The belief bias effect is aptly named: A reply to Klauer and Kellen (2011).

In “Assessing the Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect,” Dube, Rotello, and Heit (see record 2010-14834-005) examined the form of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for reasoning and the effects of belief bias on measurement indices that differ in whether they imply a curved or linear ROC function. We concluded that the ROC data are in fact curved and that analyses using statistics that assume a linear ROC are likely to produce Type I errors. Importantly, we showed that the interaction between logic and belief that has inspired much of the theoretical work on belief bias is in fact an error stemming from inappropriate reliance on a contrast (hit rate?false alarm rate) that implies linear ROCs. Dube et al. advanced a new model of belief bias, which, in light of their data, is currently the only plausible account of the effect. Klauer and Kellen (2011) disputed these conclusions, largely on the basis of speculation about the data collection method used by Dube et al. to construct the ROCs. New data and model-based analyses are presented that refute the speculations made by Klauer and Kellen. We also show that new modeling results presented by Klauer and Kellen actually support the conclusions advanced by Dube et al. Together, these data show that the methods used by Dube et al. are valid and that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias.

According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically. This finding was observed when instructional set was presented as a between-participants factor (Experiment 1), when instruction was indicated prior to problem presentation by a cue (Experiment 2), and when the cue appeared simultaneously with conclusion presentation (Experiments 3 and 4). The finding also extended to a range of simple and more complex argument forms (Experiment 5). In these latter experiments, belief-based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for default interventionist accounts of belief bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Similarity, induction, naming, and categorization (SINC): Generalization or inductive reasoning? Reply to Heit and Hayes (2005).

This article is a response to E. Heit and B. K. Hayes's (see record 2005-14939-011) comment on the target article "Induction and Categorization in Young Children: A Similarity-Based Model" (V. M. Sloutsky & A. V. Fisher, 2004a). The response discusses points of agreement and disagreement with Heit and Hayes; phenomena predicted by similarity, induction, naming, and categorization (SINC); and relationships between SINC and models of verbal inductive reasoning, as well as contributions and limitations of SINC and directions for future research. Overall, the authors disagree with Heit and Hayes's analysis of limitations of SINC and with their analysis of SINC in the context of verbal inductive reasoning. At the same time, the authors agree that more research is needed to provide a unified account of similarity, induction, categorization, and recognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An attentional learning account of the shape bias: Reply to Cimpian and Markman (2005) and Booth, Waxman, and Huang (2005).

Recently, Developmental Psychology published 2 articles on the shape bias; both rejected the authors' previous proposals about the role of attentional learning in the development of a shape bias in object name learning. A. Cimpian and E. Markman (2005; see record 2005-14938-017) did so by arguing that the shape bias does not exist but is an experimental artifact. A. E. Booth, S. R. Waxman, and Y. T. Huang (2005; see record 2005-05098-004), in contrast, concluded that the shape bias (and its contextual link to artifact categories) does exist but that the mechanisms that underlie it are conceptual knowledge and not attentional learning. In response, in this article the authors clarify the claims of the Attentional Learning Account (ALA) and interpretations of the data under question. The authors also seek to make explicit the deeper theoretical divide: cognition as sequestered from processes of perceiving and acting versus as embedded in, and inseparable from, those very processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Shill (2004).

Shill's (see record 2004-11107-008) claim that the intersubjective perspective does not address conflict and defense is glaringly mistaken. In his article on signal anxiety, Shill (2004) declared that "the intersubjectivist approach does not address issues of conflict and defense at all" (p. 119). Astoundingly, he seems to have made this absurd pronouncement without being aware of any of the numerous articles and chapters my collaborators and I have written on the subject of psychological conflict and defense over the past three decades, one of which was published in this very journal (Stolorow & Brandchaft, 1987). Our aim has never been to defocus emotional conflict but rather to contextualize it-that is, to locate it within constitutive intersubjective systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: Reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005).

