A model of market power in electricity industries subject to peak load pricing

This paper studies the exercise of market power in price-regulated electricity industries under peak-load pricing and merit order dispatching, but where investment decisions are taken by independent generating companies. Within this context, we show that producers can exercise market power by under-investing in base-load capacity, compared to the welfare-maximizing configuration. We also show that when there is free entry with an exogenous fixed entry cost that is later sunk, more intense competition results in higher welfare but fewer firms.     

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The conversion of a one-player power sector (i.e., a natural monopoly) into a multiple-players power market brings not only benefits of competition but also the costs of complexity to the consumers. Between the two, an optimal number of players is found, corresponding to the minimum price of power to the consumers. Considering time as the third dimension, the optimum curve becomes a potential surface on which the evolution of the market entities is seen as oscillations (mergers and unbundling) along the valley of minimum price. Every oscillation triggers a price burst, which is detrimental to the consumers. To avoid this, the role of the regulator is better defined in the sense of smoothing the transition from monopoly to market. The example of the US and of the EU power sectors' evolution is relevant here. In the above approach, long-range competition resulting from the future opening of power markets in Europe or from the penetration, 70 years ago, of the interconnection technology in the USA, is compared with the short-range (local) competition.     

Challenges for engineers in the electric power industry

In pace with the worldwide trend, the Japanese electric power industries are being deregulated and entering into competitive markets. Generation and a large size retail market are open to competition. The transmission system is open for use by new power suppliers, while utilities get the freedom of new business expansion. Traditional electric power utilities and new players are actively preparing for the new environment. This article discusses the challenges and opportunities for engineers in the electric power industry created by the changes occurring in the industry today.     

Monopoly power in the oil market and the macroeconomy

This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of oil price shocks caused by innovations in the monopoly power in the oil market. Monopoly power is interpreted as oil producers' ability to charge a markup over marginal costs. We propose a novel way to identify markup shocks based on meetings of the OPEC and show their unique macroeconomic consequences compared to supply and demand shocks. In particular, global real economic activity expands when oil producers' monopoly power rises. A general equilibrium model suggests that higher monopoly profits attract investments in oil producing capital which drive down marginal costs and stimulate economic growth.     

Incentives to invest in liberalised electricity industries in the North and South. Differences in the need for suitable institutional arrangements

The issue of investment is all too often underplayed in deregulation reforms focused on market rules and de-integration measures. This presentation criticises first the optimistic approach of the theory of investment incentives through market signals when it is applied to deregulated electricity industries. The greater part of the investment in base-load and peak equipment should be made profitable by income from very high prices during peak and extreme peak periods, that raises a problem of political acceptability. The problem is then addressed in the context of the mature electricity industries in the North. Given the maturity of markets there, a number of modifications to the pure market model could be envisaged to strengthen incentives to invest, but none of them is perfect. The main way is to focus on adaptation of market rules on the supply of power at peaks and extreme peaks by considering “capacity adequacy” as a public good (with three solutions: capacity payment, reserve obligations, centralised procurement by auctioning for peak capacity). Observation of reforms suggests also the validity of some other solutions based on a limitation of the competition by allowing long-term contracts and vertical integration between production and supply. Finally the question is extended to the specific problem of developing countries characterised by irregular growth. It is argued that reforms must be designed in view of the importance of the need for investment through long-term coordination and reduction of investment risks. Indeed experiences of Latin American liberalised industries show that they have to include a number of competition-based imperfections and to allow ongoing exercise of market power in order to allow prices to rise above competition prices. The single buyer model or some variants of it appear to be good alternatives if one wishes to avoid the twists and turns of the competition paradigm. The difficulty with this model arises from the institutional conditions necessary to make it efficient and not overcostly.     

