Philip Morris's Project Sunrise: weakening tobacco control by working with it

Objective

To analyse the implications of Philip Morris USA''s (PM''s) overtures toward tobacco control and other public health organisations, 1995–2006.

Data sources

Internal PM documents made available through multi‐state US attorneys general lawsuits and other cases, and newspaper sources.

Methods

Documents were retrieved from several industry documents websites and analysed using a case study approach.

Results

PM''s Project Sunrise, initiated in 1995 and proposed to continue through 2006, was a long‐term plan to address tobacco industry delegitimisation and ensure the social acceptability of smoking and of the company itself. Project Sunrise laid out an explicit divide‐and‐conquer strategy against the tobacco control movement, proposing the establishment of relationships with PM‐identified “moderate” tobacco control individuals and organisations and the marginalisation of others. PM planned to use “carefully orchestrated efforts” to exploit existing differences of opinion within tobacco control, weakening its opponents by working with them. PM also planned to thwart tobacco industry delegitimisation by repositioning itself as “responsible”. We present evidence that these plans were implemented.

Conclusion

Sunrise exposes differences within the tobacco control movement that should be further discussed. The goal should not be consensus, but a better understanding of tensions within the movement. As the successes of the last 25 years embolden advocates to think beyond passage of the next clean indoor air policy or funding of the next cessation programme, movement philosophical differences may become more important. If tobacco control advocates are not ready to address them, Project Sunrise suggests that Philip Morris is ready to exploit them.     

Comprehensive smoke-free legislation in England: how advocacy won the day

Objective

To examine how a government committed to a voluntary approach was forced by an effective advocacy coalition to introduce comprehensive smoke‐free legislation.

Methods

A diary was kept from the start of the campaign in 2003, backed up by journal and press articles, and information downloaded from the web. Regular public opinion polls were also carried out to supplement government surveys and polls conducted by the media.

Results

The 1997 Labour Government was committed to a voluntary approach to deal with the problem of secondhand smoke. By 2003, efforts to persuade government to introduce regulation of workplace secondhand smoke through a health and safety code of practice with exemptions for the hospitality trade, had failed. Despite a lack of support from the government, including the health minister, a new strategy by health advocates focusing on comprehensive workplace legislation was able to succeed.

Conclusions

In a democracy it is crucial to develop public knowledge and belief in the extent of the risks of secondhand smoke. Gaining public and media support for the issue can ensure that government has to take action and that the legislation will be enforceable. The interests of the tobacco industry and the hospitality trade differ and this can be used to gain hospitality trade support for comprehensive national legislation in order to ensure a level playing field and protection from litigation.