People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, see record 2005-11504-008) suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler (see record 2005-11504-009) suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to outpredict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A misleading review of response bias: Comment on McGrath, Mitchell, Kim, and Hough (2010).

In the May 2010 issue of Psychological Bulletin, R. E. McGrath, M. Mitchell, B. H. Kim, and L. Hough published an article entitled “Evidence for Response Bias as a Source of Error Variance in Applied Assessment” (pp. 450–470). They argued that response bias indicators used in a variety of settings typically have insufficient data to support such use in everyday clinical practice. Furthermore, they claimed that despite 100 years of research into the use of response bias indicators, “a sufficient justification for [their] use… in applied settings remains elusive” (p. 450). We disagree with McGrath et al.'s conclusions. In fact, we assert that the relevant and voluminous literature that has addressed the issues of response bias substantiates validity of these indicators. In addition, we believe that response bias measures should be used in clinical and research settings on a regular basis. Finally, the empirical evidence for the use of response bias measures is strongest in clinical neuropsychology. We argue that McGrath et al.'s erroneous perspective on response bias measures is a result of 3 errors in their research methodology: (a) inclusion criteria for relevant studies that are too narrow; (b) errors in interpreting results of the empirical research they did include; (c) evidence of a confirmatory bias in selectively citing the literature, as evidence of moderation appears to have been overlooked. Finally, their acknowledging experts in the field who might have highlighted these errors prior to publication may have prevented critiques during the review process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

A meta-analysis with nothing to hide: Reply to Hyman (2010).

In our article (Storm, Tressoldi, & Di Risio, 2010), we claimed that the ganzfeld experimental design has proved to be consistent and reliable. However, Hyman (2010) argues that the overall evidence for psi is, in fact, contradictory and elusive. We present a case for psi research that undermines Hyman's argument. First, we give examples from parapsychologists who do not outrightly dismiss psi, despite appearances, but actually support it. Second, we claim that Hyman does not tell the full story about the ganzfeld meta-analytic findings and thus presents a one-sided account. Third, we argue that our meta-analysis has followed standard procedures, that we have not broken any rules but have found a communications anomaly, often referred to as psi. Though we may be in agreement that the evidence is largely statistical, the evidence suggests that concealed targets are actually identified rather than guessed. We argue that further research is necessary. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Bauer (2003) and Fisher (2003).

The author acknowledges the sophisticated understanding of his article (J. M. Natterson, 2003) on the part of both W. D. Bauer (2003) and D. J. Fisher (2003). The author discusses Bauer's and Fisher's concerns about the defensive idealization of the therapist and about a rigid programmatic imposition of love themes on therapy. There is also a response to the question of the philosophical basis for the basic role of love in therapy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive psychometrics: Assessing storage and retrieval deficits in special populations with multinomial processing tree models.

This article demonstrates how multinomial processing tree models can be used as assessment tools to measure cognitive deficits in clinical populations, This is illustrated with a model developed by W. H. Batchelder and D. M. Riefer (1980) that separately measures storage and retrieval processes in memory. The validity of the model is tested in 2 experiments, which show that presentation rate affects the storage of items (Experiment 1) and part-list cuing hurts item retrieval (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 examine 2 clinical populations: schizophrenics and alcoholics with organic brain damage. The model reveals that each group exhibits deficits in storage and retrieval, with the retrieval deficits being stronger and occurring more consistently over trials. Also, the alcoholics with organic brain damage show no improvement in retrieval over trials, although their storage improves at the same rate as a control group. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The probative value of simultaneous contradictory belief: Reply to Gigerenzer and Regier (1996).

G. Gigerenzer and T. Regier (see PA, Vol 83:21892) are uneasy about the vagueness of the dichotomy the author (S. A. Sloman; see PA, Vol 83:21925) sets up between associative and rule-based processing that results, they argue, from collapsing too many different distinctions. The author's intent was not to collapse but rather to abstract from those distinctions. Both the author and Gigerenzer and Regier do agree on how best to characterize associative computation: by using principles of similarity and temporal contiguity. Gigerenzer and Regier also offer alternative interpretations of the author's primary form of evidence, simultaneous contradictory belief. This phenomenon does not, by itself, force an interpretation in terms of associative and rule-based processing. Nevertheless, the alternatives they offer suffer from conceptual flaws and unfavorable empirical consequences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clinician bias in the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and borderline personality disorder: Correction to Woodward et al. (2009).

