Learning a theory of causality.

The very early appearance of abstract knowledge is often taken as evidence for innateness. We explore the relative learning speeds of abstract and specific knowledge within a Bayesian framework and the role for innate structure. We focus on knowledge about causality, seen as a domain-general intuitive theory, and ask whether this knowledge can be learned from co-occurrence of events. We begin by phrasing the causal Bayes nets theory of causality and a range of alternatives in a logical language for relational theories. This allows us to explore simultaneous inductive learning of an abstract theory of causality and a causal model for each of several causal systems. We find that the correct theory of causality can be learned relatively quickly, often becoming available before specific causal theories have been learned—an effect we term the blessing of abstraction. We then explore the effect of providing a variety of auxiliary evidence and find that a collection of simple perceptual input analyzers can help to bootstrap abstract knowledge. Together, these results suggest that the most efficient route to causal knowledge may be to build in not an abstract notion of causality but a powerful inductive learning mechanism and a variety of perceptual supports. While these results are purely computational, they have implications for cognitive development, which we explore in the conclusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of intuitions about support beyond infancy.

In a series of 3 experiments modeled after infant studies, 3- to- 6-year-old children’s intuitive knowledge about support was assessed. Different objects were shown either sufficiently supported or not. Children had to predict whether a block would remain standing on a platform upon release or make perceptual judgments about the possibility of a shown block-on-platform configuration. Overall, performance was strongly age-related and independent of task context. Sensitivity for the amount of contact between object and support was clearly evidenced for each of the age-groups tested and was almost perfect in 5- and 6-year-olds. By contrast, sensitivity for the proportion of an object’s volume positioned over the support was only marginally reliable in 3-year-olds and still far from perfect in 6-year-olds. It is concluded that basic intuitions about support undergo distinct developmental change beyond infancy and are not yet fully developed in kindergartners. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on young children's event memory and false reports.

The present study investigated developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on children's memory and suggestibility. Three- and 5-year-olds were singly or repeatedly interviewed about a play event by a highly biased or control interviewer. Children interviewed once by the biased interviewer after a long delay made the most errors. Children interviewed repeatedly, regardless of interviewer bias, were more accurate and less likely to falsely claim that they played with a man. In free recall, among children questioned once after a long delay by the biased interviewer, 5-year-olds were more likely than were 3-year-olds to claim falsely that they played with a man. However, in response to direct questions, 3-year-olds were more easily manipulated into implying that they played with him. Findings suggest that interviewer bias is particularly problematic when children's memory has weakened. In contrast, repeated interviews that occur a short time after a to-be-remembered event do not necessarily increase children's errors, even when interviews include misleading questions and interviewer bias. Implications for developmental differences in memory and suggestibility are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Understanding inference as a source of knowledge: Children's ability to evaluate the certainty of deduction, perception, and guessing.

Three experiments investigated children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge. Children observed a puppet make a statement about the color of one of two hidden toys after the puppet (a) looked directly at the toy (looking), (b) looked at the other toy (inference), or (c) looked at neither toy (guessing). Most 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds did not rate the puppet as being more certain of the toy's color after the puppet looked directly at it or inferred its color than they did after the puppet guessed its color. Most 8- and 9-year-olds distinguished inference and looking from guessing. The tendency to explain the puppet's knowledge by referring to inference increased with age. Children who referred to inference in their explanations were more likely to judge deductive inference as more certain than guessing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of drawing on memory performance in young children.

In Experiment 1, 32 5- to 6-year-old boys and girls participated in a unique event and were interviewed about that event 1 day later. Half of the children were asked to draw what happened during the event and half were asked to tell what happened. In both conditions, only children's verbal behavior was scored. Children in the draw group were as accurate and reported more information than children in the tell group, especially in response to direct questions. In Experiment 2, 32 5- to 6-year-olds and 32 3- to 4-year-olds participated in the same event used in Experiment 1 and were interviewed 1 month later. The 5- to 6-year-olds in the draw group reported more information than the 5- to 6-year-olds in the tell group after the 1-month delay. Drawing did not, however, increase the amount of information reported by 3- to 4-year-olds. These findings have important theoretical implications for memory development and important practical implications for children's eyewitness testimony. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

There's more to the picture than meets the eye: young children's difficulty understanding biased interpretation

5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years.     

The development of automatic numerosity processing in preschoolers: Evidence for numerosity-perceptual interference.

