The bounded core for games with restricted cooperation

A game with restricted (incomplete) cooperation is a triple (N, v, Ω), where N represents a finite set of players, Ω ? 2^N is a set of feasible coalitions such that N ∈ Ω, and v: Ω → R denotes a characteristic function. Unlike the classical TU games, the core of a game with restricted cooperation can be unbounded. Recently Grabisch and Sudhölter [9] proposed a new solution concept—the bounded core—that associates a game (N, v,Ω) with the union of all bounded faces of the core. The bounded core can be empty even if the core is nonempty. This paper gives two axiomatizations of the bounded core. The first axiomatization characterizes the bounded core for the class G^r of all games with restricted cooperation, whereas the second one for the subclass G_bc^r ? G^r of the games with nonempty bounded cores.     

Power and welfare in bargaining for coalition structure formation

We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game for partitioning n agents into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has n time periods during which the players are called according to an exogenous agenda to propose offers. With probability \(\delta \), the game ends during any time period \(t<n\). If it does, the first t players on the agenda get a chance to propose but the others do not. Thus, \(\delta \) is a measure of the degree of democracy within the game (ranging from democracy for \(\delta =0\), through increasing levels of authoritarianism as \(\delta \) approaches 1, to dictatorship for \(\delta =1\)). We determine the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and study how a player’s position on the agenda affects his bargaining power. We analyze the relation between the distribution of power of individual players, the level of democracy, and the welfare efficiency of the game. We find that purely democratic games are welfare inefficient and that introducing a degree of authoritarianism into the game makes the distribution of power more equitable and also maximizes welfare. These results remain invariant under two types of player preferences: one where each player’s preference is a total order on the space of possible coalition structures and the other where each player either likes or dislikes a coalition structure. Finally, we show that the SPE partition may or may not be core stable.     

Virtual reality software package for implementing motor learning and rehabilitation experiments

Virtual reality games for rehabilitation are attracting increasing growth. In particular, there is a demand for games that allow therapists to identify an individual’s difficulties and customize the control of variables, such as speed, size, distance, as well as visual and auditory feedback. This study presents and describes a virtual reality software package (Bridge Games) to promote rehabilitation of individuals living with disabilities and highlights preliminary researches of its use for implementing motor learning and rehabilitation. First, the study presents seven games in the software package that can be chosen by the rehabilitation team, considering the patient’s needs. All game characteristics are described including name, function presentation, objective and valuable measurements for rehabilitation. Second, preliminary results illustrate some applications of two games, considering 343 people with various disabilities and health status. Based on the results, in the Coincident Timing game, there was a main effect of movement sensor type (in this instance the most functional device was the keyboard when compared with Kinect and touch screen) on average time reached by sample analyzed, F(2, 225) = 4.42, p < 0.05. Similarly, in the Challenge! game, a main effect was found for movement sensor type. However, in this case, touch screen provided better performance than Kinect and Leap Motion, F(2, 709) = 5.90, p < 0.01. Thus, Bridge Games is a possible software game to quantify motor learning. Moreover, the findings suggest that motor skills might be practiced differently depending on the environmental interface in which the game may be used.     

When Can Limited Randomness Be Used in Repeated Games?

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at generating random-like sequences, and true random bits may be unavailable. Even if the players have access to enough random bits for a single instance of the game their randomness might be insufficient if the game is played many times. In this work, we ask whether randomness is necessary for equilibria to exist in finitely repeated games. We show that for a large class of games containing arbitrary two-player zero-sum games, approximate Nash equilibria of the n-stage repeated version of the game exist if and only if both players have Ω(n) random bits. In contrast, we show that there exists a class of games for which no equilibrium exists in pure strategies, yet the n-stage repeated version of the game has an exact Nash equilibrium in which each player uses only a constant number of random bits. When the players are assumed to be computationally bounded, if cryptographic pseudorandom generators (or, equivalently, one-way functions) exist, then the players can base their strategies on “random-like” sequences derived from only a small number of truly random bits. We show that, in contrast, in repeated two-player zero-sum games, if pseudorandom generators do not exist, then Ω(n) random bits remain necessary for equilibria to exist.     

