Mood as a moderator of acceptance of interpersonal feedback.

Two studies demonstrated that feedback is likely to be accepted when its affective tone matches an individual's mood state. In Study 1, Ss in an induced positive mood were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of positive feedback, whereas Ss in an induced negative mood were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of negative feedback. In Study 2, after a neutral mood induction, nondepressed Ss were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of positive feedback, whereas depressed Ss were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of negative feedback. After a positive mood induction, both nondepressed and depressed Ss were more likely to change self-ratings in the direction of positive feedback. These results suggest that motivations for self-enhancement or self-consistency do not generally underlie acceptance of feedback. Instead, a model of accessibility of information in memory is proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of positive and negative feedback and degree of discrepancy on responses to test results.

169 undergraduates received falsified psychological test results that were discrepant in either positive or negative directions with their own reports on self-referring attitudes. They were then given the opportunity to change their self-reports and/or derogate the accuracy of the test interpreter. Ss who received negative feedback were more likely to derogate the interpreter, whereas Ss who received positive feedback were more likely to change their self-reports in the direction of the interpretation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Group decisions as social inference heuristics.

Three experiments investigated whether people use group decision outcomes as heuristic cues to judge group members' attitudes. In Experiment 1, Ss read a vignette in which a group's decision either was explicitly stated or in which Ss were compelled to infer the decision from other relevant information. It was hypothesized that Ss would be more likely to use the group decision outcome as an inference heuristic when the outcome was provided for them than when they were forced to generate that outcome. The results confirmed our hypothesis. In Experiment 2, a group decision was presented to Ss for whom the decision was either high or low in personal relevance. The results showed that Ss displayed a stronger correspondence bias for group decisions low in personal relevance than for ones high in personal relevance. Moreover, the decision outcome was better remembered over time than other decision-relevant information. Experiment 3 replicated this result for a nondichotomous decision outcome and also found that the more likely Ss were to remember the outcome over time, the more correspondent their inferences became. These and other data are shown to support a heuristic model of the social inference process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Outcome feedback: Hindsight and information.

Although "hindsight bias" research has demonstrated that outcome feedback leads people to exaggerate the odds they would have placed on known outcomes, learning theories view feedback as the key to effective adaptation. Our model and data show that outcome feedback has multiple effects. People can extract diagnostic information from feedback despite overestimating what they would have known in foresight. Ss reliably discriminate easy tasks where they "knew it all along" from difficult tasks where they "never would have known it"; differential reactions to feedback provide information useful in other judgment tasks such as assessment of population base-rates and personal knowledge calibration. In Experiments 1–4, feedback increased judgmental accuracy by over 150%. However, a final experiment suggests that certain tasks (insight problems) produce such strong "I knew it all along" reactions that hindsight can overwhelm the information contained in feedback and reduce predictive accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effect of delayed auditory feedback on process and reactive schizophrenic subjects.

A group of 20 male process schizophrenic, 20 male reactive schizophrenic, and 20 normal Ss read a passage aloud under delayed auditory feedback. S grouping, length of hospitalization, age, education, reading speed, and audiometric variables were controlled. It was theorized that normal Ss would be most affected by delayed auditory feedback, followed by reactive and then process Ss. Results do not support this hypothesis; after covarying for control reading time, the effect of diagnostic group disappeared. However, post hoc analysis revealed a subgroup of process patients more influenced by delayed auditory feedback than all other Ss. They were older, had shorter hospitalization, more education, lower control reading times, and higher process-reactive scores than the remaining process Ss. These patients are thought to constitute an "intermediate" schizophrenic group in their social organization and psychotic symptomatology. Thus, it is speculated that delayed auditory feedback could tap interactions between sensory and social variables in certain subsets of the schizophrenic population. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Protecting the self from the negative consequences of risky decisions.

Three experiments tested the idea that a motive to protect self-esteem (SE) from the threat of regret can influence decision making. Threat to SE was manipulated by varying whether people expected to know the outcome of their decisions. Study 1 showed that when Ss expected feedback about their decisions, only Ss low in SE made regret-minimizing choices. Study 2 showed that when Ss did not expect to know the outcome of their decisions, SE differences in choice strategies disappeared. Study 3 manipulated expectations about feedback on chosen and unchosen alternatives and showed that the more feedback that was expected, the more likely low but not high SE Ss were to make regret-minimizing choices. These studies suggest that people base decisions not only on objective attributes of choice alternatives, but also on the damage to SE that is perceived to result from a poor-decision outcome. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What is coded into memory in the absence of outcome feedback?

Although people often have to learn from environments with scarce and highly selective outcome feedback, the question of how nonfeedback trials are represented in memory and affect later performance has received little attention in models of learning and decision making. In this article, the authors use the generalized context model (Nosofsky, 1986) as a vehicle to test contrasting hypotheses about the coding of nonfeedback trials. Data across 3 experiments with selective decision-contingent and selective outcome-contingent feedback provide support for the hypothesis of constructivist coding (Elwin, Juslin, Olsson, & Enkvist, 2007), according to which the outcomes on nonfeedback trials are coded with the most likely outcome, as inferred by the individual. The relation to sampling-based approaches to judgment, and the adaptive significance of constructivist coding, are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Human factors in operating systems related to delay and displacement of retinal feedback.

