The Evolution Drive in Contemporary Psychoanalysis: A Reply to Gill (1995).

Replies to M. Gill's (see record 1995-33111-001) comment on the J. L. Bachant et al (see record 1995-33102-001) article concerning relational theories of psychoanalysis. Bachant et al explain how drives are viewed within contemporary classical theory and discuss 2 issues (dynamic unconscious and biopsychosocial forces) that distinguish classical and relational models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Associative versus contingency accounts of category learning: Reply to Melz, Cheng, Holyoak, and Waldmann (1993).

E. R. Melz et al (see record 1994-24205-001) argue that the partial blocking of cue A that was previously reported (D. R. Shanks; see record 1991-26433-001) when Ss were presented with intermixed AB?→?1, B?→?1 category learning trials is not consistent with the associative Rescorla-Wagner (R-W; 1972) theory analysis that was offered, given that the theory predicts complete blocking at asymptote. However, this claim assumes that Ss were trained to asymptote in these experiments, and there is no reason to believe this was the case. Melz et al further argue that there has been no reported evidence of complete blocking in associative learning tasks, which is incorrect. It is shown that, on the contrary, there is abundant evidence of it. The R-W theory analysis of the results is therefore sound. The results reported were inconsistent with contingency theories as they are normally formulated. Melz et al propose a revised contingency theory which, they argue, can account for data from a range of learning tasks. In particular, they claim that their theory can accommodate the results. It is shown that the theory can be refuted… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When selective adaptation and contrast effects are distinct: A reply to Diehl, Kluender, and Parker.

Two alternative conceptualizations of selective adaptation with speech have recently received attention: the adaptation level theory (AL) outlined by R. L. Diehl (see record 1981-05067-001) and a 2-stage model outlined by the 1st author and P. Jusczyk (see record 1982-00351-001). Diehl et al (see record 1986-05428-001) reported evidence of streaming in selective adaptation and claimed that their results provide a counterdemonstration to recent studies that have argued against the AL approach. It is shown how the Diehl et al results can be accounted for by both the 2-stage model and AL theory. Results are presented from a study with 74 undergraduates that compared adaptation and paired-comparison procedures. These results are precisely as predicted by the 2-stage model, but they cannot be accounted for by AL theory. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rigor, rigor mortis, and conspiratorial views of depression research.

The authors reassert the need for methodological changes in depression research appearing in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and other personality and social psychology journals. In this rejoinder the authors update their earlier literature review (H. Tennen, J. Hall, & G. Affleck; see record 1995-31710-001) and respond to the commentaries by P C. Kendall and E. C. Flannery-Schroeder (see record 1995-31700-001) and G. Weary, J. A. Edwards, and J. A. Jacobson (see record 1995-31713-001). The authors notice that G. Weary et al.'s own findings demonstrate the need to change how depression is measured and participants are assigned to experimental groups. The authors also challenge G. Weary et al.'s contention that structured interviews are limited because they require interviewer judgments, and they urge personality and social psychologists to learn more about these interviews. Finally, G. Weary et al.'s suspicion that depression research guidelines reflect professional parochialism is disputed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Propositional reasoning by model?

Two theories of propositional deductive reasoning are considered: the mental models of P. N. Johnson-Laird et al (see PA, 79:41765) and the mental logic of M. D. Braine (1994). The model theory is said to account for practically all of the known phenomena of deductive propositional reasoning, offer a general theory of conditionals, account for the most important aspects of Braine's theory, and predict new phenomena that rule theories cannot explain. It is argued that (1) the model theory is flawed in a way that is difficult to overcome, (2) conditionals are seriously misrepresented, (3) the algorithms proposed to implement it either allow invalid inferences or are psychologically useless, (4) Braine's theory accounts for all of the new phenomena worth considering, and (5) the model theory can predict Braine's results only at the cost of self-refutation. It is concluded that the mental model theory of propositional reasoning offers no reason to reject the program of mental logic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multiple explanations for multiply quantified sentences: Are multiple models necessary?

