Values and assumptions about values and assumptions.

Responds to comments by I. A. M. Nicholson, E. H. McWhirter, D. R. Ramm, and R. N. Sollod (see records 1998-00122-009, 1998-00122-010, 1998-00122-011, and 1998-00122-012) regarding I. Prilleltensky's (see record 1997-04451-002) article on the moral implications of psychological discourse and action. It is stated that these 4 authors, by commenting in a respectful fashion, show that they share the value of mutual understanding and the assumption that the best way to make progress in a discussion is through dialogue rather than moral exclusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clients deserve empirically supported treatments, not romanticism.

Comments on the article by K. J. Schneider (see record 1998-00122-001) on clinical psychology that spelled out implications for the entire discipline, elaborated the reasons for the threat to romanticism, the consequences that are associated with it, and the rich and practical advantages for reclaiming romanticism's legacy. The author mentions that romanticism can and should play a significantly greater role in our profession than it currently does. Finally, romanticism is discussed in light of another major alternative to mainstream psychology—postmodernism. The author argues that romanticism does have its place in psychology, but good science should not be sacrificed to revive it, particularly in clinical practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mistaken inferences.

Responds to P. E. Nathan's (see record 1998-00122-002) comments about the Consumer Reports mental health survey. The present authors contend that Nathan's comments contain serious errors and mistaken assumptions, stemming from a misunderstanding of the incidence rates for seeking professional care among subscribers. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sacred space, not sacred cows, or it's never fun being prophetic.

Replies to comments by E. F. Loftus (see record 1998-00766-029), S. Buchholz (see record 1998-00766-030), L. G. Humphreys (see record 1998-00766-031), D. S. Lindsay (see record 1998-00766-032), and T. Dineen (see record 1998-00766-033) regarding the article (see record 84-26142) concerning managed care and false memory movement issues in social justice-oriented psychology. Firstly, Brown contends that Loftus"s assertions of misrepresentation are inaccurate. Secondly, Brown argues that making memory retrieval per se the guiding strategy and goal of therapy is more likely to be detrimental than helpful to abuse survivors, and is not consistent with a pro-survivor stance. It is also stated that each claim of recovered memories must be evaluated carefully and on an individual basis in light of all available evidence. Lastly, Brown argues that her goal for her colleagues and readers was for them to develop and assert their own strategies for the achievement of tikkunolam, to be the authors of their own actions, as she attempts to create a therapy in which clients are the authors of their own lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Categorical thinking is the target.

Replies to the commentaries by R. G. Tweed, L. G. Conway, III, and Andrew G. Ryder (see record 1999-11644-006), T. L. Holdstock (see record 1999-11644-007), and R. J. Smith (see record 1999-11644-008) on Hermans and Kempen's article (see record 1998-12442-002) on the issues of globalization and localization in cross cultural psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What harm reduction is and isn't.

Replies to the comments by D. Cadogan (see record 1999-11644-010) and K. Resnicow and E. Drucker (see record 1999-11644-011) on the present author's article (see record 1998-11971-003) which examined 3 strategies for dealing with the harmful consequences of drug use and risky behaviors. The author clarifies some misunderstandings and highlights recent developments in the psychology of harm reduction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cross-cultural malaise.

Comments on the articles by M. H. Segall, W. J. Lonner, and J. W. Berry (see record 1998-12442-001) and H. J. M. Hermans and H. J. G. Kempen (see record 1998-12442-002) on cross cultural psychology. The present author examines the idea of globalization from each author's perspective. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Let's find basic behavioral systems first.

Highlights an issue covered by D. M. Buss et al (see record 1998-01669-001) on evolutionary thinking and its application to psychology, and their critique of S. J. Gould's views (see record 1992-11754-001) concerning exaptations and spandrels. The present author suggests a different direction that can be taken that may demonstrate that Gould's conception of the importance of spandrels and exaptations as "a mountain to the adaptive molehill" is "entirely backward". (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Neural plasticity and exaptation.

