Philip Morris's Project Sunrise: weakening tobacco control by working with it

Objective

To analyse the implications of Philip Morris USA''s (PM''s) overtures toward tobacco control and other public health organisations, 1995–2006.

Data sources

Internal PM documents made available through multi‐state US attorneys general lawsuits and other cases, and newspaper sources.

Methods

Documents were retrieved from several industry documents websites and analysed using a case study approach.

Results

PM''s Project Sunrise, initiated in 1995 and proposed to continue through 2006, was a long‐term plan to address tobacco industry delegitimisation and ensure the social acceptability of smoking and of the company itself. Project Sunrise laid out an explicit divide‐and‐conquer strategy against the tobacco control movement, proposing the establishment of relationships with PM‐identified “moderate” tobacco control individuals and organisations and the marginalisation of others. PM planned to use “carefully orchestrated efforts” to exploit existing differences of opinion within tobacco control, weakening its opponents by working with them. PM also planned to thwart tobacco industry delegitimisation by repositioning itself as “responsible”. We present evidence that these plans were implemented.

Conclusion

Sunrise exposes differences within the tobacco control movement that should be further discussed. The goal should not be consensus, but a better understanding of tensions within the movement. As the successes of the last 25 years embolden advocates to think beyond passage of the next clean indoor air policy or funding of the next cessation programme, movement philosophical differences may become more important. If tobacco control advocates are not ready to address them, Project Sunrise suggests that Philip Morris is ready to exploit them.     

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

BACKGROUND: Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda. OBJECTIVE: To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. DESIGN: This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. RESULTS: In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political effort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These efforts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted in several states. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence in state legislatures. Because of the poor public image of the tobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this power quietly and behind the scenes. State and local health advocates, who often have high public credibility, can use this fact against the tobacco lobby by focusing public attention on the tobacco lobby's political influence and policy goals and expose links between the tobacco lobby and its legislative supporters.     

Arizona's tobacco control initiative illustrates the need for continuing oversight by tobacco control advocates

BACKGROUND: In 1994, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200 which increased the tobacco tax and earmarked 23% of the new revenues for tobacco education programmes. OBJECTIVE: To describe the campaign to pass Proposition 200, the legislative debate that followed the passage of the initiative, and the development and implementation of the tobacco control programme. DESIGN: This is a case study. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with key players in the initiative campaign and in the tobacco education programme, and written records (campaign material, newspapers, memoranda, public records). RESULTS: Despite opposition from the tobacco industry, Arizonans approved an increase in the tobacco tax. At the legislature, health advocates in Arizona successfully fought the tobacco industry attempts to divert the health education funds and pass preemptive legislation. The executive branch limited the scope of the programme to adolescents and pregnant women. It also prevented the programme from attacking the tobacco industry or focusing on secondhand smoke. Health advocates did not put enough pressure at the executive branch to force it to develop a comprehensive tobacco education programme. CONCLUSIONS: It is not enough for health advocates to campaign for an increase in tobacco tax and to protect the funds at the legislature. Tobacco control advocates must closely monitor the development and implementation of tax-funded tobacco education programmes at the administrative level and be willing to press the executive to implement effective programmes.     

The passage and initial implementation of Oregon's Measure 44

OBJECTIVE: To prepare a history of the passage and early implementation of Ballot Measure 44, "An Act to Support the Oregon Health Plan", and tobacco control policymaking in Oregon. Measure 44 raised cigarette taxes in Oregon by US$0.30 per pack, and dedicated 10% of the revenues to tobacco control. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with members of the Committee to Support the Oregon Health Plan, Measure 44's campaign committee, as well as with state and local officials, and tobacco control advocates. Additional information was obtained from public documents, internal memoranda, and news reports. RESULTS: Although the tobacco industry outspent Measure 44's supporters 7 to 1, the initiative passed with 56% of the vote. Even before the election, tobacco control advocates were working to develop an implementation plan for the tobacco control programme. They mounted a successful lobbying campaign to see that the legislature did not divert tobacco control funds to other uses. They also stopped industry efforts to limit the scope of the programme. The one shortcoming of the tobacco control forces was not getting involved in planning the initiative early enough to influence the amount of money that was devoted to tobacco control. Although public health groups provided 37% of the money it cost to pass Measure 44, only 10% of revenues were devoted to tobacco control. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive planning and aggressive implementation can secure passage of tobacco control initiatives and see that the associated implementing legislation follows good public health practice.     