Reports an error in Clinician bias in the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and borderline personality disorder by Halley E. Woodward, Casey T. Taft, Richard A. Gordon and Laura A. Meis (Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 2009[Dec], Vol 1[4], 282-290). In this article, the copyright attribution is incorrect. The article is in the public domain. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-23661-003.) A sample of volunteers from a group of randomly selected psychologists in New York State (N = 119) provided a primary diagnosis and rule-out diagnoses for a case vignette that included balanced criteria for borderline personality disorder (BPD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in a mail survey. Vignettes portrayed a male or a female client, and history of childhood sexual abuse was presented either first or last. Results indicated that cognitive–behavioral therapy (CBT) clinicians were more likely to diagnose PTSD than BPD or other disorders, and psychodynamic clinicians were more likely to diagnose BPD or other disorders than PTSD. An anchoring effect (i.e., evidence that one regards initial information as an anchor that may or may not be adjusted upon exposure to subsequent information) of abuse history presentation was found. Findings did not support a patient or clinician gender bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Weak criticisms and selective evidence: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

We respond to a critique by H. Blanton et al. (see record 2009-06703-001), challenging our previous work demonstrating that an Implicit Association Test designed to assess implicit prejudice reliably predicts intergroup discrimination (see record 2001-11532-008). We outline 3 flawed aspects of the critique. First, we note that claims that an outlier should be eliminated from the original data set are unfounded, and even with the elimination of this outlier, the conclusions of our original work are still strongly supported by the data. Second, we explain that concerns about interjudge reliability are specious and that considerable data support the validity of the judges’ observations reported in our original study. Third, we note that claims of a disconnect between Implicit Association Test scores (argued to show negative bias against Blacks) and behavioral measures (argued to show pro-Black bias) are inappropriate because they neglect the relativistic nature of the key measures. Implications for the relation between implicit attitudes and behavior, for the law, and for future work on implicit attitudes are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Our main conclusion stands: Reply to Rohling et al. (2011).

In their comment, M. L. Rohling et al. (2011) accused us of offering a “misleading” review of response bias. In fact, the additional findings they provided on this topic are relevant only to bias assessment in 1 of the domains we discussed, neuropsychological assessment. Furthermore, we contend that, even in that 1 domain, the additional findings they described do not merit revision of our conclusion that the data are insufficient for evaluating the status of bias indicators. We remain hopeful that our review will spur researchers to publish additional tests of the validity of bias indicators in real-world settings and reduce the reliance on analogue studies as an evidence base for their use. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strong rebuttal for weak criticisms: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

We respond to H. Blanton et al.’s (See record 2009-06703-001) critique of J. C. Ziegert & P. J. Hanges (see record 2005-05102-011) and illustrate that their criticisms regarding our study are based on very weak evidence. In this rebuttal, we highlight the appropriateness of our manipulation as well as present reanalyses that illustrate the predictive validity of the Implicit Association Test. In particular, we illustrate that the Implicit Association Test is related to discriminatory behavior (a) after one eliminates potential outliers using appropriate multivariate methods, (b) across conditions after one controls for the manipulation, (c) when one just examines Black applicants, and (d) after one controls for explicit attitudes. Thus, in this rebuttal, we not only reaffirm the original findings of J. C. Ziegert and P. J. Hanges (2005) but we extend them to illustrate the broader contexts in which the Implicit Association Test is related to discriminatory behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In the eye of the beholder: Reply to Wilson and Shadish (2006) and Radin, Nelson, Dobyns, and Houtkooper (2006).