P. N. Johnson-Laird et al (see record 1990-03501-001) presented a theory of deductive reasoning for inference problems using multiply quantified premises. The theory classifies such problems into those that require Ss to construct only one mental model and those that require multiple models. Data corroborate the theory and show that the major results of Johnson-Laird et al can be explained without invoking mental models or deductive reasoning at all. Furthermore, reversing the order of the quantifiers in a multiply quantified sentence may produce a sentence that is both more difficult to comprehend and more ambiguous. Some implications for theories of how people understand multiply quantified sentences are noted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Plausible models of alphabetic search: Reply to Scharroo, Leeuwenberg, Stalmeier, and Vos (1994).

D. Klahr et al (see record 1984-05777-001) proposed a model of the cognitive processes involved in alphabetic retrieval in terms of a 2-level hierarchy of forward-linked associations. J. Scharroo et al (see record 1994-24216-001) attempt to demonstrate that a simple associative model is more plausible, more parsimonious, and a better fit to the data than is the Klahr et al model. In this commentary the author argues that Scharroo et al misrepresent the way in which Klahr et al evaluated their model and that they fail to demonstrate the superiority of a simple associative model. In addition, it is suggested that a composite model that integrates the distinctive features of both models would advance understanding of the process of alphabetic retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of reasoning: A reply to Greene (1992).

Responds to S. B. Greene's (see record 1992-15270-001) argument that assertions of the form "None of the A are in the same place as some of the C" are difficult for Ss to generate and that this explains the results of multiply quantified reasoning without having to invoke mental models or deductive reasoning by P. N. Johnson-Laird et al (see record 1990-03501-001). This article shows (1) that the phenomenon fails to explain most of the principal results; (2) that, far from undermining the theory of mental models, it can actually be explained by the theory; and (3) that the best available account of the results is that Ss both reason and rely on mental models to do so. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Gender schema theory and self-schema theory compared: A comment on Markus, Crane, Bernstein, and Siladi's 'Self-schemas and gender."

Notes that the present author's (see record 1982-23588-001) gender schema theory proposes that sex-typed individuals are schematic with respect to gender (masculinity and femininity), while the self-schema theory of H. Markus et al (see record 1981-25685-001) proposes that sex-typed individuals are schematic with respect to either masculinity or femininity, but not both. It is maintained, however, that the 2 theories do not share a common conceptual definition of what it means to be schematic and, therefore, are not in direct opposition. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What would be if what is wasn't? Rejoinder to Judiesch, Schmidt, and Hunter (1993).

In their critique of the N. S. Raju et al (1990) utility model, M. K. Judiesch et al (see record 1994-19598-001) claimed that Raju et al simply shifted the problem from one of estimating the standard deviation of the dollar-valued performance (Y) to that of estimating the coefficient of variation (?–iY–n/μ–iY–n). In showing the inaccuracy of this claim, the authors demonstrate that the Judiesch et al misunderstandings of the underlying assumptions of the Raju et al model have led to their misinterpretations. Furthermore, the authors refute the contentions of Judiesch et al that (1) the A parameter in the Raju et al model is equal to average employee value and (2) it is appropriate to correct the validity coefficient for criterion unreliability when conducting a utility analysis. A more detailed discussion of the issues relating to transforming the original performance scale is offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vector analysis and process combinations in motion perception: A reply to Wallach, Becklen, and Nitzberg (1985).

Comments on a proposed alternative to the present author's theory of perceptual vector analysis in motion perception, which was advanced by H. Wallach et al (see record 1986-00251-001). It is argued that Wallach et al have not taken the qualitative difference between their theory and vector analysis into account and that they employed an early and outdated vector theory in their study. Therefore, the conclusion by Wallach et al that their theory is superior to vector analysis is unwarranted. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sentential context and on-line lexical decision.

J. L. Nicol and D. Swinney (see record 1989-35356-001) reported that lexical decision response times to a test word that was related to the implicit object of a verb were faster, when tested immediately after the verb, than response times to a control test word. They concluded from this result that the relation between the implicit object and the verb was understood during comprehension. In G. McKoon et al (see record 1995-04309-001), another interpretation was suggested, that the faster lexical decision response times were due to the better semantic–pragmatic fit of the related test words to the sentential contexts, and experimental data were presented to support this interpretation. In response, Nicol et al (see record 1995-04311-001) pointed out some possible problems with these experiments. The experiment presented in this article undermines their arguments. By using sentences in which there was no implicit object, exactly the same pattern of results was found as originally reported by Nicol and Swinney, thereby implicating some factor other than syntactic processing of an implicit object as an explanation of their finding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Transitive inferences from narrative relations.