Tobacco interests or the public interest: 20 years of industry strategies to undermine airline smoking restrictions

Objectives

To understand the evolution of 20 years of tobacco industry strategies to undermine federal restrictions of smoking on aircraft in the United States.

Design

We searched and analysed internal tobacco industry records, public documents, and other related research.

Results

The industry viewed these restrictions as a serious threat to the social acceptability of smoking. Its initial efforts included covert letter‐writing campaigns and lobbying of the airline industry, but with the emergence of proposals to ban smoking, the tobacco companies engaged in ever increasing efforts to forestall further restrictions. Tactics to dominate the public record became especially rigorous. The industry launched an aggressive public relations campaign that began with the promotion of industry sponsored petition drives and public opinion surveys. Results from polling research that produced findings contrary to the industry''s position were suppressed. In order to demonstrate smoker outrage against a ban, later efforts included the sponsorship of smokers'' rights and other front groups. Congressional allies and industry consultants sought to discredit the science underlying proposals to ban smoking and individual tobacco companies conducted their own cabin air quality research. Faced with the potential of a ban on all domestic flights, the industry sought to intimidate an air carrier and a prominent policymaker. Despite the intensification of tactics over time, including mobilisation of an army of lobbyists and Congressional allies, the tobacco industry was ultimately defeated.

Conclusions

Our longitudinal analysis provides insights into how and when the industry changed its plans and provides public health advocates with potential counterstrategies.     

Consensus for tobacco policy among former state legislators using the policy Delphi method

OBJECTIVE: To test a novel approach for building consensus about tobacco control policies among legislators. DESIGN: A pilot study was conducted using a two-round, face-to-face policy Delphi method. PARTICIPANTS: Randomly selected sample of 30 former Kentucky legislators (60% participation rate). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Consensus on tobacco control and tobacco farming policies. RESULTS: Former state legislators were more supportive of tobacco control policies than expected, and highly supportive of lessening the state's dependence on tobacco. Former state legislators were in agreement with 43% of the second-round items for which there was no agreement at the first round, demonstrating a striking increase in consensus. With new information from their colleagues, former lawmakers became more supportive of workplace smoking restrictions, limitations on tobacco promotional items, and modest excise tax increases. CONCLUSIONS: The policy Delphi method has the potential for building consensus for tobacco control and tobacco farming policies among state legislators. Tobacco control advocates in other states might consider using the policy Delphi method with policymakers in public and private sectors.     

Understanding Philip Morris's pursuit of US government regulation of tobacco

Objective: To investigate Philip Morris's support of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of tobacco products and analyse its relationship to the company's image enhancement strategies.

Data sources: Internal Philip Morris documents released as part of the Master Settlement Agreement.

Methods: Searches of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) beginning with such terms as "FDA" and "regulatory strategy" and expanding to include relevant new terms.

Results: Philip Morris's support for government regulation of tobacco is part of a broader effort to address its negative public image, which has a damaging impact on the company's stock price, political influence, and employee morale. Through regulation, the company seeks to enhance its legitimacy, redefine itself as socially responsible, and alter the litigation environment. Whereas health advocates frame tobacco use as a public health policy issue, Philip Morris's regulatory efforts focus on framing tobacco use as an individual choice by informed adults to use a risky product. This framing allows Philip Morris to portray itself as a reasonable and responsible manufacturer and marketer of risky products.

Conclusions: Philip Morris's ability to improve its image through support of FDA regulation may undermine tobacco control efforts aimed at delegitimising the tobacco industry. It may also create the impression that Philip Morris's products are being made safer and ultimately protect the company from litigation. While strong regulation of tobacco products and promotion remain critical public health goals, previous experiences with tobacco regulation show that caution may be warranted.