H. B?sch, F. Steinkamp, and E. Boller's (see record 2006-08436-001) meta-analysis, which demonstrated (a) a small but highly significant overall effect, (b) a small-study effect, and (c) extreme heterogeneity, has provoked widely differing responses. After considering D. B. Wilson and W. R. Shadish's see record 2006-08436-002) and D. Radin, R. Nelson, Y. Dobyns, and J. Houtkooper's see record 2006-08436-003) concerns about the possible effects of psychological moderator variables, the potential for missing data, and the difficulties inherent in any meta-analytic data, the authors reaffirm their view that publication bias is the most parsimonious model to account for all 3 findings. However, until compulsory registration of trials occurs, it cannot be proven that the effect is in fact attributable to publication bias, and it remains up to the individual reader to decide how the results are best and most parsimoniously interpreted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting Without Modeling: A Critique of Trabasso and Bartolone (2003).

T. Trabasso and J. Bartolone (see record 2003-07955-016) used a computational model of narrative text comprehension to account for empirical findings. The authors show that the same predictions are obtained without running the model. This is caused by the model's computational setup, which leaves most of the model's input unchanged. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Level of construal, mind wandering, and repetitive thought: Reply to McVay and Kane (2010).

In this reply to the comment of McVay and Kane (2010), I consider their argument concerning how Watkins’s (2008) elaborated control theory informs their perspective on the role of executive control in mind wandering. I argue that although in a number of places the elaborated control theory is consistent with the perspective of McVay and Kane that mind wandering represents a failure of executive control, their account makes a number of claims that are not articulated in the elaborated control theory—most notably, the hypothesis that level of construal moderates entry of thoughts into awareness. Moreover, the relevant literature suggests that the relationship between level of construal and executive control may be more complex, and may be determined by multiple factors beyond those proposed in this executive-control failure account of mind wandering. Finally, the implications of this model of mind wandering for understanding repetitive thought in general are considered, and it is proposed that examining level of executive control as a further moderating variable within elaborated control theory may be of value. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias doesn't always come easy: Causal models, cognitive effort, and creeping determinism.

Creeping determinism, a form of hindsight bias, refers to people's hindsight perceptions of events as being determined or inevitable. This article proposes, on the basis of a causal-model theory of creeping determinism, that the underlying processes are effortful, and hence creeping determinism should disappear when individuals lack the cognitive resources to make sense of an outcome. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to read a scenario while they were under either low or high processing load. Participants who had the cognitive resources to make sense of the outcome perceived it as more probable and necessary than did participants under high processing load or participants who did not receive outcome information. Experiment 3 was designed to separate 2 postulated subprocesses and showed that the attenuating effect of processing load on hindsight bias is not due to a disruption of the retrieval of potential causal antecedents but to a disruption of their evaluation. Together the 3 experiments show that the processes underlying creeping determinism are effortful, and they highlight the crucial role of causal reasoning in the perception of past events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Emery, Hale, and Myerson (2008).

Reports an error in "Age differences in proactive interference, working memory, and abstract reasoning" by Lisa Emery, Sandra Hale and Joel Myerson (Psychology and Aging, 2008[Sep], Vol 23[3], 634-645). The original article contained an incorrect DOI. The correct DOI is as follows: 10.1037/a0012577. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-13050-014.) It has been hypothesized that older adults are especially susceptible to proactive interference (PI) and that this may contribute to age differences in working memory performance. In young adults, individual differences in PI affect both working memory and reasoning ability, but the relations between PI, working memory, and reasoning in older adults have not been examined. In the current study, young, old, and very old adults performed a modified operation span task that induced several cycles of PI buildup and release as well as two tests of abstract reasoning ability. Age differences in working memory scores increased as PI built up, consistent with the hypothesis that older adults are more susceptible to PI, but both young and older adults showed complete release from PI. Young adults' reasoning ability was best predicted by working memory performance under high PI conditions, replicating M. Bunting (2006). In contrast, older adults' reasoning ability was best predicted by their working memory performance under low PI conditions, thereby raising questions regarding the general role of susceptibility to PI in differences in higher cognitive function among older adults. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)