Three experiments examined developmental changes in the automatic processing of numerosity and perceptual information using a nonsymbolic numerical Stroop paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2 (E1 and E2), 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds had to compare the numerosities or the total filled areas of collections of dots (E1) or bars (E2) varying along both dimensions. Experiment 3 replicated E2's results in 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds. Results demonstrated the existence of reciprocal influences between numerical and perceptual information beginning at age 3. Moreover, the irrelevant perceptual influences remained stable throughout development, whereas the sensitivity to irrelevant numerical cues tended to increase with age despite children's growing inhibition capacities. No significant correlation could be found between these developmental changes and the acquisition of counting knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Two-year-olds' search strategies and visual tracking in a hidden displacement task.

Children younger than 3 years have difficulty with search tasks that involve hidden displacement. Partial visual information was provided about a ball's path as it moved toward a hiding place. Children (2.0 and 2.5 years old) saw a ball rolling down a ramp placed behind a transparent screen with 4 opaque doors. A wall, placed on the ramp and directly behind 1 of the doors, protruded above the screen and stopped the ball. Children were asked to find the ball. The transparency of the screen permitted visual tracking of the ball between the doors, but its final resting place was obscured. Both age groups were equally proficient at tracking the ball as it rolled behind the screen, but the 2.5-year-olds were more likely to reach to the correct door. Looking behavior was related to errors in the younger group in that tracking that stopped short or continued past the correct door was associated with incorrect choices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissociating Processes Supporting Causal Perception and Causal Inference in the Brain.

An understanding of relations between causes and effects is essential for making sense of the dynamic physical world. It has been argued that this understanding of causality depends on both perceptual and inferential components. To investigate whether causal perception and causal inference rely on common or on distinct processes, the authors tested 2 callosotomy (split-brain) patients and a group of neurologically intact participants. The authors show that the direct perception of causality and the ability to infer causality depend on different hemispheres of the divided brain. This finding implies that understanding causality is not a unitary process and that causal perception and causal inference can proceed independently. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal relations and feature similarity in children's inductive reasoning.

Four experiments examined the development of property induction on the basis of causal relations. In the first 2 studies, 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with triads in which a target instance was equally similar to 2 inductive bases but shared a causal antecedent feature with 1 of them. All 3 age groups used causal relations as a basis for property induction, although the proportion of causal inferences increased with age. Subsequent experiments pitted causal relations against featural similarity in induction. It was found that adults and 8-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, preferred shared causal relations over strong featural similarity as a basis for induction. The implications for models of inductive reasoning and development are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Three- and 4-year-olds encode modeled actions in two ways leading to immediate imitation and delayed emulation.

When copying a model's behavior with a tool, children tend to imitate (copy the specific actions to replicate the model's goal) rather than emulate (bring about the model's goal in the most efficient way). Tasks producing these findings test children immediately after the behavior is modeled. In 2 experiments, we investigated children's copying behavior after a delay (of a week). In Experiment 1 (n = 90), we found that although 3- and 4-year-olds often imitate in the short term, they are more likely to emulate in the long term. Data from Experiment 2 (n = 80) were consistent with children remembering actions that were relevant to a causal narrative of the task. Overall, our data suggest that children simultaneously encode modeled behavior in 2 ways that lead to both imitation and emulation. In the discussion, we consider what kind of information leads children to emulate in the long term. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cue competition effects and young children’s causal and counterfactual inferences.

The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children’s counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined by asking whether or not the machine would have gone off in the absence of 1 of 2 objects that had been placed on it as a pair. Cue competition effects were demonstrated only in 5- to 6-year-olds using this mode of assessing causal reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perceptual and memorial constructs in children's judgments of quantity: A law of across-representation invariance.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 117(1) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (see record 2008-10685-001). The sentence found on p. 381, right-hand column, line 15, was printed incorrectly. The corrected statement is provided in the erratum.] Children at three different ages made judgments of physically presented (perceptual estimation) or symbolically represented (memorial estimation) rectangles. Height and width were integrated according to different, age-dependent algebraic rules. Memorial data obeyed the same integration rules that operated in the original perceptual judgments even when younger children and older children used completely different combination models. Valuation operations were the same in perception and memory for the youngest group (6-year-olds) but became discriminably different at older ages (for the 8- and 10-year-olds). Three additional experiments on judgments of volume, liquid quantity, and visual length yielded strong cross-validation support for the general invariance claim (with respect to integration rule theory) but less strong support for the specific invariance claim (with respect to valuation function for the 6-year-old subjects). Results are interpreted as demonstrating lawful and long-enduring ecological constraints on internal representation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers' understanding of the link between thinking and feeling: cognitive cuing and emotional change