     

How cigarette additives are used to mask environmental tobacco smoke

OBJECTIVE: To understand the tobacco industry's research on and use of cigarette additives that alter the perception of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). DATA SOURCES: Internal documents from four websites maintained by the major US tobacco manufacturers and company patents pertaining to the use of ETS altering additives obtained from the US Patent and Trademark Office online database. STUDY SELECTION: Electronic searches of the four industry websites and the US patent database were conducted using keywords to identify relevant data. DATA EXTRACTION: Industry documents and patents obtained using an exploratory snowball sampling method were reviewed and grouped into four general categories according to whether the additive(s) described affected ETS visibility, odour, irritation, or emissions. Accuracy of isolated findings was validated through cross comparison of the data sources. DATA SYNTHESIS: Results of this preliminary study provide evidence that tobacco manufacturers have conducted extensive research on the use of chemical additives to reduce, mask, or otherwise alter the visibility, odour, irritation, or emission of ETS. CONCLUSIONS: Findings suggest that the tobacco industry uses additives to reduce the perception of ETS. To protect the public, appropriate regulation of tobacco additives should be mandated.     

Push or be punished: tobacco industry documents reveal aggression against businesses that discourage tobacco use

OBJECTIVE: To learn how the tobacco industry reacted to businesses' voluntarily enacting policies to discourage tobacco use and minimise exposure of employees and patrons to secondhand smoke. DATA SOURCES: Internal tobacco industry documents discovered among those posted on the internet. Approximately 24 million documents have been posted as of this writing. Information in this article was culled from among these documents, which have been made public as a unique requirement of the state of Minnesota's settlement with the industry. STUDY SELECTION: Those documents were used that offered insight into, and which gave a perspective on, the industry's attitudes and reactions toward other businesses as they adopted tobacco-free policies. CONCLUSIONS: In the wake of widespread acceptance that tobacco use causes illness and death, many individual businesses (and even entire industries) took positive steps to eliminate employees', customers', and facilities' exposure to tobacco smoke. Steps were also taken to discourage tobacco use among employees. Internal tobacco industry documents show that the industry reacted with aggression, and in some cases with retribution, against businesses that voluntarily adopted policies to discourage tobacco use. The intent of these actions appears to be to reverse these policies, with a broader goal of neutralising large scale public and private trends that reflect the decreasing social acceptability of tobacco use.     

Press coverage of public expenditure of Master Settlement Agreement funds: how are non-tobacco control related expenditures represented?

Objective: To examine newspaper reports of Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) allocation decisions outside of tobacco control, focusing on the arguments being put forth in favour of competing claims on MSA funds. The major aims were to identify newsworthy non-tobacco control areas for which MSA funds have been applied and to examine how non-tobacco control spending has been presented through the US press.

Design: A qualitative textual analysis was performed on 94 articles taken from a sample of 322 newspapers over a 12 month period (October 2000 through September 2001) that related to the allocation of MSA funds to non-tobacco control causes. Articles were coded for general content areas of MSA allocation as well as for rhetorical and framing devices employed to explain and justify allocation decisions.

Main outcome measures: (1) Areas of non-tobacco control allocation; (2) rhetorical devices and framing techniques employed in the articles to discuss the allocation.

Results: The analysis identified a wide variety of issues for which MSA funds were being appropriated. Three main frames emerged in relation to justifying or appealing for particular spending decisions: (1) funds should be allocated to the needy and/or the deserving; (2) funds should be spent on state development; (3) funds should be put towards helping the state weather a crisis. Claims for each such issue were made using strategies such as presenting the MSA funds as a "windfall", focusing coverage on the merits of the cause rather than the issue of resource allocation, and stressing links between the particular claim and the stated objectives of the MSA.

Conclusions: Press coverage of MSA non-tobacco control spending suggests that the funds have been quickly formulated as fodder for state spending, rather than to support tobacco control efforts. Thus, caution is required in pursuing settlements with the industry where the objective is better funding for tobacco control efforts, particularly in light of the possibility that press coverage of MSA allocation may actually serve as positive publicity for the tobacco industry.