Evaluated theories of response to altered retinal feedback i.e., associative learning doctrines and the feedback-compensation hypothesis in relation to their application in defining human factors principles in machine and perceptual training designs. Using 12 Ss, controlled comparisons were made of the relative effects of reversed and delayed feedback of head and eye movements under conditions in which head movements could not compensate altered feedback of eye movements and vice versa. Findings, e.g., the accuracy of ocular tracking, etc., are discussed. Some results indicate that there was little or no learned adaptation to the reversed and delayed vision produced by head and eye movements. Findings support a behavioral cybernetic interpretation of the guidance factors in man-machine and perceptual systems relationships by showing that the effects of altered feedback in machine and systems operation are determined by movement capabilities in compensating displacements and delays in sensory input. Results also suggest that visual impairments may be produced by delays in the retinal feedback effects of eye and head movements and that these defects may require dynamic methods of optometric diagnosis and training for their measurement and correction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-focusing effects of heartbeat feedback.

Two studies tested the hypothesis that auditory heartbeat feedback leads to an increase in self-directed attention. In Exp I, 10 female undergraduates exposed to a sound representing their heartbeat made greater self-attributions for hypothetical outcomes than did 10 similar Ss exposed to the same sound identified as an extraneous noise. Furthermore, Ss in the heartbeat condition showed a pattern of color-naming latencies (on a color-word test) that was consistent with the hypothesis that self-related information was being activated in memory. In contrast, no such pattern was observed among Ss in the noise condition. In Exp II, with 51 female and 28 male undergraduates, comparisons with appropriate control groups indicated that neither an extraneous noise nor the attachment of a heartbeat-recording device influenced self-attribution, but that the presence of either a constant or an accelerating heartbeat increased self-attribution. The latter 2 conditions did not differ from each other. Methodological and theoretical implications are discussed. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relinquishment of control and the Type A behavior pattern.

Past research suggests that Type A (coronary prone) Ss have a higher need for control than Type B (noncoronary prone) Ss, and empirical evidence documents their greater reactivity to control loss. The present study investigated the case of control decisions and examined the hypothesis that Type A's would be less willing than Type B's to relinquish control to another person. On an initial 20-trial RT task, 160 male undergraduates (typed on the basis of the Jenkins Activity Survey, Form T) received feedback about their own performance and about that of a partner. The feedback indicated equal or superior performance by the partner. On a subsequent replication of the task in which only 1 S could work on any 1 trial, Type A's relinquished fewer trials to their partners than did Type B's, particularly when the partner had exhibited a superior initial performance. Attribution data indicated that Type A's were less convinced of their partners' ability, thus justifying lower relinquishment. Implications for job stress and management decision making are discussed. (60 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma.

Used 172 undergraduates in 3 experiments to assess the effects of making salient either a superordinate (collective) or subordinate (differentiating) group identity in heterogeneous groups. In Exp I, 22 male and 36 female Ss were assigned to either a superordinate-group identity (small community resident behavior vs other areas) or a subordinate-group identity (behavior of young people vs elderly people) condition and were asked to perform a computer task individually; Ss were led to believe they were interacting with 5 other persons (2 real and 3 bogus Ss) in their group in accumulating as many points as possible while making the resource last as long as possible. Bogus feedback about group behavior was given. In Exp II, 29 male and 19 female Ss were told that the bogus Ss were economics majors and were asked to perform as in Exp I. In Exp III, the level of social-group identity for 40 male and 26 female Ss was manipulated by varying the common fate of the group members. Results of all 3 experiments show support for the hypothesis that individual restraint would be most likely when a superordinate group identity was made salient and under conditions in which feedback indicated that the common resource was being depleted. A sex-response difference found in Exp I was not sustained in subsequent experiments. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Test anxiety (worry and emotionality) changes during academic testing as a function of feedback and test importance.

Investigated the effects of feedback on fluctuations in immediately experienced test anxiety. In 2 studies, 55 and 144 college students responded to a brief test anxiety questionnaire in the context of a course examination, during which experimental Ss received item-by-item feedback. Worry, the cognitive component of anxiety hypothesized to be partially dependent on information available to the student during testing, was expected to decrease from preexamination to postexamination only in the feedback group. Study 1 results support the hypothesis. Emotionality, the physiological-affective component thought to be much less directly influenced by cognitive considerations, was not differentially affected by feedback conditions. Study 2 results indicate an interactive effect of test importance and feedback conditions on worry and emotionality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selective attention to negative feedback in Type A and Type B individuals.

In a study with 16 Type A (coronary prone) and 16 Type B (noncoronary prone) undergraduates, chosen by scores on the Jenkins Activity Survey, Ss were given a 4-min opportunity to gain feedback of their ostensible negative liabilities and positive assets. Specific asset and liability feedback was bogus and was held constant across all Ss. The amount of time spent in attending to negative information was the key dependent measure. Results show that Type A Ss selectively attended to significantly more negative information than did Type B Ss. It is suggested that selective attention to liability may exacerbate and/or maintain the Type A individual's belief of personal inadequacy and that this personal belief may in turn foster selective attention to liabilities. (8 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Understanding moral thought: Effects on moral reasoning and decision making.

