Priming is not all bias: Commentary on Ratcliff and McKoon (1997).

R. Ratcliff and G. McKoon (see record 1997-03612-005) reported a set of findings they claim is inconsistent with all prior accounts of long-term priming, including (a) a pattern of benefits and costs in an identification task suggestive of a bias interpretation of priming and (b) a restriction on priming such that benefits and costs are obtained only when the alternatives in the forced-choice task are similar. On the basis of these and related findings, Ratcliff and McKoon developed a bias theory of visual word priming that is implemented in a mathematical model. However, the present article shows that their empirical findings are ambiguous and can be explained more parsimoniously within more traditional frameworks. Furthermore, 8 studies are reported that directly contradict their model. On the basis of these and related findings, it is argued that priming is best understood as a by-product of learning within perceptual systems whose main function is to categorize inputs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Priming and constraints it places on theories of memory and retrieval.

Associative priming occurs in a large number of memory retrieval tasks, including lexical decisions, naming, item recognition, and judgments of spatial location. Priming has been commonly attributed to the spread of activation or to the construction of compound retrieval cues. This article examines the relative abilities of spreading-activation and non-spreading-activation theories of priming to account for experimental results on multiple-step priming, the effects of different types of primes (e.g., nonwords vs words), priming that spans an intervening item, priming in the naming task, and priming of associative judgments. Two conclusions are justified: First, non-spreading activation theories will have to be specified in greater detail before definitive tests of them can be made, and second, a rejection of spreading-activation mechanisms is premature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response bias, criteria settings, and the fast-same phenomenon: A reply to Ratcliff.

R. Ratcliff (see record 1985-19264-001) simulated data from 3 letter-matching experiments with his diffusion model. The fits were accomplished by varying 3 criteria, an encoding (or comparison) criterion and same and different response criteria. It is suggested that the necessity of including a comparison criterion is consistent with the conclusion of the present author and colleagues (see record 1985-11336-001) that bias of response criteria, alone, is insufficient to generate the fast-same phenomenon (faster same than different responses, often accompanied by a predominance of false-different errors). Although the diffusion model generates the commonly obtained pattern of reaction times (RTs) and errors through the settings of criteria, it does so by postulating complex patterns of settings, with no theoretical rationale for why or when they occur. The specific fits of the model violate several widely accepted psychophysical principles. It is concluded that criteria setting cannot be regarded as an adequate account of the fast-same phenomenon unless a psychologically meaningful rationale is developed for predicting the situations in which particular settings of criteria will be adopted. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On perspectives, theories, models, and friends: A reply to the relationalists.

The authors respond to the "relational" issue of Psychoanalytic Psychology (PP; Vol. 12, No. 1) and support Karol Marshall's remonstration about the need to clarify what exactly the category relational refers to. It is noteworthy that in this issue of PP the relational thinkers do not engage the specific topics of our essay. The author's article attempted to review the most comprehensive relational thinkers of that time across theoretical variables. Relationalists have begun to spell out the technical consequences of their perspective in recent discussions of neutrality, authority, and self-disclosure, among other issues. This is a useful trend in the relational literature, and we hope it continues. We are concerned, however, that the relational thinkers writing in this issue tend to dismiss the contributions to PP 12(1) because the perspectives presented there did not satisfy the relationalist vision of how scientific exchange should be undertaken. Although we feel that it is important for emerging points of view to be able to elaborate assumptions, constructs, and principles within their own framework and in their own way, constructive dialogue, much less a comparative analysis of the contributions and limitations of different points of view, requires that we have some common ground. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Retrieving information from memory: Spreading-activation theories versus compound-cue theories.

T. P. McNamara (1992) attacked compound-cue theories on a number of grounds. Using free association as a measure of distance between concepts in memory, he argued that compound-cue theories cannot explain mediated priming effects. The authors show that free-association production probabilities do not accurately predict priming effects, either directly or in the context of current spreading-activation models, and so remove the basis for McNamara's criticism. McNamara also claimed that compound-cue theories cannot account for the sequential effects of items that precede a target on responses to the target, but the authors show that sequential effects are consistent with compound-cue models if the target item is weighted more heavily than preceding items in the calculation of familiarity that determines response time and accuracy for the target. It is concluded that, although compound-cue and spreading-activation theories are both consistent with available data, the compound-cue theory, having less freedom, has passed more stringent tests. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Priming in recognition memory for categorized lists.

