A multinomial model for short-term priming in word identification.

A simple multinomial model for short-term priming in perceptual word identification is presented. In the experiments to which the model is applied, prime words are presented just prior to a flashed target word, and subjects must decide which of 2 alternative words matches the target. The model assumes that on some proportion of trials, confusion among the words leads to the decision being based on 1 of the prime words instead of the target. In addition, it is assumed that subjects sometimes discount a prime that matches 1 of the test alternatives and so choose the alternative that does not match. With these assumptions, the model fits the data from 5 experiments (including 4 used to develop the model known as ROUSE [responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence]; D. E. Huber, R. Shiffrin, K. Lyle, & K. Ruys, 2001). The multinomial model fits the data about as well as the ROUSE model and so should lead to further development and critical testing of both models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Explicit mechanisms do not account for implicit localization and identification of change: An empirical reply to Mitroff et al. (2002).

Several recent findings support the notion that changes in the environment can be implicitly represented by the visual system. S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (see record 2002-15293-003) challenged this view and proposed alternative interpretations based on explicit strategies. Across 4 experiments, the current study finds no empirical support for such alternative proposals. Experiment 1 shows that subjects do not rely on unchanged items when locating an unaware change. Experiments 2 and 3 show that unaware changes affect performance even when they occur at an unpredictable location. Experiment 4 shows that the unaware congruency effect does not depend simply on the pattern of the final display. The authors point to converging evidence from other methodologies and highlight several weaknesses in Mitroff et al's theoretical arguments. It is concluded here that implicit representation of change provides the most parsimonious explanation for both past and present findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit change identification: A replication of Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2003).

Using a simple change detection task involving vertical and horizontal stimuli, I. M. Thornton and D. Fernandez-Duque (2000) showed that the implicit detection of a change in the orientation of an item influences performance in a subsequent orientation judgment task. However, S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) were not able to replicate this finding after correcting for confounds and thus attributed Thornton and Fernandez-Duque's results to methodological artifacts. Because Mitroff et al.'s failure to replicate might in turn have stemmed from several methodological differences between their study and those of Thornton and Fernandez-Duque (2000) and Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (see record 2003-08747-002), the current authors set out to conduct a further replication in which they corrected all known methodological biases identified so far. The results suggest that implicit change detection indeed occurs: People's conscious decisions about the orientation of an item appear to be influenced by previous undetected changes in the orientation of other items in the display. Implications of this finding in light of current theories of visual awareness are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Covert operations: Orthographic recoding as a basis for repetition priming in word identification.

When a word is generated from a semantic cue, coincident orthographic visualization of that word may cause priming on a subsequent perceptual identification test. A task was introduced that required subjects to visualize the orthographic pattern of auditorily presented words. When used at study, this task produced a pattern of priming similar to that produced by a generate study task. When used at test, equal priming on the orthographic task was produced by read and generate study tasks but not by a generate study task that failed to invite orthographic visualization. Priming on perceptually based word identification tests that results from a generate study episode may be largely due to orthographic recoding of the target rather than to conceptual processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Process, not representation: Reply to Radavansky (1999).

The size of fan effects is determined by processes at retrieval, not by whether or not information is represented as situations. Evidence contradicts G. A. Radvansky's (see record 1999-05245-005) claim that time to retrieve information from a situation does not depend on the number of elements in the situation. Moreover, Radvansky's principles for ascribing situational models to experiments appear to be post hoc ways of redescribing the data. On the other hand, the evidence does support the Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational (ACT-R) assumption that participants can adjust their attentional weightings and so produce differential fan effects. Moreover, the ACT-R theory of the fan effect is consistent with many other findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Not a piano key: Reply to Orange (1999).

What I called "minor quibbles" with a book I found appealing appear to reflect some major issues. The authors may have intended the book for readers in the tradition of European phenomenology, but I reviewed the book for psychoanalytic psychologists who are members of an American Psychological Association, not for a journal of philosophy or of psychoanalysis alone. I don't fault the authors for not writing a literature review or a work of scholarly criticism. Prospective readers will wonder, however, if they are saying something different from other writers they are already familiar with—if they are "introducing" any new ideas or if their ideas differ from others' ideas (I had just reviewed Benjamin's book, for example). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A better approach to goodness: Reply to Wagemans (1999).

