Mechanisms of predictive and diagnostic causal induction.

In predictive causal inference, people reason from causes to effects, whereas in diagnostic inference, they reason from effects to causes. Independently of the causal structure of the events, the temporal structure of the information provided to a reasoner may vary (e.g., multiple events followed by a single event vs. a single event followed by multiple events). The authors report 5 experiments in which causal structure and temporal information were varied independently. Inferences were influenced by temporal structure but not by causal structure. The results are relevant to the evaluation of 2 current accounts of causal induction, the Rescorla-Wagner (R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972) and causal model theories (M. R. Waldmann & K. J. Holyoak, 1992). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predictive and diagnostic learning within causal models: Asymmetries in cue competition.

Several researchers have recently claimed that higher order types of learning, such as categorization and causal induction, can be reduced to lower order associative learning. These claims are based in part on reports of cue competition in higher order learning, apparently analogous to blocking in classical conditioning. Three experiments are reported in which Ss had to learn to respond on the basis of cues that were defined either as possible causes of a common effect (predictive learning) or as possible effects of a common cause (diagnostic learning). The results indicate that diagnostic and predictive reasoning, far from being identical as predicted by associationistic models, are not even symmetrical. Although cue competition occurs among multiple possible causes during predictive learning, multiple possible effects need not compete during diagnostic learning. The results favor a causal-model theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing of logically valid and logically invalid conditional inferences in discourse comprehension.

Two competing theories of processing of conditionals (if-then) were tested. Syntactic theories posit that people only draw inferences conforming to the logically valid modus ponens (MP) schema. Mental models theories predict that people draw MP and invalid affirming-the-consequent (AC) inferences. Three experiments tested these predictions. Participants read short stories that conformed to either the MP or AC form but without conclusions, and they completed either priming or recognition tasks. Results indicate that both MP and AC inferences occur during discourse processing: MP and AC premise forms prime their respective conclusions, participants erroneously judged that they had read the conclusions to MP and AC arguments, and AC inferences did not stem from a biconditional interpretation of conditionals. Findings support mental models theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-esteem and self-evaluative covert statements.

Self-esteem scores, as measured by 2 standardized inventories, were compared with self-monitored positive and negative self-evaluations in 33 college students. Self-esteem was negatively correlated with both the absolute and relative rates of negative self-evaluations. Also, Ss higher in self-esteem reported significantly greater rates of positive than negative self-evaluations, whereas these data for Ss lower in self-esteem were nondifferential. Self-monitored nonevaluative behaviors served as controls and indicated that the observed relationship between self-esteem and self-evaluative statements was not artifactual. The clinical implications of these findings are discussed. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of prior diagnostic information on clinicians' causal attributions of a client's problems.

63 female social welfare students listened to a taped therapy interview, and the degree to which they attributed the client's problems to personality vs situational factors was explored. Results support the hypothesis that previous tentative diagnoses result in personality-based attributions. A recency effect suggested that personality attributions may be lessened by presenting situational information after hearing the client. (3 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing attitude statements from in-group and out-group members: Effects of within-group and within-person inconsistencies on reading times.

The authors examined reading times of attitude statements made by group members as a function of consistency of statements with stereotypic expectancies (between-member) and consistency of statements with other statements from the same member (within-member). Stereotype-inconsistent statements were studied longer than consistent statements only when the target group was an outgroup or when subjects were instructed to focus on the group as a whole. Results suggested that the out-group was perceived as a single homogeneous whole regardless of experimental instructions. Inconsistencies within individual group members instigated the longest reading times. This effect was stronger for inconsistencies within out-group members than within in-group members, suggesting that subjects not only expected more within-group variability in in-groups than in out-groups, but they also expected more within-person variability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychotherapy and moral discourse.

Argues that psychotherapy's (PT's) claim to be a universal scientific practice that objectively treats ahistorical illnesses is untenable. PT is a cultural product, so it both reflects and reproduces its cultural context. Because cultural context is in part composed of moral traditions embedded in political structures, PT is unavoidably a moral practice with political consequences. Implicit moralities in current practices are discussed. Philosophical hermeneutics in PT practice are offered as an alternative. In a discussion of intersecting traditions, it is suggested that a hermeneutic perspective can portray the keeping of family secrets as a commitment to a particular moral code, rather than the products of a "dysfunctional family." If PT theories can be changed so that they are more historically situated, and if PT practices can be changed to use hermeneutics, then a different moral frame can be put forth. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory for referential statements in texts.