Comments that S. J. Gould (see record 1992-11754-001) posed something of a problem for D. M. Buss et al (see record 1998-01669-001) in his argument that human psychology links not to past evolutionary adaptations but to the coopting of previously evolved functions to do new things, or exaptation. The present author states that Buss et al observed that Gould failed to document this exaptation for any of the examples he mentioned because he could not demonstrate any "special design for the hypothesized function." He suggests that neural plasticity strongly links the brain, exaptation and human psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The vitality of old ideas.

Responds to the comments of N. Shpancer (see record 1998-00006-001), R. L. Richmond (see record 1998-00005-001), and J. R. Browning (see record 85-00001) on the article of J. Kagan (see record 83-35876) that discusses the psychological assumptions of: the influence of early experience, the generalizability of psychological processes, the primacy of sensory pleasure, and the issue of the relevance of animal studies and language to the human mind. Addressing Shpancer, Kagan reaffirms his stance on the assumption of the influential nature of early experience, by referencing the February 3, 1997, issue of Time magazine in which there appeared a supportive article entitled "How a Child's Brain Develops." Kagan agrees with Richmond's suggestion that language is unique to the human condition, however, he suggests that human guilt and shame are probably more relevant. Finally, Kagan addresses Browning's suggestion that self-esteem is a motivational variable in social psychology by noting that one cannot know if a behavior does maintain or increase a person's self esteem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Toward an emancipatory psychology.

Responds to comments by W. Mieder (see record 1991-03996-001), K. L. Dion (see record 1991-03991-001), and K. J. Gergen (see record 1991-03993-001) on T. B. Rogers's (see record 1991-03999-001) examination of the role of proverbs in psychology. It is argued that theory is important for the critical social functions it serves, rather than just for the quest for truth. Also, consideration of an emancipatory psychology is recommended, in which psychology is viewed as a socially embedded discipline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Grappling with diverse conceptions of diversity.

Replies to comments made by S. R. Wester and D. L. Vogel (see record 2002-12457-009), E. E. Sampson (see record 2002-12457-010), R. S. Campbell et al (see record 2002-12457-012), and S. C. Rooney (see record 2002-12457-013) regarding the article by R. E. Redding (see record 2001-00465-001) which discusses pluralism and sociopolitical diversity in psychology and argues that the discipline of psychology is liberally biased. The current author addresses the various articles' comments individually. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Editor’s choices.

Reviews the books, Mind regained by Edward Pols (see record 1998-06466-000); Manifesto of a passionate moderate by Susan Haack (1998); and Mind, meaning and mental disorder: The nature of causal explanation in psychology and psychiatry by Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill (see record 1996-98296-000). In different but equally compelling ways, these three books address central problems in philosophical psychology and offer telling replies to more complacent perspectives on the nature of mind and mental life. The first two of the volumes are by philosophers, the third by authors trained in clinical psychology and psychiatry. In different ways, each of the volumes is at war with simplistic conceptions of explanation; each is also careful to distinguish between the correctives needed and a lapse into relativistic and ultimately skeptical positions on the nature of knowledge itself. All three of these volumes would serve as useful, even essential, texts in advanced courses in theory and philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind. But so would they serve in interesting ways the larger aims of courses in Personality and Abnormal Psychology. Together, these books present encouraging reminders of the importance of conceptual analysis to the development and refinement of Psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Money and the mission of clinical psychology.

Replies to comments by S. R. Hamburg (see record 84-20390), J. W. Bush (see record 84-20386), and L. R. Lieberman (see record 84-20392) on K. Humphreys's paper (see record 83-28417) on clinical psychologists as psychotherapists. Humphreys questions 2 assumptions underlying the viewpoints of Hamburg, Bush, and Lieberman: (1) that clinical psychology has no influence over what society will pay for; and (2) that the success of clinical psychology is well indexed by money and jobs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

E pluribus unum.