In P. A. van der Helm and E. L. J. Leeuwenberg (see record 1996-01780-002), the authors presented a representation model for the goodness, or detectability, of visual regularities such as mirror symmetry and repetition. J. Wagemans (see record 1999-03499-009) acknowledged that this holographic goodness model has considerable explanatory power, but he also argued that it is not good enough yet. He challenged van der Helm and Leeuwenberg to qualify some open ends of their representation model, in particular those concerning its process assumptions. He also questioned the authors' assessment of previous goodness accounts such as S. E. Palmer's (1982, 1983) transformational approach and his own bootstrap model. He concluded that it is expedient to aim at a synthesis of useful aspects of diverse accounts of goodness, but he did not establish such a synthesis. Van der Helm and Leeuwenberg agree with his conclusion that such a synthesis is a worthy cause, but they disagree with his evaluation of the issues involved. This article is a reply with an alternative evaluation of these issues, advancing the discussion to a process-representation synthesis called holographic bootstrapping. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Obituary: Richard D. Walk (1920-1999).

Memorializes Richard D. Walk, known for his work with Eleanor Gibson on the visual cliff and the development of depth perception. His research interests and contributions were diverse and included visual discrimination, research on concept formation, aesthetics, and social relations. He is best known for his work on perceptual development, and his 1981 book Perceptual Development still provides an excellent introduction and guide to the field. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Further evidence for temporal decay in working memory: Reply to Lewandowsky and Oberauer (2009).

The sources of forgetting in working memory (WM) are a matter of intense debate: Is there a time-related decay of memory traces, or is forgetting uniquely due to representation-based interference? In a previous study, we claimed to have provided evidence supporting the temporal decay hypothesis (S. Portrat, P. Barrouillet, & V. Camos, 2008). However, reanalyzing our data, S. Lewandowsky and K. Oberauer (2009) demonstrated that they do not provide compelling evidence for temporal decay and suggested a class of alternative models favoring a representation-based interference account. In this article, we develop from the most recent proposals made by Lewandowsky and Oberauer 2 of the most plausible extensions of these alternative models. We show that neither of these extensions can account for recent findings related to between-domain WM performance and that both lead to predictions that are contradicted by new empirical evidence. Finally, we show that recent studies that have been claimed to rule out the temporal decay hypothesis do not resist close scrutiny. We conclude that the time-based resource-sharing model remains the most parsimonious way to account for forgetting and restoration of memory traces in WM. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vicissitudes of a misnomer: Reply to Dalgleish (2005).

The Stroop effect is psychology's classic measure gauging the selectivity of attention to individual attributes of complex stimuli. The emotional Stroop effect gauges the influence on behavior of threat and emotional stimuli. The former taps central/executive processes abstracted from particular stimulus contexts, whereas the latter taps automatic processes inextricably linked to particular stimuli in the environment. T. Dalgleish (see record 2005-14939-009) raised concerns about the data and theory that support the separateness of the 2 effects (D. Algom, E. Chajut, & S. Lev, see record 2004-17825-001). The present reply shows that Dalgleish's objections are unwarranted and that the term emotional Stroop effect blurs the deep conceptual divide separating the 2 phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Limitations of the motivational intensity model of attentional tuning: Reply to Harmon-Jones, Gable, and Price (2011).

In an integrative review, we concluded that implicit affective cues—rudimentary stimuli associated with the onset of arousing positive or negative emotional states and/or with appraisals that the environment is benign or threatening—automatically moderate the scope of attention by Friedman & F?rster (see record 2010-17510-008). In their comment, Harmon-Jones, Gable, and Price (see record 2011-08310-001) contended that their own recent research, aimed at demonstrating that motivational intensity moderates the relationship between affective state and attentional tuning, requires a tempering of our conclusions. However, Harmon-Jones et al. portrayed these conclusions neither accurately nor comprehensively and offered an insufficient critical assessment of their own competing account. More important, they failed to establish a compelling alternative explanation for the multitude of specific findings we reviewed (Friedman & F?rster, 2010). Therefore, although the work of Harmon-Jones et al. is provocative, it leaves critical issues unresolved and does not yet demand a reconsideration of either our basic assumptions or our overall conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Graded effects in hierarchical figure-ground organization: Reply to Peterson (1999).