Previous research on primed recognition of categorized lists has shown 2 discrepant patterns of results. The reasons for that discrepancy are investigated by focusing on the differences between the tasks used to effect priming in the various previous studies. The 1st 2 experiments, with a total of 48 university students, showed that lure processing was facilitated when priming was achieved through another recognition test item, whereas inhibition was obtained if a semantic category judgment task was performed on the priming items. Thus, both patterns could be reproduced under nearly identical circumstances, with the type of prime processing being the only difference. Two additional experiments, with a total of 42 university students, served to generalize the inhibition found in the 2nd experiment to other semantic priming tasks. The type of processing done on the prime determined whether inhibition or facilitation of lure rejection was obtained. Inhibition was obtained when a semantic task was used to prime a recognition judgment, whereas facilitation resulted from priming with an episodic task. The results are interpreted in the framework of the semantic/episodic distinction. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Episodic effects on picture identification: Implications for theories of concept learning and theories of memory.

The effects of differences in study processing on free recall of picture names and on generalization in picture identification were investigated. Experience with degraded pictures produced poorer subsequent free recall of picture names than did naming intact pictures. For the test of picture identification, pictures that were identical to a studied picture, pictures that shared a name with a studied picture (same name), and new test pictures were presented, and the amount of clarification required to identify a picture was measured. Experience with degraded pictures produced better subsequent identification of identical test pictures but poorer later identification of same-name test pictures than did naming intact pictures. The importance of these episodic effects for theories of concept learning and theories of memory is discussed. It is argued that distinctions between memory systems (e.g., episodic-semantic) must be couched in terms of a theory of concept learning and that the data are inconsistent with a simple distinction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychosis and psychoticism: A reply to Bishop.

This brief rejoinder to D. V. Bishop's (1977) critique of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, and in particular the concept of psychoticism (P), emphasizes that when all the evidence available is taken into account and when the theory is seen in its proper development, the criticisms advanced by Bishop will be seen not to be tenable. It is concluded that there is much evidence for the viability of the concept of psychoticism and for the validity of the questionnaire measurement of P. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Homophobia and psychoanalysis: A reply to Roughton.

Replies to R. E. Roughton's (see record 1994-27310-001) response to D. K. Flaks's (see record 1993-23357-001) article on homophobia and the psychologists's role in psychoanalytic training institutes. Flaks commends attempts by the American Psychoanalytic Association to combat homophobia within the organization but notes potential problems that might limit its success. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Discontinuity and correlation: A reply to Eysenck.

"Our original point was to underscore Eysenck's own carefully stated reservations concerning the application of criterion analysis. We erred in not making this sufficiently clear. Here, we have tried to rectify this error and to amplify a suggestion made implicitly in the earlier paper (see 33: 1700), for an experimental approach to the validation of factor analytic procedures in relation to discrete genotypic determinants of human behavior." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Truth and deception: A reply to Lykken.

In reply to D. T. Lykken's (see record 1979-30044-001) review of the validity of lie detector tests and his criticisms of the present authors' (see record 1978-07412-001) survey, evidence is presented showing that control question tests of deception have an accuracy of approximately 90% in the field situation and are highly effective with both innocent and guilty Ss. Lykken's representation of the theory of lie detector tests is questioned, and the correct application of control question tests is discussed. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and cancer: A reply to Stachnik.

T. J. Stachnik's (see record 1980-10503-001) call for work in the area of prevention contains a naive assumption that we know what to do to prevent cancer. However, oncologists and epidemiologists involved in cancer research disagree about this very issue. Current research suggests that alterations in the tumor–host relationship, mediated at the biochemical level by endocrine or immune function and influenced by psychological response to the disease state, should not be ignored. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reply to Melzack.