Pass-through of the policy-induced E85 subsidy: Insights from Hotelling's model

We build a structural model of imperfect competition for a retail market that supplies both low-ethanol (E10) and high-ethanol (E85) gasoline blends. The model permits us to study some impacts of the E85 subsidy induced by the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard, specifically how the pass-through of this subsidy to retail prices is affected by market power. The model is rooted in Hotelling's horizontal differentiation framework, which is extended to also represent the imperfect substitutability between E10 and E85 (a vertical product differentiation attribute). The model naturally captures two sources of imperfect competition in the fuel market—refueling stations' market power arising from their spatial location, and limited availability of E85 stations. We derive both analytical and numerical solutions for Nash equilibrium outcomes under various scenarios. In our baseline parameterization, when the penetration of E85 stations is incomplete, we find that the pass-through rate is about 0.7. Complete penetration of E85 stations leads to near complete pass-through, notwithstanding the market power enjoyed by stations because of their spatial location. With monopolistic market power (e.g., collusion), however, with full penetration of E85 stations the pass-through rate is lower. Moreover, when market power only arises from location differentiation (duopoly model with full penetration of E85), the pass-through rate converges to one as the subsidy gets large, whereas it converges to zero if a station has exclusivity in selling E85 (partial penetration of E85) or there is collusion/monopoly power from collusion.     

What happened to efficiency in electricity industries after reforms?

The last two decades have witnessed widespread power market reforms in both developed and developing countries that have cost billions of dollars. Among the key aims (and assumptions) of these reforms, there has always been realization of improvements in power sector efficiency. This paper questions the validity of this hypothesis. Using panel data from 92 countries covering the period 1982–2008, empirical models are developed and analyzed. The research findings suggest that the impact of the reforms on electricity industry performance is statistically significant but also limited. The results imply that, after controlling for country-specific variables, application of liberal market models in electricity industries slightly increases efficiency in power sector. Besides, we detect a positive relationship between reform process and the percentage share of network (transmission and distribution) losses in total electricity supplied, meaning that as countries take more reform steps the network losses as a fraction of power generated tend to increase. Moreover, the study puts forward that income level and other country specific features are more important determinants of industry efficiency than the reform process. Overall, contrary to expectations of substantial increases in sector efficiency, the paper concludes that introducing a decentralized market model with competition in the electricity sector has a limited increasing effect on power industry performance.     

Cooperate or compete: The Swedish electricity market in transition

The electricity market in Sweden in changing from being a geographic monopoly to allowing competition in areas other than transmission and distribution. When it was announced that the rules were about to change, a conflict arose between two of the larger generators concerning which of them should transmit electricity to a nearby distributor. The arguments used coincide with market theory but not with market practice. Ideally, a market consists of independent parts competing with one another to the advantage of customers, who obtain lower prices. In reality, organizations depend on one another and build social networks based on mutual trust. Such networks are essential for business and trade to develop. Preconceptions such as those shown by the parties here threaten, even before rules have been changed, to demolish an elaborate and extended system of cooperation.     

Long-term contract auctions and market power in regulated power industries

A number of countries with oligopolistic power industries have used marginal cost pricing to set the price of energy for small customers. This course of action, however, does not necessarily ensure an efficient outcome when competition is imperfect. The purpose of this paper is to study how the auction of long-term contracts could reduce market power. We do so in a two-firm, two-technology, linear-cost, static model where demand is summarized by a price inelastic load curve. In this context we show that the larger the proportion of total demand auctioned in advance, the lower are both the contract and the average spot price of energy.     

New accountabilities in utilities: fifty years of legal accountability in the gas industry

Privatisation was to have released the nationalised industries from the ‘dead hand of government’. Regulation with a ‘light hand’ was imposed to curb abuse of monopoly power. But as the industries have matured in the private sector we have seen regulation extended to cover a wider area, both in theory and in practice. This paper examines the change in responsibilities and the way they are divided between industry, regulator and government, tracing the legal accountability of the UK gas industry through nationalisation, privatisation and more recent regulation reform as an example. It concludes by questioning the appropriateness of the ‘vertical separation’, instituted by the privatisation and competition legislation, of responsibilities for the public interest and for organisational operations.     

Transmission capacities and competition in Western European electricity market

The integration of national electricity markets into a single European one is expected to reduce the ability of dominant players to exercise market power. This paper investigates whether or not existing transmission capacities of cross-border interconnectors are sufficient to achieve this result and create vigorous competition in the market. A model with two decision levels is used. On the first level profit maximizing generators play Cournot game against each other. On the last level the system operator clears the market and determines flows in the network to maximize social welfare subject to a set of physical constraints. As each strategic generator anticipates her impact on equilibrium prices and congestion in the system, her optimization problem is subject to equilibrium constraints from the system operator's problem.The analysis demonstrates that interconnector capacities in Western Europe are insufficient for integration alone to reduce the exercise of market power. I compare several possible competition-enhancing policies: expansion of interconnectors and different scenarios of national markets’ restructuring. I show that although increase of line capacity is a useful tool to stimulate competition in an integrated market, it is not a substitute for the restructuring of large players.     