An important issue in vision research concerns the order of visual processing. S. P. Vecera and R. C. O'Reilly (1998) presented an interactive, hierarchical model that placed figure-ground segregation prior to object recognition. M. A. Peterson (1999) critiqued this model, arguing that because it used ambiguous stimulus displays, figure-ground processing did not precede object processing. In the current article, the authors respond to Peterson's (1999) interpretation of ambiguity in the model and her interpretation of what it means for figure-ground processing to come before object recognition. The authors argue that complete stimulus ambiguity is not critical to the model and that figure-ground precedes object recognition architecturally in the model. The arguments are supported with additional simulation results and an experiment, demonstrating that top-down inputs can influence figure-ground organization in displays that contain stimulus cues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The phoenix of bipolarity: Reply to Watson and Tellegen (1999).

In their commentary on our review (J. A. Russell & J. M. Carroll, 1999; see record 1998-03256-001), D. Watson and A. Tellegen (1999; see record 1999-03909-006) agreed that when various factors, including activation, are taken into account, the structure of self-reported affect includes a bipolar dimension contrasting pleasant with unpleasant feelings. Agreement on this the central conclusion of our review may surprise readers familiar with the widespread claim that pleasant and unpleasant affect are not bipolar opposites but are largely independent of one another. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Shill (2004).

Shill's (see record 2004-11107-008) claim that the intersubjective perspective does not address conflict and defense is glaringly mistaken. In his article on signal anxiety, Shill (2004) declared that "the intersubjectivist approach does not address issues of conflict and defense at all" (p. 119). Astoundingly, he seems to have made this absurd pronouncement without being aware of any of the numerous articles and chapters my collaborators and I have written on the subject of psychological conflict and defense over the past three decades, one of which was published in this very journal (Stolorow & Brandchaft, 1987). Our aim has never been to defocus emotional conflict but rather to contextualize it-that is, to locate it within constitutive intersubjective systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The dimensional nature of disturbed dreaming: Reply to Weiss (2007).

The authors' proposed model of nightmare formation (see record 2007-06095-006) withstands several criticisms raised in an accompanying commentary article (D. S. Weiss, 2007; see record 2007-06095-007). A principal criticism, that the model lacks convergent and divergent validity, appears to stem from the commenter's application of a strong categorical, as opposed to the authors' use of a dimensional, approach to the model/construct of nightmares. Furthermore, ongoing research continues to support the authors' assumptions about the basic relationship between nightmares and affect distress. Other criticisms of the model, including a failure to account for robust epidemiological differences in nightmares and an ambiguity in the concept of affect distress, are also countered by reference to relevant research findings. A robust gender difference in nightmares (women = men) is particularly compatible with studies demonstrating gender differences in emotion among the physiological and cognitive systems that the authors propose are centrally implicated in nightmare formation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Intact perceptual and conceptual priming in temporal lobe epilepsy: Neuroanatomical and methodological implications.

Explicit memory appears to be supported by medical temporal lobe structures, whereas separate neocortical regions may mediate perceptual and conceptual implicit memory. Children and adults with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and matched controls were administered experimental verbal memory tests. Performance on implicit tests--word identification and word generation--was contrasted with explicit recognition and recall. Encoding conditions emphasized either conceptual or perceptual aspects of study words and were crossed with presentation modality. The priming performance of participants with TLE did not differ from controls, but participants with TLE did show deficits on recognition and recall measures. Thus, intact left temporal cortex does not appear to be necessary for normal implicit memory performance, even when conceptual processing is emphasized at study or test. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Weak criticisms and selective evidence: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

