Extent of opinion change as a function of amount of change advocated.

"Three different degrees of change in opinion were advocated by communications presented in such a way as to be independent of the recipient's own position." Communications advocating most extreme change had the greatest influence, those advocating moderate change had the next greatest influence, and those advocating the smallest change had the least influence. At the same time the ratio of change produced to that advocated declined, average amounts of change being 58%, 62%, and 88%, respectively, of the amount of change advocated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conclusion-drawing, communicator credibility, and anxiety as factors in opinion change.

Ss' attitudes toward biological warfare and position on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale were assessed. 4 experimental groups then read an article on biological warfare. The articles differed in the source attributed to the article and in the explicitness of the conclusion regarding the effectiveness of biological warfare. Opinion change was greater for Ss in "explicit" groups, for Ss with high anxiety, and for Ss with high residual concern. No relationship was found between opinion change and expressed knowledge of communicator's position or credibility of source. 22 references. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bartlett effect and the persistence of induced opinion change.

As a result of more rapid forgetting of qualifications inconsistent with the body of a message (see 7: 3691), it was hypothesized that the persuasive impact of a qualified message would decline less with time relative to that of an unqualified message. Opinions following qualified and unqualified written messages were obtained from 155 undergraduate Ss at 4 different time intervals up to 41 days. Qualifications were forgotten more rapidly than message main points. The unqualified messages had consistently greater persuasive impact than the qualified. Thus the Bartlett effect for retention was confirmed but received little, if any, support for opinion change. 1 reason for the latter is the partial independence of content recall from opinion change. (23 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Familiarity and the order of presentation of persuasive communications.

One of the areas that Hovland (1957) and his associates did not explore with regard to order of presentation of a topic and its influence on opinion change was prior familiarity with the topic; this study does. The results indicated that a primary effect (a situation where the argument given first is more effective in changing opinion) is related to increasing familiarity, and that a recency effect (effectiveness of the second argument to affect opinion change) was found with minimal familiarity. From Psyc Abstracts 36:04:4GD73L. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Primacy versus recency in persuasion as a function of the timing of arguments and measures.

In an after-only design 4 independent variables were manipulated to test Miller and Campbell's theory of primacy vs. recency in persuasion: time between communications (none, 2 days, 1 week, or 2 weeks), time between the 2nd communication and the measures of opinion and retention (none, 2 days, or 1 week), order of communications (pro-con or con-pro), and order of measures (opinion-recall or recall-opinion). There were 2 dependent variables: opinion (measured on a rating scale) and retention (measured through recall). Confirming Miller and Campbell, the longer the time interval between 2 communications the greater the recency effect in both opinion and recall immediately after the 2nd communication; and the longer the time elapsed from the 2nd communication until measurement the less the recency effect. Contrary to Miller and Campbell's prediction, delayed measurement did not tend to produce primacy in the case of the groups in which the 2nd communication followed immediately upon the 1st. The theoretically predicted shape of the recency function over time was only roughly supported. A correlational analysis of the relation between opinion and retention called into question the assumption that opinion is a direct function of retention of message content. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The influence of role playing on opinion change.

"The experiment was designed to determine whether or not overt verbalization, induced by role playing, facilitates opinion change… . The main findings, together with various methodological checks, support the hypothesis that overt verbalization induced by role playing tends to augment the effectiveness of a persuasive communication." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgments of frequency and recency: How they relate to reports of subjective awareness.

In 2 experiments, the author explored the relations of remember versus familiar ratings to judgments of frequency (JOFs) and to judgments of recency (JORs). In both cases, remembered items were associated with more accurate memory judgments. In general, familiar items were judged to have occurred less frequently and less recently than remembered items. However, JOFs and JORs associated with familiar items were more accurate than chance. Implications for theories of remember versus familiar ratings, JOFs, and JORs are considered. Some basic findings that constrain these theories are that (a) remember versus familiar ratings were less sensitive than JOF to presentation frequency and less sensitive than JOR to recency and (b) although remember versus familiar ratings are strongly related to both JOF and JOR, as measured by gamma, the relations are far from perfect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Communicator credibility and communication discrepancy as determinants of opinion change.

