If you can't join them, beat them: Effects of social exclusion on aggressive behavior.

Social exclusion was manipulated by telling people that they would end up alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them. These manipulations caused participants to behave more aggressively. Excluded people issued a more negative job evaluation against someone who insulted them (Experiments 1 and 2). Excluded people also blasted a target with higher levels of aversive noise both when the target had insulted them (Experiment 4) and when the target was a neutral person and no interaction had occurred (Experiment 5). However, excluded people were not more aggressive toward someone who issued praise (Experiment 3). These responses were specific to social exclusion (as opposed to other misfortunes) and were not mediated by emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Automatic emotion regulation after social exclusion: Tuning to positivity.

Nine experiments tested competing hypotheses regarding nonconscious affective responses to acute social exclusion and how such responses may relate to positive mental health. The results strongly and consistently indicated that acute social exclusion increased nonconscious positive affect. Compared to nonexcluded participants, excluded participants recalled more positive memories from childhood than did accepted participants (Experiment 1), gave greater weight to positive emotion in their judgments of word similarity (Experiments 2 and 3), and completed more ambiguous word stems with happy words (Experiments 4a and 4b). This process was apparently automatic, as participants asked to imagine exclusion overestimated explicit distress and underestimated implicit positivity (Experiment 3). Four final experiments showed that this automatic emotion regulation process was found among participants low (but not high) in depressive symptoms (Experiments 5 and 6) and among participants high (but not low) in self-esteem (Experiments 7 and 8). These findings suggest that acute exclusion sets in motion an automatic emotion regulation process in which positive emotions become highly accessible, which relates to positive mental health. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social Exclusion Impairs Self-Regulation.

Six experiments showed that being excluded or rejected caused decrements in self-regulation. In Experiment 1, participants who were led to anticipate a lonely future life were less able to make themselves consume a healthy but bad-tasting beverage. In Experiment 2, some participants were told that no one else in their group wanted to work with them, and these participants later ate more cookies than other participants. In Experiment 3, excluded participants quit sooner on a frustrating task. In Experiments 4-6, exclusion led to impairment of attention regulation as measured with a dichotic listening task. Experiments 5 and 6 further showed that decrements in self-regulation can be eliminated by offering a cash incentive or increasing self-awareness. Thus, rejected people are capable of self-regulation but are normally disinclined to make the effort. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

It's the thought that counts: The role of hostile cognition in shaping aggressive responses to social exclusion.

Prior research has confirmed a casual path between social rejection and aggression, but there has been no clear explanation of why social rejection causes aggression. A series of experiments tested the hypothesis that social exclusion increases the inclination to perceive neutral information as hostile, which has implications for aggression. Compared to accepted and control participants, socially excluded participants were more likely to rate aggressive and ambiguous words as similar (Experiment 1a), to complete word fragments with aggressive words (Experiment 1b), and to rate the ambiguous actions of another person as hostile (Experiments 2-4). This hostile cognitive bias among excluded people was related to their aggressive treatment of others who were not involved in the exclusion experience (Experiments 2 and 3) and others with whom participants had no previous contact (Experiment 4). These findings provide a first step in resolving the mystery of why social exclusion produces aggression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Now you see it, now you don't: Repetition blindness for nonwords.

Repetition blindness (RB) for nonwords has been found in some studies, but not in others. The authors propose that the discrepancy in results is fueled by participant strategy; specifically, when rapid serial visual presentation lists are short and participants are explicitly informed that some trials will contain repetitions, participants are able to use partial orthographic information to correctly guess repetitions on repetition trials while avoiding spurious repetition reports on control trials. The authors first replicated V. Coltheart and R. Langdon's (2003) finding of RB for words but repetition advantage for nonwords (Experiment 1). When all participants were encouraged to utilize partial information in a same/different matching task along with an identification task, a repetition advantage was observed for both words and nonwords (Experiment 2). When guessing of repetitions was made detectable by including non-identical but orthographically similar items in the experiments, the repetition advantage disappeared; instead, RB was found for both words and nonwords (Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, when experiments did not contain any identical items, participants almost never reported repetitions, and reliable RB was found for orthographically similar words and nonwords (Experiments 5 and 6). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social exclusion and early-stage interpersonal perception: Selective attention to signs of acceptance.