Mean field games based on stable-like processes

We investigate the mean field games of N agents based on the nonlinear stable-like processes. The main result of the paper is that any solution of the limiting mean field consistency equation generates a 1/N-Nash equilibrium for the approximating game of N agents.     

On the <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-accessibility of cores of <Emphasis Type="Italic">TU</Emphasis>-cooperative games

This paper proposes a strengthening of the author’s core-accessibility theorem for balanced TU-cooperative games. The obtained strengthening relaxes the influence of the nontransitivity of classical domination αv on the quality of the sequential improvement of dominated imputations in a game v. More specifically, we establish the k-accessibility of the core C(α _v ) of any balanced TU-cooperative game v for all natural numbers k: for each dominated imputation x, there exists a converging sequence of imputations x₀, x₁,..., such that x₀ = x, lim x _r ∈ C(α _v ) and x_r?m is dominated by any successive imputation x _r with m ∈ [1, k] and r ≥ m. For showing that the TU-property is essential to provide the k-accessibility of the core, we give an example of an NTU-cooperative game G with a ”black hole” representing a nonempty closed subset B ? G(N) of dominated imputations that contains all the α _G -monotonic sequential improvement trajectories originating at any point x ∈ B.     

A method to assess pervasive qualities in mobile games

Software designers are facing huge challenges imposed by a new generation of applications that mix real and digital worlds, such as pervasive games. This type of game has recently become a worldwide phenomenon, with thousands of people walking in the streets with smartphones to interact with the physical environment. In this paper, we propose a new method to assess pervasive qualities in pervasive mobile games, which can be customized and extended to other ubiquitous applications. This method generates a quality report, which consists of a quality spreadsheet (containing metric values and comments) and a quality vector (representing the game quality profile in the form of a bar chart). In addition, we can compare quality vectors using similarity criteria. In this paper, we apply the proposed method to commercial and academic prototype games to shed more light on their pervasive characteristics and identify ways to improve the overall quality that sets these games apart from traditional digital games—that is, pervasiveness.     

Guaranteed approach with the farthest of the runaways

Games of the family {Λ _N } _N?2 are formulated and studied with the application of generalized Isaacs’s approach. The game Λ _N is a simplest model of the counteraction of one persecutor P and coalition N of E ^N runaways for the case when the payoff is the distance up to the coalition of E ^N equal to the Euclidean distance between P and the farthest from the runaways; P is in command of the termination moment. Moreover, an approach within the limits of which in games with a smooth terminal payoff are generated strategies prescribing players’ motions in the directions of local gradients of the payoff is described. The approach is used for constructing pursuit strategies in games in which smooth approximations of the maximum of Euclidean distances up to the runaways are in place of payoffs. Pursuit strategies prescribing the motion in the direction of the farthest of the runaways are studied. A numerical simulation of the development of the games Λ₂ and Λ₃ is conducted in using different strategies by the players.     

Another Sub-exponential Algorithm for the Simple Stochastic Game

We study the problem of solving simple stochastic games, and give both an interesting new algorithm and a hardness result. We show a reduction from fine approximation of simple stochastic games to coarse approximation of a polynomial sized game, which can be viewed as an evidence showing the hardness to approximate the value of simple stochastic games. We also present a randomized algorithm that runs in \(\tilde{O}(\sqrt{|V_{\mathrm{R}}|!})\) time, where |V _R| is the number of RANDOM vertices and \(\tilde{O}\) ignores polynomial terms. This algorithm is the fastest known algorithm when |V _R|=ω(log?n) and \(|V_{\mathrm{R}}|=o(\sqrt{\min{|V_{\min}|,|V_{\max}|}})\) and it works for general (non-stopping) simple stochastic games.     