     

From strange bedfellows to natural allies: the shifting allegiance of fire service organisations in the push for federal fire-safe cigarette legislation

Background: Cigarettes are the leading cause of fatal fires in the USA and are associated with one in four fire deaths. Although the technology needed to make fire-safe cigarettes has been available for many years, progress has been slow on legislative and regulatory fronts to require the tobacco industry to manufacture fire-safe cigarettes. Method and results: We conducted a case study, drawing on data from tobacco industry documents, archives, and key informant interviews to investigate tobacco industry strategies for thwarting fire-safe cigarette legislation in the US Congress. We apply a theoretical framework that posits that policymaking is the product of three sets of forces: interests, institutions, and ideas, to examine tobacco industry behaviour, with a special focus on their and others'' attempts to court fire service organisations, including firefighters'' unions as allies. We discuss the implications of our findings for future policy efforts related to fire-safe cigarettes and other tobacco control issues. Conclusions: Tobacco control advocates ought to: continue efforts to align key interest groups, including the firefighters unions; contest tobacco industry "diversionary" science tactics; and pursue a state based legislative strategy for fire-safe cigarettes, building towards national legislation.     

Development and destruction of the first state funded anti-smoking campaign in the USA

Background: Minnesota was the first state in the USA to implement a large state funded tobacco control programme (in 1985). Despite evidence of effectiveness, it was dismantled in 1993.

Objective: To describe and analyse how and why these events transpired and identify lessons for tobacco control advocates facing similar challenges in the 21st century.

Design: Case study based on previously secret tobacco industry documents, news reports, research reports, official documents, and interviews with health advocates and state government officials.

Results: Unable to defeat funding for this campaign in 1985, the tobacco industry organised groups which eliminated it later. Despite the programme's documented effectiveness, it was dismantled based on claims of fiscal crisis. These claims were not true; the real debate was what to do with the state's surplus. Health advocates failed to challenge the claim of fiscal crisis or mobilise public support for the programme.

Conclusions: Simply quoting evidence that a tobacco control programme is effective does not ensure its continuing survival. Claims of fiscal crisis are an effective cover for tobacco industry efforts to dismantle successful programmes, particularly if health advocates accept these claims and fail to mobilise political pressure to defend the programme.

     

Policy makers' perspectives on tobacco control advocates' roles in regulation development

OBJECTIVE: To identify, from policy makers' perspectives, strategies that enhance tobacco control advocates' effectiveness in the regulatory arena. DESIGN: Key informant interview component of a comparative case study of regulatory agencies in the USA. SUBJECTS: Policy makers involved in the development of four regulatory tobacco control policies (three state and one federal). METHODS: Interviews of policy makers, field notes, and deliberation minutes were coded inductively. RESULTS: Policy makers considered both written commentary and public testimony when developing tobacco control regulations. They triaged written commentary based upon whether the document was from a peer reviewed journal, a summary of research evidence, or from a source considered credible. They coped with in-person testimony by avoiding being diverted from the scientific evidence, and by assessing the presenters' credibility. Policy makers suggested that tobacco control advocates should: present science in a format that is well organised and easily absorbed; engage scientific experts to participate in the regulatory process; and lobby to support the tobacco control efforts of the regulatory agency. CONCLUSIONS: There is an important role for tobacco control advocates in the policy development process in regulatory agencies.     

Tobacco industry efforts hindering enforcement of the ban on tobacco sales to minors: actions speak louder than words

OBJECTIVE: The tobacco manufacturers state that they want to see laws that prohibit the sale of tobacco to minors enacted and enforced. Our purpose was to compare these public statements with the US tobacco industry's legislative agenda at the federal and state levels. DESIGN: A review of the industry's comments to the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regarding proposed federal regulations, and an analysis of pro-tobacco state legislation concerning tobacco sales to minors. RESULTS: The industry is strongly opposed to federal regulations requiring states to effectively enforce their laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors. A food industry newsletter reports that the Tobacco Institute has circulated a model state bill concerning underage tobacco sales. Striking similarities between bills from several states would seem to confirm this report. These bills strip communities of enforcement authority while making effective enforcement by state officials virtually impossible. CONCLUSION: The evidence strongly suggests an industry strategy to undermine efforts to enforce laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors. As has been the case in the past, the tobacco industry is publicly endorsing a socially responsible goal while apparently taking action behind the scenes to ensure that the goal is not achieved.