Inferences drawn while reading artificial set inclusion passages tend to be different than those made when reasoning with categorical syllogisms and linear orderings even though all 3 describe transitive relations. The present study tests the hypothesis that this disparity results from reasoners' perceptions of the commonality among category terms. In 3 experiments, students were given artificial set inclusion paragraphs that either contained convergent category terms that possess a common superordinate, similar to what is found in syllogistic reasoning (e.g., R. Revlin et al; see record 1979-22790-001), or they were given divergent category terms that do not possess a common superordinate (similar to R. A. Griggs; see record 1977-11973-001). The perceived commonality among the category terms affected the interpretations of the narrative relations and determined the pattern of inferences that students were willing to draw. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On distinguishing theories from procedures: A comment on Williams, Dooseman, and Kleifield.

Contends that S. L. Williams et al (see record 1984-32119-001) confuse procedures for fear reduction with theories of fear reduction in their article comparing effectiveness of guided mastery and exposure treatments for intractable phobias. It is suggested that there is no exposure model but that models or theories of habituation, extinction, and bioinformational cognitive theories explain why exposure works and why self-efficacy is increased. (1 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A rejoinder to Notarius.

Responds to C. I. Notarius's (see record 1984-11607-001) rebuttal of the present author's (see record 1984-11616-001) criticisms of a study by Notarius et al (see record 1983-05644-001) which supported the discharge model of the facial expressivity/physiological reactivity relationship. It is concluded that only when all data from the Notarius et al study are examined will one know what their results have shown. (3 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Repetition effects in word and pseudoword identification: Comment on Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel.

Discusses 2 recent articles by T. C. Feustel et al (see record 1984-08643-001) and A. Salasoo et al (see record 1986-03032-001), which argue that word identification is based on episodic and semantic memory. Feustel et al argued for separate processing stages affected by repetition (episodic memory) and lexicality (semantic memory). To account for the finding that number of repetitions interacts with lexicality, Salasoo et al invoked the same 2 types of memory, operating in parallel rather than serially. It is argued that data by Salasoo et al are compatible with a wide variety of competing theories, including some that do not involve episodic memory. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The locus of orthographic-phonological facilitation: Reply to Roelofs, Meyer, and Levelt (1996).

In their comment, A. Roelofs, A. S. Meyer, and W. J. M. Levelt (see record 1997-06337-001) argued that serial-access language production models predict an interaction between semantic and orthographic-phonological variables in picture–word tasks. In this reply, the authors first show that this position conflicts with Roelofs et al.'s previous work and conclude that the model presented in the comment is a modification of Roelofs' (1992a, 1992b) original model. Next, they present 3 arguments against this new model. First, Roelofs et al. did not provide independent empirical evidence in favor of their modification. Second, contrary to Roelofs et al.'s prediction, the reduction of semantic interference appears to be independent of the percentage of shared orthography. Third, Roelofs et al.'s model predicts early phonological effects of spoken-word distractors, a prediction that is refuted by time-course data reported by H. Schriefers, A. S. Meyer, and W. J. M. Levelt (see record 1990-16319-001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Role of context in accessing distant information during reading.

In 3 experiments, the authors investigated factors that influence accessibility of backgrounded goal information. Participants read texts consisting of 2 episodes. In the 1st episode, the goal was satisfied or unsatisfied. Following a statement of goal satisfaction or goal postponement, there was a 2nd unrelated episode. After completion of the 2nd episode, target sentences were presented that were consistent with the 2nd episode but were inconsistent with completion of the earlier unsatisfied goal. Participants noticed the inconsistency only when the conflicting information was separated by a few sentences or when the context of the goal had been reinstated. The results are consistent with the resonance model described by J. E. Albrecht and E. J. O'Brien (see record 1994-00399-001) and by J. L. Myers, E. J. O'Brien, J. E. Albrecht, and R. A. Mason (see record 1995-39562-001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Avoiding bias in the search for artifact: A reply to Carlopio, Adair, Lindsay, and Spinner.

J. Carlopio et al (see record 1983-31564-001) criticized several aspects of the present authors' (see record 1982-12761-001) procedures and conclusions in a study of S roles and contended that the entire "subject role" approach is misguided. In this reply, the merits of the arguments and follow-up study of Carlopio et al are considered along with the "alternative" conception of S behavior they proposed. (8 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)