Deregulation of ESI and privatization of state electric utilities in Thailand

In Thailand, electric supply services have all been taken over by the state and operated under state enterprises since 1968. Under a law empowering its monopoly, state utilities accumulated assets and built up their manpower to expand and operate the power system to serve the whole country. During the time of high growth in power demand in early the1990 s, the government initiated a move to privatize state electric utilities, the pace of which was firmed up after 1997, the year of the financial crash. Engagement of independent power producers (IPPs) through the use of long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) for supply of electric power into the system operated by state electric utilities was also initiated from the mid 1990s. Total capacity of IPPs and Small Power Producers (SPPs) that sell excess power from cogeneration on to the system) rose and by the late 1990s started to create a constraint on system economic dispatch. In 1999 the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) approved a recommendation of international consultants to transform the electric supply industry into a structure similar to the system in the United Kingdom. The transformation was proposed to precede corporatization and privatization of state electric utilities. The objectives of deregulation were to revoke the monopoly in ESI, to improve transparency in electricity pricing, to reduce debts of state enterprises, and to improve economic efficiency. Industry participants have voiced strong objection to the industry model proposed. With the change of market structure in UK to the New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA), the secretariat of NEPC also proposed a new structure similar to NETA. More acceptance from industry participants have been received for the new structure. However, it has been assumed that the proposed structure would bring improvement in system reliability, drawing investment into power generation in a manner that would be efficient. Tariff has also been expected to become lower because of the competition in power generation and retail trading. The authors argue that, for developing countries, issues of timely investment in new generation and delivery capacity, stable and reasonable price of electricity, reliability of power supply, fuel diversity and security, equitable access of supply and promotion of social equity are important. Maintaining a functioning ESI that meet the broad objectives of providing reliable power supply to serve social and economic development needs could be prioritized over introduction of complete competition in wholesale generation and retailing. The authors examine the present situation of the industry and propose a transitional model that would serve the broad objectives and introduce gradual competition in the industry. The proposed design would unbundle generation from transmission and retailing. It would aso eventually promote intra-regional interconnection and electricity trading.     

Analysis of competition and market power in the wholesale electricity market in India

The electricity reforms were initiated in India with the objective of promoting competition in the electricity market. In order to promote competition, the Electricity Act 2003 was enacted and various policy initiatives were taken by the Government of India. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) also facilitated competition through the regulatory framework of availability based tariff, Indian Electricity Grid Code, open access in inter-state transmission, inter-state trading and power exchanges. Despite these initiatives, electricity prices increased in the Wholesale Electricity Market in India (WEMI). This paper analyses the market structure and competitiveness in the WEMI. There are, of course, various potential reasons for the rise in the electricity price. This paper seeks to investigate, if market power was one of the reasons for increase in market prices. Concentration ratio, Herfindahl–Hirschman index, Supply Margin Assessment, and Residual Supply Index have been used to measure market power. This paper also uses the price–cost mark-up to examine, if exercise of market power led to higher margins. The analysis suggests that market power of firms may be part of the reason for the increase in electricity prices in WEMI. The study suggests various measures to increase competition in the WEMI.     

Towards a competitive market for electricity and consumer choice in the Indian power sector

The initial phase of reforms in the Indian power sector was primarily aimed at bringing regulatory reforms and unbundling of the vertically integrated State Electricity Boards (SEBs). Enactment of the Electricity Act 2003 led to deepening of the reform process by dismantling this monopoly in the power sector. Primary issues emerging on account of transition from a single-buyer model to a multi-buyer multi-seller model include, among others, policy and regulatory initiatives related to open access, power exchanges, and transmission allocation and its pricing. The paper provides an overview of the status of competition in various segments of the power sector. It also reviews the phased program for open access outlined by various State Electricity Regulatory Commissions, including their status and impact on competition. The paper highlights a number of residual issues for the wholesale and retail competition, and also discusses the approach to address the same. These include liberalization of fuel markets, market monitoring, unbundling of retail tariffs, universal service obligation, supplier of last resort and demand response.     