Replies to comments on the original article by R. J. Sternberg and E. L. Grigorenko (see record 2001-10045-001), which described an approach to psychology ("unified psychology") which is a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrated study of psychological phenomena through converging operations. Sternberg and Grigorenko reply to comments by H. H. Kendler (see record 2003-03406-005), M. Y. Lau (see record 2003-03406-006), J. I. Kassinove (see record 2003-03406-007), W. Chovan (see record 2003-03406-008) and R. Chao (see record 2003-03406-009). Sternberg and Grigorenko note that the aforementioned authors disagree at least as much among themselves as they do with Sternberg and Grigorenko's proposals. Sternberg and Grigorenko provide brief replies to each published comment here. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Toward a psychology of persons.

Reviews the book, Toward a psychology of persons by W. E. Smythe (see record 1998-04017-000). One of the gems of the grand theoretical movement in contemporary psychology is the group known as the Western Canadian Theoretical Psychologists, founded in 1989. Their first book, Positivism in Psychology, edited by Charles Tolman, was published in 1992. This review is of the group's second volume, a result of their more recent discussions and debates concerning depersonalization in psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Teaching about animal research in psychology.

Responds to P. F. Cunningham's (see record 199604968-008) and S. D. Gosling's (see record 199604968-009) comments on M. Domjan and J. E. Purdy's (see record 1995-45383-001) study of the acknowledgment of contributions of animal experimentation in leading introductory psychology textbooks. The authors agree with Gosling that the primary goal of the general psychology course is to facilitate the students' understanding of psychology and that animal research is not presented in an educationally effective fashion in general psychology textbooks. However, it is argued that students need to know not only the conclusions of research but also something about how the research was conducted. In response to Cunningham's contention that psychology instructors will have to address why research animals are kept under stressful laboratory conditions, the authors note that psychology experiments typically do not involve deadly diseases or experimental pathologies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thorndike's science of values.

Comments on the article by B. Beatty (see record 1998-12442-007) which concluded that E. L. Thorndike's educational psychology was the beginning of an American behavioristic tradition that sought efficient, scientific solutions to education, moral, and social problems. The present author poses the question of whether science and psychology can reveal a moral code for humankind, or whether facts are incapable of revealing moral truths. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Animal research in psychology.

Responds to the comments of Y.-F. Lau and C. Cheney (see record 1998-02643-001) regarding S. Plous's (see records 84-20622 and 84-09797) articles on animal research in psychology. Addressing each of the points raised by Lau and Cheney, Plous summarizes that the methodological critique they offer is flawed on several grounds. Plous agrees, however, with their conclusion that psychologists should make every effort to educate students about animal research and the existing legal regulations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental Dynamics and Contemporary Evolutionary Psychology: Status Quo or Irreconcilable Views? Reply to Bjorklund (2003), Krebs (2003), Buss and Reeve (2003), Crawford (2003), and Tooby et al. (2003).

The authors address commentaries by D. F. Bjorklund (2003; see record 200309105-002); D. M. Buss and H. K. Reeve (2003; see record 200309105-004); C. B. Crawford (2003; see record 200309105-005); D. L. Krebs (2003; see record 2003-09105-003); and J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, and H. C. Barrett (2003; see record 2003-09105-006) on their analysis of the underlying assumptions of contemporary evolutionary psychology (R. Lickliter & H. Honeycutt, 2003; see record 200309105-001). The authors argue that evolutionary psychology currently offers no coherent framework for how to integrate genetic, environmental, and experiential factors into a theory of behavioral or cognitive phenotypes. The authors propose that this absence is due to a lack of developmental analysis in the major works of evolutionary psychology, resulting in an almost exclusive focus on adaptationist accounts of evolution by natural selection rather than a more broad-based focus on the process and products of evolution by epigenetic developmental dynamics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)