On an approach to constructing a characteristic function in cooperative differential games

We propose a novel approach to constructing characteristic functions in cooperative differential games. A characteristic function of a coalition S is computed in two stages: first, optimal control strategies maximizing the total payoff of the players are found, and next, these strategies are used by the players from the coalition S, while the other players, those from N S, use strategies minimizing the total payoff of the players from S. The characteristic function obtained in this way is superadditive. In addition, it possesses a number of other useful properties. As an example, we compute values of a characteristic function for a specific differential game of pollution control.     

Guaranteed strategies for escaping encirclement

This paper considers a conflict situation on the plane as follows. A fast evader E has to break out the encirclement of slow pursuers P _{j1,...,j n} = {P _j1,..., P _jn }, n ≥ 3, with a miss distance not smaller than r ≥ 0. First, we estimate the minimum guaranteed miss distance from E to a pursuer P _a , a ∈ {j ₁,..., j _n }, when the former moves along a given straight line. Then the obtained results are used to calculate the guaranteed estimates to a group of two pursuers P _b,c = {P _b , P _c }, b, c ∈ {j ₁,..., j _n }, b ≠ c, when E maneuvers by crossing the rectilinear segment P _b P _c , and the state passes to the domain of the game space where E applies a strategy under which the miss distance to any of the pursuers is not decreased. In addition, we describe an approach to the games with a group of pursuers P _{j1,... jn} , n ≥ 3, in which E seeks to break out the encirclement by passing between two pursuers P _b and P _c , entering the domain of the game space where E can increase the miss distance to all pursuers by straight motion. By comparing the guaranteed miss distances with r for all alternatives b, c ∈ {j ₁,..., j _n }, b ≠ c, and a ? {b, c}, it is possible to choose the best alternative and also to extract the histories of the game in which the designed evasion strategies guarantee a safe break out from the encirclement.     

Altruistic behavior in a nonantagonistic positional differential game

We consider a two-person nonantagonistic positional differential game (NPDG) whose dynamics is described by an ordinary nonlinear vector differential equation. Constraints on values of players’ controls are geometric. Final time of the game is fixed. Payoff functionals of both players are terminal. The formalization of positional strategies in an NPDG is based on the formalization and results of the general theory of antagonistic positional differential games (APDGs) (see monographs by N.N. Krasovskii and A.I. Subbotin [3, 4]). Additionally, in the present paper we assume that each player, together with the usual, normal (nor), type of behavior aimed at maximizing his own functional, can use other behavior types introduced in [2, 5]. In particular, these may be altruistic (alt), aggressive (agg), and paradoxical (par) types. It is assumed that in the course of the game players can switch their behavior from one type to another. Using the possibility of such switches in a repeated bimatrix 2 × 2 game in [5, 6] allowed to obtain new solutions of this game. In the present paper, extension of this approach to NPDGs leads to a new formulation of the problem. In particular, of interest is the question of how players’ outcomes at Nash solutions are transformed. An urgent problem is minimizing the time of “abnormal” behavior while achieving a good result. The paper proposes a formalization of an NPDG with behavior types (NPDGwBT). It is assumed that in an NPDGwBT each player, simultaneously with choosing a positional strategy, chooses also his own indicator function defined on the whole game horizon and taking values in the set {normal, altruistic, aggressive, paradoxical}. The indicator function of a player shows the dynamics of changes in the behavior type demonstrated by the player. Thus, in this NPDGwBT each player controls the choice of a pair {positional strategy, indicator function}. We define the notion of a BT-solution of such a game. It is expected that using behavior types in the NPDGwBT which differ from the normal one (so-called abnormal types) in some cases may lead to more favorable outcomes for the players than in the NPDG. We consider two examples of an NPDGwBT with simple dynamics in the plane in each of which one player keeps to altruistic behavior type over some time period. It is shown that in the first example payoffs of both players increase on a BT-solution as compared to the game with the normal behavior type, and in the second example, the sum of players’ payoffs is increased.     