Social exclusion can thwart people's powerful need for social belonging. Whereas prior studies have focused primarily on how social exclusion influences complex and cognitively downstream social outcomes (e.g., memory, overt social judgments and behavior), the current research examined basic, early-in-the-cognitive-stream consequences of exclusion. Across 4 experiments, the threat of exclusion increased selective attention to smiling faces, reflecting an attunement to signs of social acceptance. Compared with nonexcluded participants, participants who experienced the threat of exclusion were faster to identify smiling faces within a “crowd” of discrepant faces (Experiment 1), fixated more of their attention on smiling faces in eye-tracking tasks (Experiments 2 and 3), and were slower to disengage their attention from smiling faces in a visual cueing experiment (Experiment 4). These attentional attunements were specific to positive, social targets. Excluded participants did not show heightened attention to faces conveying social disapproval or to positive nonsocial images. The threat of social exclusion motivates people to connect with sources of acceptance, which is manifested not only in “downstream” choices and behaviors but also at the level of basic, early-stage perceptual processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit self-esteem compensation: Automatic threat defense.

Four experiments demonstrated implicit self-esteem compensation (ISEC) in response to threats involving gender identity (Experiment 1), implicit racism (Experiment 2), and social rejection (Experiments 3-4). Under conditions in which people might be expected to suffer a blow to self-worth, they instead showed high scores on 2 implicit self-esteem measures. There was no comparable effect on explicit self-esteem. However, ISEC was eliminated following self-affirmation (Experiment 3). Furthermore, threat manipulations increased automatic intergroup bias, but ISEC mediated these relationships (Experiments 2-3). Thus, a process that serves as damage control for the self may have negative social consequences. Finally, pretest anxiety mediated the relationship between threat and ISEC (Experiment 3), whereas ISEC negatively predicted anxiety among high-threat participants (Experiment 4), suggesting that ISEC may function to regulate anxiety. The implications of these findings for automatic emotion regulation, intergroup bias, and implicit self-esteem measures are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dimensions of mood in mood-dependent memory

In this investigation of the roles of 2 different dimensions of mood (pleasantness and arousal) in mood-dependent memory (MDM), participants generated words while listening to a selection of independently rated mood music (normative study and Experiment 5). Then they recalled the words while listening to another mood-music selection (Experiments 1-3) or to a verbal-mood scenario (Experiment 4). Changing only the dimension of mood pleasantness from generation to recall decreased memory whether the intended moods were explicitly defined or not. However, changing only arousal decreased memory only when moods were defined. Thus, pleasantness-dependent memory, but not arousal-dependent memory, occurred consistently. Although MDM also occurred with simultaneous changes in both dimensions, the effect was not significantly greater than that of pleasantness-dependent memory. The results are discussed in terms of 2-dimensional theories of emotion as applied to memory.     

Separate effects of word frequency and age of acquisition in recognition and recall.

Three experiments investigated word frequency and age of acquisition (AoA) effects in recognition and recall. Experiments 1 and 2 used the "remember-know" procedure developed by J. M. Gardiner (1988). In Experiment 1, recognition performance was higher for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words and higher for late-acquired words than for early-acquired words, but only in "remember" responses. Experiment 2 replicated the AoA effect by using a different set of early- and late-acquired words. Experiment 3 found advantages for low-frequency and late-acquired words in recall, but only when words were presented in mixed lists. The frequency effect was reversed, and the AoA effect was eliminated, when participants studied pure lists. Findings were attributed to the more distinctive encoding of low-frequency and late-acquired words. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affective habituation: Subliminal exposure to extreme stimuli decreases their extremity.

Following a functional perspective on evaluation, the authors hypothesized that subliminal exposure to extreme stimuli (e.g., extremely negative or positive words) would lead these stimuli to be perceived as less extreme. This process--affective habituation--was tested in 4 experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were subliminally exposed to extremely positive and extremely negative words. In a subsequent explicit-judgment task, these words were rated as less extreme than extreme words that had not been presented. In Experiment 2, these results were replicated with an implicit evaluation measure. In Experiments 3 and 4, subliminal exposure to extreme positive and negative words made the words "behave" as words that are only moderately positive or negative. Several implications are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Direct Assessments of the Processing Time Hypothesis for the Missing-Letter Effect.

When participants search for a target letter while reading, they make more omissions if the target letter is embedded in frequently used words or in the most frequent meaning of a polysemic word. According to the processing time hypothesis, this occurs because familiar words and meanings are identified faster, leaving less time for letter identification. Contrary to the predictions of the processing time hypothesis, with a rapid serial visual presentation procedure, participants were slower at detecting target letters for more frequent words or the most frequent meaning of a word (Experiments 1 and 2) or at detecting the word itself instead of a target letter (Experiment 3). In Experiments 4 and 5, participants self-initiated the presentation of each word, and the same pattern of results was observed as in Experiments 1 and 3. Positive correlations were also found between omission rate and response latencies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Alone but feeling no pain: Effects of social exclusion on physical pain tolerance and pain threshold, affective forecasting, and interpersonal empathy.