The diversity of design of TSOs

It is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analyzed within a [Wilson, R, 2002. Architecture of the power markets. Econometrica 70(4), 1299–1344] modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: (1) the short run management of network externalities; (2) the long run management of network investment; and (3) the coordination of neighboring transmission system operators (TSOs) for cross-border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified 27 options of organization, we define an ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that (1) monopoly design differs from this ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission, while (2) definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of TSOs are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organization.     

Market opening and third party access in district heating networks

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the possible effects of introducing TPA in district heating networks by identifying and scrutinizing a number of possible scenarios for increased competition. The analysis builds on a theoretical discussion of economic efficiency in district heating operations, and the possible impacts on consumer prices of a market opening. An important conclusion is that regulated TPA may have small positive effects on competition, and at the same time it can have a negative impact on the possibility to run the integrated district heating operations in a cost-effective manner. This conclusion stems in part from the observation that most district heating networks are local in scope. Moreover, district heating operations are highly interdependent in, for instance, that the level of the return temperature of the water will affect the efficiency of combined heat and power plants. For these reasons, the introduction of the so-called single-buyer model or, perhaps even more preferable, an extended and more transparent producer market could represent more efficient market designs. Moreover, in networks with clear natural monopoly characteristics an ex ante price regulation must be considered.     

Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets

This paper discusses the main competition issues that arise in electricity systems dominated by hydro generation, arguing that technological differences between hydro and thermal plants may allow hydropower producers to exert market power in different and subtler ways compared to thermal generators. The key for market power in hydro-based systems is the strategic allocation of a given amount of output across periods, rather than a straightforward reduction of total output. The paper examines the interaction between strategic hydro reservoir operation and transmission capacity constraints, and summarizes the implications of market power for system reliability. A review of recent relevant literature is included. Finally, possible interventions to mitigate market power are analysed.     

A game theoretic analysis of a closed-loop water-energy nexus: The effect of technology efficiency and market competition on the market equilibrium and social welfare

Water and energy are two scarce and concerning resources interconnected in the closed-loop water-energy nexus, exemplifying the co-dependence of water and energy production. In this article, we investigate the interaction between the industries of these two resources and model it as a simultaneous game. We consider a supply chain that consists of water suppliers (WSs), power suppliers (PSs), and consumers of these commodities. In the supply chain, WSs purchase power from the power market, and PSs purchase water from the water market. Other consumers can also buy these resources at the water and power markets. The prices of these commodities depend on their quantities supplied to the markets. Each firm tries to maximize its own profit, in doing so the suppliers of water and power decide their production quantities. In this research, the Nash equilibria of the firms are determined and a comparative statics is performed on various economic measures. When there are multiple equilibria, the analysis finds the Pareto optimal equilibrium. We find that when there is sufficient supply to meet the demand of both industries and consumers, improvement of production technology improves social welfare and other economic measures of the supply chain. We also find that higher competition in either industry improves all economic measures. However, when either water or power supply is solely consumed by the firms in the cross industry, improvement of technology and higher competition can have a negative effect on some measures.     

Market power in the European electricity market—The impacts of dry weather and additional transmission capacity

This paper uses a static computational game theoretic model of a fully opened European electricity market and can take strategic interaction among electricity-producing firms into account. The model is run for a number of scenarios: first, in the baseline under perfect competition, the prices differ due to the presence of various generation technologies and a limited ability to exchange electricity among countries. In addition, when large firms exercise market power, the model runs indicate that prices are the highest in countries where the number of firms is low. Second, dry weather would increase the prices in the hydro-rich Nordic countries followed by the Alpine countries. The price response would be about 20% higher with market power. Third, more transmission capacity would lower the prices in countries with high prices and it also reduces the impact of market power. Hence, more transmission capacity can improve market competitiveness.     

The prerequisite for competition in the restructured wholesale Saudi electricity market

Protection of customers against monopoly is the first and main objective of the Saudi Electricity and Co-generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA). The second important objective, as recommended by the present study, is regulating natural monopoly businesses [Saudi electricity national grid (SENG) and Saudi electricity distribution (SED)] in addition to promoting real competition in competitive businesses [power supply providers (PSPs) and customer service providers (CSPs)]. Another four main objectives of ECRA are to promote the efficient use of energy and natural resources, to ensure a reasonable rate of return for PSPs and CSPs and at the same time to be fair to end-users, to ensure reasonable charges to SENG and SED services to be adequate for them to run the organization in a break-even manner and to maintain the system's security and reliability. The present paper discusses the way to improve and restructure the Saudi electricity market.