     

Globalisation of tobacco industry influence and new global responses

The globalisation of tobacco marketing, trade, research, and industry influence represents a major threat to public health worldwide. Drawing upon tobacco industry strategy documents prepared over several decades, this paper will demonstrate how the tobacco industry operates as a global force, regarding the world as its operating market by planning, developing, and marketing its products on a global scale. The industry has used a wide range of methods to buy influence and power, and penetrate markets across the world. It has an annual turnover of almost US$400 billion. In contrast, until recently tobacco control lacked global leadership and strategic direction and had been severely underfunded. As part of moving towards a more sustainable form of globalisation, a global enabling environment linked to local actions should focus on the following strategies: global information management; development of nationally and locally grounded action; global regulation, legal instruments, and foreign policy; and establishment of strong partnerships with purpose. As the vector of the tobacco epidemic, the tobacco industry's actions fall far outside of the boundaries of global corporate responsibility. Therefore, global and local actions should not provide the tobacco industry with the two things that it needs to ensure its long term profitability: respectability and predictability.     

Tobacco industry influence on the definition of tobacco related disorders by the American Psychiatric Association

Objective: The Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, third edition (DSM-III), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1980, included the first official definitions by the APA of tobacco dependence and tobacco withdrawal. Tobacco industry efforts to influence the DSM-III were investigated. Method: Searches of previously secret tobacco industry documents, primarily the University of California San Francisco Legacy Tobacco Documents Library and British American Tobacco collections. Additional information was collected through discussions with editors of DSM-III, and library and general internet searches. Results: The tobacco companies regarded the inclusion of tobacco dependence as a diagnosis in DSM-III as an adverse event. It worked to influence the content of the DSM-III and its impact following publication. These efforts included public statements and private lobbying of DSM-III editors and high ranking APA officers by prominent US psychiatrists with undisclosed ties to the tobacco industry. Following publication of DSM-III, tobacco companies contracted with two US professors of psychiatry to organise a conference and publish a monograph detailing controversies surrounding DSM-III. Conclusions: The tobacco industry and its allies lobbied to narrow the definition of tobacco dependence in serial revisions of DSM-III. Following publication of DSM-III, the industry took steps to try to mitigate its impact. These actions mirror industry tactics to influence medical research and policy in various contexts worldwide. Such tactics slow the spread of a professional and public understanding of smoking and health that otherwise would reduce smoking, smoking induced disease, and tobacco company profits.     

Public health foundations and the tobacco industry: lessons from Minnesota

Objective: To investigate whether private foundations can be created in a way that will insulate them from attacks by the tobacco industry, using the Minnesota Partnership for Action Against Tobacco (MPAAT) as a case study.

Design: Information was collected from internal tobacco industry documents, court documents, newspapers, and interviews with health advocates and elected officials.

Results: The creation of MPAAT as an independent foundation did not insulate it from attacks by tobacco industry allies. During 2001–2002, MPAAT was repeatedly attacked by Attorney General Mike Hatch and major media, using standard tobacco industry rhetoric. This strategy of attack and demands for information were reminiscent of previous attacks on Minnesota's Plan for Nonsmoking and Health and the American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST). MPAAT was ultimately forced to restructure its programme to abandon effective community norm change interventions around smoke-free policies and replace them with less effective individual cessation interventions. Neither MPAAT nor other health advocates mounted an effective public response to these attacks, instead relying on the insider strategy of responding in court.

Conclusion: It is not possible to avoid attacks by the tobacco industry or its political allies. Like programmes administered by government agencies, tobacco control foundations must be prepared for these attacks, including a proactive plan to educate the public about the principles of community based tobacco control. Public health advocates also need to be willing to take prompt action to defend these programmes and hold public officials who attack tobacco control programmes accountable for their actions.

     

Industry Front Groups: A Tobacco Case Study

We consider how industries use front groups to combat public health measures by relating the history of “Get Government Off Our Back”, a coalition created by the tobacco industry to fight government regulation. Using tobacco industry documents, contemporaneous media reports, journal articles, and press releases, we review the establishment by RJ Reynolds of an industry front group, Get Government Off Our Back (GGOOB) in 1994. The group’s goal was to advocate against U.S. federal regulation of tobacco. By keeping its involvement secret, RJ Reynolds was able to draw public and legislative support toward limiting government regulation of tobacco without having to address the tobacco industry’s reputation for misrepresenting evidence. Unfortunately, the tobacco industry”s use of front groups is not unique; other industries use front groups to fight measures designed to protect public health. Research on the background and funding of advocacy organizations could help identify industry front groups and make them less useful to their creators. Received: July 2, 2007; Accepted: July 4, 2007