Two experiments investigated memory for referential statements in texts. Both experiments found superior recognition for subjects reading original texts as opposed to reversed texts (see Bates, Kintsch, Fletcher, & Giuliani, 1980). However, there was no difference in the choice of targets between original-text and no-text subjects. In both experiments the original-text subjects, but not the reversed text or no-text subjects, showed a recognition bias for explicit over implicit referential statements. Experiment 2 showed a subject preference for noun phrases over pronouns only when the sentence contained a single referent. When the sentence contained a repeated referent, there was a preference for pronouns in all three groups of subjects. These results suggest that observations of verbatim memory depend crucially on the method of testing. When subjects were tested against a reversed-text group, the results of Bates et al. (1980) were replicated. However, when the subjects were tested against a no-text group, which controls for discourse constraints free from memory effects, then verbatim memory was not observed, only reconstruction biases. These results are discussed in the light of more general notions of verbatim memory and in terms of the likely role of referential statements in a discourse. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mutability and propensity in causal selection.

We examined differences in causal ratings of 1 factor depending on the mutability (defined as the ease with which a factor can be imagined to be different) and causal propensity (defined as the likelihood that the event would occur in the presence of a factor) of another factor that conjoined to produce the event. In 3 studies, causal ratings of the target factor depended on the interaction of mutability and propensity of the other factor. When the other factor was high in mutability, ratings of the target decreased as the propensity of the contributing factor increased, but when the other was low in mutability, ratings of the target increased as the propensity of the contributing factor increased. Mediation analysis indicated that mutability and propensity affected causal ratings by determining the comparison against which the event was considered. Comparison judgments also mediated beliefs about which factor should have adjusted to the other. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Arousal and causal attribution.

Two experiments involving a total of 114 male undergraduates investigated whether arousal increased the impact of salient information on causal attributions and decreased the impact of nonsalient information. In Exp 1, salience was manipulated by instructions that directed Ss' attention to different types of information. Arousal was manipulated by the presence or absence of white noise. As expected, the impact of salient information on causal attributions increased with arousal. In Exp 2, emotional arousal (anger) decreased the perceived impact of a nonsalient person in a social interaction. Both effects were most pronounced for Ss with lower chronic levels of arousal. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Introspection and causal accounts.

R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson (see record 1978-00295-001) have argued that people are often inaccurate in their causal reports about their behavior because they lack access to their cognitive process. This position has been criticized on several grounds by E. Smith and F. Miller (see record 1979-23548-001). The present paper attempts to clarify these issues by focusing on some confusions in the notion of a cognitive process that Smith and Miller and Nisbett and Wilson share. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recalling oral and written discourse.

We prescribed an expository text in two versions that varied in difficulty. The text was presented either orally or under one of two reading conditions, a normal reading or a moving window condition. The subjects were business trainees whose main communication experience was in either written or spoken communication. Immediately after presentation of the text, we asked the subjects to answer questions about it. The answers given after reading in the moving-window mode were in every respect the same as those given after self-controlled reading. There were differences between the listening condition and the two reading conditions, depending on the nature of the subjects' main communication experience and the difficulty of the text. We concluded from these results that the differences between the processing of oral and written discourse are caused neither by the difference of processing control nor by structural factors but by factors related to the communication experience of the subjects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pronoun resolution and discourse models.

Psychological investigations of pronoun resolution have implicitly assumed that the processes involved automatically provide a unique referent for every pronoun. The authors challenge this assumption and propose a new framework for studying pronoun resolution. Drawing on advances in discourse representation and global memory modeling, this framework suggests that automatic processes may not always identify a unique referent for a pronoun. In 9 experiments, the authors demonstrate that, unlike noun anaphors, pronouns sometimes do not produce relative facilitation of their referents in comparison with nonreferents. They argue that research on pronoun resolution must consider the discourse contexts in which pronouns are likely to occur. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Individual differences in causal uncertainty.

Presents a scale that measures chronic individual differences in people's uncertainty about their ability to understand and detect cause-and-effect relationships in the social world: the Causal Uncertainty Scale (CUS). The results of Study 1 indicated that the scale has good internal and adequate test–retest reliability. Additionally, the results of a factor analysis suggested that the scale appears to be tapping a single construct. Study 2 examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale, and Studies 3 and 4 examined the predictive and incremental validity of the scale. The importance of the CUS to work on depressives' social information processing and for basic research and theory on human social judgment processes is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ethnocentrism and causal attribution in Southeast Asia.

