A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). This article calls for clarifications regarding its characterization of Heideggerian phenomenology. Kendler drew on his admittedly "limited understanding" (p. 322) of Heidegger and rested his critique upon a critical confusion that pervaded his presentation--a confusion of the ontological and ontic dimensions of Heidegger's work. In his depiction of authenticity as an objective set of values that form "a universal ethical system that is right for all humanity" (Kendler, 2005, p. 321), Kendler made the mistake of taking an ontological structure to instead prescribe an ontically particular way of living these structures out. Beyond the confusion of ontological structure with ontic particulars, Kendler's (2005) characterization of phenomenological inquiry as "naive" calls for a response. Indeed, whether one agrees with the epistemology of the co-constitution of phenomena or not, the epistemological rigor with which phenomenological psychologists consider approach--a term which "denote[s] the ways a science's basic presuppositions are intimately interrelated with the content it takes up and the methods it evolves" (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 4)--belies this charge (see also Giorgi, 1970, 1985; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clarifications with respect to psychology and phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). The comment author discusses the original article from three perspectives: the issue of subjectivity in phenomenology that he raised, the relevance of American phenomenological psychology to the topic to which Kendler oddly made no reference, and the promotion of and reservations about the "naturalization" of phenomenology in relation to psychology. Kendler advocated the "moral pluralism" of democracy. A similar position of advocacy for "methodological pluralism" is required (cf. Farber, 1967, p. 6). Recognition and respectful consideration of other methodologies in psychology advance the discipline and safeguard against intellectual parochialism and prejudice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ideology of logic in contemporary psychology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler sought to resolve the methodological issue that divides much of contemporary psychology--namely, the difference between natural science and human science in their respective views of psychological life. Whereas Kendler provided an evocative historical account of conflicts over how psychology has interpreted consciousness, the force of his analysis depends on the extent to which the proverbial "is/ought" distinction, invoked any time the question of "science" is at stake, can have any meaningful purchase in the face of a radical phenomenology like that of Martin Heidegger. Regrettably, Kendler's position in the end eclipses any intention to clarify our understanding of the relationship between "natural" and "human" science. The consequence of his article will not likely resolve the controversy he put before us, but if it does nothing more than provoke further discussion, Kendler will have provided our profession with an opportunity to understand more fully this business we call psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and obfuscation in Kendler's (2005) "clarification."

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and the naturalistic ethics of social policy.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. This argument is challenged with reference to the behaviorist position of ethical naturalism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dewey's integrated logic of science, ethics, and practice.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. J. Dewey's (1929 [1958], 1938) instrumentalism and logic of inquiry are presented as solutions to the trifurcation of theoretical science, ethics, and practical science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology depends on human nature.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). Kendler contrasted objective phenomena going on in the mind with phenomenological convictions. He concluded, on the basis of a thoughtful analysis, that scientific psychology cannot validate moral principles, which have to be agreed upon by discussion among educated members of a democratic community. He recommended psychological research on the consequences of social policies that may facilitate humans' decisions. I argue that research on the nature of phenomenological convictions is useful as well, enabling human beings to amend their strategies when reasoning about moral values. Scientific psychology can contribute to moral reasoning not only by examining social consequences of certain policies but also by highlighting the very process, starting from phenomenological convictions and ending in moral values within a community. Thus, psychological research contributes to the reflection of how members of a community exert their freedom and may give them the opportunity to enhance their reasoning and negotiation procedures. Scholars have to be humble and admit that the limit to this enhancement lies in the limitations of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A personal encounter with psychology (1937-2002).

An undergraduate assistantship with Maslow, research with S. Asch, and an indirect exposure to E. Nagel's philosophy of science encouraged H. H. Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with K. Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife T. Kendler, in the extension of the Hull-Spence model of cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology as well as its role in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why psychologists don't think like philosophers.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. This argument is cited in opposition to what is purported to be the position of the American Psychological Association on the abortion issue. It is suggested that PhD candidates in psychology be well versed in the philosophical issues and debates that are the foundation for the formation of ethical principles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Facts, values, and policies: A comment on Howard H. Kendler (2002).

In a recent article, Howard H. Kendler (2002) criticized Kenneth B. Clark and the other social scientists who worked in Brown v. Board of Education for polluting their science with value judgments. This article argues that Kendler's critique is misguided because it conflates a policy judgment with a value judgment. In addition, Kendler inconsistently applied his own standard of objectivity when he examined the social science used in Brown. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Values and Science: Reply.