Prior findings of emotional numbness (rather than distress) among socially excluded persons led the authors to investigate whether exclusion causes a far-reaching insensitivity to both physical and emotional pain. Experiments 1-4 showed that receiving an ostensibly diagnostic forecast of a lonesome future life reduced sensitivity to physical pain, as indicated by both (higher) thresholds and tolerance. Exclusion also caused emotional insensitivity, as indicated by reductions in affective forecasting of joy or woe over a future football outcome (Experiment 3), as well as lesser empathizing with another person's suffering from either romantic breakup (Experiment 4) or a broken leg (Experiment 5). The insensitivities to pain and emotion were highly intercorrelated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The lasting effect of words on feelings: Words may facilitate exposure effects to threatening images": Correction to Tabibnia, Lieberman, and Craske (2008).

Reports an error in "The lasting effect of words on feelings: Words may facilitate exposure effects to threatening images" by Golnaz Tabibnia, Matthew D. Lieberman and Michelle G. Craske (Emotion, 2008[Jun], Vol 8[3], 307-317). The URL provided for the supplemental materials was incorrect. The correct URL is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-06717-001.) Previous studies have shown that mere words, particularly affective words, can dampen emotional responses. However, the effect of affective labels on emotional responding in the long term is unknown. The authors examined whether repeated exposure to aversive images would lead to more reduction in autonomic reactivity a week later if the images were exposed with single-word labels than without labels. In Experiment 1, healthy individuals were exposed to pictures of disturbing scenes with or without labels on Day 1. On Day 8, the same pictures from the previous week were exposed, this time without labels. In Experiment 2, participants were spider fearful and were exposed to pictures of spiders. In both experiments, although repeated exposure to aversive images (without labels) led to long-term attenuation of autonomic reactivity, exposure plus affective labels, but not nonaffective labels, led to more attenuation than exposure alone. Thus, affective labels may help dampen emotional reactivity in both the short and long terms. Implications for exposure therapy and translational studies are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Left hemisphere specialization for response to positive emotional expressions: A divided output methodology.

An extensive literature credits the right hemisphere with dominance for processing emotion. Conflicting literature finds left hemisphere dominance for positive emotions. This conflict may be resolved by attending to processing stage. A divided output (bimanual) reaction time paradigm in which response hand was varied for emotion (angry; happy) in Experiments 1 and 2 and for gender (male; female) in Experiment 3 focused on response to emotion rather than perception. In Experiments 1 and 2, reaction time was shorter when right-hand responses indicated a happy face and left-hand responses an angry face, as compared to reversed assignment. This dissociation did not obtain with incidental emotion (Experiment 3). Results support the view that response preparation to positive emotional stimuli is left lateralized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why do non-color words interfere with color naming?

In the non-color-word Stroop task, university students' response latencies were longer for low-frequency than for higher frequency target words. Visual identity primes facilitated color naming in groups reading the prime silently or processing it semantically (Experiment 1) but did not when participants generated a rhyme of the prime (Experiment 3). With auditory identity primes, generating an associate or a rhyme of the prime produced interference (Experiments 2 and 3). Color-naming latencies were longer for nonwords than for words (Experiment 4). There was a small long-term repetition benefit in color naming for low-frequency words that had been presented in the lexical decision task (Experiment 5). Facilitation of word recognition speeds color naming except when phonological activation of the base word increases response competition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior.

Current empirical evidence regarding nonconsciously priming emotion concepts is limited to positively versus negatively valenced affect. This article demonstrates that specific, equally valenced emotion concepts can be nonconsciously activated, remain inaccessible to conscious awareness, and still affect behavior in an emotion-specific fashion. In Experiment 1A, participants subliminally primed with guilty emotion adjectives showed lower indulgence than did participants subliminally primed with sad emotion adjectives; even after the addition of a 5-min time delay, these results were replicated in Experiment 1B. Participants in the different priming conditions showed no differences in their subjective emotion ratings and were unaware of the emotion prime or concept activation. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated these findings using a helping measure, demonstrating that individuals primed with guilt adjectives show more helping than do individuals primed with sadness adjectives. In all studies, effects were moderated by individuals' specific emotion-response habits and characteristics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An Online Measure of Thought Suppression.

