Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: Comment on Behrmann, Zemel, and Mozer (1998).

The validity of M. Behrmann, R. Zemel, and A Mozer's (see record 1998-04674-001) finding that object-based attention can be directed toward occluded objects is examined in 3 experiments. In A Behrmann et al.'s original study, participants made speeded judgments of whether the numbers of bumps attached to 2 arms of an X shape were the same or different. The 2 sets of bumps belonged either to a single object, 2 different objects, or 2 separated parts of an occluded object. Unfortunately, this objecthood manipulation was confounded by the symmetry of the stimuli. Experiment 1 replicated M. Behrmann et al.'s main results using identical stimuli. Experiments 2a and 2b dissociated objecthood from symmetry. The results suggest that the effects of object-based attention found by A Behrmann et al. are largely due to symmetry. The stimuli used in M. Behrmann et al. are not appropriate for examining the relation between object-based attention and occlusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Grouped locations and object-based attention: Comment on Egly, Driver, and Rafal (1994).

Recently, R. Egly et al (see record 1994-34191-001) provided evidence for an object-based component of visual orienting in a simple cued reaction time task. However, the effects of objects on visual attention can be due to selection from either of 2 very different types of representations: (1) a truly object-based representation that codes for object structure or (2) a grouped array representation that codes for groups of spatial locations. Are Egly et al's results due to selection from an object-based representation or from a grouped array representation? This question was addressed by using a variant of Egly et al's task. The findings replicated those of Egly et al and demonstrated that the selection in this task is mediated through a grouped array representation. The implications of these results for studies of attentional selection are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ethical knowledge, language, and the unconscious: Reply to Orange (2000).

The author replies to D. Orange's (2000) appreciative response to his article by exploring the notion of dialogical praxis and the relationship between unconsciousness and language. The moral and ethical aspects of analytic theory and practice are suggested to be indispensable in the effort to reconceptualize along practical or pragmatic lines. The author also favors the idea that language enriches and, to an extent, transforms and creates human experience, a view that is based on an encompassing view of language. It is suggested that only by appreciating how analytic theory and practice are embedded within a larger cultural stream of values and meanings will it be possible to sort out the contributions and limitations of psychoanalysis in the search for a more decent society and a more fulfilling way of life. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Grouped arrays versus object-based representations: Reply to Kramer et al. (1997).

An important issue in attention research concerns the representational format from which attention selects. S. P. Vecera and M. J. Farah (see record 1994-32352-001) presented results that they argued demonstrated attentional selection from a spatially invariant object representation. In their comment, A. F. Kramer, T. A. Weber, and S. E. Watson (see record 84-18014) questioned the interpretation of these results, and they presented evidence consistent with selection from a grouped location-based representation. In this reply, the author argues that although an absence of spatial, or distance, effects may be ambiguous as to whether attention is selecting from an object-based representation or from a location-based representation, there are computational considerations that favor object-based selection in certain tasks. The author concludes with a discussion of how object-based and location-based representations might interact with one another, thereby providing a possible explanation of Kramer et al.'s results. Such an account may lead to an understanding of how multiple forms of attentional selection may coexist in the visual system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Serial processing in reading aloud: Reply to Zorzi (2000).

K. Rastle and M. Coltheart (1999; see also M. Coltheart & K. Rastle, 1994) reported data demonstrating that the cost of irregularity in reading aloud low-frequency exception words is modulated by the position of the irregularity in the word. They argued that these data implicated a serial process and falsified all models of reading aloud that operate solely in parallel, a conclusion that M. Zorzi (2000) challenged by successfully simulating the position of irregularity effect with such a model. Zorzi (2000) further claimed that a reanalysis of K. Rastle and A Coltheart's (1999) data demonstrates sensitivity to grapheme-phoneme consistency (which he claimed was confounded across the position of irregularity manipulation) rather than the use of a serial process. Here, the authors argue that M. Zorzi's (2000) reanalyses were inappropriate and reassert that K. Rastle and A Coltheart's (1999) findings are evidence for serial processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A self-presentational view of psychotherapy: Reply to Hill, Gelso and Mohr (2000) and to Arkin and Hermann (2000).

The self-presentational view of psychotherapy challenges current assumptions about the benefits of high levels of clients' openness in therapy (A. E. Kelly, 2000; see record 2000-08364-001). The author responds to questions about whether clients' discretion really is linked to favorable therapy process ratings and outcomes (see record 2000-08364-002 and 2000-08364-003). She also addresses problems that may emerge if readers apply a narrow definition of self-presentation as a form of deliberate manipulation, rather than the intended definition of consciously or unconsciously showing oneself to be a particular kind of person for audiences. A brief review of the evidence on the role of audience feedback in self-concept change is offered, along with suggestions for explaining self-concept change to clients. The author concludes by clarifying and reasserting her suggestion that it is acceptable for clients to reveal the themes as opposed to details of their problems that seem particularly heinous or humiliating. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Revisiting the constraint attunement hypothesis: Reply to Ericsson, Patel, and Kintsch (2000) and Simon and Gobet (2000).

