information regarding event-unspecified consequences of actions differentiated criterion judgments. Responses to the word-evaluation condition (in which Ss' judgments were assessed in the absence of stories) revealed no response biases to the questions. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of mood on self-appraisal of health status.

Investigated the effects of temporary mood on the self-perception of health status in 2 experiments, using 44 and 90 undergraduates, respectively. In Exp I, Ss viewed 1 of 2 videotapes designed to induce either positive or negative mood and were asked to imagine an illness-related scenario and to provide judgments concerning their health status. Positive-induction Ss judged their health more favorably than negative-induction Ss. In Exp II, Ss viewed 1 of 2 mood induction tapes, and some Ss were asked to imagine either an illness-related scenario or illness-unrelated scenario. A 3rd group was given no instructions. Data are consistent with the notion that negative mood can affect subjective appraisals of health by increasing the accessibility of illness-related memories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The utility of theories in intuitive statistics: The robustness of theory-based judgments.

Research on human judgment demonstrates that people's theories often bias their evaluation of evidence and suggests that people might be more accurate if they were unbiased by prior beliefs. In 2 studies using the covariation estimation problem and the t-test problem, judgments made by Ss who had potentially biasing prior information about data were compared to those made by Ss who were not biased by prior information. 265 undergraduates served as Ss in Study 1; 201 undergraduates were Ss in Study 2. The quality of the data was varied to present Ss with data that were either well-behaved or contaminated with outliers. In both studies, Ss' judgments approximated robust statistical measures rather than the conventional measures typically used as normative criteria. The usual biasing effects of prior beliefs were found, along with an advantage for Ss who had prior theories—even incorrect ones—over Ss who were completely "objective." Potentially biasing beliefs both enhanced Ss' sensitivity to the bulk of the data and reduced the influence atypical scores had on their estimates. Evidence is provided that this robustness results from the fact that prior theories make judgment problems more meaningful. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Person perception and self-awareness: Knowledge of influences on one's own judgments.

96 college students watched 50 short interviews and rated the interviewees' intelligence, friendliness, or deceptiveness, then later estimated how the interviewees' characteristics had influenced their judgments. Ss were moderately accurate at estimating the impact of characteristics on their judgments, with the mean correlation between the actual influence and their estimates being 42. To control for Ss' use of a priori theories of causation, observers who did not see interviews or make person-perception judgments estimated how these characteristics would have influenced their judgments. Ss' self-awareness remained even after controlling for observers' estimates of effects. Although Ss showed self-awareness, their beliefs about what influenced them were also shaped by a priori theories about what should have influenced them. Ss' degree of self-awareness varied with the person-perception judgments they had made and the characteristics they were assessing. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aging and illusory correlation in judgments of co-occurrence.

Examined the influence of aging on illusory correlation in judgments of co-occurrence. Ten older (aged 60–76 yrs) and 10 younger (aged 17–29 yrs) Ss judged the probability of co-occurrence for events associated with preexisting expectancies after receiving nonsalient or salient information about the true probabilities of co-occurrence of the events. Results showed that when current information on event co-occurrence was not salient, preexisting expectancies strongly influenced the judgments of both younger and older Ss. However, when this information was salient, younger Ss' judgments reflected more accurate adjustment to the probabilistic relationships in the information than did older Ss' judgments. This age difference may be related to changes in memory processes that accompany increasing age and to differences in judgment processes necessitated by these changes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)