In 3 studies we investigated 3- through 6-year-olds' knowledge of thinking and feeling by examining their understanding of how emotions can change when memories of past sad events are cued by objects in the current environment. In Study 1, 48 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were presented with 4 illustrated stories in which focal characters experience minor sad events. Later, each story character encounters a visual cue that is related to one of his or her previous sad experiences. Children were told that the character felt sad, and they were asked to explain why. Study 1 suggested considerable competence as well as substantial development in the years between 4 and 6 in the understanding of the influence of mental activity on emotions. Studies 2 and 3 more systematically explored preschoolers' understanding of cognitive cuing and emotional change with different types of situations and cues. Across these 2 studies, 108 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds listened to illustrated stories that featured story characters who each experienced a sad event and who were later exposed to a related cue. Children were not only asked to explain why the characters suddenly felt sad, but in some stories, they were also asked to predict and explain how another character, who was never at the past sad event, would feel. Results of Studies 2 and 3 showed an initial understanding of cognitive cuing and emotion in some children as young as 3, replicated and extended the evidence for significant developmental changes in that understanding during the preschool years, and revealed that the strength and consistency of preschoolers' knowledge of cognitive cuing and emotion was affected by whether cues were the same, or only similar to, parts of the earlier events.     

What parents know, how they know it, and several forms of adolescent adjustment: Further support for a reinterpretation of monitoring.

Parental monitoring has been conceptualized as tracking and surveillance but operationalized as knowledge of daily activities. This study tested the tracking and surveillance explanation of why parental knowledge is linked to better adolescent adjustment. Participants were 1,186 14-year-olds in central Sweden and their parents. The results supported and extended a reinterpretation of parental monitoring (H. Stattin & M. Kerr, in press). Across sex and informant, high parental knowledge was linked to multiple measures of good adjustment. But children's spontaneous disclosure of information explained more of these relations than parents' tracking and surveillance efforts did. Parents' control efforts were related to good adjustment only after the child's feelings of being controlled, which were linked to poor adjustment, were partialed out. The findings suggest that parents' tracking and surveillance efforts are not as effective as previously thought. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

True or false: Do 5-year-olds understand belief?

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Young children's understanding of briefly versus extremely delayed images of the self: Emergence of the autobiographical stance.

Eighty-eight young 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were scheduled for 2 testing sessions. On Visit 1, the children were videotaped playing a game while an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on their head and covertly removed it after the game. One week later, the children were videotaped playing a different game. A sticker was again covertly placed on their heads. Half the children in each age group then observed the video from the previous week, whereas the other half observed the tape from 3 min earlier. Less than half of the 3-year-olds in both conditions reached up for the sticker. In contrast, the majority of 4- and 5-year-olds in the briefly delayed condition reached for the sticker, but few in the extremely delayed condition did so. By 4 years of age, children may have developed a causal understanding of the self's endurance through time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Young children's representation of spatial information acquired from maps.

The early development of the ability to acquire integrated knowledge of a space from a map was investigated in 130 children, 4 to 7 years of age. Experiment 1 demonstrated that all 6- and 7-year-olds and many 4- and 5-year-olds could learn the layout of a large playhouse composed of six adjoined rooms by memorizing a map. Children who learned the map before entering the playhouse more quickly learned a route through it than children who were not exposed to the map, and older children performed significantly better than younger children. In Experiment 2 preschoolers learned a map of a space that contained six spatially separated small rooms within one large room. Children could therefore view the entire configuration of smaller rooms as they traveled around the larger room. Preschoolers performed significantly better in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, and the majority of them performed perfectly or almost perfectly. Taken together, the findings help to clarify young children's map-reading abilities in several respects and suggest that preschoolers' abilities are more substantial than has been assumed or demonstrated previously. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Perceptual and memorial constructs in children's judgments of quantity: A law of across-representation invariance": Correction to Wolf and Algom (1987).

Reports an error in "Perceptual and memorial constructs in children's judgments of quantity: A law of across-representation invariance" by Yuval Wolf and Daniel Algom (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1987[Dec], Vol 116[4], 381-397). The sentence found on p. 381, right-hand column, line 15, was printed incorrectly. The corrected statement is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1988-07144-001.) Children at three different ages made judgments of physically presented (perceptual estimation) or symbolically represented (memorial estimation) rectangles. Height and width were integrated according to different, age-dependent algebraic rules. Memorial data obeyed the same integration rules that operated in the original perceptual judgments even when younger children and older children used completely different combination models. Valuation operations were the same in perception and memory for the youngest group (6-year-olds) but became discriminably different at older ages (for the 8- and 10-year-olds). Three additional experiments on judgments of volume, liquid quantity, and visual length yielded strong cross-validation support for the general invariance claim (with respect to integration rule theory) but less strong support for the specific invariance claim (with respect to valuation function for the 6-year-old subjects). Results are interpreted as demonstrating lawful and long-enduring ecological constraints on internal representation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)