Tested D. M. Taylor and V. Jaggi's (see record 1975-05049-001) hypothesis of ethnocentric attribution, which states that group members make internal attributions for the positive behavior of other ingroup members and external attributions for their negative behavior, while the reverse holds true for attributions to outgroup members. In Exp I, 34 Malay and 34 Chinese male Malaysan university students were asked to ascribe to internal or external causes the behavior of ingroup and outgroup members performing socially desirable or undesirable acts. The hypothesis was supported only for the Malays, whereas the Chinese favored the outgroup. These results were consistent with a limited analysis of auto- and heterostereotypes. Exp II, with 60 Singaporean male university students, revealed ingroup favoritism for the Malays once again, although the Chinese no longer favored the outgroup. These less extreme results mapped onto the stereotypes and mirrored the more multicultural environment in Singapore. Differences between the studies are discussed in terms of wider sociostructural and cultural influences that indicate that ethnocentric attribution is not a universal tendency. (33 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Covariation in natural causal induction.

The covariation component of everyday causal inference has been depicted, in both cognitive and social psychology as well as in philosophy, as heterogeneous and prone to biases. The models and biases discussed in these domains are analyzed with respect to focal sets: contextually determined sets of events over which covariation is computed. Moreover, these models are compared to the authors' probabilistic contrast model, which specifies causes as first and higher order contrasts computed over events in a focal set. Contrary to the previous depiction of covariation computation, the present assessment indicates that a single normative mechanism, the computation of probabilistic contrasts, underlies this essential component of natural causal induction both in everyday and in scientific situations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Person memory and causal attributions.

Three experiments with 273 college students were conducted to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the well-established finding that initial impressions are resistant to incongruent (ICG) information and the finding that information ICG with an impression is particularly likely to be recalled. Using a procedure similar to that of R. Hastie and P. A. Kumar (1979), a situational or dispositional attribution was provided for a target item, which was either congruent (CG) or ICG with an initial impression. The ICG item was more likely than the CG item to be recalled only when attributed to dispositional causes (Exp I). The congruence of the target had greater impact on impressions when attributed to dispositional causes, particularly when Ss were given little other information about the target (Exps I and II). Exp III revealed that Ss preferred situational attributions for ICG items and dispositional attributions for CG. The authors conclude that Hastie and Kumar's findings may be limited to conditions in which situational attributions for TCG information are not provided. Possible mediators of the effects of causal attributions on recall, and the relation between recall and impressions are discussed. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conversational processes and causal explanation.

Causal explanation takes place in and takes the form of conversation. Explanations are selected by questions and are thus governed by general rules of discourse. A conversational model of causal explanation is introduced that explicates social aspects of the explanation process by postulating that good explanations must be relevant to the focus of a why question, as well as being true. The notion of explanatory relevance enables an integration of the major models of the attribution process by showing that they use the same counterfactual logic but address different causal questions. The conversational perspective suggests a reinterpretation of many attributional biases, and also highlights the role of interpersonal goals in generating implicit questions, which in turn constrain explanations. Finally, the relevance of the conversational perspective for research on causal networks, the social context of explanation, and intrapsychic explanation is noted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contrastive and counterfactual reasoning in causal judgment.

Addressed differences in the use of covariation information implied by counterfactual reasoning, which focuses on the question "Would the event Y have occurred if the candidate X had not?" and contrastive reasoning, which involves comparing the target episode to contrasting background instances and noting distinctive features. Two experiments test hypotheses regarding the use of counterfactual and contrastive thinking under different conditions. Findings suggest that when no candidate has been identified, people are more likely to engage in constrastive thinking, but they may engage in counterfactual thinking when they are asked to evaluate a specific candidate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inference and action in early causal reasoning.

Two experiments investigated whether a simple-to-embedded-rules account can explain the change in causal reasoning in children between 3 and 4 years of age. A marble-and-ramp apparatus that operated in 2 distinct configurations of straight and across was used throughout. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds were able to predict the path of the marble when there was only 1 input hole (a simple if-then rules task), whereas only 4-year-olds could solve the 2-input version (an embedded or conjoint conditional if-then rules task). Experiment 2 found the same 3- to 4-year age difference when children chose where to insert the marble in the 2-input version, indicating that the same rules may underlie causal action as well as causal prediction for the more complicated task. The results of the 2 experiments are discussed in relation to previous findings on causal reasoning, children's theory of mind, and a theory of cognitive complexity in the preschool period. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)