Presents a reply to the comments by Melzack (see record 1989-30022-001). Melzack comments that psychological theory is at a standstill and that the nature of self, mind and reality continue to elude us. I recall realizing during my educational training that we had not agreed upon conceptual understanding of self, let alone mind or reality. As an undergraduate student, I was introduced to, as Melzack states, a "profusion of little theories" and, as a graduate student, to a profusion of bigger clinical theories, without however, any conceptual clarity of these important terms. As I prepared for my dissertation, I found myself frustrated reviewing journal articles on self. Despite masses of studies laboriously investigating implications of self, self was being utilized as a vaguely defined dependent variable. As Melzack concluded, masses of facts are compiled with no agreed upon theoretical framework to hold them together. I would like to describe how I came upon a new avenue toward understanding self, mind and reality which has provided profound meaning to my clinical practice. I believe the ideas presented by Melzack have direct relevance for applied psychological theory. Substituting the term "phantom self for "phantom limb" can have many interesting parallels; when a person says "me," that implies "self" though the "self" described is a phantom as the phantom limb. As the search continues for the brain processes that generate qualities of experience for "self." I strongly recommend the consideration of Buddhist ideology for anyone concerned with defining self, mind and reality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reply to Scott.

"… Scott [see 31: 2349] reports a failure to confirm our findings on the basis of a study which was not a replication of ours. To the extent that his animals were closely analogous to one of our 5 groups (the interrupted relationship group), his findings tend to confirm one of our major findings, viz., that an interrupted relationship seriously disrupts the behavior of the previously handled animals." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reply to McNemar.

Corrections made by the present author (see record 1970-05886-001) for suggested spuriousness in Q. McNemar's (see record 1951-05872-001) formula for determining the validity of a short form of the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale were rejected by McNemar (see record 1974-24264-001) as being based on fallacious reasoning. The present author replies that correlated errors responsible for the spurious correlation given by McNemar's formula affect only the covariance, not the variances, of the full scale and the short form. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reply to Garfield.

Responds to S. L. Garfield's (see record 1978-02320-001) comment on the authors' (1975) article, with specific reference to the adequacy of the measure of social class used in previous studies and to the interpretation of the data offered by Garfield. Several specific questions that Garfield asks about the Stern et al article are answered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reply to Weinstock.

Contends that although R. B. Weinstock's (see record 1973-02058-001) recent review of the role of deprivation schedules reveals several significant differences as well as similarities resulting from different maintenance techniques, his strong recommendation to use an adjusted vs fixed-percentage weight loss is based on weak or inappropriate data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Measuring attendance: A reply to Ilgen.

D. R. Ilgen's (1977) objections to the use of attendance as a performance criterion are discussed in terms of R. L. Thorndike's (1949) criteria for criteria, namely, relevance, reliability, freedom from contamination, and practicality. The argument is made that trying to interpret correlations involving an absenteeism measure that has little or no stability is relatively futile, regardless of whether other estimates of reliability (e.g., interobserver) are high. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Casting stones: A reply to Humphreys.

Contends that the critique by L. G. Humphreys (see record 1982-24859-001) of the present author's (see record 1981-06882-001) article is vitiated by the facts that (a) the article he criticizes was an invited position paper and not an original presentation of data, so that detailed statistical testing would have been inappropriate to the purpose of the article; (b) Humphreys commits in his reply some of the "misdeeds" of which he accuses the present author; (c) contrary to Humphrey's assertion, the number of cases in the 3 nonentrenchment experiments (74) is more than adequate for drawing conclusions of the sort made; and (d) Humphreys misinterprets his own z tests. (2 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Worker control: A reply to Ronan.

Argues that W. W. Ronan (1980) presents a one-sided picture of "work force control" by the "entrepreneur–capitalist–management group" and discredits the contributions of many psychologists to workers' well-being. Ronan's contentions that (1) psychological concepts are applied to programs that are motivated by management's desire to avoid unionization, (2) psychological experiments and interventions are unilaterally imposed on workers by management, and (3) economic benefits of psychological interventions should be shared equally with workers are discussed. It is concluded that psychologists have every reason to be proud of their colleagues' contributions to making companies more profitable while improving the work environment for employees. (1 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)