ACE-RL-Checkers: decision-making adaptability through integration of automatic case elicitation,reinforcement learning,and sequential pattern mining

In agents that operate in environments where decision-making needs to take into account, not only the environment, but also the minimizing actions of an opponent (as in games), it is fundamental that the agent is endowed with the ability of progressively tracing the profile of its adversaries, in such a manner that this profile aids in the process of selecting appropriate actions. However, it would be unsuitable to construct an agent with a decision-making system based only on the elaboration of such a profile, as this would prevent the agent from having its “own identity,” which would leave the agent at the mercy of its opponent. Following this direction, this study proposes an automatic Checkers player, called ACE-RL-Checkers, equipped with a dynamic decision-making module, which adapts to the profile of the opponent over the course of the game. In such a system, the action selection process is conducted through a composition of multilayer perceptron neural network and case library. In this case, the neural network represents the “identity” of the agent, i.e., it is an already trained static decision-making module. On the other hand, the case library represents the dynamic decision-making module of the agent, which is generated by the Automatic Case Elicitation technique. This technique has a pseudo-random exploratory behavior, which allows the dynamic decision-making of the agent to be directed either by the opponent’s game profile or randomly. In order to avoid a high occurrence of pseudo-random decision-making in the game initial phases—in which the agent counts on very little information about its opponent—this work proposes a new module based on sequential pattern mining for generating a base of experience rules extracted from human expert’s game records. This module will improve the agent’s move selection in the game initial phases. Experiments carried out in tournaments involving ACE-RL-Checkers and other agents correlated to this work, confirm the superiority of the dynamic architecture proposed herein.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">N</Emphasis>-person credibilistic strategic game

This paper enlarges the scope of fuzzy-payoff game to n-person form from the previous two-person form. Based on credibility theory, three credibilistic approaches are introduced to model the behaviors of players in different decision situations. Accordingly, three new definitions of Nash equilibrium are proposed for n-person credibilistic strategic game. Moreover, existence theorems are proved for further research into credibilistic equilibrium strategies. Finally, two numerical examples are given to illustrate the significance of credibilistic equilibria in practical strategic games.     

Quantum secure two-party computation for set intersection with rational players

Recently, Shi et al. (Phys Rev A 92:022309, 2015) proposed quantum oblivious set member decision protocol where two legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob, play a game. Alice has a secret k, and Bob has a set \(\{k_1,k_2,\ldots k_n\}\). The game is designed towards testing if the secret k is a member of the set possessed by Bob without revealing the identity of k. The output of the game will be either “Yes” (bit 1) or “No” (bit 0) and is generated at Bob’s place. Bob does not know the identity of k, and Alice does not know any element of the set. In a subsequent work (Shi et al in Quant Inf Process 15:363–371, 2016), the authors proposed a quantum scheme for private set intersection (PSI) where the client (Alice) gets the intersected elements with the help of a server (Bob) and the server knows nothing. In the present draft, we extended the game to compute the intersection of two computationally indistinguishable sets X and Y possessed by Alice and Bob, respectively. We consider Alice and Bob as rational players, i.e. they are neither “good” nor “bad”. They participate in the game towards maximizing their utilities. We prove that in this rational setting, the strategy profile ((cooperate, abort), (cooperate, abort)) is a strict Nash equilibrium. If ((cooperate, abort), (cooperate, abort)) is strict Nash, then fairness and correctness of the protocol are guaranteed.     

