On the evaluative factor in the trait scales of Peabody's study of trait inferences.

In 2 factor analyses of trait inferences, an analysis of antecedent terms and an analysis of trait scales, D. Peabody (see record 1968-03876-001) did not find an evaluative factor. S. Rosenberg and K. Olshan (see record 1971-04168-001) criticized Peabody's analysis of antecedent terms, having found an evaluative dimension by the use of distance measures. The present reanalysis of Peabody's data also yielded a clearly evaluative dimension in the trait scales. The resulting factors, except the evaluative one, were identical to Peabody's antecedent term factors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Just as arbitrary as ever: Comments on Zuckerman's rejoinder.

Responds to M. Zuckerman's (see record 1984-00261-001) comment on the authors' (see record 1982-09834-001) paper that argued that trait–state distinctions are arbitrary. It is concluded that without the state–trait distinction, psychologists would be free to use whatever measure "works best" for a given task and thus, state–trait labels for methods of measurement would no longer act as prohibitions against the use of the methods wherever these might provide successful prediction. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personality: Nomothetic or idiographic? A response to Kenrick and Stringfield.

Suggests that substantial consistency can be observed in personality, as reflected in both behavior and judges' ratings, when the principle of aggregration is applied to traditional nomothetic assessment procedures and the results are interpreted in terms of classical reliability theory. It is demonstrated that conclusions by D. T. Kenrick and D. O. Stringfield (see record 1980-07621-001) about the improvement in predictive power stemming from an idiographic analysis do not follow from their data, as they confound trait consistency and trait extremity and fail to take account of restriction and inflation of range effects. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The possibility of possibility.

Comments that B. D. Slife (see record 1995-13451-001), M. Gergen (see record 1995-14294-001), R. N. Williams (see record 1995-12851-001), and M. S. Richardson (see record 1995-14311-001) all seem to suggest that the contextless nature of the traditional conception of free will is problematic. Although each author attempts to contextualize this traditional conception, many of their explanations reveal that the underlying problem remains. It is suggested that a radically new assumption of time, such as Heidegger's temporality, is necessary. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Traits, consistency, and self-schemata: What do our methods measure?

Psychologists have responded to the inadequacies that W. Mischel (1968) noted in the trait approach to personality by exploring 2 other facets of personality, cross-situational consistency and self-schemata. It is argued that these newer approaches have yet to be clearly distinguished conceptually or empirically from the traditional model that they were designed to supplement or replace. In the present 2 studies, 362 undergraduates rated the extent to which 10 traits applied to them (overall level), their consistency on these traits (cross-situational consistency), and the importance of these traits to their view of themselves (self-schema). Correlational analyses showed that the measures of consistency and self-schema lacked discriminant validity from the measures of overall level. Specifically, their correlations with level were as high as their internal consistencies. It is concluded that the measurement models for cross-situational consistency and for self-schemata do not adequately reflect their theoretical counterparts. This failure undercuts the interpretations of recent research by H. Markus (see record 1977-27585-001), Markus et al (see record 1982-23588-001), and S. Bem (see record 1981-25685-001). (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The farmer and the cowman should be friends: An attempt at reconciliation with Batson, Coke, and Pych.

R. L. Archer et al (see record 1982-05783-001) suggested that high dispositional empathy and socially evaluative circumstances be added to the 2-stage model of empathically-mediated helping of J. S. Coke et al (see record 1980-00984-001). C. D. Batson et al (1983) responded with 2 lines of argument against this. To the 1st of their arguments, that the original model will apply to Ss low as well as high in dispositional empathy, the present author replies that both hypotheses (theirs and his) await an adequate test. To the 2nd, that the success of the model in experimental contexts lacking in social evaluation is well-demonstrated, the author replies that those experimental paradigms may also have socially evaluative aspects. A reconciliation based on shared beliefs that the 2-stage model has potential and deserves more investigation is also explored. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reactions diagnosed.

Responds to comments of J. R. Bergan (see record 1989-10250-001), B. Y. Wong (see record 1989-10319-001), and G. Alessi (see record 1989-10243-001) on the article by the present author (see record 1989-10292-001). Four issues are discussed: conceptions of behavior focused on the individual's characteristics, norm-referenced vs process assessment, think-aloud analysis, and premature dissemination. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Method, theory, and drawing inferences.

Responds to the comment by T. A. Brigham (see record 1989-31532-001) criticizing the labeling of correlational studies as experiments in the article by S. J. Lynn and J. W. Rhue (see record 1988-15963-001). The present author considers the labeling question less critical and differs from Brigham on the issue of methods and inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clinical judgment and affective disorders.

Addresses 3 limitations of previous work on counselor clinical judgment by the 1st author et al (see record 1983-11141-001) and R. F. Haase et al (see record 1983-26503-001). Results of the study of 20 practicing counselors suggest that the judgment process used by experienced counselors to make diagnoses of affective disorders differs depending on the type of diagnostic judgment and that attributions may play a role in at least certain types of judgments. (8 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inaccurate implications of philosophy of science and rational-emotive therapy: A reply to DiGiuseppe.