The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that opinion change is a function of a specific complex interaction between the credibility of the communicator and the discrepancy of the communication from the initial attitude of the recipient. In a laboratory experiment, Ss who read a communication that was attributed to a highly credible source showed greater opinion change when the opinion of the source was presented as being increasingly discrepant from their own. In sharp contrast to this was the behavior of Ss who were exposed to the same communication—attributed to a source having only moderate credibility. In this condition, increasing the discrepancy increased the degree of opinion change only to a point; as discrepancy became more extreme, however, the degree of opinion change decreased. The results support predictions from the theory and suggest a reconciliation of previously contradictory findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Persistence of induced opinion change and retention of the inducing message contents.

Induced opinion change shows a strong positive relationship to recall of the contents of the persuasive message 1 week after receipt of the communication but tends, over time, to become functionally autonomous of recall of at least some aspects of the contents of the inducing message. Induced opinion change was found to decay rectilinearly over a 6-week period, while recall of contents showed a negatively accelerated decay trend. Opinion change and recall of the message topic were positively related 1 week after the communication, but negatively related 6 weeks later. Recall of the side taken and of the specific arguments used were positively related to opinion change both 1 week and 6 weeks after the communication. Recall of source was complexly related to opinion change. (23 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Test of a model for opinion change.

"Two experiments designed to test a mathematical model for opinion change were presented. In each experiment, subjects read 17 successive arguments summarized from the testimony and procedure of a jury trial." It was hypothesized that final judgment would be affected by serial position in being read (recency) and strength of the argument. The hypothesis was supported. 12 refs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of induced aggressiveness on opinion change.

The hypothesis that aggressively aroused persons are more influenced by a punitively oriented communication and less by a leniency oriented one than are nonaggressive persons is investigated. One group of Ss is exposed to a failure-insult procedure to evoke instigation to aggression, the other group of Ss to an ego-satisfying experience. Then half of each group read a communication urging punitiveness toward delinquents and the other half read a communication suggesting leniency and consideration in America's dealings with her allies. An immediate-after opinion questionnaire followed. The data support the research hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Opinion change as a function of external commitment and amount of discrepancy from the opinion of another.

"The present study was concerned with the effect of prior attribution of opinion to a person on a subsequent attempt to influence his opinion. It was hypothesized that an attribution congruent with the recipient's current opinion results in resistance to influence while an incongruent attribution facilitates opinion change." The results support the hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recency and primacy in persuasion as a function of the timing of speeches and measurements.

"The order in which opposing arguments were presented… the time interval between them… and the time of testing… were varied for eight groups… . a significant recency effect was found under the conditions most favorable to recency as predicted from the application of Ebbinghaus decay curves." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The relationship between judgments of a communicator's position and extent of opinion change.

3 groups of Ss, college students, were formed: 2 exposed to a communication on juvenile delinquency and a control group that was not. One group read an appeal for the adoption of a punitive policy toward delinquents; the other group read the same basic communication with the addition of a few introductory statements. Both groups then responded to a modification of Form A of the Wang-Thurstone scale of attitude toward the treatment of the criminal. Judgment of the communicator's position was not found to be related to own opinion on the treatment of delinquents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissonance, awareness, and motivation.

The problems were whether dissonance can be aroused between 2 cognitions without awareness of 1 of them and whether change in consummatory strength of a motive can be an avenue of dissonance reduction. 40 high school Ss were hypnotized to a depth adequate for assuring amnesia for suggestions. ? ate sauce that was very thirst arousing (HT), and ?, sauce that aroused little thirst (LT). Placed under hypnosis again, the 20 experimental Ss were told that, on awaking, they would feel water bloated, while the control Ss were told they would feel fatigued. Ss were awakened and offered water. HT experimental Ss drank less water than LT experimental Ss, the reverse of the control group effect (interaction p     

Climate of opinion and methods of readjustment.