An online thought-suppression paradigm was developed to test predictions of ironic process theory. Participants concentrated on or suppressed a particular semantic category. Semantic activation was indexed by the latency to name words from the category. In Experiments 1 and 2, an analog intrusion was introduced while participants were trying to suppress the information. Results consistent with ironic process theory were observed using words with polar opposites in Experiment 1 and words without polar opposites in Experiment 2. To determine whether these effects were dependent on the analog intrusion, Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 1 without the intrusion. Concentration generated semantic activation, but suppression exacerbated this activation. The data imply that hyperaccessibility results from efforts to suppress, whereas the processes of thought suppression identified by ironic process theory require the presence of material inconsistent with a desired cognitive state. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Guessing strategies, aging, and bias effects in perceptual identification

In the typical single-stimulus perceptual identification task, accuracy is improved by prior study of test words, a repetition priming benefit. There is also a cost, inasmuch as previously studied words are likely to be produced (incorrectly) as responses if the test word is orthographically similar but not identical to a studied word. In two-alternative forced-choice perceptual identification, a test word is flashed and followed by two alternatives, one of which is the correct response. When the two alternatives are orthographically similar, test words identical to previously studied items are identified more accurately than new words (a benefit) but tests words orthographically similar to studied words are identified less accurately than new words (a cost). Ratcliff and McKoon (in press) argue that these are bias effects that arise in the decision stage of word identification. We report five experiments that examined the alternative hypothesis that these bias effects arise from postperceptual guessing strategies. In single-stimulus perceptual identification, repetition priming benefits were equally great for young and older adults who claimed to use deliberate guessing strategies and those who did not (Experiment 1). In contrast, only groups of young and older people who claimed to deliberately guess studied words in a two-alternative forced-choice task (Experiments 2 and 5) showed reliable benefits and costs. Costs and benefits were abolished in the two-alternative forced-choice task when a very long study list was used, presumably because the increased retrieval burden made the use of deliberate guessing strategies less attractive (Experiment 3). Under conditions similar to those of Experiment 3, repetition priming was observed in single-stimulus perceptual identification (Experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that costs and benefits in the forced-choice perceptual identification task arise from deliberate guessing strategies but that those in the single-stimulus task do not. The possibility that the observed relationship between strategy reports and priming effects reflects erroneous postexperimental assessments of strategies by participants is also considered.     

Effects of repetition priming on recognition memory: Testing a perceptual fluency-disfluency model.

Five experiments explored the effects of immediate repetition priming on episodic recognition (the "Jacoby-Whitehouse effect") as measured with forced-choice testing. These experiments confirmed key predictions of a model adapted from D. E. Huber and R. C. O'Reilly's (2003) dynamic neural network of perception. In this model, short prime durations pre-activate primed items, enhancing perceptual fluency and familiarity, whereas long prime durations result in habituation, causing perceptual disfluency and less familiarity. Short duration primes produced a recognition preference for primed words (Experiments 1, 2, and 5), whereas long duration primes produced a preference against primed words (Experiments 3, 4, and 5). Experiment 2 found prime duration effects even when participants accurately identified short duration primes. A cued-recall task included in Experiments 3, 4, and 5 found priming effects only for recognition trials that were followed by cued-recall failure. These results suggest that priming can enhance as well as lower familiarity, without affecting recollection. Experiment 4 provided a manipulation check on this procedure through a delay manipulation that preferentially affected recognition followed by cued-recall success. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Embodiment of emotion concepts.

Theories of embodied cognition hold that higher cognitive processes operate on perceptual symbols and that concept use involves partial reactivations of the sensory-motor states that occur during experience with the world. On this view, the processing of emotion knowledge involves a (partial) reexperience of an emotion, but only when access to the sensory basis of emotion knowledge is required by the task. In 2 experiments, participants judged emotional and neutral concepts corresponding to concrete objects (Experiment 1) and abstract states (Experiment 2) while facial electromyographic activity was recorded from the cheek, brow, eye, and nose regions. Results of both studies show embodiment of specific emotions in an emotion-focused but not a perceptual-focused processing task on the same words. A follow up in Experiment 3, which blocked selective facial expressions, suggests a causal, rather than simply a correlational, role for embodiment in emotion word processing. Experiment 4, using a property generation task, provided support for the conclusion that emotions embodied in conceptual tasks are context-dependent situated simulations rather than associated emotional reactions. Implications for theories of embodied simulation and for emotion theories are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)