We respond to a critique by H. Blanton et al. (see record 2009-06703-001), challenging our previous work demonstrating that an Implicit Association Test designed to assess implicit prejudice reliably predicts intergroup discrimination (see record 2001-11532-008). We outline 3 flawed aspects of the critique. First, we note that claims that an outlier should be eliminated from the original data set are unfounded, and even with the elimination of this outlier, the conclusions of our original work are still strongly supported by the data. Second, we explain that concerns about interjudge reliability are specious and that considerable data support the validity of the judges’ observations reported in our original study. Third, we note that claims of a disconnect between Implicit Association Test scores (argued to show negative bias against Blacks) and behavioral measures (argued to show pro-Black bias) are inappropriate because they neglect the relativistic nature of the key measures. Implications for the relation between implicit attitudes and behavior, for the law, and for future work on implicit attitudes are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Common factors in the identification of an assortment of brief everyday sounds": Correction to Ballas (1993).

Reports an error in "Common factors in the identification of an assortment of brief everyday sounds" by James A. Ballas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1993[Apr], Vol 19[2], 250-267). A previous notice regarding this article incorrectly identified the volume number and date of publication of the journal in which this article appeared. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1993-28211-001.) Acoustic, ecological, perceptual and cognitive factors that are common in the identification of 41 brief, varied sounds were evaluated. In Exp 1, identification time and accuracy, causal uncertainty values, and spectral and temporal properties of the sounds were obtained. Exp 2 was a survey to obtain ecological frequency counts. Exp 3 solicited perceptual–cognitive ratings. Factor analyses of spectral parameters and perceptual–cognitive ratings were performed. Identification time and causal uncertainty are highly interrelated, and both are related to ecological frequency and the presence of harmonics and similar spectral bursts. Exps 4 and 5 used a priming paradigm to verify correlational relationships between identification time and causal uncertainty and to assess the effect of sound typicality. Results support a hybrid approach for theories of everyday sound identification. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Berry et al. (2010).

Reports an error in "Can “pure” implicit memory be isolated? A test of a single-system model of recognition and repetition priming" by Christopher J. Berry, David R. Shanks, Selina Li, Luke Sheridan Rains and Richard N. A. Henson (Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 2010[Dec], Vol 64[4], 241-255). In the article there was an error in Equation B2 in Appendix B. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-26226-002.) Implicit memory is widely regarded as an unconscious form of memory. However, evidence for what is arguably a defining characteristic of implicit memory—that its contents are not accessible to awareness—has remained elusive. Such a finding of “pure” implicit memory would constitute evidence against a single-system model of recognition and priming that predicts that priming will not occur in the (true) absence of recognition. In three experiments, using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure at encoding, we tested this prediction by attempting to replicate some previous studies that claimed to obtain pure implicit memory. We found no evidence of priming in the absence of recognition; instead, priming and recognition were associated across experiments: when priming was absent, recognition was also absent (Experiments 1 and 2), and when priming was reliably greater than chance, recognition was similarly greater than chance (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the prediction of a single-system model, which was fit to the data from all the experiments. The results are also consistent with the notion that the memory driving priming is accessible to awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strong rebuttal for weak criticisms: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

We respond to H. Blanton et al.’s (See record 2009-06703-001) critique of J. C. Ziegert & P. J. Hanges (see record 2005-05102-011) and illustrate that their criticisms regarding our study are based on very weak evidence. In this rebuttal, we highlight the appropriateness of our manipulation as well as present reanalyses that illustrate the predictive validity of the Implicit Association Test. In particular, we illustrate that the Implicit Association Test is related to discriminatory behavior (a) after one eliminates potential outliers using appropriate multivariate methods, (b) across conditions after one controls for the manipulation, (c) when one just examines Black applicants, and (d) after one controls for explicit attitudes. Thus, in this rebuttal, we not only reaffirm the original findings of J. C. Ziegert and P. J. Hanges (2005) but we extend them to illustrate the broader contexts in which the Implicit Association Test is related to discriminatory behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)