Argues that contrary to R. DiGiuseppe's (see record 1987-22610-001) claims, irrational beliefs are evaluative cognitions with central importance theories of emotion and are the focus of disputing in rational-emotive therapy. The concept of personal paradigm and the potential contributions of cognitive psychology to cognitive psychotherapy are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Where is fashion leading us?

Two trends threaten to destroy the traditional collegiate values of scholarship and challenge: One trend has its roots in R. P. Carver's (see record 1975-00055-001) idea of the edumetric test; the other is rooted in the idea of mastery as advocated by B. S. Bloom (see record 1977-11414-001) and F. S. Keller (1968). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Optimum service delivery to the Black client.

Replies to the comments of H. U. Ashby (see record 1986-17759-001) and P. Bronstein (see record 1986-17774-001) on the author's (see record 1985-26063-001) work on the nondisclosing Black client. Ashby's and Bronstein's objections to the term healthy cultural paranoia are addressed with assertions that the author is not the originator of the term and that the impact of the proposal on the quality of care services to Black clients was not considered by either Ashby or Bronstein. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On mood variation and memory: Reply to Isen (1985), Ellis (1985), and Mayer and Bower (1985).

Responds to comments by A. M. Isen (see record 1986-13663-001); H. C. Ellis (see record 1986-13654-001); and J. D. Mayer and G. M. Bower (see record 1986-13675-001) on the present authors' (see record 1986-03061-001) findings that (a) depressed college students showed no overall deficit in recall performance and (b) depressed students failed to show selective recall for mood-congruent (negative) events in a story. Issues considered included performance deficits in depression, selectivity effects in memory, the possibility that affective traits rather than mood states were assessed, and potential reactions to the mood questionnaires. Evidence is presented that the Beck Depression Inventory is not a mild mood-induction procedure. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

IQ gains and fluid g.

Responds to J. P. Rushton's comments (see record 2000-15413-003) on the J. R. Flynn article (see record 1999-00167-001) examining IQ gains over time. Flynn contends that factor analysis does show that inbreeding depression isolated from a cluster including fluid g, IQ gains, and Black-White differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rational explanation of the selection task.

M. Oaksford and N. Chater (O&C, see record 1995-08271-001) presented the first quantitative model of R C. Wason's (1966) selection task in which performance is rational. J. St. B. T. Evans and D. E. Over (see record 83:25190) reply that O&C's account is normatively incorrect and cannot model K. N. Kirby's (see record 1995-04302-001) or R Pollard and J. St. B. T. Evans's (see record 1984-30572-001) data. It is argued that an equivalent measure satisfies their normative concerns and that a modification of O&C's model accounts for their empirical concerns. D. Laming (see record 83:25220) argues that O&C made unjustifiable psychological assumptions and that a "correct" Bayesian analysis agrees with logic. It is argued that O&C's model makes normative and psychological sense and that Laming's analysis is not Bayesian. A. Almor and S. A. Sloman (see record 83:25168) argue that O&C cannot explain their data. It is argued that Almor and Sloman's data do not bear on O&C's model because they alter the nature of the task. It is concluded that O&C's model remains the most compelling and comprehensive account of the selection task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

That's not my dog: A reply to Patton and Wampold.

Responds to the comments of M. J. Patton and B. E. Wampold (see record 1983-11132-001) concerning the present authors' article (see record 1983-11141-001). Issues addressed are (1) the use of a clinical model of prediction and elements of judgment considered, (2) questions relating to the statistical analysis, and (3) issues concerning modeling the counselor judgment process and directions for research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Consciousness and stress reduction in defensive projection: A reply to Holmes.

Discusses D. S. Holmes's (see record 1982-03660-001) critique of the author's (see record 1982-03692-001) article on self-serving biases in person perception. Holmes's critique is not compelling for 2 reasons: (a) His contention that there is no evidence to support classical projection is defensible only if an essentially untestable concept, the unconscious, is considered to be a vital component of the mechanism; and (b) his conclusions regarding the stress-reduction effects of attributive projection rely on research that is methodologically flawed or unavailable for public scrutiny. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Creators and producers.

Addresses J. G. Nichols's (see record 1973-02491-001) heuristic analysis on creativity. Consistent with Nichols's comments, evidence from R. B. Ammons (1962) and G. A. Haven (1965) suggests that creative productivity can be developed through human engineering and is learned behavior, rather than a result of a personality trait or habitual divergent thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More words but still no lexicon: Reply to Besner et al. (1990).

The major points in the D. Besner et al (see record 1990-27434-001) critique of the M. S. Seidenberg and J. L. McClelland (see record 1990-03520-001) model are addressed. The model's performance differs from that of people in ways that are predictable from an understanding of the limitations of implementation. The principal limitations are the size of the training corpus and the phonological representation. The issue of pseudohomophone effects is discussed, and Besner et al's new data are shown to be consistent with the Seidenberg and McClelland account of lexical decision. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perceptual defence: Attempted replication using the dark adaptation paradigm: A rejoinder.

A. G. Worthington's (see record 1982-31842-001) criticisms of the replications by the present author and C. de la Mahotière (see record 1982-31812-001) using the dark-adaptation paradigm for perceptual defense (Worthington, 1964) are evaluated, and the basis for choosing this paradigm to replicate rather than a later version is elaborated. Reasons for the failure to replicate are delineated. (French abstract) (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)