Responds to Kendler (2004), Johnson (2004), and Zuriff (2004) who directed a number of criticisms against the authors' original article (see record 2003-03405-003) examining the psychological data and policy debates surrounding affirmative action. Kendler and Zuriff both chided the authors for interjecting values into the realm of science. The authors, however, state that both seriously misread the argument, imagining that they talked about "morality" when they did not. The authors claim to hold the same view as Kendler and Zuriff about the dichotomy between data and values and revisit portions of their argument further questioned. To Johnson, they state that the issues are not as clear cut as he has suggested. The authors do, however, reevaluate their original article in light of his criticisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On social psychology and policy analysis.

Responds to criticisms by H. H. Kendler (see record 1984-12071-001), I. J. Mansdorf (see record 1984-12073-001), D. A. Resnick (see record 1984-12082-001), and G. Caplan (see record 1984-12061-001) of the present author's (see record 1983-32571-001) social-psychological assessment of the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace, based on an analysis of Yasser Arafat's cognitive style. The author upholds the validity of his use of psychological principles in policy analysis, responds to specific criticisms related to cultural and political realities in the Middle East, and argues that recent political events support his conclusions concerning the readiness of Palestinians to seek peace. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

E pluribus unum.

Replies to comments on the original article by R. J. Sternberg and E. L. Grigorenko (see record 2001-10045-001), which described an approach to psychology ("unified psychology") which is a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrated study of psychological phenomena through converging operations. Sternberg and Grigorenko reply to comments by H. H. Kendler (see record 2003-03406-005), M. Y. Lau (see record 2003-03406-006), J. I. Kassinove (see record 2003-03406-007), W. Chovan (see record 2003-03406-008) and R. Chao (see record 2003-03406-009). Sternberg and Grigorenko note that the aforementioned authors disagree at least as much among themselves as they do with Sternberg and Grigorenko's proposals. Sternberg and Grigorenko provide brief replies to each published comment here. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Article-reading behavior of psychologists: A reply to Cohen.

Comments on the original article by L. H. Cohen (see record 1981-03972-001), in which Cohen compares his data to that of the current authors' earlier data on the extent to which clinical psychologists read research materials for their work. The current authors offer possible explanations for the discrepancies between the two articles' data. Additionally, they suggest that the possibility that clinical psychologists expose themselves less frequently to the research literature than do psychologists in general could have disturbing implications for the field of clinical psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

To medicate or not to medicate: Let us be honest about why we should.

Responds to the articles of P. H. DeLeon et al (see record 1991-25292-001) and S. J. Kingsbury (see record 1992-25066-001) on prescribing privileges for psychologists. It is argued that such privileges would help psychologists provide the best, most efficient, and least complicated care for the patients, unencumbered by a 3rd party. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The research-academic psychologist.

Responds to H. E. Rie's (see record 1977-30159-001) article, which was a plea for academicians to join with practitioners in the state psychological associations to develop a systematic program of mental health. Rie's suggestion that academic-research psychologists should stop publishing is disputed. The American Psychological Association's increasing focus on the needs of practitioners has made it more irrelevant to the needs of academic psychologists. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The place of facts in a world of values: Subject and object in a postmodern world": Errata.

Reports an error in the original article by R. J. Smith (Journal of Philosophical and Theoretical Psychology, 2001[Fall], 21[2], 153-172). On pages 160, 161, 166, and 167 the subject to object relationship was reported at "S/O". The corrected representation is "S?O". (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2002-10964-004.) The value-fact or subject-object split (S-O) recently defended by H. H. Kendler (1999) as necessary for a scientific psychology to establish facts, was rejected by Gestalt psychology as reducing the person to object status. The Gestalt solution correlating principles of perceptual organization with corresponding features of the object world (S/O) has however answered poorly to the vast cultural differences found in values. Communal/dialectical psychology in agreement with a postmodern worldview, treats facts as intrinsically value-laden social constructions mediated by a society's particular social relations (S?O) Examples of fact ambiguity are illustrated, and S?O is recommended as ontologically preferable for psychology as social science and for turn-of-the-millenium psycho-ecology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Counseling psychology and clinical psychology: Some preliminary comparative data.

Comments on L. F. Fitzgerald and S. H. Osipow's (see record 1986-25640-001) occupational analysis and statements regarding the lack of empirical bases to distinguish counseling psychologists from clinical psychologists by presenting findings from the present authors' own comparison of survey data from 716 counseling psychologists and 479 clinical psychologists. These data reveal several similarities and differences regarding counseling and clinical psychologists' theoretical orientations, occupational environments, amount of time devoted to specific professional and psychotherapeutic activities, and identification with a practitioner role. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)