Adaptive user modelling in car racing games using behavioural and physiological data

Personalised content adaptation has great potential to increase user engagement in video games. Procedural generation of user-tailored content increases the self-motivation of players as they immerse themselves in the virtual world. An adaptive user model is needed to capture the skills of the player and enable automatic game content altering algorithms to fit the individual user. We propose an adaptive user modelling approach using a combination of unobtrusive physiological data to identify strengths and weaknesses in user performance in car racing games. Our system creates user-tailored tracks to improve driving habits and user experience, and to keep engagement at high levels. The user modelling approach adopts concepts from the Trace Theory framework; it uses machine learning to extract features from the user’s physiological data and game-related actions, and cluster them into low level primitives. These primitives are transformed and evaluated into higher level abstractions such as experience, exploration and attention. These abstractions are subsequently used to provide track alteration decisions for the player. Collection of data and feedback from 52 users allowed us to associate key model variables and outcomes to user responses, and to verify that the model provides statistically significant decisions personalised to the individual player. Tailored game content variations between users in our experiments, as well as the correlations with user satisfaction demonstrate that our algorithm is able to automatically incorporate user feedback in subsequent procedural content generation.     

Majority bargaining for resource division

We address the problem of how a set of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. The pie can be generated by the entire set but also by some of its subsets. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should for this purpose be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation. Voting is modelled as a Bayesian weighted voting game with uncertainty about the players’ weights. The agenda, (i.e., the order in which the players are called to make offers), is defined exogenously. We focus on impatient players with heterogeneous discount factors. In the case of a conflict, (i.e., no agreement by the deadline), no player receives anything. We provide a Bayesian subgame perfect equilibrium for the bargaining game and conduct an ex-ante analysis of the resulting outcome. We show that the equilibrium is unique, computable in polynomial time, results in an instant Pareto optimal outcome, and, under certain conditions provides a foundation for the core and also the nucleolus of the Bayesian voting game. In addition, our analysis leads to insights on how an individual’s bargained share is influenced by his position on the agenda. Finally, we show that, if the conflict point of the bargaining game changes, then the problem of determining the non-cooperative equilibrium becomes NP-hard even under the perfect information assumption. Our research also reveals how this change in conflict point impacts on the above mentioned results.     

On the effect of quantum noise in a quantum prisoner’s dilemma cellular automaton

The disrupting effect of quantum noise on the dynamics of a spatial quantum formulation of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with variable entangling is studied in this work. The game is played in the cellular automata manner, i.e., with local and synchronous interaction. It is concluded in this article that quantum noise induces in fair games the need for higher entanglement in order to make possible the emergence of the strategy pair (Q, Q), which produces the same payoff of mutual cooperation. In unfair quantum versus classic player games, quantum noise delays the prevalence of the quantum player.     

Endogenous games with goals: side-payments among goal-directed agents

Boolean games have been developed as a paradigm for modelling societies of goal-directed agents. In boolean games agents exercise control over propositional variables and strive to achieve a goal formula whose realization might require the opponents’ cooperation. The presence of agents that are goal-directed makes it difficult for an external authority to be able to remove undesirable properties that are inconsistent with agents’ goals, as shown by recent contributions in the multi-agent literature. What this paper does is to analyse the problem of regulation of goal-direct agents from within the system, i.e., what happens when agents themselves are given the chance to negotiate the strategies to be played with one another. Concretely, we introduce endogenous games with goals, obtained coupling a general model of goal-directed agents (strategic games with goals) with a general model of pre-play negotiations (endogenous games) coming from game theory. Strategic games with goals are shown to have a direct correspondence with strategic games (Proposition 1) but, when side-payments are allowed in the pre-play phase, display a striking imbalance (Proposition 4). The effect of side-payments can be fully simulated by taxation mechanisms studied in the literature (Proposition 7), yet we show sufficient conditions under which outcomes can be rationally sustained without external intervention (Proposition 5). Also, integrating taxation mechanisms and side-payments, we are able to transform our starting models in such a way that outcomes that are theoretically sustainable thanks to a pre-play phase can be actually sustained even with limited resources (Proposition 8). Finally, we show how an external authority incentivising a group of agents can be studied as a special agent of an appropriately extended endogenous game with goals (Proposition 11).