This article is part of an exchange concerning the contributions of the constraint attunement hypothesis (CAH) to the understanding of expertise effects in memory recall. K. A. Ericsson, V. Patel, and W. Kintsch (2000) and H. A. Simon and F. Gobet (2000) claim that the CAH is not novel and that existing theories of this phenomenon do not have the limitations that were attributed to them. In this reply, the CAH is argued to be the only theory of expertise effects in memory recall to adopt the abstraction hierarchy as a theory of the environment, a feature that has important theoretical implications. Also, other theories focus on psychological mechanisms but have not satisfied the burden of scientific proof required of process theories. Progress can be made by integrating the complementary advantages of existing theories into a unified theory that acknowledges the equally important roles of the organism and the environment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Executive functioning and alcohol-related aggression: Reply to Weingartner (2000), Bates (2000), Lyvers (2000), Cherek (2000), and Berman (2000).

H. Weingartner (see record 2000-02949-018), M. E. Bates (see record 2000-02949-014), M. Lyvers (see record 2000-02949-017), D. R. Cherek (see record 2000-02949-016), and M. E. Berman (see record 2000-02949-015) put forth some very interesting and thought-provoking commentaries on the author's executive functioning framework for alcohol-related aggression (P. R. Giancola; see record 2000-02949-013). Many of their comments raised very important questions such as how executive functioning should be defined and conceptualized. Specifically, they asked whether executive functioning is better conceptualized as a unidimensional macroconstruct or as a set of related, yet independent, cognitive processes. Another key question was what other factors does executive functioning interact with to facilitate intoxicated aggression. Although these issues are far from being resolved, the author hopes that his article, their commentaries, and his responses will generate new research that will ultimately help to better predict and prevent alcohol-related aggression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nature, culture, and explanations for erotic plasticity: Reply to Andersen, Cyranowski, and Aarestad (2000) and Hyde and Durik (2000).

R. F. Baumeister's (2000) (see record 2000-15386-001) article on erotic plasticity was criticized by B. L. Andersen, J. M. Cyranowski, and S. Aarestad (2000) (see record 2000-15386-003) for not being biological enough and by J. S. Hyde and A. M. Durik (2000) (see record 2000-15386-002) for being too biological. Both critiques were based on drawing a polarized caricature of R. F. Baumeister's actual view, although the two caricatures are opposites. Actually, neither commentary questioned the gender difference R. F. Baumeister documented; rather, the dispute is about how to explain it, which is indeed a challenge remaining for further work. Although both commentaries provided valuable suggestions about how to approach an explanation, neither approach can provide a coherent account until various theoretical problems are resolved and seemingly contrary empirical findings are addressed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selective attention and the formation of linear decision boundaries: Reply to Maddox and Ashby (1998).

In this reply to W. T. Maddox and F. G. Ashby's (see record 1997-38560-018) commentary, the author argues that (a) Maddox and Ashby's current stance represents a marked departure from their previously published claims about the unimportance of selective attention in categorization, (b) they are inconsistent with their own work when they criticize S. C. McKinley and R. M. Nosofsky's (see record 83-21759) tests of the linear-boundary models, (c) their arguments about modeling averaged data have no bearing on the central conclusions reached by McKinley and Nosofsky, and (d) they make incorrect assertions regarding the application and predictions of the exemplar model. Finally, the author defends the theoretical progress that has been made in recent years with the exemplar model and argues instead that it is the decision-bound theory of Ashby and Maddox that is in need of greater constraints. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The importance of frameworks for directing empirical questions: Reply to Goodie and Fantino (2000).

A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (see record 2000-16324-004) make two main criticisms of the predictions of M. C. Lovett and C. D. Schunn's (see record 1999-05245-001) RCCL model. (RCCL is pronounced 'ReCyCLe;" it stands for Represent the task, Construct a set of action strategies, Choose from among those strategies according to success rate, Learn new success rates.) In both cases, the authors believe the criticisms reflect a failure to appreciate the difference between broad frameworks and specific mathematical/computational models. In this article, the value of a broad framework, such as RCCL, in directing new empirical analyses and guiding theoretical development is shown. In particular, RCCL expands on existing work to reveal how variability and change in mental representations influence base-rate sensitivity. The authors also address several other issues raised by A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) and show that qualitative shifts in individuals' choice behavior are present in their original data—a key prediction of RCCL that does not appear in previous accounts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Process, not representation: Reply to Radavansky (1999).