89 16–18 yr olds' understanding of processes involved in moral reasoning and decision making was examined in relation to the Ss' level of moral reasoning, extent of prudential concerns, and consistency of decision making. Four qualitatively different levels of understanding of moral thought were identified. These levels were related to moral scores in 2 dilemmas: one involving a fictitious other and the other involving the self as protagonist. Ss with less understanding of moral thought were more likely to demonstrate lower moral scores and more prudential concerns in each perspective and to make a different decision (often prudentially rather than morally based) in the self-perspective. Ss who changed their decision in the self-perspective demonstrated lower self-perspective moral scores than Ss who demonstrated decision consistency. It is suggested that Ss with less understanding of the processes involved in moral thought are more likely to use moral reasons in the service of decisions they want to make for prudential reasons. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Interactive effects of test anxiety, test difficulty, and feedback.

Examined interactive effects of item difficulty, test anxiety, and failure feedback in a study of 67 undergraduates (mean age 20.1 yrs) using multiple-choice verbal aptitude items. Ss' levels of test anxiety were measured on the Achievement Anxiety Test and the Test Anxiety Scale. Ss were then randomly assigned to receive either a hard or an easy test either with or without immediate feedback. Results indicate that ability estimates can be affected in complex ways by the examinee's anxiety level. The least anxious Ss in the sample did best on a very hard test, and moderately anxious Ss did best on an easy test, whereas the most anxious Ss did poorly on both tests. In addition, it was found that immediate feedback improved performance, especially for Ss given an easy test. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effect of information feedback on matrices learning for differing socioeconomic levels.

Examined the differential effect of 2 kinds of information feedback on performance when used to train matrix completion strategies. A matrices training task was administered to 120 white male Ss representing Grades 1 and 3 and low- and middle-socioeconomic status (SES) levels. After 4 enclosure-type items had been learned under 1 of 2 feedback conditions, Ss responded to a transfer set of 10 similar items. Results indicate that the 3rd-grade Ss learned more quickly than the 1st-grade Ss (p 1969-02983-001) concerning differential conceptual performance abilities characteristic of different SES levels. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effect of instructions and feedback on blood alcohol level discrimination training in nonalcoholic drinkers.

Investigated whether nonalcoholic drinkers can be trained to discriminate their blood alcohol levels (BAL) on the basis of internal cues. 72 male undergraduates classified as heavy drinkers came to the laboratory for 3 consecutive sessions, each consisting of 5 BAL estimation trials. The 2 manipulated independent variables factorially combined were beverage sequence and administration of BAL feedback. All Ss were told that they would receive mixed drinks containing vodka and tonic on each day, and all Ss received alcohol on Day 1. On Day 2, half of the Ss received alcohol and half received tonic alone; similarly, half of the Ss in each of these groups received either alcohol or tonic on Day 3. No S received BAL feedback on Day 1, and one-third of Ss did not receive feedback on Days 2 and 3. The remaining Ss received feedback on Day 2; half of the latter Ss also received feedback on Day 3, and half did not. Ss did not learn to discriminate their BAL on the basis of internal cues. Results are discussed in reference to the utility of BAL discrimination training in alcoholism prevention programs. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Information choice and cue use: An experiment in group information processing.

The literature on group decision making suggests that collective decisions often differ from those of individuals. The present study, through the use of discriminant analysis, sought to account for performance differences between individuals and groups in a loan review situation involving 89 senior accounting or graduate business students. Ss were divided among 23 3-member groups and 20 individual Ss. Each group or individual received information about a business firm and was asked to classify its financial status. Information selection, cue use, and decision consistency were considered as explanatory variables. Results reveal significant performance differences between individual and committee decisions. These differences could not be accounted for by information selection or cue use, but the committees were found to be more consistent in their decisions. Unlike individuals, they were also able to improve their performance with supplementary financial information. Findings suggest that under certain circumstances, group decision making might be more effective than individual decision making because of information-processing advantages and the elimination of random individual error. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Acquiring self-knowledge: The search for feedback that fits.

Assessed the influence of self-conceptions on feedback solicited during social interactions. In Exp I, 79 undergraduates displayed a clear preference for feedback that would confirm their self-perceived emotionality and self-perceived assertiveness (Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values and the Texas Social Behavior Inventory). Exp II (113 undergraduates) assessed the extent to which Ss were willing to purchase feedback that would confirm their self-conceptions. Ss spent more money for the purchase of self-confirmatory than self-disconfirmatory feedback. Exp III (41 undergraduate and 33 graduate students) found that Ss regarded self-confirmatory feedback as especially informative. This suggests that feedback preferences may reflect a cognitively based tendency for people to regard confirmatory instances of phenomena to be more diagnostic and compelling than disconfirmatory instances. The discussion considers how people's efforts to solicit self-confirmatory feedback from others may stabilize their social environment, self-conceptions, and behavior. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)