The effects which the social prestige of an idea have upon its application in psychological rehabilitation are indicated. The major purpose of the paper is to point out that "… the progress from individual observation to the formation of generalized principles in the field of psychological rehabilitation depends not only on rational effort and good will, and on the presence of devoted specialists, but also conversely on the arrest which progress suffers when considerations of prestige and power begin to influence the methods of readjustment." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Size Estimation in Schizophrenics as a Function of Stimulus-Presentation Time.

15 good premorbid paranoid acute schizophrenics, 15 poor premorbid nonparanoid acute schizophrenics, and 15 attendants, all males, estimated stimulus paranoid size after receiving (a) 10-sec. and (b) 100-msec. presentations of the standard, also (c) 10-msec. blank flashes instead of the standard. Choices were then made from a group of variable-sized stimuli. As expected, good paranoids, normals, and poor nonparanoids tended to low, intermediate, and high estimation levels, respectively. Contrary to eye-movement interpretation, patient groups differed under the 100-msec. presentation. Lowered estimation level with this presentation suggested stimulus redundancy interpretations. No differences with the blank flash ruled out a simple size-preference response bias. Equal proportions of "hits" among groups indicated that error distributions rather than error frequencies accounted for the results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Opinion change as a function of some intrapersonal attributes of the communicatees.

The following hypotheses are proposed: (1) Individuals high in extrapunitiveness are more likely to be influenced by a communication designed to effect an aggressive opinion on action toward a particular group, (2) such a communication is more likely to be effective on those with high aggressive needs, and (3) those high in aggressive needs and in extrapunitiveness are more likely to be influenced by the communication than those low in both. S's initial opinions about juvenile delinquency were assessed; then, after being exposed to the test communications over a period of time, their revised opinions were assessed. The Rosenzweig P-F Study and the TAT were used to determine personality characteristics. The data confirm the hypotheses, particularly for the immediate aspects of the communication. 22 references. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Primacy, Recency, and Suffix Effects in Auditory Short-Term Memory for Pure Tones: Evidence From a Probe Recognition Paradigm.

The present study was designed to explore serial position and suffix effects in the short-term retention of nonverbal sounds. In contrast with previous studies of these effects, a probe recognition paradigm was used to minimize the possibility that participants would use a verbal labelling strategy. On each trial, participants heard a memory set consisting of three pure tones, followed five seconds later by a probe tone. Participants were required to indicate whether or not the probe tone had been a member of the memory set. On most trials, a suffix sound was presented 1 second following the third sound in the memory set. Results revealed that tones presented in the first and last positions of the memory set were recognized more accurately than were tones presented in the middle position. Furthermore, recognition of sounds presented in the last position was compromised when the memory set was followed by a postlist suffix of similar pitch, spectral composition, and spatial location. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotional salience, emotional awareness, peculiar beliefs, and magical thinking.

Two studies with college student participants (Ns = 271 and 185) tested whether peculiar beliefs and magical thinking were associated with (a) the emotional salience of the stimuli about which individuals may have peculiar beliefs or magical thinking, (b) attention to emotion, and (c) clarity of emotion. Study 1 examined belief that a baseball team was cursed. Study 2 measured magical thinking using a procedure developed by P. Rozin and C. Nemeroff (2002). In both studies, peculiar beliefs and magical thinking were associated with Salience × Attention × Clarity interactions. Among individuals for whom the objects of the belief–magical thinking were highly emotionally salient and who had high levels of attention to emotion, higher levels of emotional clarity were associated with increased peculiar beliefs–magical thinking. In contrast, among individuals for whom the objects of the belief–magical thinking were not emotionally salient and who had high levels of attention to emotion, higher levels of emotional clarity were associated with diminished peculiar beliefs–magical thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)