The size of fan effects is determined by processes at retrieval, not by whether or not information is represented as situations. Evidence contradicts G. A. Radvansky's (see record 1999-05245-005) claim that time to retrieve information from a situation does not depend on the number of elements in the situation. Moreover, Radvansky's principles for ascribing situational models to experiments appear to be post hoc ways of redescribing the data. On the other hand, the evidence does support the Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational (ACT-R) assumption that participants can adjust their attentional weightings and so produce differential fan effects. Moreover, the ACT-R theory of the fan effect is consistent with many other findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Strain, Patterson, and Seidenberg (2002).

E. Strain, K. E. Patterson, and M. S. Seidenberg (2002) reported an effect of imageability and a Regularity X Imageability interaction in a regression analysis of naming latencies to 120 words. One of their items (couth) was named correctly by just 5 of their 24 participants, and its reaction time was an outlier on their distribution. When that single item is removed, the significant predictors are age of acquisition (AoA), word frequency, regularity, and length. Analyses of the combined data from J. Monaghan and A. W. Ellis's (2002) Experiments 1-3 indicate that AoA predicts naming latencies for exception words but not consistent words. E. Strain et al.'s other points are considered in the light of these observations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mentalism, mechanisms, and medical analogues: Reply to Wakefield (1998).

J. C. Wakefield's (1998) critique of W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts's (1996) article is addressed by raising questions about (a) mentalism as a framework for studying psychopathology, (b) the nature of inferred mechanisms and the process of making such inferences, and (c) the accuracy of claiming that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association) expansion is analogous to the success of physical medicine. The authors argue that Wakefield's analysis of mental disorders leads to the conclusion that the modern DSMs are not reflective of the progress of physical medicine. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Shill (2004).

Shill's (see record 2004-11107-008) claim that the intersubjective perspective does not address conflict and defense is glaringly mistaken. In his article on signal anxiety, Shill (2004) declared that "the intersubjectivist approach does not address issues of conflict and defense at all" (p. 119). Astoundingly, he seems to have made this absurd pronouncement without being aware of any of the numerous articles and chapters my collaborators and I have written on the subject of psychological conflict and defense over the past three decades, one of which was published in this very journal (Stolorow & Brandchaft, 1987). Our aim has never been to defocus emotional conflict but rather to contextualize it-that is, to locate it within constitutive intersubjective systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Alpert (1995).

Replies to J. L. Alpert's (see record 1995-44717-001) comment on Brenneis' (see record 1995-18442-001) article concerning the relation of dreams to early childhood trauma. Brenneis addresses Alpert's (1) dispute of the findings on the relation of dream content to traumatic experience; (2) argument that clinicians, in reconstructing trauma, work from a broader context than dreams; and (3) insistence that clinical findings discrepant from research findings not be summarily dismissed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Smith, McCarthy, and Anderson (2000).

Reports an error in the original article by Gregory T. Smith, Denis M. McCarthy, and Kristen G. Anderson (Psychological Assessment, 2000, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 102-111). Specifically, several formulas throughout the article contained errors. The corrected formulas are presented here. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2000-07311-012.) The empirical short-form literature has been characterized by overly optimistic views of the transfer of validity from parent form to short form and by the weak application of psychometric principles in validating short forms. Reviewers have thus opposed constructing short forms altogether, implying researchers are succumbing to an inappropriate temptation by trying to abbreviate measures. The authors disagree. The authors do not oppose the development of short forms, but they do assert that the validity standards for short forms should be quite high. The authors identify 2 general and 9 specific methodological sins characterizing short-form construction and offer methodological suggestions for the sound development of short forms. They recommend a set of 6 a priori steps researchers should consider and 9 methodological procedures researchers can use to develop valid abbreviated forms of clinical-assessment procedures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Pariser (2005).

The author responds to Michael Pariser's critique (see record 2005-01622-013) of her original article (see record 2003-99989-005) by distinguishing between reduction and reductionism, by refusing to see philosophy and neuroscience as competitors, by rejecting the call to adapt psychoanalysis to the demands of managed care, and by using the ideas of Wittgenstein to point out the problems of too-facile translation between the languages of neuroscience and of emotional-relational experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Small, robust, and important: Reply to Sloan and Bagiella (2001).

Responds to R. P. Sloan and E. Bagiella's (see record 2001-06506-009)comments on the M. E. McCullough, et al (see record 2000-03769-001) article regarding religious involvement and morality. McCullough et al note that Sloan and Bagiella compared their findings with results from individual studies of hopelessness and physical activity that used criteria other than morality. The present authors argue that such comparisons are meaningless. Sloan and Bagiella's questioning of the statistical nonsignificance of the fully adjusted association is addressed. Methodological issues are also discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stress and specificity: Reply to Miller (2009).

T. F. Denson, M. Spanovic, and N. Miller (see record 2009-19763-001) meta-analytically tested the hypotheses that specific appraisals and emotions would predict cortisol and immune responses to laboratory stressors and emotion inductions. Although the cortisol data supported the integrated specificity hypothesis, G. E. Miller (see record 2009-19763-002) raised questions concerning the extent to which the immunity data supported specificity. The authors respond to these concerns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)